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A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

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# A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY  
ARCH. B. D. ALEXANDER, M.A.

*SECOND EDITION*  
*REVISED AND ENLARGED*

GLASGOW  
JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS  
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## PREFACE

INCREASED attention has been devoted in recent years to historical studies. It will not be assumed that the history of action is worthier of consideration than the history of thought. While a number of books dealing with particular periods of philosophy have been written, it is somewhat remarkable that few, if any, English works have appeared treating of its general history. No subject is more frequently lectured upon in German Universities than the history of philosophy, and many of the larger treatises we possess are the products of such courses of lectures—some of the most notable of these have been made available through translation. But with the exception of Lewes' *Biographical History*—a book which is now half a century old, and one written to discredit all philosophy—and a small handbook in the Bohn edition which only came into my hands when my own book was completed—I know of no purely British work which treats of the entire course of European speculation. Though I dare not flatter myself that I have succeeded in supplying the want, it seems to me that there is a need for such a volume. The true introduction to philosophy is its history. For students and those who are interested in the progress of thought it is desirable to have a book of orientation in which one

may discover the standpoint and significance of a writer individually and in relation to his times. Such is the aim of this "Short history of philosophy." I have called it a *short* history, because, though it seeks to furnish fuller information than may be derived from a mere outline or handbook, it does not profess to compete with larger works, such as those of Erdmann, Zeller or Kuno Fischer.

I have endeavoured to indicate the salient features rather than to give an exhaustive account of the successive systems of philosophy, and have attempted to show the place and influence of each in the evolution of thought.

I have included in the History an account of some German writers who, though not strictly regarded as philosophers, have exercised a powerful influence upon speculative thought as well as upon general culture. I have also devoted a larger space to English and Scottish thinkers than is usually assigned to them in German histories. Finally, I have sought to add to the value of the book by giving a résumé of the progress of thought in our own country and on the Continent in the nineteenth century, and by bringing the history of philosophy down to our own day.

It would be impossible to enumerate all the authorities to which I am indebted. I have made use of most of the larger German and French histories, and have consulted many of the writers who treat of special periods. While acknowledging my obligations to Hegel, Erdmann, Windelband, Kuno Fischer, Falckenberg, Zeller, Ferrier, Seth, Adamson, Caird, Green, and others, I may say that in dealing with the more important writers and with many of the lesser, I have studied their own works.

A list of the chief writings of each author has been



given, but it has not been deemed necessary to cumber the text with a multitude of references.

For the aid of students a fairly full bibliography has been supplied, while an index of names and topics has been added.

But for the kindly interest and helpful suggestion of Professor Jones of Glasgow University, who read some parts of the MS., the book would have been more imperfect than it is. He will allow me the satisfaction, I trust, of recording my sincere thanks.

LANGBANK,  
GLASGOW, *May*, 1907.

## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THAT a second edition of this volume should be called for within little more than a year of its publication indicates that there was need for a book of the kind.

I am gratified with its reception both at home and abroad, and I have to thank private friends and others unknown to me who have made suggestions. In the present edition I have endeavoured to profit by these criticisms. The whole work has been revised and the sections on Greek Philosophy completely rewritten and enlarged, while the closing chapters on recent tendencies have been considerably amplified. I have made use of some additional authorities and consulted others which have appeared since my own volume was published. Of these I may mention in particular Diels' *Doxographi Graeci*,

Aristotle's *De Anima* by Hicks, Burnet's new edition of *Early Greek Philosophy*, Adam's *Gifford Lectures on Greek Thinkers*, Vorlaender's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, James' *Pragmatism*, Watson's *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, Höffding's *Moderne Philosophen* and Siebert's *Geschichte der neueren Deutschen Philosophie*. To these authors and to others too numerous to mention I acknowledge my indebtedness.

LANGBANK, *October*, 1908.

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
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A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY



## INTRODUCTION

### CONCEPTION. HISTORY. DIVISION

PHILOSOPHY, according to its definition, is the love of wisdom, and may be said to be in general the mind's search for truth or unity. Tradition assigns the first employment of the word to Pythagoras. With him it meant the pursuit of knowledge, but in so far as the nature of the knowledge which the philosopher seeks is not specified, the name is vague. Socrates represented by the word the modesty of the truth-seeker in contrast to the arrogant pretensions of the Sophists. Plato distinguished philosophers as those who are able to grasp the eternal and immutable. The Greek thinkers in general asked what is the permanent reality which underlies the diversity and change of the visible world around us. If we turn again to modern times we find philosophy variously defined. Hegel calls it "the thinking consideration of things." Philosophy, he says, defines all else, but cannot itself be defined. The philosopher aims at unity in his conception of the universe, and seeks to discover the reality which underlies the assumptions of the common mind, and to bring into one consistent whole the multiplicity of the phenomena perceived by the senses.

Ferrier has defined philosophy as "the pursuit of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists for all intelligences."

"By philosophy," says Windelband, "present usage understands the scientific treatment of the general questions relating to the universe and human life."

Philosophy deals with the same material as the separate sciences. But while they take what is given for granted, it searches to the ultimate grounds of being and from the infinite mass of contingencies deduces one universal principle. In other words, while the particular sciences deal with their own special provinces of nature or life, philosophy, as the mother of the sciences, takes all knowledge as her province and investigates the postulates which the particular sciences assume.

The question as to the utility of philosophy is a vain one. It is a necessary exercise of the human mind. That which distinguishes man from the lower animals is his power to think. But thought, just because it is thought, cannot rest. It is ever going out of itself to find its object, and it claims all that is as its theme. "Wonder," says Aristotle, "is the parent of philosophy." Surrounded by the universe in its varying manifestations, confronted by life and its ever-changing forms, man is moved with a feeling of mystery and awe, and he asks the "why," the "wherefore" and the "whither" of things. The world of being is a riddle to him. The attempt to answer the ever-haunting question—"What am I?" "What is this world of which I form a part?"—the desire to know things in their reality and unity—that is philosophy.

Just because the asking of these questions is itself philosophy, there can be no final philosophy. The mind can never call a halt and say, "the riddle of being is solved." Philosophy advances with life and must exist as long as life. In one sense, every thinker must begin anew, but in another, it is also true that the ages are linked together and each generation builds on its predecessor. Just as there exists no complete empirical science, so there is no absolute philosophy, but only what may be called a succession of time-philosophies, which advances with the empirical sciences, and without claiming for itself any mechanical order, presents on the whole a recognisable intellectual development.



It may be said to be the province of the *history of philosophy* to set forth those successive time-philosophies in their proper sequence and proportional relationship. The history of philosophy does not always move steadily forward, but has sometimes to make a seemingly retrograde movement that it may recover some neglected phase of thought. Yet, on the whole, thought, like life, is an evolution, the successive stages of which it is the business of the history of philosophy to exhibit.

It was Hegel who first made of the history of philosophy an independent science, and regarded it not simply "as a motley collection of the opinions of various learned gentlemen about all manner of subjects, but rather a necessary logical process in which the 'categories' of reason have successively attained distinct consciousness and reached the form of conceptions."

This valuable principle, true in the main, has been pursued by Hegel, here as elsewhere, at the expense of chronological order; and facts have been not seldom distorted or at least subordinated to the necessary dialectic movement of thought. "The History of Philosophy," it has been truly said, "depends not solely upon the thinking of 'Humanity' or even of the 'Welt-Geist,' but just as truly upon the reflections, the needs of mind and heart, the presaging thought and sudden flashes of insight, of philosophising individuals."

In dealing with the history of philosophy, there are therefore three principal factors which must be taken account of in its construction.

(1) The Pragmatic, or logical factor, according to which the problems are in the main given. The great fundamental questions are constantly recurring and are ever anew demanding a solution—problems which the human mind cannot escape, and which by a logical necessity are evolved the one from the other.

(2) Along with the Pragmatic, or necessary factor, there is a second factor contributed by the *history of civilization*.

Philosophy receives both its problems and the material for their solution from the ideas of the times and from the needs of the society amid which it exists. The results of science, the movement of religious thought, the intuitions of art, the revolutions of social and political life, supply the impulses and mould the tendencies of philosophy, bringing into prominence now one question, now another.

(3) A third factor in the shaping of the history of philosophy is the *individual factor*. The course of philosophical thought has been undoubtedly directed by outstanding personalities, whose life and thought have contributed elements which have enriched its general development. While in one sense individuals are often the product rather than the inspiration of their times, there is another in which great minds by their originality and grasp have exercised a far-reaching and decisive influence on philosophy.

It may be interesting to observe the *external conditions* under which philosophy has been cultivated. At first, in early Greek times, it was cultivated in closed schools. The Guilds or orders, with their strict rules of discipline, would seem to indicate a religious origin of philosophic pursuit.

In the Roman period these unions were loosened, and we find writers like Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, who cultivated reflection, by themselves, neither as members of a school nor as professed teachers.

But again, in the middle ages, philosophy under the influence of the Church had its seats principally in the Monasteries, and was pursued by the various religious orders, such as the Dominican and Franciscan. With the beginning of the modern period philosophy once more passed beyond the cloisters into the open, and was carried on by the literary men of the period. Not until the middle of the eighteenth century did philosophy become domesticated in the Universities. This took place first in Ger-

many, but gradually the movement spread to Scotland, France and Italy.

*The share which the various nations* have taken in the development of philosophy also deserves attention. As with European civilization generally, so it is with philosophy. It was first cultivated on Greek soil, and the creative faculty of that gifted race gave the form and direction to the problems which have continued down the ages to exercise the mind of man. Rome, of practical rather than reflective genius, contributed little to the development of philosophy proper. The Romans looked to Alexandria for their philosophy, and the Church of Rome derived from the same source its profoundest theories of existence. With this people originality took the form of law. In creating their marvellous legal system they were impelled not by motives of literary production, but by the instinct of social development. Thus the treasures of Roman jurisprudence were the result of the organic growth of the State.

The scientific culture of the middle ages was international, and the distinguished names of Scholasticism belong to various nationalities, while Latin was the language of learning and communication.

It is with modern philosophy that the special character of the individual nations discloses itself. Modern philosophy may be said to begin in Germany; thence it spread to Scotland and to England. Specially from the inquiries of Locke and Hume it received a particular bias, exerting its influence both in France and Germany. In the latter country, from the time of Kant onwards, it has been in a special sense at home.

It has been customary to divide the history of philosophy into three periods—Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Philosophy. While in general we may observe this division, it will be convenient to subdivide the entire history of European philosophy into seven parts, as follows:

1. Greek philosophy, from Thales to Aristotle.

2. Philosophy in the Greco-Roman world.
3. Mediaeval philosophy or scholasticism, from fifth to fifteenth century.
4. The revival of philosophy or the renaissance, from fifteenth to seventeenth century.
5. The philosophy of the enlightenment, from Locke to Kant.
6. Philosophy of Germany, from Kant to Hegel.
7. Philosophy of nineteenth century, from Hegel to the present time.

## *PART I*

### *GREEK PHILOSOPHY*

#### ITS ORIGIN AND CHARACTER

IF we regard philosophy as the quest for the unity and ground of things, then it had its home originally in Greece. Of course, wherever man has emerged from the purely savage state there has existed some kind of reflection regarding existence. At the great centres of oriental civilization, in China, India, and Persia, there may be traced movements of thought and reflective views of the world, but inasmuch as these grew out of mythical fancy and were more or less governed by religious poetic feeling, they cannot be styled in the strictest sense philosophical. So far as we know, the Indians were the only people besides the Greeks who ever had anything that deserves the name of philosophy. No one now suggests that Greek philosophy was derived from India; modern research inclines rather to the belief that Indian philosophy came from Greece. The mysticism of the Upanishads and of Buddhism were indeed of native growth, and profoundly influenced philosophy, but they were not themselves philosophy in the true sense of the word.

Nor must it be assumed, as it is sometimes alleged, that the Greeks derived their philosophy from Egypt and Babylon. No writer of the period during which Greek



philosophy flourished knows anything at all of its having come from the East. Even though we admit, as Herodotus tells us, that the worship of Dionysus and the Doctrine of Transmigration came from Egypt, these did not directly bear upon philosophy. Long before Greek speculation began the Egyptians and Babylonians had made considerable progress in mensuration and astronomical observation, and it is most probable that the Greeks became acquainted in a general way with their methods. But the knowledge which they derived in this way was of an empirical and mechanical order, largely confined to concrete examples and to practical purposes.

But it would be a mistake to say that the Greeks borrowed either their philosophy or their science from the East. They did receive from Egypt certain rules of mensuration which, when generalized, gave birth to astronomy, and from Babylon they learnt the rotary movement of the stars. But their attitude towards the information thus derived was entirely original. Out of the particular rules and ascertained facts they evolved general principles and propounded speculative problems which had never occurred to either the Egyptians or Babylonians.

All beginnings are obscure, and in accounting for the intellectual character of a people there is a certain individual element which eludes analysis. This is specially true of the Greeks. As a people they had peculiar gifts and qualifications, partly indeed derived from their composite social origin and partly due to their geographical position—an insatiable curiosity, a faculty of generalization, a broad and varied interest in life, and a sense of beauty and fitness—which fitted them for their special mission of being the pioneers of philosophical inquiry. Hellas was a sea-girt mountain land; her back was turned to the north and west; her bays and islands faced east and south. On the one side her impregnable mountains defended her from invasion, and on the other her broken coastline afforded a natural stimulus to commerce and emigration.

If her sense of independence and national life was fostered by her geographical position, her love of beauty was developed by the wealth and variety of nature for which the land of Greece is pre-eminent.

Still the principal factor in the development of the intellectual life of Greece must be sought in her system of *Colonization*. The sea naturally wooed the daring and enterprising; and the islands in close proximity to the mainland formed convenient ports of call for commerce and suitable homes for her increasing population. From the earliest period there arose a vast circle of Greek plantations, which stretched not only along the coast of Asia Minor but to Southern Italy and Sicily, and even to Spain. By this way the Greeks were brought into contact with other nations—not only was the race enriched by intermarriage, but their mental horizon was enlarged. Local customs, tribal prejudices and religious beliefs embodied in the national mythologies, quickly disappeared before the wider outlook which the settlers obtained in their new surroundings. The new knowledge of the world which they acquired as traders and seafarers continually enlarged their ideas, while their active and adventurous life not only broke up their old habits of thought, but stimulated their natural curiosity and versatility of mind.

(It was not therefore in Athens but in the outlying colonies, which were in advance of the mother country in mental and political progress, that the new intellectual awakening began.) It was only after the Persian war that Athens became the centre of culture and thought as well as the focus of national life. The west coast of Asia Minor is the cradle of the intellectual civilization of Greece. It was there that new answers were first given to the eternal questions of mankind—what is the meaning of God, of the world, of self?—and these new answers gradually replaced or transformed the earlier religious beliefs.

Of the primitive view of the world which obtained in Greece we have little knowledge. The magic rites and

savage myths which prevailed before the dawn of history faded away like a mist before the breeze of a larger experience and more fearless curiosity. Even in the earliest poets, Homer and Hesiod, in whom the religion of Greece found its expression, the mythical element had begun to be eliminated. In Homer the gods had become human, and everything savage was kept largely out of sight. Hesiod offers the first crude attempt at constructing a world-system. The so-called Orphic Cosmogonies had the Hesiodic theogony for their basis. But they, no more than he, seek to account for the origin of things by natural causes. In Pherecydes of Syros, for the first time the philosophical spirit finds expression. The feature common to all the earlier poetic cosmogonies is the attempt to get behind chaos or 'the gap' and put Kronos or Zeus at the beginning of things. These fantastic conceptions are anticipations of the rational explanation of nature.

That which gave to the thinkers of Ionia the distinction of being the awakeners of thought was that they were the first who, as Professor Burnet says, 'left off telling tales.' Philosophy dates its origin from the day when those cosmologists, or 'physicians,' as Aristotle terms them in contrast to their predecessors, the theologians, relegated the traditional gods to the domain of fable and sought to explain nature by principles and causes. Yet philosophy in her earlier stages did not at once discard the garb of mythology. She still continued to express herself in the rhythmical language of the poets, and even her conceptions were tinged with the religious faith from which she sprung. The gods were not at once abolished, but their nature and actions were explained.

Greek philosophy was first devoted to the consideration of the problems of nature. What is the primitive element from which all things take their rise? The so-called 'seven wise men,' of whom Thales, Bias and Solon are the best known, were the representatives of a certain form of worldly wisdom and prudential morality, certainly most

remarkable for the age in which it appeared, but not sufficiently reflective or connected to be termed philosophy.

Later, under the impulse of social and political life, research turned from outward being to the inner nature of man. Philosophy was first objective and then subjective. Ultimately, after positive results had been reached in the field of human nature, there arose those great constructive systems of philosophy—of Plato and Aristotle—which have given to Greek thought its distinctive character and pre-eminence.

Three periods of Greek philosophy may be, therefore, distinguished.

1. A Physical or Cosmological period, which deals with the question of being—extending from about 600 B.C. to 450 B.C.

2. A Humanistic or Ethical period, which treats of the nature of man in his moral and social relations—extending from 450 B.C. till about 400 B.C.

3. A Systematic period, in which an attempt was made for the first time to bring all questions of being and life into one connected whole—extending from about 400 B.C. till 300 B.C.

## SECT. 1. THE PHYSICAL PERIOD

### CHAPTER I

#### EARLY MONISTIC THEORIES OF BEING

THE conception of an Absolute principle of unity in the universe, which is deeper than any of the special forms of existence, was the earliest form of Greek philosophy. This idea, though it underlies the first attempt at reflection upon the origin of things, was not clearly grasped before Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School, who first set the permanent unity of all things in opposition to their diversity and change. It is always the mystery of vicissitude and decay that first excites the wonder which, as Plato says, is the starting-point of all philosophy. When the polytheistic mythology which had personified the more striking natural phenomena was beginning to pass away, it must have seemed as if there was nowhere any abiding reality. Can it be that amid all this drift and change there is nothing eternal? It was natural, then, that gradually the question should emerge—what is that *something* which underlies all variety and outlasts all change—that which, ceasing to exist in one form, reappears in another? It is significant that this something is spoken of by more than one early thinker as ‘deathless’ and ‘ageless.’ Greek philosophy began, then, with the search for what was abiding in the flux of things.



The solution of this problem was attempted by different men, who may be conveniently grouped together into Schools, partly according to their birthplace and partly according to the character of the answer they gave.

1. *The Milesian School.* It was at Miletus that the earliest school of scientific cosmology had its home. This, the oldest and most powerful of the Ionian towns, was on account of its position of security and the leisure and refinement which resulted from its material prosperity, exceptionally suited for scientific effort. During the entire sixth century the school to which the town gave its name flourished and only perished when the city itself was laid waste by the Persians in 494.

(1) *Thales* is the earliest Greek philosopher of whom we have any definite information. He was born at Miletus, in Asia Minor, about 640 B.C. He was a contemporary of Solon and Croesus. In old age he learned Geometry from the Egyptians. He is said to have predicted the eclipse of the sun. In common with many thinkers of antiquity, he took part in public affairs, and on account of his statesmanship, was placed at the head of the seven wise men. He died at the age of 90. His writings have not come down to us, and we are indebted for the meagre information we possess of him first to Herodotus, and afterwards to Diogenes Laertius and Simplicius.

With Thales, philosophy may be said to begin. He was the first to reject the myths relating to the origin of the universe and to prepare the way for a scientific interpretation.

He assumed that water existed before all else, and is, therefore, the source of all things. Everything comes from water, and to water everything returns.

By water it is probable that Thales did not mean the element as it is ordinarily presented to our senses, but some more subtle form of moisture or fluidity. It may be that he was led to this generalization by the important part

moisture plays in the economy of nature. All life, animal and vegetable, depends upon this element, and without it, it is impossible to conceive of nature in its present condition. Aristotle says that Thales was led to this opinion from observing that all nourishment is moist, that heat is generated from moisture, and life is sustained by heat. It is not probable that Thales had any idea of the chemical properties of water; and what determined his choice of this agent was its mobility and apparent inner vitality.

Of all things we know water seems to take the most various shapes. It is familiar to us as a solid in the form of ice and as a vapour in the form of steam. The process of transformation is taking place everywhere before our eyes. The sun draws the water up from the earth, which again comes back in the form of rain, and finally it enters the earth and produces the manifold fruits of the soil.

Aristotle ascribes to Thales the saying, "All things are full of gods," and infers, therefore (it is admittedly but an inference), that he believed in a soul of the universe. It is thus supposed that Thales attributed a plastic life to matter, or that he believed in a Divine mind which formed all things out of water. But the view is now generally held that the saying was "but a passing expression of Thales' religious sentiment" without any organic connection with the physical doctrine of the philosopher.

The only significance which the system of Thales has for us is that he was the first to conceive of the multiplicity of nature under one principle. He was the first, moreover, to reject the authority of the senses as the criterion of truth and to substitute the conclusion reached by thought for the mere fancies of mythology.

(2) *Anaximander*, a younger friend of Thales, was born at Miletus about 610, and died in 547 B.C. He was the inventor of the sun-dial, and is said to have been the first philosopher who put his thoughts in writing. None of his writings have come down to us, and his chief interest lies in the fact that he assumed the infinite or unlimited,—

τὸ ἄπειρον—as the principle of all things. This indeterminate element, not being in itself any particular thing, is capable of assuming any shape or form. It is the all-inclusive element in which all things have their being. We are not told what kind of matter, whether simple or complex, he had in view when speaking of the infinite, and many different views have been advanced. All that can be definitely affirmed is that he did not identify the infinite with any of the four elements. At the same time, he does not conceive of it as dead matter, but as a living substance possessed of eternal motion and indebted to itself for that process of separation of the warm and cold which brings the cosmos into being. Anaximander believed that there were innumerable worlds which were probably regarded as coexistent and not, as Zeller and others represent, as passing in an endless succession from ‘creation to decay.’ The first animals sprang from moisture, and from them the more advanced species gradually arose. Man, like other creatures, was derived from the fish. Anaximander had a crude idea of adaptation to environment, and there are those who see in his views of animal creation a foreshadowing of Darwin’s theory.

Finally, the ἄπειρον is not only infinite, but original (ἀρχή). He describes it moreover as “without beginning, indestructible, immortal”: “encompassing and guiding all things.” If we remember that the infinite to Anaximander represents the ultimate cause, and that immortality was always believed by the Greeks to be an attribute of Deity, we may see in these characterizations a tendency to identify the infinite with God.

(3) *Anaximenes* was born in the same Greek colony as Thales about 560-500. Almost nothing of his work remains. Rejecting water as the first cause, he conceived *air* to be the origin of life and the principle of all things. To its eternal motion he attributed all change. Air seemed to him to have a feature which water lacked, viz.—infinity. In selecting an element less palpable, less formed than

water, yet more definite than mere infinitude, he seems to unite the principle of Thales and that of Anaximander. That of Thales was too material; that of Anaximander too indefinite. Air combined the two. Air embraces all things, and by its condensation and rarefaction all things are created. The earth and the heavenly bodies he conceived to be flat and supported by air. The world is a huge animal which breathes just as man does. "Just as our souls, being air," he says, in the only fragment that has come down to us, "holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world."

In representing air as the essential and animating principle of the universe, Anaximenes prepared the way for the conception of mind or soul. About a century later Diogenes of Apollonia carried out this principle still further. Following the suggestion of Anaximenes, he reasoned that as air is the origin of all things it may be regarded as intelligent. Air was really the 'soul' of the universe, and by participation in this ethical principle, man not only exists, but feels and thinks.

The early Ionian philosophers were students of nature who sought to account for the actual world as it presented itself to their senses. They agreed in assuming a single primitive substance, which they regarded as endowed with vitality and force. Their views were very crude and elementary. Yet we find in them the seeds of those more elaborate explanations which were afterwards attempted. In Anaximenes Milesian philosophy culminated. His theory of rarefaction and condensation was really the starting-point for the consideration of one of the most important problems of philosophy around which not only Greek, but modern thought has revolved—the problem of permanence and change—the concept of the one and the many.

2. *Pythagoras and his School.* Before, however, proceeding to a consideration of this antithesis as it appears in the two opposing lines of thought as repre-



sented by the school of Parmenides and Heraclitus and his followers, we have to notice a movement which took place in Southern Italy almost contemporaneous with that which had its rise in the Ionian colony. This movement was, in the first instance, an ethical one, and took the form of a religious protest. The originator of it was the semi-mythical figure of Pythagoras, who was really a religious reformer. Of the life of Pythagoras little is known. His biography has been written by Porphyry, but many of the facts of his career are apocryphal. All we know for certain is that he was born at Samos about 580 B.C., and that after many doubtful travels, and perhaps a visit to Egypt, he settled at Crotona, in Italy, where he founded a guild or brotherhood, the members of which pledged themselves to purity of life, mutual friendship and works of charity. He is said to have been a man of exalted character. He wore a white linen robe with a figure of a triangle, the symbol of his philosophical belief, upon his breast. He died at Malepontum, whither he had retired on the first signal of revolt against his influence.

It is not easy to obtain accurate information about his philosophical views. Of all the early school of philosophy, says Zeller, there is none where history is so enveloped in the mists of fable and mythology and whose doctrines are so overlaid with a mass of later accretions as that of the Pythagoreans. Aristotle never speaks of the teachings of Pythagoras, but only of the Pythagoreans.

Though the foundations of the more speculative philosophy of the Pythagoreans were no doubt laid by the originator of the School himself (mathematics and music were among the subjects cultivated by the order he founded), his aims were in the first instance of a more practical nature. Philosophy with him was not so much an enquiry into the causes of things, as a rule of life—a way of salvation. The Ascetic rules and rigid practices which he framed for the brotherhood were no doubt



adopted as a protest against the widespread licence of the time. The doctrine of Transmigration, which is said to have been a conspicuous element in his teaching, gave emphasis to the fact of moral retribution and the need of expiation. Whether Pythagoras gave his sanction to the political activity of his followers or not, we cannot tell. The truth is, as the late Prof. Adam has pointed out, that philosophy, as interpreted by Pythagoras, exercised many of the functions which we are in the habit of ascribing to religion; and the Pythagorean brotherhood should be regarded as a kind of Church. It is only thus that we can understand the veneration which long continued to surround the name of Pythagoras.

With the death of the founder the religious character of the movement fell into the background, and the more philosophical and scientific aspects of it became prominent, and continued down to the time of Aristotle to exert considerable influence.

According to Aristotle, the general principle of the Pythagoreans was that number is the essence of all things. The organization of the universe in its various relations is a harmonious system of numbers. This peculiar doctrine received its development chiefly at the hands of Pythagoras' disciples, the principal of whom were Archytas and Philolaus. The latter lived about the time of Socrates, and is supposed to have been the first to commit to writing his master's tenets. Their fundamental principle seems to have been that proportion and harmony lie at the root of all things, and that order is the supreme law of the universe as well as the regulative principle of practical life. Number is the secret of all things, and it is only as chaos takes a harmonious form that we have what deserves the name of Cosmos. Here already we have a glimpse of the distinction between matter and form which played such an important part in Aristotelian philosophy. Every body is an expression of the number four: the surface is three because the triangle is the simplest of figures: the line is

two because of its terminations : and the point is one, the smallest unit of space.

Not only is each body a number, but the entire universe is an arrangement of numbers, the basis of which is the perfect number, ten. All the heavenly bodies, moon, stars and earth, move in prescribed courses around the central fire from which life streams forth, vivifying and sustaining the whole world. Of the nature of the soul the early Pythagoreans taught nothing definite; although Plato introduces into his *Phaedo* a disciple of Philolaus, who teaches that the soul is a harmony. As we have seen, the Pythagoreans conformed their theology to the popular religious notions of their time. Their ethical system was of a religious nature. Virtue was the realization of harmony, and was to be attained by the practice of asceticism, and devotion to music, gymnastics and the study of geometry.

It is probable that this idea of form and harmony was suggested to the Pythagoreans by their mathematical and astronomical studies as well as by their theoretic investigations concerning music. If musical sounds can be reduced to numbers, why, they may have argued, may not everything else? It may have seemed to them moreover, that in contrast to the variable things of sense mathematical conceptions possessed universal validity.

The definite nature of each individual number and the endlessness of number in general suggested to them the antithesis between the limited and the unlimited, to both of which they ascribed reality. "It is necessary," says Philolaus in a striking passage, "that everything should be either limited or unlimited. Since then things are not made up of the limited, nor of the unlimited only, it follows that each thing consists of both, and that the whole world is thus formed and adjusted out of the union of the limited and the unlimited." This antithesis manifests itself everywhere, and the world is constituted in an ascending scale of pairs—odd and even, one and many, right and left,

male and female, light and dark, good and bad—of geometrical forms.

The elaboration of this principle led at last to a barren symbolism, and the only valuable truth which emerges from this mystical arithmetic is the idea that amid the ever-changing phenomena of nature and life a rational order exists and that the harmony of the world lies in the union of opposites. The conception of numerical relationships was not without its influence on the atomic theory of Democritus, through whose application it became an important factor in modern science. Not only Bruno but Comte and the naturalist Oken have been strongly affected by the doctrine of number.

The chief importance of the Pythagorean movement lies in this, that it marks a deepening of the moral consciousness in Greece. As a system of philosophy it must be regarded primarily, as Aristotle describes it, as a philosophy of nature. As such, however, in so far as it attempted to emancipate itself from sense and to explain the world from the standpoint of an idea rather than a material element, it indicates a distinct advance of thought, and prepares the way for a still higher notion—that of Being. "The boldness of such an assertion," says Hegel, "impresses us as remarkable. It is an assertion which at one stroke overthrows all our ordinary ideas as to what is essential and true. It makes thought and not sense the criterion of truth."

3. *The Eleatic School.* The beginnings of philosophy among the Greeks, as we have seen, all take the forms of naturalism. The explanation of the world is sought in some constituent of nature; and if the Pythagoreans seemed to adopt a less physical element, we must remember that number as conceived by them was strictly a material entity, a quantitative substance. While therefore the early physicists reached a kind of unity by a method of abstraction, by seizing upon a particular element and enunciating it as the ground of being, the principle of unity was really

first grasped and the idea of permanence emphasised by the Eleatics. They were impelled by the dim consciousness that rational knowledge must ever strive after completeness and unchangeableness. As we look forth upon this surging, seething world we are first indeed impressed by its constant change and variety. But our senses really deceive us. The reality which changes must all the time be one and the same reality, and what we first regard as movement has simply no existence. The Eleatics were the first to call attention to the opposition between the unity which the mind craves and the manifold variety which the senses perceive. In them the permanent alone is the really existing. The world of sense, on the contrary, is fleeting, deceptive and unreal.

The so-called Eleatic School derived its name from a small town in Southern Italy, Elea, where the three representatives of this phase of philosophy dwelt. It was an obscure, retired spot, offering a striking contrast to Miletus, a centre of luxury and commerce; and its quiet comports with the character of its reflection which was a withdrawal from all diversity and life into the realm of pure being.

(1) *Xenophanes*, the reputed founder of the Eleatic School, was born about 570 B.C. at Colophon, in Asia Minor, whence he fled in consequence of the Persian conquest of Ionia. After travelling through Greece as a wandering poet, he settled in Elea. He seems to have been more of a religious teacher than a philosopher, and, like Pythagoras, aimed at the moral reformation of the people. After the manner of a Hebrew prophet, he raised his voice of invective and satire against the vanities of his time, extolling an intellectual life and advocating simplicity of manners. He was the opponent of the current religious superstitions, and inveighed especially against polytheism, advocating a kind of monotheism in place of the worship of many gods taught by Homer and Hesiod. In the fragment of the poem which has come down to us he ridicules



the anthropomorphism of the poets and resents the ascription of human passions to the Gods. "Mortals think that the gods are born as they are, and have perceptions like theirs, and voice and form." "If oxen and lions had hands, and could paint and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen. In place of these imaginary beings let us adore the one infinite being who bears us in his bosom, and in whom there is neither generation nor corruption, neither change nor origin." "There is one God, the greatest among gods and men, comparable to mortals neither in form or thought." We need not enter into the vexed question whether Xenophanes advocated a pure monotheism, as Adams holds, or was, as Gomperz styles him, a henotheist,—*i.e.* a believer in many gods, depending upon a single highest God. What Xenophanes seemed to aim at was an idea of Godhead which should be identical with the whole universe and embrace within him all minor phenomena of nature as well as all lesser forms of life. Xenophanes anticipates to a certain extent the curiously personal kind of Pantheism which we afterwards meet in the hymn of Cleanthes. When he passes to the positive attributes of God he becomes obscure. From this world-God he makes no attempt to deduce the variety of individual things, and he simply ascribes to it eternity, immutability and omniscience.

(2) *Parmenides* was the real head of the school. He completes the teachings of Xenophanes, and to the ideas of permanence and identity, which were largely on his part the outcome of poetic insight, he gives a more strictly philosophical form. He was born at Elea, and flourished about 504-501 B.C. It is probable that he was an associate, if not a pupil, of Xenophanes.

Parmenides was the first philosopher to expound his system in verse, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius. The poem opens with an allegory, in which the poet represents himself going out in search of truth.



He is borne along on a car by swift steeds, and the daughters of the sun point the way. He comes to a closed gate, of which Justice or wisdom keeps the keys. On the entreaty of the maidens, the doors are unfastened, and he is bidden welcome by the goddess, who says, "Meet it is that thou shouldst learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth as the opinions of mortals, in which is no pure belief at all." There lie before him, as he sees, two paths—"the way of truth and the way of error—the way of reason and that of sense." The guardian bids him follow the one and avoid the other. The poem then is divided into two parts—"the way of truth" and the "way of opinion." The first discusses the notion of pure being—that which is—that which is unoriginated, imperishable, illimitable and indivisible, bounded neither by time nor space.

This pure being, this thing that *is*, never *came* into being, for it could not come from what is not. It must be eternal, underivable, unchangeable, or not at all. "Nor is it divisible since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than another. Everything is full of what is . . . All these are but names which mortals have made—being and passing away, change of place and alteration of colour."

It is not easy at first sight to know what Parmenides means by the '*it is*.' Is it God or the universe? In a sense it is both. What he really implies is that there is no such thing as empty space. The universe is a plenum, and anything beyond it is unthinkable. There is no room for anything but itself. If it is now, it is always. If sense perception seems to tell us the contrary, then the testimony of the senses must be rejected. The appearance of multiplicity, change, motion, of empty space and time are illusions. This is the apotheosis of pure being—the immutable and eternal one. He even makes the bold assertion—which sounds wonderfully modern, suggestive first, of Spinoza's two attributes of the one substance, and next,

of Hegel's absolute,—that, as only what can be thought, is, Being and Thought are one. We need not follow Parmenides in tracing the second part of his poem—"the way of opinion." Historians of philosophy are far from agreed as to the value which he attached to the views he here develops. Parmenides traces the origin of all things to light and darkness, and represents a goddess throned in the centre of the world and "steering the course of all." It is known that Parmenides was once a Pythagorean, and it may be that here he is sketching the Pythagorean cosmology to show the plausible delusions into which philosophers may be led.

It is indeed a lofty system of thought which he has built up. But it strikes the beholder as cold and monotonous notwithstanding its grandeur. It may be that he himself was impressed with this feeling, and he felt impelled therefore in the second part to account at least for the phenomena of the world as they presented themselves to ordinary sense.

The views of Parmenides were carried to their ultimate consequences by his disciples, of whom the two best known are Zeno and Melissus.

*Zeno* of Elea (about 490-430 B.C.) sought to defend his master's position against ridicule by showing that the difficulties involved in the conception of permanence are equalled by difficulties as great in the views of those who contend for the reality of change and motion. He has been styled by Aristotle the father of dialectics, and he was the author of many of those puzzles of thought regarding motion which have baffled logicians. Numerous examples of his skill have been transmitted, of which the most noted are the so-called Achilles puzzle and the flying arrow. Movement can have no existence, seeing that each space over which a moving body passes can be divided into infinite spaces. In a race Achilles can never overtake the tortoise, if the tortoise has ever so slight a start, because he must first reach the point at which the tortoise started, but in the

meantime the latter will have gained a certain amount of ground : and as Achilles must always reach first the position previously occupied by the tortoise, the tortoise must *always* keep ahead at every point. Of course the fallacy here is, as De Quincey and others have pointed out, that "the infinity of space in this race of subdivision is artfully run against a *finite* time."

Again, "a flying arrow is always at rest" : for in order that it should reach its destination it must successively occupy a series of spaces. But at any moment it is in a particular space, and therefore is at rest. And as no addition of particular points of rest can result in motion, the arrow never really moves at all. An argument of a similar kind is employed to demonstrate the impossibility of plurality. The many is an aggregate of units : but an actual unit is necessarily indivisible. What is indivisible can have no magnitude, therefore the many can have no magnitude—in other words, cannot exist. If opposite determinations are incompatible in the same subject, we are of course shut up to the paradox of Zeno. But after all, so far from opposites being incompatible, they are the necessary constituents of every subject, and it is only by the union of opposites that the world can be thought at all.

Of *Melissus* of Samos we know but little. Plutarch, in his life of Pericles, tells us that he was the Samian general who defeated the Athenian fleet in 440 B.C. The fragment of his writing which has been preserved by Simplicius shows that he had substantially adopted his master's views as to the nature of reality, with one exception. He held, in contrast to Parmenides, that reality was infinite in *space* as well as in time : for if it were limited spacially it would be limited by empty space, which is inconceivable.

The real greatness of Melissus, however, as Professor Burnet points out, consists in this, that not only was he the real systematiser of Eleatism, but he was able to see, before the pluralists themselves, the only way in which the theory that things are a many could be consistently worked out.

In doing so he went far to destroy the validity of his master's position and to pave the way for the atomic theory, which is the only consistent pluralism.

It is impossible to deny the deep kernel of truth underlying the Eleatic principle, whether it is expressed in the theological pantheism of Xenophanes or the more metaphysical unity of Parmenides. To grasp Being as a whole and to acknowledge nothing but the eternal and the immutable, defective and one-sided as it is, is one of the great thoughts that has had an ever-recurring attraction for the human mind. Fantastic and far removed from experience as is the poem of Parmenides, it bears witness to a truth which we human beings only forget to our hurt—that after all, the way of truth is not the easy road of sense and semblance, but the far harder path of reason and thought. Compared with the world-God of Xenophanes—"all eye, all mind, all hearing"—the Being of Parmenides appears as something colourless and impersonal—"a motionless corporeal plenum." It has been consequently held that so far from being the 'father of Idealism,' as some have called him, Parmenides is really the father of Materialism. At the same time, though the reality in which he believed was clearly something material, it is not apprehended by the senses, but only by thought. It is the changeless unity—"the thing in itself," as Kant would say, which is hidden from us by the deceptive appearances of plurality and change. It may have been this strain of idealism which drew forth the high veneration in which Plato held him.



## CHAPTER II

### PLURALISTIC THEORIES OF CHANGE AND MULTIPLICITY

It was natural that the rigorous consequences drawn by the Eleatics in suppressing all change and movement should bring about a reaction, and that there should come forth a series of thinkers who sought to combat the abstract unity which had been reached by the earlier schools, and to find an explanation of reality in the many elements which had been denied. The belief that all things are one was common to the philosophers we have hitherto studied. "Parmenides," says Burnet, "has shown that if this one being really *is*, we must give up the idea that it can take different forms. The senses which present to us a world of change and multiplicity are deceitful. From this there is no escape: the time was still to come when men would seek the unity of the world in something which from its very nature the senses could not perceive. We find accordingly that from the time of Parmenides to that of Plato all thinkers in whose hands philosophy made real progress abandoned the monistic hypothesis."

It is true that Heraclitus (about whose place in the sequence of thought historians differ) was not really a pluralist. He, not less than Parmenides, sought to derive the world from a single principle. But in so far as he opposed, to the idea of permanence and rest, that of change and movement, he inaugurated a new era, and his doctrine



of 'Becoming' may be regarded as marking a transition from the monistic to the pluralistic explanation of reality. He marks the beginning of a change of doctrine in so far as he affirms the principle of becoming to be the law of the world whose ground he seeks in the primitive constitution of the material itself. The idea of becoming is more closely examined by Empedocles and the Atomists, and being and non-being are transformed into a plurality of uncreated elements. But while Empedocles affirms that the primitive constituents are qualitatively different and places alongside of them the mythological figures of Love and Hate as their moving forces, the Anatomists recognise only a mathematical difference in the primal bodies, and explain their movement in a purely mechanical way by the attractive power of the weight of the elements themselves. Finally, Anaxagoras pronounces this mechanical explanation of nature to be unsatisfactory, and he is constrained to set over against external matter an inner spirit or *nous* as its formative and moving cause. Heraclitus therefore, though not actually a pluralist, in so far as he unites the two sides of being and non-being in the principle of becoming, may be said to be the connecting-link between the earlier monists and the later pluralists.

1. *Heraclitus* of Ephesus is one of the most remarkable figures of early Greek philosophy. Unlike some of his predecessors, he was reared not amid the markets and docks of a commercial town, but in the shadow of a sanctuary city. Solitude and the beauty of nature were his teachers. He was a man of abounding pride and self-confidence, and he sat at no master's feet. Of his life we know little beyond what may be gathered from the fragments of his book that have been preserved. Legend has been busy spinning threads of story around his name. He is sometimes called the 'dark' or 'obscure,' probably on account of the obscurity of his teaching: and he has been named the 'weeping philosopher,' perhaps on account of the sombre view he took of life. He is said to

have been descended from the city kings of Ephesus; but, disgusted with the growing power of democracy, he renounced his high position, and in the isolation of his later years betook himself to reflection. According to the best authorities he flourished about 504-501 B.C., and was therefore a contemporary of Parmenides, though he did not publish his work till after 478. We do not know the title of his book, and from its fragments it is not easy to form a clear estimate of its contents. His style is proverbial and aphoristic in form, and somewhat melancholy in spirit. He was one of those disdainful prophetic souls who are not anxious to make themselves intelligible to the multitude. He himself says in one of his fragments, "if men cared to dig for gold they might find it, if not they must be content with straw." The political and moral condition of Ephesus seemed to feed his contempt, and he never tired pouring out his invective against the luxury and effeminacy of his countrymen. He withdrew to the solitude of the mountains, where he ended his days, having first deposited in the temple of Artemis a roll of manuscript containing his reflections on nature and life.

(1) Heraclitus looked down not only upon the mass of men, but upon all previous thinkers. He himself thought he had attained insight into the truth of things which had not hitherto been recognised. If we wish to get at the central thought of his teaching, we must discover what it was that led him to denounce the ignorance of others. The truth hitherto ignored he said was—"That the many apparently conflicting things are really one, and that this one is also the many." Wisdom is not so much a knowledge of many things as a perception of the underlying unity of warring opposites. Not rest but motion, not permanence but change, is the key to nature and to life. All things are in a state of endless flux and mutation. "The one remains, the many change and pass." All things flow; nothing stays. Life passes into death: death into life. The universe is like a river, the waters of which

are continually passing away. "No one," so runs a famous dictum of the philosopher, "can bathe twice in the same stream,"—because indeed a stream never is for a single moment the same. Not individuals only, but the whole universe is involved in ceaseless movement and change. We cannot say that things are: they come into being and pass away. Not being but "becoming" is the alone real.

(2) To account for this endless flux and transformation Heraclitus is led to seek out a new primary element from which all things take their rise. This substance is not water or air, but something finer, more subtle and mysterious—*Fire*. This original matter extends from the very centre to the utmost boundaries of the earth. Everything that exists is derived from it and returns to it again. The universe is, therefore, fire in the process of transformation, an ever-living, ever-changing force which takes innumerable forms but is never extinguished. That restless, all-consuming, all-transforming and vivifying activity, now darting and vibrating as a flame, now sinking to an ember, now soaring up and vanishing away as smoke, is at once the symbol and essence of life. At every moment it seems to pass away. The contents change but its substance is the same.

(3) This ceaseless movement of which fire is the symbol must not be conceived as a gentle flow like a gliding stream. Becoming is a *struggle between contrary forces*, one of which comes from above and strives to transform the celestial fire into earth; while the other ascends from earth and strives to bring all things back to fire. The path of change he calls 'the upward way' and 'the downward way.' Fire sinks through water to earth: and rises again through water to fire. Everywhere there is strife, war, ferment. "Strife is the father and king of all things." The Milesians had already recognised this strife of contending forces, but they had regarded it as a disturbing element—an 'injustice' in the world. Heraclitus

sets himself to show that so far from it being an injustice, it is the very secret of justice and order. "We must know," he says, "that war is common to all, and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away through strife." "Homer was wrong in saying: Would that strife would perish from among gods and men: he did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe: for if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away."

(4) But not discord but *harmony* is the last word of Heraclitus. If there is flux everywhere, all this mutation and change takes place according to 'measure' or law. Everywhere there is strict order or harmony in the revolution of the universe. Reality is an "attunement" of opposites like that of the bow and the lyre, the strings of which must suffer strain to produce music. It is the tension of opposite forces that makes the world one. Opposition is co-operative, and the fairest harmony is born of differences. Were there no higher and lower notes in music, no flats and discords, there could be no melody.

(5) Now what is this harmony which comprehends all opposites? What is it that preserves this rhythm amid all strife and multiplicity? It is termed by Heraclitus sometimes "Destiny," sometimes Justice, and more frequently the *Logos*, or Reason, and in two passages at least God. "It is God who is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger." "To God all things are beautiful and right and good." In Heraclitus the three conceptions—Fire, *Logos* and God—are fundamentally the same. In his physical aspect he is Fire, the substance which creates and sustains all. Regarded as the *Logos*, God is the omnipresent wisdom or Reason by which all lives are animated and steered. "The one is all and all is one."

(6) Heraclitus never wearies reiterating this union of contrasts, and he applies his doctrine of opposites not only



to the constitution of the world, but to *man's nature* and his *ethical conduct*. As all things come from the primitive fire, so does man. Without the soul the body is rigid and lifeless. "The driest soul is the wisest and best." "Where the fire in man is quenched by moisture, reason is lost." Knowledge is not dependent upon sense. Wisdom belongs only to him who follows the dictates of the Logos. For man has reason as well as God, and man's reason is derived from the Divine. "Man's character is his fate," and that which makes the soul divine is just its union with the Logos. Most men ignore this and follow the fleeting appearances of sense. Our duty is to follow the universal faculty, and not the senses which are relative to the individual.

As the world is always "according to measure," so must man's life be governed by moderation and the sense of harmony. To "follow the universal" is to recognise that pain and evil are the necessary and inseparable concomitants of good in human life. Just as the light and the heavy, the warm and the cold, are relative terms, so likewise are good and evil. Without injustice there could be no justice. "It is not good for men to get all they desire. Sickness makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest." Heraclitus foreshadows the words of Browning—

"Type needs antitype :  
As night needs day, as shine needs shade, so good  
Needs evil : how were pity understood  
Unless by pain?"

With all his melancholy and seeming pessimism, Heraclitus is an optimist. "To God all things are beautiful," and He "accomplishes all things with a view to the harmony of the whole."

It is significant that this lonely thinker founded no school, though his influence may be traced through the Stoics, upon Plato and Aristotle, in Philo and the Neo-



platonics; and even in modern times upon Schleiermacher, Lassalles, and, above all, upon Hegel, who sees in his doctrine of Becoming—"the dialectic of the infinite"—the union of being and non-being.

Heraclitus' claim to originality rests not on his theory of nature, but, as Gomperz says, in the fact that "he was the first to build a bridge, which has never since been destroyed, between the natural and the spiritual life." The essence of Heraclitism lies in the insight into the many-sidedness of things and the relativity of all truth. If we must discard many of his grotesque paradoxes, we may at least learn from his perception of the deep inner harmony amid apparent conflict, that only out of strife, truth and nobility are born, and that what seems repulsive and harmful may be the stepping-stone to the beautiful and the wholesome.

2. In the teaching of *Empedocles* we meet the earliest exponent of pluralism, which, as we have seen, pervades later Greek philosophy and the first attempt to reconcile the opposite poles of thought represented by Parmenides and Heraclitus.

*Empedocles* was a native of Agrigentum, in Sicily (about 490-430 B.C.). He was distinguished as a statesman, physician, poet and wonder-worker. In the political events of his country he played an important part. He sided with the popular party, and to this day his memory is revered in the district round Girgenti as a popular hero and deliverer. He was famed for his skill in medicine, and was credited with possessing supernatural powers. The tradition that he leapt into the crater of Mount Aetna to prove his divinity is probably but one of the many legends that have grown up around his name.

(1) At the outset of his poem *Empedocles* seeks to mark the distinction between himself and previous writers. Parmenides had held that the reality which underlies the illusory world was a spherical, eternal and immovable plenum. Granted the sphere of Parmenides, how are

we to get the world from it we know—whence come the variety and motion we see? If we assume the perfect homogeneity of the sphere, then motion is impossible, or at least it would simply be equivalent to rest. But if we assume a variety of primary elements within the sphere, it would be quite possible to apply all that Parmenides says of reality to each of these, and then the forms of existence could be explained by the mingling and separation of these realities. This then is the new conception of Empedocles which marks an important advance in philosophic thought. If reality is *one*, as Parmenides had assumed, then the world as we know it can never come into being. But if reality is many, then we can account both for permanence and change. Matter, in other words, is immutable in its essence, but its primary constituent elements are combined and separated in different proportions.

(2) The *four roots of all things* which Empedocles assumed were those that have become traditional—*Fire, Air, Earth and Water*. These are eternal. “They are what they are,” and “are always alike.” In their mixture all change and motion, all variety and difference in this world become possible.

All things then are formed out of these four elements by a process of mingling and separation, and, according to the kind of mixture, are due the various qualities of individual things. These four radical elements have an immutable being. They cannot pass into each other, and are capable of change in their material relations and combinations alone.

(3) But now the question presents itself to Empedocles, how are these elements to be *set in motion*? How is that process of mingling and separation, which we see everywhere, brought about? Heraclitus had attributed the dynamic force to the primitive fire from which everything arose. But if fire is only one of the constituents of reality, and if, in its nature it is entirely alien to the

others, this will not sufficiently account for generation and decay.

(4) Empedocles, therefore, finds it necessary to have recourse to a separate principle in order to set the bodies in motion. But inasmuch as the elements not only unite with one another in birth and generation, but also fall asunder in death, Empedocles feels constrained to conceive not one but *two moving causes*. These he calls 'Love' and 'Hate.' These are not to be regarded as properties of the elements, but as independent powers set over against them. These rival powers contend with one another throughout the whole of nature. "At one time," says Empedocles, "all the members of the body are united through love, and their life's bloom is at its highest. At another, severed by hateful strife, they wander apart by themselves, where the waves of life are breaking." "It is the same with plants, with fishes in their watery halls, with wild beasts that crouch in the mountains, and with birds that move on the wing." Love and hate are eternal, like the elements which they move; so that in reality there are six uncreated principles in the universe.

(5) Each of these moving powers—love and hate—alternately prevail, and the life of the world follows a *circular course*. At first there was a period of unity over which love presided. But when the elements were completely blended, there could be no real worldly existence. But strife entered, and the elements began to separate. For a time love was sufficiently strong to keep disintegration within limits. The result of this conflict of the elements was the creation of the cosmos. But next dissolution and decay set in. Hate overcame love, and the separation was complete. At this point, however, the process is renewed, and love again gains upon strife until unity is once more established. Such is the history of the world, which repeats itself in endless cycles through eternity. The story of the universe is an everlasting evolu-

tion, a constant oscillation to and fro between discord and harmony.

(6) In his theory of *human life* this principle of evolution also finds expression. Man is the image of the sphere. The four radical elements are represented in turn, and he is likewise affected by love and hate. He perceives everything because he *is* everything. The problem of knowing is thus explained by Empedocles. What we are, we know. Like is perceived by like. "It is with earth that we perceive earth, and water with water: by air we see air, by fire, fire. By love do we see love, and by hate, hate."

(7) In his *theology*, Empedocles conceals his naturalism under the traditional forms of mythology. He deifies the four elements, and the two motive principles. But it must not be forgotten that love and hate are simply material powers, and not spiritual or personal embodiments. He does, indeed, speak of the Deity "as sacred and unutterable mind flashing through the whole world with rapid thought." But his conception of God does not enter as an integral part into his account of the constitution of the universe. Thought, like all other vital activities, depends on the mixture of the four elements. The soul is not considered as an entity apart from the body; though in his sacred poems entitled the "Purifications," he adopts the Pythagorean doctrine of the Transmigration of the Soul, and describes how he himself was at one time a youth, a maiden, a fish, a bird, and even a shrub. The originality of Empedocles is undoubted. He was highly esteemed by Plato and Aristotle. Many fine suggestive thoughts which have borne fruit in later times are to be found in his writings. It is his merit to have been the first to have originated the idea of primitive elements, thus preparing the way for the atomistic theories of Leucippus and Democritus. But, as Aristotle has pointed out, the chief defect of his system is the omission of the idea of an intelligent Ruler under whose guidance



the various elements of the world would be brought into consistency and order.

3. A third attempt to combat the conception of unity which the earlier philosophers assumed was made by *The Atomist Theory* of the universe, the propounders of which were Leucippus and Democritus. In another way they sought also to unite the Eleatic and Heraclitic ideas. They assumed that all bodies consisted of numberless invisible and indivisible particles which in their various combinations gave form, size and weight to bodies.

Of the age of *Leucippus* and the circumstances of his life little is definitely known; his very existence, indeed, has been questioned. Aristotle, however, makes him the originator of the Atomic theory. He was probably a native of Miletus, where philosophy first had its rise. It is uncertain whether he wrote anything or whether Aristotle and others drew their information concerning his opinions from his pupil Democritus.

*Democritus*, the younger and better known of the two, was born of wealthy parents in the Ionian colony of Abdara about 420. He travelled widely and gave to the world the treasures of his scientific knowledge in a series of writings, of which *μέγας Διάκοσμος* was the most celebrated. Cicero compares Democritus to Plato in regard to eloquence. He died at the age of 104.

The origin and general standpoint of the atomists is thus described by Aristotle: The Eleatics, he says, denied the plurality and movement of things, because they cannot be conceived without the notion of empty space. But empty space is unthinkable. Leucippus acknowledges that without the void no motion is possible, but, as he was not willing to give up the reality of change, he believed that movement and multiplicity could still be preserved by assuming the existence of empty space alongside of the full. Accordingly, for solid motionless unity of being for which Parmenides contended, the atomists substituted an infinite number of invisibly small bodies



qualitatively similar and differing only in quantity, which move within the void and by whose combination and separation and reciprocal action the world of reality exists.

The distinctive features of the Atomic theory may be summarized in the following three points :

(1) *The nature of the atom.* The world consists of primitive, immutable, indivisible particles, alike in quality but unlike in quantity—size, shape, weight. The atom is the least conceivable particle, so small that it cannot be less. It entirely fills the space which it occupies, that is to say, it is incapable of further compression. Besides being the absolutely least, the atom is the absolutely full. Between atom and atom is the void or empty space. The atoms moreover are the same in kind, indistinguishable from each other by any difference of quality. They are different in quantity only—that is, they differ in size, weight, figure, but not in being hot or cold, sweet or bitter, luminous or dark. On the one hand, the atoms are analogous to the pure being of Parmenides in regard to uniformity of quality; and on the other hand, the Atomic school differs from Empedocles, who attributes differences of quality to his four elements in order to account for the changes of the universe.

According to the atomists there is no difference in the universe except differences of quantity. All qualitative differences are merely apparent and are due to our sensations only.

(2) *The conception of the "full and the void."* The atoms being the least conceivable are incapable of further compression. In order to exist at all they must be reciprocally bounded off and separated. There must, therefore, be something of an opposite nature to themselves that receives them as atoms and renders possible their separation and independence. This is empty space—the vacuum which is between the atoms, and keeps them asunder. Aristotle, in his account of the early philosophers, says, "Leucippus and Democritus assume as elements the

'full' and the 'void.' The former they term being and the latter non-being. Hence they assert that non-being exists as well as being." And, according to Plutarch, Democritus himself is reported as saying, "there is naught more real than nothing." The number of things is infinitely great. Each of them is indivisible. Between them, therefore, there must be empty space. Hence the full and the empty stand opposed, and are necessary to each other.

(3) *The principle of necessity.* But now, as with Empedocles, the question arises, how do the change and movement which we see everywhere come about? What is the reason that the atoms assume these manifold combinations which make up the world of nature and life around us? Democritus maintains that the ultimate ground of the world's constitution is to be found in the inner necessity or predestination inherent in the nature of the different atoms to combine. The atoms, varying in size and weight and mobility, impinge on each other and coalesce, forming larger or smaller bodies and constituting the inorganic and organic worlds.

It is incorrect to say that Democritus explained the motion of the atoms by attributing it to chance, as Cicero seemed to indicate. At the same time, in the cosmological scheme of the Atomists there is no room for design or intelligent purpose. Motion simply belongs to each atom as an original possession, and there is no attempt made to appeal to mind or purpose, or any cause whatever beyond the natural necessity of mechanical interaction. Nothing, indeed, happens without cause. All things have their reason and necessity (*ἀνάγκη*). And if Democritus sometimes uses the word *τύχη* or chance, it simply expresses man's ignorance of the real causes of things.

The atomist theory is interesting as affording the first hint at a theory of sensation which has been much in vogue in more recent times. Sensation is entirely subjective and dependent on our senses. A body is cold or

hot, sweet or bitter, light or dark, not because it is so in itself, but wholly because of certain sensations peculiar to ourselves and dependent on our senses of touch, taste, smell or sight.

While modern exponents of this theory have held that there are occult qualities in matter, corresponding to our sensations of heat, colour, taste, smell, etc., the atomists maintained that the quantitative differences of bodies, by affecting our sentient organisms in different ways, sufficiently accounted for our various sensations. According to Democritus, the perceiving mind or soul consists also of atoms of the finest, smoothest and most mobile character. These he calls "fire-atoms," because they are the same as those which constitute the essence of fire. These indeed are scattered throughout the whole world, and are present in all animate things, but are united in largest numbers in the human body. The emanations which proceed from things set in motion the organs, and through them, the fire-atoms of the soul. These emanations he calls images (*εἰδωλα*), and regards them as infinitely small copies of the things. Their impression upon the fire-atoms constitutes perception. External objects, in other words, give off minute copies or images of themselves. These impress themselves upon the senses, and, by setting in motion the fire-atoms of which the soul is composed, create our knowledge. The materialism of Democritus thus compels him to explain knowledge simply in terms of contact and reduce it to a form of material influence. This theory of images as a mode of representing outward things and explaining the mind's knowledge of the world, largely dominates ancient philosophy, and is defended, as we shall afterwards see, by Locke.

The atomist theory is professedly a system of materialism, and stands in contrast to the idealism of Plato. Democritus is one of the great names of history, and his atomic hypothesis may be regarded as still largely the faith of the scientific world. He may be said indeed to

have laid the foundations of modern chemistry and other cognate sciences. In the comprehensiveness of his system he rivals Plato and Aristotle, and is the earliest philosopher who attempted to give a scientific explanation of the world.

We cannot but admire the greatness of the man who struck out for the first time in firm and decisive outline a purely dynamic theory of the world and who, in the place of the fragmentary and uncertain pictures of nature which the earlier philosophers afforded, at last sought to satisfy the demands of reason by a principle of inner coherence and reciprocal interaction of parts. All subsequent materialistic explanations of the world have always reverted to the atomic theory, although the advance of knowledge may throw a very different light upon the actual nature of the particles and their mode of operation. Two great and fruitful ideas were struck out by Democritus which became axioms in all scientific procedure: (1) The sensible, discreet particular as the starting-point in all investigation of nature; and (2) the invariable and unbroken causal connection of all things.

The radical defect, however, of all such theories as an explanation of the world, as Aristotle showed, lies in the contradiction of assuming the indivisibility of matter and the consequent derivation of the extended from that which occupies no space. It is also a weakness in the system of Democritus that the unconscious motiveless necessity, which is really equivalent to chance, banishes from nature all idea of a final cause.

4. The last philosopher of this period we may mention is *Anaxagoras*, who was born at Klasomene about 450. He lived a considerable time at Athens, where he became a friend of Pericles. The age of Pericles was the zenith of commercial and political power. The highest development of art and letters was reached just as the State began to decline. This brilliant period was ushered in by a reign of doubt, which brought to a close the series of



attempts on the part of the pre-Socratic thinkers to solve the problems of existence. This first period of Greek thought closes with Anaxagoras, who made a valiant effort to establish in Athens a revival of the Ionian school. A short time before the Peloponnesian war he was accused by his enemies of impiety, and was condemned to banishment. Advanced in years he retired to Lampacus, where a monument was erected to his memory.

The speculations of Anaxagoras are contained in a work on Nature, which was popular at the time of Socrates. His philosophy centres in two points: (1) his doctrine of simple substances, called "Homoiomeries," which he held were countless in number; and (2) his doctrine of the intelligence or *nous* as the universal in all things and as the originating principle of the universe.

(1) The world is made up of a mass of primitive constituents. These elements are not like those of Empedocles, fire, air, earth, water, but they are the seeds or roots (*σπέρματα*) of all things, or, as he sometimes calls them, the primal substances (*χρήματα*)—stone, gold, bone, etc. These are infinitely fine and simple, and are present throughout the entire universe. So that in each individual particle of matter all elements are represented. Everything changes into everything else. The things of which the world is made are not "cut off with a hatchet." On the contrary, the true formula must be: "There is a portion of everything in everything." How then do things differ? Though everything has a portion of everything in it, things appear to be that of which there is most in them. Air is that in which there is most cold; fire, that in which there is most heat. According to this theory, every particular object in the universe is itself a kind of world in miniature.

(2) But now we come upon that part of Anaxagoras' theory which has given him a distinctive place in the history of early philosophy—his doctrine of the *nous*. Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras required some external



cause to produce motion in the primitive 'mixture' or chaos so that it might form a cosmos. This moving cause Anaxagoras finds in Reason. It is the function of the *nous* to set this inert chaotic mass of substances in ever-changing motion. This formative principle separates the like parts and brings them together again, each according to its nature. Such an arrangement of gigantic masses in a harmonious system could only be, he held, the result of a *mind* working towards special ends. The *nous* of Anaxagoras, though a corporeal element, is so fine as almost to partake of the character of thought. It differs from the other substances not only in degree, but also in essence, as being alone self-moved, and in virtue of its own motion moving all the other elements in a purposeful way.

At the same time we cannot disguise the fact that by this artificial introduction of Reason a dualism was created. On the one side were the elements of the world, inert and motionless, and on the other the *nous*, which alone is self-moved, and is entirely foreign to all the substances on which it acts. When he comes to explain the *nous*, he falls back upon material qualities, and he fails to show how it applies to particulars. Plato, in the *Phaedo*, represents Socrates as saying that he had rejoiced to see *nous* designated as the cause of the order of the world, but when he came to examine it he was disappointed, as Anaxagoras had recourse only to "concomitant causes." Aristotle praises him on account of the supersensible principle which he had introduced, and describes him "as a sober man standing out from the crowd of random talkers who preceded him." But in general both Plato and Aristotle blamed Anaxagoras for his lack of consistency. They complained that he employed the 'nous' as the *Deus ex machina* of the dramatists, whose function it was to descend from heaven and cut the tragic knot, when no other means could be found of disentangling its confusion.

But after all is said, it is the unique distinction of this thinker to have proclaimed an omniscient, omnipotent creator of the universe—a Being “who has all knowledge about everything,” “who owns no master but itself,” and “has power over all things that have life.” In this theory we have the first instance of a teleological explanation of the universe. Anaxagoras therefore strikes out a new path in philosophy. He looks at the *end* rather than the beginning of things, and is concerned with the purpose more than the origin of being. Anaxagoras therefore has the merit of being the first philosopher who recognised an intelligent principle as the orderer of the world, and has thus laid the basis of the various arguments from design, which have been adduced by different thinkers to account for the existence of an all-wise and all-powerful creator.

In Anaxagoras we detect also the first conscious separation of thought and matter. Mind is conceived by him as having a distinct existence in the universe and as being the supreme motive force of all things. His conception of the *nous* is indeed confused and vague; it is still regarded as consisting of material elements. But it was a great thing in that dim morning of time to perceive the distinction between those two factors, mind and matter, the relation of which has been the perennial problem of philosophy. With Anaxagoras, therefore, the first stage of philosophy, the physical stage, comes to a close, and his vision of a rational element in life prepares the way for the more definite study of man on his mental and moral side, which followed.

## *SECT. 2. THE MORAL PERIOD*

### CHAPTER I

#### THE SOPHISTS

IT was said of Socrates that he brought philosophy out of the seclusion of the schools into the arena of common life. This was the feature not of Socrates only, but of Greek thought generally at the period at which we have now arrived. After the victories of the Persian wars, the mental and spiritual life of the nation became intensified, and knowledge, formerly confined to the few, broadened out and became the possession of the multitude.

The nation as a whole, disciplined by the stern experiences it had passed through, had entered upon its manhood. Greece had become the foremost nation in the world. At the head of the Athenian State stood Pericles, the master of oratory and statesmanship, around whom were clustered the most illustrious names in poetry, science and art. It was an era of great mental activity, rich in every form of intellectual achievement. Knowledge was coming to be valued for its practical results. The State now demanded light on the complex questions of government and policy. In every department of activity the man of culture and education was recognised as the most capable and the most useful, and truth was sought as a means to successful attainment. Positions in the political

and social world were no longer acquired by birth or rank, but by ability, and the man who desired to gain honour found that intellectual discipline and study were indispensable. Nowhere were these tendencies so manifest as in Athens, the capital of Greece, and the centre of its political life.

This demand for education created the supply, and the Sophists came forward into public life as the teachers of the people. From all parts of Greece philosophers of different schools flocked towards Athens to expound their various doctrines. The Sophists, as these wandering teachers were called, were the inaugurators of this age of enlightenment. It became their vocation to instruct the youth in those mental accomplishments which seemed necessary to success in life. The Sophists, as Mr. Grote and others have pointed out, were not so much a philosophic sect as a professional class who taught for payment and came forward to meet a demand. As one of the primal requirements for politics was a capacity for public speaking, the Sophists became teachers of eloquence and rhetoric. These masters or teachers of wisdom would obviously not confine their teaching to the young. "They brought to the altars of rhetoric and literature," says Gomperz, "the same gifts and resources which served them in their teaching capacity." Modern life has no exact parallel to the Sophists. They resembled the journalists and men of letters of to-day in their constant readiness for the war of words. They earned a rich meed of reward no less than material success, and the enthusiasm that their foremost representatives aroused in the youth of Greece, with its keen love of beauty and culture, was immeasurable. The best known of these—Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus and Gorgias—were men of high attainments and almost encyclopaedic learning, which they used for the highest purposes. For the most part they were men of lofty ideals, whose aim it was to inculcate virtues and practical wisdom into their pupils, and in the "choice of Hercules" by Pro-



dicus and in Plato's dialogue of "Protagoras" we may see what their teaching was when it was at its best. Too often, however, the ends of truth were sacrificed for outward brilliancy and mere elegance of language. Philosophy underwent a change in character and spirit. Research, in so far as it was seriously pursued, turned away from the old problems of being to questions of life and ethics, investigating the inner activities of man,—his thoughts, sensations and volitions.

The danger of this condition of things was that the Sophist became content with the mere discussion of terms and the graceful presentation of ideas irrespective of the worth of truth. Gradually the question as to whether there was any universally valid truth was discarded and a general spirit of scepticism prevailed.

It would be a mistake to stigmatize the Sophists as a class as the corrupters of the youth of their times, and to charge them with undermining the morality of Greece. They were born at a time of political ferment, when new political forces were coming into conflict with old customs. The Persian wars had brought about a disintegration of society and created a general upheaval of life and thought in Athens. New radical ideas were set up in opposition to conservative beliefs. The spirit of democracy was breaking down the sanctity of law and awakening in the minds of individuals the consciousness of the rights of private judgment. Not only were the established laws of the State called in question, but the moral law, the very meaning and obligation of virtue and justice and truth, was brought to the bar of criticism. "The whole epoch," as has been said, "was penetrated with a spirit of revolution and progress." This spirit was reflected in the development of poetry, and especially of the drama. "The whole action of the drama," says Zeller, "comic as well as tragic, was based on the collision of duties and rights." The Sophists were the representatives of the spirit of the age. The Sophistic movement was not so much a cause



as a symptom : its danger lay in stimulating those new tendencies to individualism and radicalism which needed control. It was only natural that they should take part in the intellectual movement of the times and become the mouthpiece of ideas which were rising into predominance. They were the critics of the period, and in general the vehicles of emancipation, though the majority of them, possibly on account of their dependence on the public, maintained an attitude of moderation, and none of them was so radical an assailer of tradition and superstition as Socrates or even Plato himself. In the eyes of the old-fashioned and conservative, the whole class was regarded with suspicion, because they set themselves in opposition to the popular religious belief and fixed conventions of the past. It is unfortunate that in forming a conception of the teaching and influence of the Sophists we are dependent almost solely for our information regarding them on their victorious opponents, Plato and Aristotle. In Plato's *Protagoras* we have a delineation of a Sophist congress full of irony, and in the *Gorgias* and the *Theaetetus* a serious criticism of their methods of teaching. In the dialogue, the *Sophist*, we have a somewhat malicious definition of their theories. Aristotle also seeks to expose their fallacies, and in general regards them with little approbation.

For a long time this depreciatory judgment of the Sophists was repeated, and the title "Sophist" was used in a disparaging sense. Hegel was the first to rehabilitate the Sophists, and he claims for them as a class that they fostered culture and scattered many fruitful seeds of thought.

The Sophists flourished from about 450 B.C. to 400 B.C. Though Sophism as a profession did not entirely disappear at the later date, after the appearance of Socrates the movement dwindled into insignificance.

The chief Sophists were Protagoras, the individualist; Gorgias, the nihilist; and Prodicus, the moralist.

1. *Protagoras* was born at Abdara about the year 440. He was a man of upright character, whose life was darkened by the shadows of national misfortune. Though a friend of Democritus in his youth, his thoughts were transferred from the investigation of nature to the study of human affairs. He was the first to call himself a Sophist, which meant an itinerant teacher of wisdom. He made repeated visits to Athens, where he was honoured with the friendship of Pericles and Euripides and other eminent men. As a teacher he was in great demand, and his instruction centred in a preparation for public life. He was a witness of the deadly struggle between Athens and Sparta, and of the fearful ravages of pestilence which were added to the horrors of war, and he extols the heroism of his patron, Pericles, under the calamities of his time. He himself fell a victim, like his contemporaries, Anaxagoras and Socrates, to the fanaticism of the masses. At the age of seventy he was expelled from the city on a charge of Atheism, and was said to have been drowned on the voyage to Sicily.

His work *On the Gods* was burned in the market-place. It begins with the words, "Of the gods I know not whether they are or are not—many things, such as the obscurity of the subject and the brevity of life, prevent us from knowing."

He held that there is no absolute being and no universal knowledge. All truth is simply a matter of subjective feeling. Good or bad does not belong to the nature of things, but is determined solely by law and agreement. Starting from the Heraclitic thought of perpetual flux, he applied the principle to the individual. He enunciated his famous dictum that "man is the measure of all things," by which he meant that truth is relative to the individual. His feelings and desires are his only test of what is true and good, and therefore his only guide in matters of duty. The individual is the measure of the true and the good. An act that benefits one man is bad for another. Practical

truth is a relative thing—a matter of taste, temperament and education.

It is impossible to prove anything but the fact of sensation, and it is still more impossible to know the ultimate causes of reality.

Let a man therefore occupy himself—as the only accessible object—with *himself*. Let him abandon all sterile speculations with regard to nature. Happiness is the only problem of importance. To be happy is to govern one's self. Hence philosophy is the art of being virtuous. As a means let us think correctly and speak correctly. Protagoras was thus the champion of individualism, the first agnostic and advocate of the relativity of knowledge. As a teacher he was also the earliest to introduce grammar into his curriculum, and it is remarkable that in the teaching of Greek thought there was before him not the remotest attempt to distinguish the forms of expression or to analyse the principles of speech. As a teacher of rhetoric he invented themes in which his pupils were to argue the *pros* and *cons*. Though these practices tended to produce formalism, we cannot lay the blame at the door of the man who gave the first impulse to the art of forensic oratory for which Greece has given the model to the world.

For the personal integrity of Protagoras Plato himself vouches. In the dialogue bearing his name, whenever he has to choose between a lower and a higher standard of ethics, the higher is invariably represented by Protagoras himself.

2. *Gorgias* (483-375) of Leontini in Sicily carried the spirit of agnosticism still further, in so far as he denied all truth and despaired of finding any standard of knowledge. He was sent by his countrymen to Athens at the head of an embassy to solicit help against Syracuse. Here he gained a great literary reputation. In old age he betook himself to Thessaly. His character and speech were said to have been marked by vulgar ostentation. In physical philo-

sophy he was an adherent of Empedocles, but his activity lay chiefly in the domain of rhetoric, in which he rivalled Protagoras. In his chief work—*On Nature or the Non-existent*, which has been preserved by Sextus Empiricus—he emphasises his three famous propositions: 1st, nothing exists; 2nd, even if anything did exist, it could not be known; 3rd, and even if it could be known, it would be incommunicable.

If Protagoras affirmed that every opinion was equally true, Gorgias declared that every opinion was equally false. Such thoroughgoing scepticism makes knowledge impossible. All is delusion. Gorgias has been called, with reason, a philosophical nihilist.

It is only necessary to mention the names of Prodicus of Chios and Hippias of Elis.

3. *Prodicus* discoursed upon the choice of a life-purpose, upon adversity and death. He displayed keen observation, and was characterized by purity of moral sentiment, on account of which he has been called the forerunner of Socrates. He ventured to account for religion on utilitarian principles. In early times he said men deified whatever was profitable to themselves; thus bread was worshipped as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, water as Poseidon, and so forth. He is best known on account of what might be called his moralizing essays, the most celebrated of which is entitled *Hercules at the Cross-Roads*, an allegory not without its influence upon early Christian literature.

Of *Hippias* of Elis, a younger contemporary of Protagoras, it is enough to call to mind his extraordinary attainments. He was astronomer, mathematician, poet and even sculptor. He interests us chiefly on account of the famous distinction which he drew between nature and law, between what is originally binding by the constitution of things and what is of merely human enactment. Plato attributes to him the bold paradox—"Law is the tyrant of man because it prescribes many things contrary



to nature." There were not wanting others who carried to their extreme consequences these revolutionary utterances.

The later Sophists were for the most part free-thinkers, and many of them became simply charlatans, who undermined all law and morals, representing the right of the strong as the law of nature, and preaching the unrestrained satisfaction of the senses. The maxim attributed to Protagoras, "man is the measure of the universe," may be accepted as the common principle of the Sophists. The meaning which they attached to this saying was that truth, goodness, beauty, are relative to the individual. There is no absolute standard of right—what a man holds to be true is true for him. This doctrine, if carried to its extreme, as it was by several of the Sophists, is the denial of all objective truth and morality. The Sophists held that the criterion of right is personal advantage. They carried this rule of expediency into every department of life, making all law and justice yield to individual interest. In assuming this position they were impelled partly by the character of the age and partly by the tendency of recent philosophy—especially the atomist theory of sensation.

In Greece at this time individualism reigned supreme, State trampled upon State. The old traditional respect for the validity of law began to waver. The frequent and sudden changes of constitution undermined the people's reverence for statute as a divine institution. The laws of the State became a subject of discussion. Losing their veneration for ancient custom, the people were not slow in violating private as well as public rights, and the question arose whether there was any primary universal standard of right and justice at all.

Not only were the Sophists influenced by the experiences of public life, but also, on the one hand, by the teaching of Anaxagoras with respect to the supremacy of the mind, and, on the other, by the atomist theory of sensation. Before the time of Anaxagoras nature was held to be



greater than man, and all that came from nature,—law, government, necessity,—were regarded with unquestioning reverence. But Anaxagoras revealed a power superior to nature—the mind which controlled nature. But if mind existed anywhere it had its seat in man: so that man, possessed of intellect, was really greater than nature. Thus, argued the Sophists, instead of the universe being the measure of man, to which he must bow, man is the measure of the universe, where he may impose his power and laws.

In one sense the doctrine of the Sophists embodies a valuable truth. Man, in so far as he is sharer of the universal mind and is true to the truth as it exists for all men, is indeed the measure of the universe. But the Sophists, as we have seen, made the individual man, with his subjective feelings and desires, the standard of truth and right. They acknowledged no universal faculty in man, and were led to the conclusion that whatever appeared to any individual to be true, was to him true; and whatever ministered to his personal advantage or pleasure was for him right and good. The later Sophists indeed pushed the doctrine of Protagoras to its last consequences and taught that the individual ought to follow solely the impulses of his own nature.

There is no objective truth, and sensations are our only test of good. The free man, therefore, should not bridle his desires, but let them have their full gratification.

## CHAPTER II

### SOCRATES

SOCRATES came forward as the opponent of the Sophists. He discussed the same moral problems as they did, but while they used their skill to undermine truth and unsettle morality, he sought to re-establish the ideals of right and goodness. He raised his voice of protest against the scepticism of his age, and contended for the claims of absolute truth and absolute morality. He admitted that man was supreme, but he denied that truth and virtue were contingent upon the individual sensations of man. Truth he held to be dependent not on the variable and particular part of man's nature, but on the invariable and universal part, on that faculty which he has in common with all intelligence.

There were two ways in which the argument of the Sophists might be met. The one was the way of the orthodox conservative party in Athens,—that of suppressing all inquiry and resting in blind faith upon the old traditional customs and conventions.

The other way was the way of Socrates. He would not be a party to quenching investigation. On the contrary, he cordially welcomed inquiry, and was willing with the Sophists to subject the institutions of society and the accepted opinions of men to a rigorous examination. He agreed with the Sophists in their demand for free inquiry, but he demanded that the inquiry should not be partial and superficial, but complete, radical and searching.

There is no more impressive figure in ancient history than that of Socrates, and his trial and death, as a martyr to truth, have deeply touched the consciousness of the world. Born about 470 B.C., this teacher is identified with the most illustrious period of Hellenic life. He came forth, at a time when Grecian manhood and patriotism were beginning to decline, as the champion of virtue and the advocate of all that is highest and best in humanity.

*Socrates* of Athens (469-399) marks an epoch in the history of philosophy. He was neither savant nor wandering teacher. He belonged to no school. He was simply a man of the people. He was taught by Prodicus, but he was uninfluenced by any past philosophy. What he was, was due to himself. With the exception of one or two solitary expeditions he was never out of Athens. Little is known of his early life. He was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phaenarete, a midwife. He was brought up to his father's calling. His manner of teaching was conversational and popular, drawing illustrations from common life. He frequented the market-place and the gymnasium, where he discoursed to the young men on the significance and aim of life, seeking to convince them of their ignorance and to awake within their breasts the yearning for knowledge. Convinced that the amelioration of the State could only proceed from a sound and thorough instruction of the young, he became the first moral philosopher.

According to Xenophon, he was the model of every virtue, just and temperate, brave in the field of battle as well as in the drinking booth. He was the enemy of all frivolity and selfishness, yet he was full of patience and self-command.

A characteristic feature of his personality was the demonic element (*δαιμόνιον*), which he claimed to possess—a fine deep, divining instinct by which he professed to be able to discern the tendencies of life and even to foretell future events. In circumstances in which there was not

sufficient knowledge for certain decision, Socrates believed that he heard within himself the *daimonion*, counselling or warning him by its inner voice. His enemies saw in this personal claim a denial of the national gods and an attempt to set himself up as a divinity.

Aristophanes, a champion of the ancestral worship, has invested Socrates with ridicule in his poem *The Clouds*, and has defamed him as a Sophist.

His striking though unattractive personal appearance, together with his peculiar gait and mean garb, has made him the butt of Athenian comedy.

In his 70th year Socrates became a martyr to his convictions. He was charged with refusing to recognise the national gods and perverting the minds of the youth. In a simple but eloquent speech he repelled these charges. He refused to save himself by flight. After twenty days of intercourse with his friends in prison, he drank the cup of poison appointed by the State and died in the year 399 B.C.

Socrates has left no writings. To Xenophon and to Plato we are indebted for a knowledge of his life and teaching. Xenophon is the more historical in his account, Plato the more philosophical; the latter of whom, chiefly in the *Banquet*, has invested his name with undying lustre.

The life and philosophy of Socrates are inseparable. Yet he was not simply a good man who sought to influence others for good. He based conduct on knowledge. "Virtue is knowledge." Without knowledge there can be no morality—hence the first thing to strive after is wisdom.

The scepticism of the Sophists forms the starting-point of the philosophy of Socrates. All he knows is that he knows nothing. He turns with impatience from nature. "The trees," he says, "can teach me nothing." He who studies man has no time to investigate material things. We can never know what is the origin and end of the world, but we can know what we ourselves ought to be. What is the meaning and aim of life? What is the



highest good of the soul?—to know *that* is the only real and profitable knowledge. ‘Man, know thyself.’ To know oneself is the one pursuit worthy of man, the beginning of all morality, the sum of all philosophy. The philosophy of Socrates is thus of a purely ethical nature, and his main doctrine may be summed up in the saying, “Virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance.”

For, after all, knowledge is the principal thing. All life and conduct come back to that. Let a man know what he ought to do, and nothing else is needed. For surely a man will not willingly do what he knows to be against his true interests. Socrates, therefore aims at producing knowledge, not of course for its own sake, but because he believes that it is the ground and secret of all right conduct. Rightly understand what is implied in these words “virtue is knowledge,” and you will see, says Socrates, that it involves important consequences.

(1) What is done without insight does not deserve the predicate “good”: whereas what is done knowingly must always be good. If it were possible it would be better that one should do wrong knowingly than that one should do wrong unknowingly; for, in the first case, virtue would only be temporarily injured; in the second, virtue would be wanting altogether.

(2) From the principle that “virtue is knowledge” may also be deduced the further position that “Happiness or well-being is the necessary result of virtue.” The intelligent man knows and therefore does what is good for him; he must therefore through his doings become happy also. Virtue, as knowledge of the good, must always bring in its train its appropriate consequences.

(3) From the same principle a still further deduction may be made, viz., that all virtue is one and the same, the excellence of each good quality just consisting in the knowing what ought or ought not to be done.

(4) Still again, the same principle implies that everyone can attain to virtue by aspiration and practice.



Goodness can be *taught*, because it is a matter of knowledge. Were virtue not knowledge, we could not be instructed in it, nor would we be capable of advancing from one stage to another.

Socrates went about seeking to convince men not so much of sin as of ignorance. Sin is error. He who does a bad action does it from a mistaken judgment. Everyone believes that he is really doing the good, *i.e.* the advantageous. Hence to show men their ignorance is the first step towards right actions.

What is called the "irony" of Socrates is his manner of affecting ignorance in the presence of the seeming wise in order to bring them to the confession of their want of knowledge. His object was not to lead to scepticism. He claimed to follow his mother's profession and to help those in labour with new ideas to bring them to the birth. Hence he adopted the dialectic method, the method of questioning. His philosophy is a philosophy of dialogue. It develops itself in conversation. Feigning to be as anxious to instruct himself as others, Socrates brings his companion step by step to unfold into clearer and ever less contradictory statements the thoughts which were lying latent within him. Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the merit of introducing the *inductive method*,—the method of searching for general definitions based upon particular instances,—the forming of judgments from a number of analogous cases. This subordination of the particular under the general, which we call the inductive method, becomes the future law of logic, and the process adopted by the sciences to establish general conceptions from comparison of facts.

While Socrates confined his philosophy within the bounds of practical life and conceived of it mainly as a system of ethics, passing over all questions concerning nature and being with seeming indifference, he at the same time professes a *teleological view* of nature, recognising wisdom in the arrangement and adaptation of the

world. Where knowledge cannot reach Socrates seems to put forth a faith in Providence, falling back on his *daimonion* for inspiration when insight fails.

Xenophon has represented Socrates as employing the argument from design to prove the existence of God: he cannot, however, decide how far his opinions on the subject differed from those of the popular religion.

But by the testimony of his principal disciples, the whole life of Socrates was permeated by the thought of God. His ethics everywhere run up into religion. Every moral duty found a religious sanction. Every act of wrong was an act of impiety. It is not to be understood by this that he had a reasoned theology or that he aimed at any new doctrinal statement of belief. He had no ambition to start a new sect or any desire to reform the Greek religion. Sometimes he seems to dwell within the old limits with contentment, but he rejects as incredible the stories of blood and deceit and lust with which Greek mythology was disfigured. He believes God to be unchangeably good, and if he seems at times to accept lower divinities who minister to men of their bounty, it is because the Supreme Being manifests Himself in the world and particularly in men, and may be conceived as dwelling also in beings wiser and more powerful than men.

Still it is no mere impersonal diffusion. There is a central Divine Life in whom all things live, who upholds all things and by whom all things subsist. He has been called the father of the design argument, which proceeds from the order in the world and in the physical and mental organism of man to a supernal reason. The whole world, in his view, owes its existence and place to mind (Xen. *Mem.* i. iv. 8 ff.). And in the make of man the same order is discernible. His body is a system of contrivances, bespeaking utility and delight as ends. The mind, by its very supremacy in man, is a proof of God's presence in the universe. Man is a sharer of the Divine nature. Though his essential nature is enshrined in a body which

can execute the behests of the mind, he moves amongst the other creatures as a god (Xen. *Mem.* 1. iv. 14; cp. Plato's *Rep.* vi. and *Phaedrus*).

Of Socrates' view of the place of the *conscience* in life it is more difficult to speak. We have already seen how in his own life he acknowledged a 'Divine Something,' which seemed to take the form of a warning inner voice. But while he affirms the existence of this 'sign' in his own case, he seems to regard it as peculiar to himself, and not in the possession of all men.

Still his whole teaching did imply that not he only but all men had the power of discerning between right and wrong, and that only he was a virtuous man who followed the dictates of his own insight and knowledge.

With regard to the *immortality of the soul* it is difficult to know what his views exactly were. Whenever the subject is touched it is impossible to exclude from the mind the marvellous picture in the *Phaedo*. But it is improbable that Socrates held the definite opinions on this question attributed to him by Plato. He conceives of death as a long sleep, and falls back upon the recognition of the Divine will, assured that no evil can befall the good man either in life or death. His absolute truthfulness seems to hinder him from asserting more than this, and he makes no attempt to veil his ignorance in figures of speech. In general it may be said that he did not profess knowledge with regard to the soul's immortality, but he cherished the belief. He closes his apology with the sublime words, "But now the time has come and we must go hence: I to die, and you to live. Whether life or death is better is known to God, and to God only."

The philosophy of Socrates is best judged in the light of the influence which he exerted upon the Platonic and Aristotelian systems of thought. Regarding his philosophy as a body of doctrine, three things stand out: (1) It contains a reform in philosophic method; (2) it affords the first inquiry into the conditions of knowledge; and

(3) it lays the foundations of ethical science. But great as were these contributions to philosophy, greater far was the influence which Socrates exerted by his life. His rectitude of character, his humility and courage, his faith and piety, and, above all, his calm acceptance of condemnation and death, have encircled the figure of Socrates with a halo of reverence which history has accorded to few.

The narrative of his trial is one of the most dramatic in all literature, and the closing scenes of Plato's *Phaedo* is unequalled for pathos and sublimity by anything that ever Plato wrote. "His last words were: 'Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?' 'The debt shall be paid,' said Crito; 'Is there anything else?' There was no answer to this question, but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend: concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and greatest and best."

Socrates founded no special school of philosophy, though he gave a starting-point to several lines of thought. The strong personality and original teaching of the man forced the intellectual activity of the times into new channels. He gave a fresh impulse to reflection which ultimately prepared the way for these systems in which Greek philosophy culminates. It is the fate of a great teacher to be inadequately interpreted by his immediate successors, and the richer and more many-sided his teaching is, the more is it likely to be broken up by those who come after. Socrates was no exception to this law, and his various followers seized each upon a fragment of his doctrine and elevated it into a principle. It will not be necessary to dwell at any length upon these *imperfect Socratics*, as they have been called. But, in particular, mention must



be made of three schools—the Cynic, the Cyrenaic and the Megaric—in which the different sides of Socrates' teaching with regard to conduct were represented. In the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools we have the first expression of two opposing types of ethical theory which have continued to find supporters even to our own day. What is the highest good? What is the end of life? asked Socrates. Is it virtue or is it happiness? In the hands of Socrates these were harmonized, for virtue being knowledge a man will always seek that which is for his ultimate good. But the question arose, which Socrates did not definitely answer—Is virtue an end in itself or is it to be sought merely for the sake of happiness?

1. The *Cynics*, of whom *Antisthenes* is the chief representative, emphasized virtue for its own sake. The virtuous man is self-sufficient. The supreme object of man, says Antisthenes, is a virtuous life. But the ideal of virtue is freedom from all desire—the complete withdrawal of the individual within himself. The truly wise man is independent of everything—of marriage, society and station. He needs neither wealth, honour, nor pleasure.

The later Cynics despised all knowledge and sank to a condition of shameless sloth and beggary. Not till long after, in the age of the Stoics, did cynicism revive and regain its prestige.

2. The *Cyrenaic* school, which was the antithesis of the Cynic, sought the essence of life in pleasure. Aristippus, its founder, set forth as the principle of life, that a man must not be the slave but the master of circumstances, if he would lead a happy life. Pleasure is indeed the aim, but it must be pleasure in its highest forms. Nothing is bad or shameful which ensures real enjoyment. To the attainment of happiness, however, discrimination, moderation and spiritual culture are necessary. It must be admitted that the theory of Aristippus was more in consonance with the teaching of



Socrates than of the Cynics, which it opposed. His idea of self-mastery was not mutilation, but use. The Cynic sought to starve desire, but in so doing was in danger of reducing life to barrenness. The Cyrenaic believed in gratifying desire within limits, ruled by a quantitative measure of happiness. In theory this conception seemed to present the truest ideal of self-realization—the Socratic idea of “using the world without abusing it.” Yet, in its ultimate analysis, it really made pleasure and not virtue the end of life, and in practice it led to the most selfish interpretations.

Of the other hedonists, *Theodorus* declared that the highest thing in life is the joy arising from the ability, in all the relations of life, to be guided by a rational purpose.

*Hegesias* regarded the absence of pain as the only worthy goal of the wise man, while *Annicerus* thought that withdrawal from society is impossible, and that, therefore, the true aim is to take as much enjoyment out of life as can be got.

3. The *Megaric* school, in which an attempt was made to combine the Cynic and Cyrenaic principle, was founded by Euclid of Megara. The idea of the good is the same thing ethically as that of being is physically. Only that which is self-existent, self-identical is good; while all change and variety are only appearance.

The true good is not sensuous, but intellectual. Truth and reason are the only real. Man is at his best when he is faithful to those highest elements within him.

The good is immutable: it is insight, reason, God. It alone exists. Euclid of Megara deserves to be remembered for his identification of Goodness with life. His system is the connecting-link between Socrates and Plato. The school of Megara, which Stilpo made famous, continued its activities for some time, but it was ultimately eclipsed by the schools of Plato and Aristotle. As Cynicism led

to Stoicism and Cyrenaic herodism to Epicureanism, so the later Megarics prepared the way for Scepticism.

The imperfect Socratics grew up side by side, and there is little continuity of development in their teaching. They fell largely into the arid discussions of the Sophists, and beyond a few pretentious moral maxims and some feeble witticisms, little of worth has been preserved. The pride of poverty and contempt of life became their dominant characteristics, and the typical figure of Cynicism is Diogenes in his tub wandering about Greece denouncing luxury and preaching independence of life's necessities. It is to Plato that we must look for the true successor of Socrates. In contrast to these imperfect followers we learn to appreciate the more the one true disciple, who entered into the spirit of his master's teaching and brought to their richest fruition and fullest expansion those seeds of thought and life which Socrates had sown.

### *SECT. 3. THE SYSTEMATIC PERIOD*

THE third period of Greek philosophy may be said to combine the two former periods, in so far as consideration was now given to both metaphysical and moral problems. The union was not so much a natural outcome of the times as the work of the great personalities who have stamped the period with their genius.

The general questions regarding being, with which the earlier philosophers were concerned, had largely lost their interest under the influence of the Sophists, and the natural trend of thought was towards practical matters. The fact that philosophy returned with renewed vigour to the great problems of metaphysics and reached its climax in this direction, was due to the commanding influence of the two great men who now appeared in history—Plato and Aristotle.

That which differentiates the philosophy of these eminent teachers is the systematic character of their work. Each gave to the world a many-sided, all-embracing system of philosophy complete in itself.

Yet while both Plato and Aristotle dealt with the entire circle of scientific subjects, their systems are not repetitions of each other. Each dealt with the various themes raised from his own standpoint and infused into his system his own personality.

Plato may be said to present a counterpart to the earlier physical theories of the universe, and his idealism is to

be regarded as the antithesis of the materialism of Democritus and of the sensationalism of the Sophists.

From Plato again there springs the imposing form of Aristotle, the greatest teacher the world has yet produced. His system, which embraces the entire contents of philosophy, combines the isolated results attained by all previous philosophers in one harmonious whole, and thus affords the most perfect expression of Greek thought.

## CHAPTER I

### PLATO

PLATO (427-347) was born at Athens during the early years of the Peloponnesian war, in the same year as Pericles died. He came of an aristocratic family, his father boasting his descent from Codrus, the last king of Athens. Legend gathered around his name, and the story was current that he was descended from the gods. His real name was Aristocles, but he was called Plato, either on account of his broad shoulders or broad forehead.

Plato was an aristocrat not only by birth, but by temperament. Unlike Socrates, who was a man of the people, he had a contempt for the masses, and withdrew himself from public life. He made no attempt to enter on a political career, though he had exceptional opportunities of doing so, but devoted himself to study. He would be about fifteen when the expedition to Sicily was undertaken, and he may have witnessed the great fleet sailing out in pomp from the harbour of Piræus; and two years afterwards he must have shared in the general despair when the news came that the fleet and the flower of the army had perished, and with them the hope of Athens. There was little indeed to tempt a man of Plato's spirit to mingle with the politics of the day. The great statesmen, and with them the bloom of the Periclean age, had passed away. The long war had done its work and had well-nigh exhausted both the revenues and



strength of Athens. Revolution followed revolution so rapidly that public confidence in the Constitution was fast disappearing, and men of talent and honour were beginning to despair of their country and withdraw themselves from public life. There is a story told that Plato thanked the gods for four things: that he was born a man, a Greek, an Athenian and a contemporary of Socrates. This last blessing was probably the most determinative factor in shaping his life. He early came under the influence of Socrates, whose intercourse he enjoyed for eight years. After the death of his master, he seems to have undertaken extensive travels, visiting Egypt, Italy and Sicily.

In his 40th year he returned to Athens, where he began to teach in the Academy, a place of exercise in the western suburb of Athens, planted with a grove and named from the hero Academus. Here he gathered around him a band of disciples, teaching them after the manner of Socrates, mainly by conversation, and embodying the results of his teaching in his written dialogues. His philosophic seclusion was twice broken by visits to Sicily, in order to realize at the court of Dionysius the Younger his ideas with regard to political government. The young despot welcomed him warmly, but soon grew tired of serious discussion. On his return to Athens Plato resumed his teaching. He died in his 81st year. He was called the "divine" on account of the depth and originality of his thoughts as well as the beauty of his expositions.

*Plato's writings* consist of a collection of thirty-five dialogues and a number of letters. The question as to their *genuineness* has received various answers, from the conservatism of Grote, who accepts all the dialogues as Plato's which bear his name, to the radicalism of Schaar-smidt, who accepts nine only as genuine. It is noteworthy that Aristotle directly alludes to nine,—*The Republic*, *The Laws*, *Timaeus*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, *Theaetetus* and *Philebus*; and to these we may

add as beyond doubt the so-called youthful writings, *The Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthydemus*, *Laches*, *Lysis* and *Protagoras*. Others like the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politics*, if not by Plato, are the works of his immediate pupils.

The question as to the *order of composition* is one of the vexed problems of Platonic criticism. As there is a Homeric problem, so there is a Platonic problem which has been widely discussed and has produced an inexhaustible literature. Schleiermacher, who was the first in modern times to investigate the subject, regards the works of Plato as the development of a philosophical plan. Hermann, on the other hand, sees in Plato's writings the disclosure of the various phases of his own mental history. Monk unites these views and sees, especially in the successive dialogues of Plato, an idealistic unfolding of the ideas of Socrates. More recently the attempt has been made to determine the order of the works by linguistic considerations and particular historical circumstances, irrespective of the doctrines taught. Various reasons may have actuated Plato to adopt the style of dialogue. For one thing, it was the only way in which he could give a just idea of the Socratic method. Moreover, it permitted the truth to develop of itself without the appearance of dogmatism, and helped to stimulate the independent thought of the readers. But, above all, it was a form particularly adapted to an artistic nature. Philosophy with Plato was not merely a doctrine, but a life—a power embodied in the personality of the thinker. After the barren abstractions of the earlier philosophers the dialogues of Plato must have been hailed by the Athenian world as a refreshing literary entertainment.

Plato is not only thinker, but artist as well. The dialogues are works of art which set before us in vivid dramatic colouring his thoughts of things and men. They are descriptive, dramatic, historical, by turns: pathos, humour, seriousness, follow each other like the light and shadow of a spring morning. The variety, the sparkle

and vivacity, the charming descriptions and subtle sketches of character, the sarcasm and play of humour, above all the purity and grace of diction of his writing, have rendered the name of Plato immortal as one of the greatest masters of literary composition and dramatic style the world has produced.

The speakers in the dialogues are not more historical than the characters of Shakespeare. In nearly every dialogue Socrates is the central figure. Never once does the author speak in his own person. Yet he appears in all his characters. He is, as Grote has said, "Sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic, mathematical philosopher, artist, poet—all in one, or at least all in succession, during the fifty years of his philosophical life."

There is one peculiarity in Plato's dialogues which, while it adds to their charm, increases the difficulty of exact interpretation. It is the frequent use of *myths* or poetic pictures in which Plato often enshrines his truths. We must remember that he had to contend with the difficulties of language in order to express the novelty of his thought, and, in order to make himself intelligible to ordinary minds, he resorted to the forms of mythology. It may be also that he sought in this way to conceal his religious opinions and escape the criticism of the shallow. Many of the myths are mere allegories. We must not therefore be deceived by the symbolism of Plato or mistake the figure of speech for the literal truth.

It will be impossible to give a detailed account of Plato's dialogues. It may be said that they declare in some measure the phases of his inner development, and they may be arranged roughly, for convenience, into three groups—the Socratic or early, the Megaric or mature, the Pythagorean or later dialogues.

1. The *Socratic* or youthful writings, in which Plato argues in Socratic style against the superficiality and the inconsequence of the Sophists.

*Charmedes* discusses temperance; *Lysis*, friendship;

*Laches*, fortitude; *Hippias Minor*, voluntary wrongdoing; *First Alcibiades*, qualities of statesmanship; *Protagoras*, the method and influence of the Sophists, together with the Socratic idea of virtue; *Gorgias*, the sophistical identification of virtue and pleasure, affirming the absoluteness of the good and its superiority to the merely useful and pleasureable.

2. *The Megaric dialogues*, which are poetic in form and somewhat obscure in language. These deal with the formation of the ideal theory and the ultimate grounds of knowledge.

*The Theaetetus* stands at the head of this group. It seeks to prove that ideas are objectively real and independent of sensuous perception. They are the sources of all thought—the universal notions from which all knowledge and action are derived.

*The Sophist* deals with the reciprocal relations of ideas; *Parmenides* with the relation of ideas to the world of appearances.

3. *The Pythagorean group*, in which Plato applies the doctrine of ideas to psychology, ethics and natural science. Plato returned from his travels with his mind enriched with facts and ideals which he had gathered. This group is specially characterized by the idealizing of the personality of Socrates, who became the mouthpiece of his views, and by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, which gave to the writings of this period a mystical tendency.

The prominent thought of this group is that ideas are objective realities, the ground of all truth, while the phenomena of the senses are but copies of them.

*Phaedrus* and the *Banquet* seek to show that the *ἔρως* (devotion to the idea) alone affords the stability of a scientific principle and secures us from arbitrariness and prejudice in thinking.

*Phaedo* bases the immortality of the soul on the ideal theory. *Philebus* applies the highest principles to the



notions of pleasure and the supreme good. *Timaeus* treats of nature and the physical world. Finally, the *Republic*, begun early and completed in successive strata, extending into the last years of the philosopher's life, determines the true character of the State and in general affords the grandest impression of his system as a whole.

Plato himself has given us no systematic exposition of his philosophy, and if we follow Aristotle in classifying his thoughts under the three heads—logic, physics and ethics—it must be remembered that Plato does not himself so divide his philosophy.

1. *Dialectic or logic.* The conversations of Socrates gave to Plato his method of philosophy. Dialectic means originally discussion, conversation. It is therefore the art of developing knowledge by conversation (*Republic*), or in so far as speech and thought are indistinguishable, the science of properly uniting and separating ideas.

But in a more general sense it is the science of ideas, of the absolute truth of things.

We have seen that the inductive method was ascribed to Socrates, by which he proceeded from the particular to the general. When people spoke of persons or acts being just or beautiful, Socrates asked, What is justice? What is beauty? and tested every definition by a number of particular instances. This in general is the procedure of Plato, but in the *Theaetetus* he asks at once the deeper question—What is knowledge? He proves that it is not sensation, as Protagoras suggests, for that alone gives no objective certainty true for everyone. Nor is it opinion, which may be true, but has no certainty. A man can only be said to know when he has got at the reason or causes of things; when he sees facts not in their isolation, but in their relation and unity. The question, therefore, which Plato asks is, What is the permanent and universal which underlies all that is variable and particular?

The answer to this question Plato develops in his *Theory of Ideas*. This is the very kernel of the philosophy of



Plato on which, indeed, his whole system is based. Hence it is desirable that we should form a clear conception of what Plato means by ideas. By this theory Plato reconciles the opposing views of Heraclitus and the Eleatics. According to Plato both the one and the many, the permanent and the variable, have their place in the universe: the former in the world of ideas, the latter in the world of sense.

There is a threefold inquiry with regard to Plato's ideas which may be considered: Concerning (1) their origin, (2) their nature and (3) their relation and unity.

(1) *The origin of Ideas.* Perhaps we shall more clearly understand how Plato was led to the formation of his theory if we start from the passage in which Aristotle describes the genesis of Plato's doctrine. According to Aristotle, Plato's theory arose out of a union of the Socratic concept and the Heraclitean notion of flux. Plato agreed with Heraclitus in holding that all things are ceaselessly flowing, and are therefore incapable of being known. At the same time, he agreed with Socrates as to the importance he attached to universal notions with which definitions are concerned. But he asked, What is this universal or constant element which the general term seeks to express? It cannot be something perceptible, for perceptibles are never constant. But just because it is something permanent and universal, it must be something separable from sensible things. It must have a reality of its own. In this way Plato arrived at the doctrine of ideas, which are simply the objective correlates of our general notions. In the view of Aristotle, Plato accepts Heraclitus' doctrine of flux as far as the visible world is concerned, while at the same time he does justice to the Eleatic principle by elevating the Socratic general concepts into certain incorporeal and unchanging realities, which he calls ideas. The first point which Aristotle makes clear is that Plato hypostatized the Socratic universals, giving to them not merely a conceptual but a substantial existence on their

own account: and, in the second place, he shows that, according to Plato, the ideas are at once transcendent and immanent, at once separate from and yet present in particulars. The idea is, as Plato says, present in the phenomena which bear its name, but at the same time it exists as a separate entity for and by itself.

(2) *The nature of the ideas.* Such being the origin of Plato's theory, we are now in a position to look a little more closely at its nature. The ideas are not simply general names or thoughts of the mind, as Socrates had conceived them. They represent realities. They are to our notions what natural objects are to our sense-perceptions. They are alone pure being, the essence of things with the search of which all knowledge begins. The object of all true knowledge is the ideas. They are the only permanent and universal—that indeed from which all particulars are derived. They exist wherever a general notion exists. For example, when you see a chair or a bed there must exist a general idea of chair or bed which is separate from that which you see, and lies behind the particular instance you are looking at. Every object we behold is simply an instance—an instance of something. That something is the idea. The instance is the particular, the idea is the universal, but it is just because the universal is real that the particular has any significance. The general ideas, expressed by our concepts,—‘Good,’ ‘Being,’ ‘Identity,’ ‘Man,’—are therefore realities. The ordinary man considers general ideas as but abstractions of the mind, or mental copies of sensible things. The reverse is true. It is the ideas which are the models or originals, and the particular things are but the copies. All we can say of the sensible object is that it *has* something of what the idea *is*. Every beautiful object, be it man or statue, or deed, is doomed to destruction. But beauty itself is imperishable, and is more real than all the things which common opinion calls beautiful. In the conceptions of mathematics, which, as Plato says, is the first pre-

liminary training in passing from the life of the senses to a higher intellectual knowledge, we have a clue to the understanding of Plato's theory of ideas. The mathematician looks at a triangle, but he speaks not of this or that triangle, but of *the* triangle—the idea of the triangle—the prototype of all particular triangles. In short, we can only know a thing in so far as we have grasped, as a reality, the idea of it—the universal element which manifests itself in the particular.

While it will thus be seen that Plato separates the intelligible from the sensible world, it must not be imagined that the world of ideas is a mere negative of the sensible world. The ideal world is, on the contrary, more real than the phenomenal world—since things are but copies of ideas and obtain what reality they possess from participation in them.

There are three attributes which Plato assigns to ideas, the examination of which may make their nature clearer. In the first place, each idea is *one* and not many. There cannot, for example, be two ideas of the beautiful, otherwise we should have to postulate a still higher idea to account for the common element in these two, which would be the really existent beautiful. Again, ideas are *changeless* and eternal. On this characteristic of the ideal world Plato never wearies of insisting. The idea always *is*. It never becomes. Although particulars come into being and pass away it is uncreated, ever-existent and imperishable. It is in this kingdom that cannot be shaken alone that we can find rest amid the change and decay of terrestrial things. The third attribute of the ideas is their *perfection*. The idea is thus the absolute standard for the particular group of things which partake of its nature. There is even a perfect bed, a perfect table at which the carpenter looks when manufacturing the particular beds and tables which we use. The manufactured object is always imperfect—it never fully is what it would fain be. So everywhere in nature, and in art, and in all

the efforts of man, the ideal type is there, but it is never wholly realized. As Tennyson has expressed it :

"That type of Perfect in his mind  
In Nature can he nowhere find."

It is this vision of a transcendent standard of beauty which has fired the imagination of artists, and was, in particular, the inspiring motive of the art of Michael Angelo, in whose lifetime the famous academy at Florence made Platonism live again.

(3) *Their relation and unity.* These three attributes of the ideas—their unity, unchangeableness and perfection—may enable us to understand the motive which led Plato to separate his ideas from the region of sense and assign to them a transcendent existence of their own. In the world of space and time there is nothing but multiplicity, nothing that abides, or that is perfect of its kind. Yet earthly things are always pointing to their ideals and suggesting by their very fragmentariness and imperfections their purer archetypes, of which they are but manifestations. The ideas abide in the heavenly sphere, where the gods and the souls of the pure contemplate them. Not only then are the ideas eternal, but they constitute a world apart from the world of earthly existence. They form a hierarchy among themselves, as Aristotle tells us. Just as in our visible world there is a gradation of beings, from the most imperfect creature to the most perfect, so in the world of ideas there is a progressive advance from lower to higher until the highest is reached—which is the Good. This idea is the unifying principle of all the ideas and the cope-stone of Plato's entire philosophy. The ideas therefore are at once individual and members of a higher unity. They form an organism and live a common life. It is true Plato sometimes speaks of the heavens as their abode. But this heaven is not a part of the physical universe. The home of the ideas is a place suitable to the nature of the ideas. The idea of the Good is king of the



intelligible world, as the sun is of the visible. Just as in the material world the sun gives light and life to every part of it, so in the world of ideas, the idea of the Good is the life of all the other ideas, causing them at once to *be* and to be *known*. The Good is therefore the ultimate cause of knowledge; it is the light by which all ideas are seen and known. It is also the ultimate cause of Being, for just as the sun gives generative increase and nourishment to all objects of sense, so the Good furnishes the objects of knowledge, not merely with the power of being known, but with existence itself. In short, the idea of the Good is the source of all subordinate ideas, each of which is but a special adumbration of itself. But if the idea of the Good is absolute, what is God, to whom Plato so often refers? The Good is nothing else than God Himself. If we deny the identity, as is sometimes done, we must maintain that there are two separate principles in the universe: or that one of these is subordinate to the other. But in view of the many passages in the dialogues, notably in the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*, which imply the identity, this is hardly possible. Of the Good we read that "it is the best among things that are." It is "the beginning or source of the universe," the creator or parent of the visible sun, and through it of the world we live in. In like manner God is spoken of as "the Maker and Father of all"—as the creator and sole cause of whatever is good and beautiful and right in the world. Nor must it be assumed that this highest Being is a mere abstract, impersonal principle, as the conception of the Good would seem to imply. In the dialogues the idea is frequently personified. It is spoken of as Father and King. Though it would not be admissible to attribute to Plato all the clear and definite notions of personality and conscious life which later ages associate with the idea of God; still, as the Good is regarded as the supreme creative principle, alike in the world of sense and the world of thought, it is not going too far to say that Plato conceived of it as possessing intelli-



gent life,—that *nous* or reason which communicates being and movement to all that lives.

But now the question arises, How do we human beings know the ideas? What is their relation to our minds? They are not due to experience. They are not attained by perception or sensation. Yet in all our thinking ideas are involved—we cannot pass from a particular object to a general without having recourse to ideas. It is sometimes maintained that the Platonic ideas exist only in the mind of man, but this is a notion which cannot be legitimately held, in view of Plato's frequent insistence on their separate and independent existence. All that comes into our minds, or rather that is developed in our minds, is simply our concepts, which, like sensible things, are but shadowy copies of the eternal ideas. At the same time there is a sense in which it may be said that human beings share in these ideas. Plato was evidently convinced that while the infinite was above and beyond the finite, it was at the same time *present* in the finite—immanent in the souls of men. In proof of this we have but to recall the famous passage in the *Phaedo*, in which Socrates describes his intellectual development. After describing how he had found no satisfaction in the study of mere secondary causes, he proceeds: "Let me now try to show you what kind of cause interests me. . . . I begin with the ideas, postulating a self-existent Beautiful, Good, Great, and so on. If you grant me these, I hope to make you understand what I mean by causation. . . . I hold that if a thing is beautiful, it is so for no other reason than because it *partakes* in the Ideal Beauty. . . . I cleave fast in my own mind that nothing makes an object beautiful except the presence of Ideal Beauty, or their communion with each other, or the advent of the idea in whatsoever way. Upon the mode of connection I do not insist: but only that it is the idea of beauty by which beautifuls are made beautiful." In the same way elsewhere Plato represents the rational faculty as the divine element *in* man. So

that there is a sense in which it may be said that the ideas are not only entities *beyond* but also *within* man.

The absolute idea, and with it all other ideas, may be regarded as original endowments of the mind. But they are at first latent, and we are not conscious of them. The aim and art of all true education lie in drawing forth from the pupil's own mind its own native treasures and awaking those seeds of knowledge which have pre-existed in the soul awaiting full growth and development.

To account for the origin of those germs of truth in the mind Plato falls back on the mythical tradition that the soul in a previous state beheld these ideas, and that knowledge of them is possible because the mind by an act of memory or recollection recovers what is its own. According to Plato true philosophic knowledge is nothing more than recollection. Reasoning is the only road to truth. The art of dialectic,—the intellectual midwifery of Socrates—is necessary to help the soul to bring forth genuine thoughts. The slave-boy in the *Meno*, who manages to prove a simple geometrical proposition, is helped step by step by the questions of Socrates, who only brings out what was already in the lad's mind and enables him to recover the missing whole, of which at first he sees only fragments. Sensations provoke ideas: they do not create them. Their function is to recall to our minds our latent possessions. The perception of corporeal things calls the remembrance back to these forgotten forms and awakens the philosophic impulse—the love of ideas, by which the soul is raised again to the knowledge of the true reality. The homesick soul, living in exile in the world of sense, longs to be reunited with the absolute, and to see again those truths which it once knew. In the seventh book of the *Republic* Plato gives us his celebrated similitude, by which he allegorizes the conversion of the mind from the world of sense to the world of ideas. The majority of men are pictured by him as prisoners in a subterranean cavern, which opens to the day by a long, wide passage; they are

chained with their backs to a fire looking at the shadows, thrown by it on the wall, of men and other figures which pass behind them. These captives represent the condition of men who see nothing but the shadows of realities. If one of these prisoners should be loosed from his bonds and made to turn round and walk towards the light, at first he would be dazzled by the glare and unable to see clearly, but by and by he would realize that what he previously took for realities were nonentities; and, if he were brought up out of the cavern into the light of day, he would soon be aware of the real objects and know that what he had previously beheld in the cave were only shadows, illusions. Remembering his previous state in the cavern, he would pity those who were still within it. All this—the turning round, the toilsome ascent out of the cave, the gradual accustoming of his eyes to the light, the ultimate realization of the objects as they are in themselves—represents the education of the philosopher. Education, in other words, is “the turning round of the eyes of the soul.”

2. The *physics* of Plato is chiefly confined to the *Timaeus*. He gives a rough draft or sketch of the philosophy of nature for which he does not claim certainty. He seeks to explain occurrences and phenomena of nature from the point of view of the world's purpose or end.

The neo-Platonists regarded the *Timaeus* as the most important of Plato's works. In Raphael's “School of Athens” Plato is represented with the *Timaeus* in his hand, and, as has been said, no writing of Plato exercised so powerful an influence on subsequent Greek thought. It must be remembered, however, that Plato himself did not attach supreme importance to this book, and the elaboration of a theory of the physical universe he regarded as but a recreation from severer meditation. In his astronomical views Plato was a child of his age, and though he anticipates many ideas of later times with regard to the movement of the stars and the structure of animal bodies, he had not Aristotle's eager interest in physical matters.

As the details of Plato's cosmology belong rather to the history of natural science than philosophy, it will not be necessary to dwell at any length upon them.

While his teleological view of nature is given in mythical form only, he takes up a position sharply opposed to the mechanical explanation of the world suggested by Democritus. In opposition to the theory that this world is the result of the accidental or undesigned meeting of lawless particles, coming into existence just to perish again, he sets forth his theory that there is only this one world, a most perfect and most beautiful cosmos, unitary in nature and unique in kind, and that its origin can be traced only to a reason acting according to ends.

It may be said that he had no doubt as to the ultimate unity of the universe "which is one and only begotten." The whole of nature is a revelation of the good. The world is a divine child, "the image of its maker—most mighty and good, most beautiful and perfect." "Let me tell you why the Creator made this world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being without jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like unto Himself as possible. . . . For God desiring that all things should be good, and that, so far as might be, there should be nothing evil, having received all that is visible, not at rest but moving in a disorderly and irregular fashion, brought it from disorder into order. . . . As intelligence could not be present in anything that was devoid of soul, when he was forming the universe he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the maker of a work that was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the universe became a living creature, in very truth possessing soul and reason by the providence of God."

The world is an emanation of the world-forming God (*δημιουργός*). The actual cosmos is the image of God which was originally shaped out of the idea, or ideas, and



the formless chaotic mass—an indefinite plasticity, which takes up all corporeal forms into itself. It is significant that Plato, like the earlier philosophers, gets no further back than this formless void or non-being, which he assumes as existing before all else. This primitive material contains the element of evil or imperfection; hence the world, though an emanation of God, cannot be perfect. The main interest of Plato's cosmogony lies in the conception that the world is the product and image of reason—an organism of harmony and order.

3. Plato's *Ethics* is based on a psychology, a doctrine of the soul, which is the first attempt in philosophy to understand the psychical life from within.

The soul springs from the ideal world and discloses its origin in its yearning for the beautiful and its effort to gain the mastery over the physical part of man's nature.

Plato describes the soul of man as a threefold being—a man, a lion and a many-headed hydra: or as a charioteer driving two horses, one of a noble and the other of an ignoble nature. The noble element is striving continually to mount to the region of the heavens, where it may behold the images of divine beauty and wisdom which are proper to its nature; but the baser element, which is the body, is ever dragging the soul down to the earth.

In itself the soul is indestructible and divine, but through its union with the body it participates in the fluctuations of the sensuous nature and is subject to the influence of the physical. Hence it may be said to belong to two worlds, of both of which it bears the traits. In its essence, there is that which corresponds to the world of ideas, and that which corresponds to the world of perception. The former is the rational nature (*νοῦς*), the seat of knowledge and of virtue. The latter, the irrational nature, Plato further divides into two elements—the nobler, which inclines towards reason, and the lower, which resists it. The nobler is the will or spirit (*θῦμος*); the lower, the sensuous desire (*ἐπιθυμία*). Hence, Reason, Spirit, and Appetite,



are the three activities of the soul. The rational element alone, which is the soul in its true being, apart from its mixture with the body, is that which is immortal. It possesses a vitality which survives all change. The proof of the immortality of the soul Plato sets forth chiefly in the *Phaedo*, though he refers to the subject also in other dialogues.

Various arguments are adduced by Plato which have been elaborated by philosophers in later times. He argues the soul's immortality (1) from its simplicity, which renders all decomposition impossible; (2) from the goodness of the creator; and (3) from the fact that it is the very principle of life, and therefore that a transition from being to non-being is impossible; and (4) from the longing of the wise man to be freed from the fetters of the body and come into direct communion with the world of ideas. It has been urged by some modern critics that Plato's arguments do not prove the immortality of the soul at all in the sense of continued personal existence. All that he shows is, it is alleged, that the soul or mind belongs to the eternal world, and not to the world of appearance merely. Yet the doctrine of "Recollection," when stripped of its poetic form, does imply a kind of unity of self, and a continuance of personal existence, at least before this life. And, moreover, it must be noticed that, whatever we may think of his attempted proofs, the conclusion which he seeks to draw from them all, in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere, has reference to the individual soul. "According to Plato," says the late Mr. Adam, "the true and essential 'ego' is the rational and spiritual part of our nature, which he calls *Nous*: and he would consequently hold that we do not lose, but rather gain, our perfect individuality by union with the all-embracing, all-sustaining mind or spirit in which even now we live and move and have our being."

Upon this conception of the soul, Plato bases the *moral destiny* of the individual. The fettering of the soul to the body is at once a consequence and punishment of the

sensuous appetite. The soul exists *before* the earthly life as well as after, and the sin in which the soul is ensnared in the world of sense has been committed in a pre-existent state, and its destiny hereafter will depend upon how far it has freed itself from appetite, and turned to the knowledge of ideas.

Plato teaches the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration after death. The souls of men go to the place of reward or punishment, and after one thousand years they are permitted to choose a new lot of life. He who has thrice chosen the higher life gains, after three thousand years, the home of the gods in the kingdom of thought. Others wander for thousands of years in various bodies, and many are destined to pursue their earthly life in lower and ever lower animal forms.

The supreme aim of the soul is to break the power of evil and attain to freedom and wisdom and goodness. Plato seems to waver in his teaching as to the way in which the higher life is to be reached. Sometimes he would seem to teach a negative ascetic morality of suppression of all appetite, and flight from the world of sense. But in other places he implies that the life of wisdom and goodness can be realized even in this world of sense. This world is full of joy and beauty, and by a life of well-ordered harmony it is to be used and not abused. The passions and appetites, in so far as they are elements of the soul, have their justification, and are, therefore, not to be wholly quenched, but transmuted and transformed into channels of the higher life.

In accordance with this idea, in the *Republic* he shows that each part of the soul has a definite task to fulfil, and a perfection of its own to reach. All virtue is indeed one, but it may be divided into four cardinal virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. The virtue of reason is wisdom (σοφία): the virtue of the spirit or heart is courage (ἀνδρεία): the virtue of sensuous appetite is moderation, self-control (σωφροσύνη).

But in addition to all these, the virtue of the soul as a whole, which binds all the other virtues together and preserves them in a perfect relationship, is justice, integrity (*δικαιοσύνη*).

Righteousness as the unity of the virtues consists in each part in the individual and in society, doing its proper work, and not interfering with the work of others.

Pleasures are distinguished in kind and degree of excellence according to the part of the soul which they accompany, and the pleasures of the highest part must be preferred to those of lower parts, because the higher part, the reason, is the only part capable of judging. Pleasure cannot be the chief good, as the Cyrenaics hold, for it partakes of the nature of the indefinite: but neither is knowledge alone the chief good. The best life must contain both. "Plato's more important ethical dialogues, beginning with the *Protagoras* and ending with the *Philebus*, make a steady advance from the ethics of Socrates," and prepare the way for the more complete "codification" of Aristotle.

Plato's doctrine of the soul leads, naturally, to *his theory of the State*, to a consideration of which the *Republic* is devoted. The tendency of the doctrine of ideas, directed as it is to the general and universal, attains its completion, not in the individual, but in the species. The ethical ideal becomes for Plato the political. At a time when there were everywhere visible the signs of the dissolution of Greek political life, in opposition to the individual theories of happiness which were in vogue, Plato exalts the conception of the State as the ideal of humanity.

The State is indeed the enlarged man. Just as there are three elements in the soul, so there must be corresponding orders in the State—Rulers, Warriors, Workers. Wisdom is the virtue of the rulers and teaching class: courage that of the warriors and guardians (*φύλακες*), while the virtue of the workers, artisans and the great mass of the people is

self-control, obedience. Finally, justice is the virtue and harmony of the whole State.

The main idea of Plato's *Republic* is the sacrifice of the individual to the whole,—the subordination of separate interests to the general good. Private property and family life, education, choice of occupation and employment of special gifts, must all be subordinated to the order of the State and dedicated to the advancement of the common weal. All things are to be in common; even the breeding and rearing of citizens are to be entirely under the control of the rulers. The State is to be a single family, a large educational establishment in which the individual only exists for the good of the whole. By means of a constantly repeated process of selection, continued from birth to maturity, the two upper classes are to be continually preserved and reinforced.

Some of the features of Plato's ideal State were doubtless suggested to him by the Pythagorean brotherhood. But though his general conception is, theoretically, very beautiful and most complete, it is as impracticable as the communistic attempts of modern times. Both tend to suppress individuality and fetter freedom. Plato failed to recognise the worth of man as man, and did not rise above the notion of slavery prevailing in his time. All physical defects were to be banished from the State. Poetry, even, was only to be practised under the supervision of judges; and all dramatic works which misrepresented the human and divine life were to be excluded. Gymnastics and music, mathematics and philosophy, are the means by which the young are to be educated and made strong and fit in body, will and mind.

Plato, as we have seen, is not always quite consistent, for while he sometimes identifies the good and the beautiful and justifies the enjoyment of the good things of life, at other times his teaching is tinged with asceticism, and he preaches abnegation as the path to virtue. But, generally, it may be said that he rises above the cynic contempt for



the beauty of the human form and the graces of social intercourse. The body must be carefully disciplined that it may become the fit servant of the soul; and the young are to be brought up amid fair scenes and noble surroundings that they may be prepared for fulfilling the highest ends of service.

Before leaving Plato, it may be well to attempt to sum up the merits and defects of his position. For Plato is one of the immortal teachers of mankind whom we can never get past, and whose errors are more suggestive and instructive than many another's truths.

The first great truth for which we are indebted to him is that, in order to direct human knowledge to its proper goal in the interpretation of the nature of things, we must start with knowledge itself—from the peculiar gift of reason which has been allotted to man. The "know thyself" of Socrates became for his great disciple the master-key which was to unlock the mystery of being. It is Plato's merit to have been the first to attempt a theory of knowledge. In reaction against the materialism of the Sophists he followed Socrates in emphasizing human reason as the source of all truth—as the one durable and persistent element amid all that was changeable and evanescent. "We could not take for granted even the possibility of knowledge," says Socrates in *Cratylus*, "if everything were changing and had no permanence." The rational principle in man is characterized by the possession of the universal ideas—the good, the beautiful, the true. These ideas are recognisable everywhere as the peculiar property of reason.

The second great truth for which we are indebted to Plato is, that all our thinking is accomplished by means of universal conceptions, which are contrasted with both material things and sensible perceptions. These general ideas are the true object of rational thought, and in them the reason discerns the permanent and essential amid the changing stream of phenomena. This great truth, the doctrine of abstract or universal ideas, has powerfully



influenced the after history of philosophy. It was the truth which Locke was the first to revive and which, since Kant's time, has come to be so important a factor in every system of psychology.

But while the Platonic doctrine of ideas has been the fruitful source of all that is valuable in the philosophy of the mind, in Plato's treatment, the theory is entangled with ontological assumptions, which split his whole conception of the world into a dualism. On the one side he conceives of the soul as an immaterial substance to which alone pure thought belongs. On the other side he places the material world with its perpetual flux and change. Only what the reason apprehends, viz., the universal ideas, are real and true. All else, particular and individual things, are seeming and evanescent. The ideas are the eternal prototypes of things which, by reason of the phenomenal world in which we live, we can only dimly perceive. The true way, therefore, to attain to knowledge is to disentangle the ideas from their material relations, and to rise by abstraction and self-denial above the world of sense into the purer region of thought. The imprisoned soul must be emancipated from the body. In a former state of existence the spirit dwelt with the gods in the realm of ideas. The soul comes into this world with a reminiscence of its former glory, which, however, earthly things tend to obscure and obliterate. All true knowledge is really recollection. To bring that recollection to clearness and to purify the vision of the soul by the crucifixion of earthly desires is the aim and ideal of the wise man's life.

It will thus be seen that the natural tendency of Plato's philosophy is to disparage the world of sense and to regard the earthly life as a clog to the aspirations of the soul.

This dualism of Plato between the world of ideas and the world of phenomena, between the life of knowledge and the life of sense, has become the crux of modern philosophy. How are we to reconcile these two sides? Plato's plan is to allow the phenomena to become absorbed in the

ideas while the material world is banished into the realm of the non-existent, and the life of purity is attained by denying the legitimacy of the senses. But this is an avoidance of the difficulty, not a solution of it. It is the attainment of unity only by suppression of one of the terms of opposition. It might be asked, as indeed Plato himself sometimes sees, why were the desires and passions bestowed upon us if they are only hindrances to the spirit and have no legitimate function to serve? What can be the rationale of a world of phenomena if it is only there to be got rid of?

It must not be supposed that Plato did not see these difficulties, and in his later dialogues, particularly in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, there are those who hold that he sought to recast his theory and eliminate the dualism of his earlier position. But if the introduction of the Demiurge or second principle who forms the world be the work of his later life, it does not remove but increases the duality. The *Laws*, on the other hand, but repeat much of the social philosophy of the *Republic*, but in a more prosaic manner. "He who," says Jowett, "was the last of the poets, in his book of *Laws* wrote prose only: he has himself fallen under the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was combating."

When all is said, we must recognise the theory of ideas as Plato's distinctive glory. Not only is it the basis on which the whole superstructure of his philosophy rests, but it is the foundation on which all subsequent idealists have reared their interpretation of the world. Whatever we may think of his system as a whole and however we may criticise its details, no adverse judgment can detract from the preeminence of Plato among the masters of thought in all ages. All that is fruitful in later speculation has its seeds in his philosophy. It was his to exalt the power of the mind, and he has shown that its influence embraces not ethics and dialectics alone, but elucidates politics, art, and religion. He has based physical science

on a knowledge of mathematics and established a method of research which has continued ever since. He has sketched the outlines of a new religion—a religion of monotheism, of humanity, of purity and immortal life, substituting the intelligent imitation of God for the blind and superstitious observance of his will. Not only do his dialogues disclose a charm of manner and style of literary composition which has never been surpassed, but they breathe a spirit which raises us above the world of sense into a region of exalted types and noble ideals. Raphael in his immortal picture represents Plato as pointing towards heaven. It was the aim of his life and thought to show that all reality and knowledge are to be sought not in this world of change and decay, but in that realm of purity beyond the skies, where God in his unchangeable perfection dwells.

The existence of a world of ideas, outside of and superior to the world of sense, roused the antagonism of his great pupil Aristotle. While Plato practically denies the existence of the empirical world and attributes reality only to the universal ideas, Aristotle, though not denying the world of ideas, conceives also of an actual world as the foundation on which all knowledge must be built.

In Plato, then, philosophy is placed in an idealistic antithesis to actuality, and it therefore requires for its completion a more realistic conception of things. This, as we shall see, was supplied by Aristotle, the greatest of Plato's disciples.

## CHAPTER II

### ARISTOTLE

PASSING over the three more immediate followers of Plato, —Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon,—who succeeded him as heads of the academy, the next name which claims our attention is Aristotle, who at once supplemented and completed the philosophy of Plato.

Aristotle (385-322) was born at Stagira, a Greek colony in Thrace. His father, Neomachus, was a physician at the court of Amytas, King of Macedonia. Left an orphan at seventeen, Aristotle came to Athens, where he remained in the society of Plato for twenty years. After the death of Plato he went to the court of Hermeias, in Mysia, whose sister he married. In the year 343 he was appointed by Philip of Macedon tutor to his son Alexander, and is supposed to have prepared the hero for his future destinies. Milton has told us how Aristotle "bred great Alexander to subdue the world." Hegel tells us this was done by giving to him a consciousness of himself and of his powers. Zeller discovers several good points in Alexander—his precocious statesmanship, his zeal for Hellenic civilization, his moral restraint, and, amid all his subsequent aberrations, a nobility, moral purity, and culture which raise him above other great conquerors. Grote gives, however, a very different view of his character, and describes him as arrogant, drunken, cruel and vindictive, wanting in every



trait of gentleness or moderation. Aristotle himself in more than one passage seems to express admiration for Alexander, regarding him as his ideal of magnanimity. On the whole, however, we can trace little influence upon each other of these two extraordinary men. On Alexander's departure for the East, Aristotle returned to Athens, where, amid the walks of the Lyceum, he meditated and taught: hence the name applied to his school and the epithet given to his disciples—Peripatetics. Charged with atheism, he left Athens in 322, and died soon after in Chalcis, in Euboea, at the age of 63.

*The writings* attributed to Aristotle deal with almost all the sciences known to antiquity. He neglected no branch of knowledge. It is beyond dispute that some of his works have been lost, and it has been said that only about a sixth part of his compositions have come down to us. The story told by Strabo of their concealment in a damp cellar and of their discovery in the age of Sulla is probably nothing more than a fable. But the fragmentary character of many of his writings, their disorder and general want of unity, lead to the surmise that we have only notes of oral lectures at the hands of his pupils. For style of diction and beauty of form they cannot compare with the writings of Plato, though they are distinguished by lucidity and exactness of terminology. Plato was a poet as well as a thinker. Aristotle was before all else a man of science. Of the lost writings, quite recently, in 1891, the fragment on the *Constitution of Athens* was discovered, the papyrus of which is now in the British Museum. Even of the extant works many are known to be spurious and some doubtful, and of those which are genuine it is not an easy matter to make a satisfactory classification. Aristotle himself has divided them into *theoretic*, *practical* and *productive*, corresponding to the three kinds of thinking. The theoretic—whose object is truth—have been subdivided into mathematics, physics and theology; the practical, which treat of the



useful, embrace ethics, economics and politics; and the poetic or productive sciences—whose object is the beautiful—deal with poetry, art and rhetoric.

It will be noticed, however, that an important class of writings—the logical—are omitted from this classification. The reason, possibly, is that Aristotle, though justly famed as the founder of logic, did not regard it as an independent science, but simply as a method or technique of his philosophic investigations—as a kind of propaedeutic of science. His works on the *Categories*, *Concerning Interpretation*, the two *Analytics* and the *Topics*, have been collected under the title *Organon*, a name, it must be observed, not used by Aristotle, and first employed by later scholars.

His *Physics*, or natural philosophy, embrace (1) *Physica*, (2) *De Coelo*, (3) *De Generatione et Corruptione*, (4) *Meteorology*, (5) *Historiae Animalium*, (6) *De Generatione Animalium*, (7) *De Partibus Animalium*.

*Philosophy proper* is discussed in a number of treatises, which were collected at a later time and placed after the physics: hence the name metaphysics.

*Psychological treatises* consist of (1) *De Anima*, (2) *De Sensu et Sensibili*, (3) *De Memoria*, (4) *De Vita et Morte*, and other minor works.

The *Ethical* writings include the *Magna Moralia*, the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, and eight books of the *Politics*.

As has been well said, the works of Aristotle, taken together, form a veritable encyclopaedia of the knowledge possessed in the fourth century before Christ.

There is considerable difficulty in presenting a complete view of Aristotle's philosophy, because he treats of one subject at a time to the exclusion of all others. Before proceeding to consider his system according to his own division, we shall first endeavour to grasp the general character of his philosophy. Next, we shall glance at his contribution to logic and then treat of the three main

divisions—theoretic, practical and poetic—which Aristotle himself supplied.

1. *General character.* Aristotle's view of philosophy agrees in the main with that of Plato. For him also it is the knowledge of the universal essence of things, and he is convinced that only by the pathway of scientific generalization is the knowledge of reality possible. But at the same time, while Plato starts with general ideas, Aristotle begins with actual things as they are commonly presented to us, and proceeds inductively from the particular to the general. The one idea to which he may be said to remain true is that the individual is the real. If Plato emphasizes the universal, Aristotle emphasizes the particular. The process of all thought he conceives to be a rising from the individual to the general, and thence by analysis to arrive again at the individual.

The difference might also be stated in another way. Plato discusses the problem of reality *as it is*. Aristotle is concerned rather with the *causes* of reality. Being for him is a process of development or growth, and it is more interesting for him to inquire how and whence a thing came to be than to ask what it is. There is no such thing as pure matter. It is always in a process of becoming. All matter contains within it the potentiality of something more. Hence it is the inner meaning and final cause of a thing that is its true significance. The transition from the potential to the actual is always conceived by Aristotle as motion, growth, development. Hence while Plato dwells upon the static reality of the world, Aristotle insists upon its dynamic aspects, and sees everything as moving upwards towards the realization of an end, which was implicitly contained within it from the beginning. The world therefore presents a gradated series of realities which leads upwards from lower to higher forms till at last it attains its climax in the perfect being of God.

2. *The logic of Aristotle.* In keeping with this general character we may mark also a difference in the logical

method of Aristotle. While that of Plato was in general deductive, that of Aristotle is inductive as well. Aristotle's idea of logic was more formal and technical than Plato's dialectic. Hence, according to Aristotle, the analytical investigations which have been gathered together under the name of *Organon* were intended as a methodological preparation for philosophy, and not as a body of properly philosophical doctrine.

The first section of the *Organon* is entitled the *Categories*, which deal with notions proper or the predicates of being. The various species of mental representations correspond, according to Aristotle, with definite forms of that which exists. The most universal forms of existence are ten in number—substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, passion. Their use may be thus illustrated: 'Socrates is a man, seventy years old, wise, the teacher of Plato, now sitting on his couch, in prison, having fetters on his legs, instructing his disciples, and questioned by them.' It has been pointed out that this classification errs both by excess and defect. The first four are really the essential, the others are but qualifications of them. As a matter of fact, Aristotle makes little use of them, and practically they may be reduced to two—substance and accident, or, logically, subject and predicate.

The second of the logical treatises, *De Interpretatione*, deals with the proposition in which the distinctions between contrary and contradictory, and between possible and necessary propositions, are for the first time clearly explained. In the third section—the *Analytics*—the doctrine of the syllogism is set forth, together with an account of applied reasoning under the two heads of Demonstration and Dialectic. It further distinguishes between induction, arguing upwards to universals from particulars, and deduction, arguing downwards to particulars from universals.

The doctrine of the syllogism is the central point of the

Aristotelian logic. On this converges all he taught concerning the forms of thought and their various applications and uses. The outline of this doctrine, which forms the basis of logic to this day, is thus presented by Aristotle. The syllogism is the deduction of a judgment from two other judgments. Since in a judgment one concept, viz., the predicate, is affirmed of another concept,—the subject, this affirmation requires a third,—a middle term, which is related to both the subject and the predicate.

These two relationships form two statements or judgments, which are called the premisses (*πρότασεις*) of the syllogism.

There are three kinds of syllogisms—(1) Apodictic, where the truth is certain; (2) Dialectic, where the truth is disputable and only probable; (3) the Sophistic or fallacious.

According to Aristotelian logic, inference or proof can only follow from premisses that are already known or sure. But behind these premisses there must be other ultimate grounds which cannot be proved. It is the task of science before deducing particulars from generals, to search out the starting-point for deduction—the ultimate grounds of proof. The activity of thought involved in this process Aristotle calls *dialectic*, and has laid down its principles in the *Topics*. This procedure of searching out the ground is not attended by the same apodictic certainty as that of deducing consequences from already given premisses. Investigation, therefore, takes the opposite course of that of deduction; while the one inference proceeds from the general to the particular: the other—the searching process—proceeds from the particular to the general. The one is the deductive method, the other is the inductive. Every true deduction, therefore, implies a previous process of induction.

According to the conception of its founder, Logic is the propaedeutic to his first philosophy or metaphysic. Accordingly, we now proceed to a consideration of



Aristotle's Philosophy proper, and we shall follow the classification which he himself has laid down—Theoretic, Practical, and Poetic.

I. *Theoretic*, which deals with truth as such, is further divided into metaphysics or first philosophy, physics and mathematics, the latter of which we may omit.

1. *Metaphysics*. Under this head (although the word was not employed by Aristotle himself) he treats of the principles common to all things, the universal constituents of being. The particular sciences have to do with the proximate causes of being, but metaphysics considers Being as such, irrespective of all considerations of time and place—the eternal essence of things as opposed to the relative and the accidental.

Though Aristotle treats of a number of subjects in his metaphysics which are not very closely connected, perhaps the best way to get to the core of his philosophy is to contrast his position with that of Plato, from whom he inherited the problem of knowledge which mainly occupies his thought. Plato, as we saw, practically placed the two worlds—the world of matter and the world of ideas—in opposition. And the question which Aristotle had to solve was how to get quit of this duality. In setting up a world of ideas, Plato so far from solving the problem of being, really complicates it by adding to the real world a world of useless names or abstractions. We are at a loss to know what is the relation between things and ideas. Plato's theory does not really account for being. The "ideas" were only a repetition of things. They were but poetic fictions with no causative or motive power in them—but "things of sense eternalized."

They existed apart (*χωριστά*) from individual things, which were formed after their pattern. Hence Aristotle objected to Plato's theory on four grounds:

(1) Such a doctrine is a mere doubling of sensible existence.

(2) The ideas have no real being, and cannot be the



causes of motion, nor can they explain the varying phenomena of the world.

(3) They are contradictory, inasmuch as they are presented as the essence of things and yet as existing separate from things.

(4) Supposing the ideas to exist, they and the things which are their copies would require to be subsumed under a higher idea; *e.g.* if the idea "man" exists as something apart from actual men, we must have a higher idea to embrace both the ideal and the actual man. That is to say, as Aristotle expresses this objection, the ideal theory involves the supposition of a "third man." Aristotle's merit here lies in showing that the genus has no existence apart from the individual, that, indeed, a thing and its idea cannot be separated.

Aristotle therefore rejects Plato's theory of specific types or real entities, considered apart from things. He does not of course deny the objective existence of species. For him as well as for Plato the general idea is the essence of the particular. What he denies is that ideas as such exist apart from things. The idea is inherent in the thing. It is its *form*, and cannot be separated from it.

On the other hand, if idealism, as represented by Plato, is untenable, not less is materialism. Matter also has no reality apart from the idea or form—matter without the inherent idea is as much an abstraction.

Nor does movement exist of itself. It presupposes at once a mover and an element that is moved. The ideas of Plato were static. They are finished products, having in them no force or energy, so that there is no possible transition from ideas to things or things to ideas. Hence neither the idea nor matter, nor movement, has a substantial or independent existence. Reality consists in all three notions taken as a whole.

The criticism of Plato's theory led Aristotle therefore to the positive statement of his own doctrine of Being—and in particular to the elaboration of the two main

features of his system—the doctrine of *Form and Matter*, or *Potentiality and Actuality*. Aristotle approaches the subject by asking not what substance or being actually is, but—given any particular thing—say a table, a statue or a man—What are the generative causes of it, what are the productive elements which go to make it what it is? All things which have been produced, whether by nature or by art, are ultimately dependent upon four principles—form or essence, matter or substratum, moving or efficient cause, and end or final cause.

(1) Matter is not, properly speaking, the existent, neither is it the non-existent. It is not empty space, but a corporeal substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*). It is the mere potentiality or capacity of existence (*δύναμις*).

(2) *Form or essence* (*εἶδος* or *οὐσία*) is that which gives actuality to existence. Matter void of all form would be in a state of privation (*στέρησις*). Matter united with form is matter as we find it, and is called by Aristotle organized,—or realized, being that has come to existence in the processes of nature (*ἐντελέχεια*).

(3) *The efficient cause* is that power which raises matter, the mere capacity of being, into form, the perfected existence. Every change from the potential to the actual is brought about by a cause, called by Aristotle *τὸ κίνησαν*, the moving cause. It may either operate from within, as in the case of organized existences (*e.g.* when in the plant or the animal or man there is contained the germ which gradually unfolds and develops); or it may operate from without, as in the case of artistic construction, in which the material is given and the work of the artist or artificer is added to produce the shape he has in his own mind. In either case there is an operative cause by which the materials are moulded into form.

(4) *The final cause* or end is that for which everything exists. Everything has a purpose, and that purpose is called its final cause. A final cause always implies intelligence, which an efficient cause does not necessarily imply.

To illustrate the operation of these various elements we may take the case of a house. There is first the potential material for the house (matter). There is the house actually existing in the mind of the builder (form). There is the builder (efficient cause). There is the purpose or end—the house realized (final cause).

The same is true in the realm of nature. A living organism, say a man, is the product of four causes: (1) The substance or substratum out of which he is made; (2) the type or idea according to which the embryo tends to develop; (3) the act of creation or generation; (4) the purpose or end for which he has been created. Matter, idea, force, purpose, are the four principles involved in the production of everything that exists. But while we may distinguish these four generative causes, it will be seen that three of them—the idea, the force, and the purpose—may be regarded as one. If, for example, we take a work of art—a statue—the idea, the purpose, and the creative power exist in the mind of the sculptor, while the matter, the block of marble which he manipulates, is really separate and distinct. So that ultimately the four causes may be reduced to two—matter and form. The one is that out of which the thing is made; the other, the idea or form, is that which causes it to assume a particular character.

If Aristotle had gone no further he would have been no more successful than Plato in overcoming the duality between matter and idea. But he now proceeds to introduce two new determinations which help to bridge over the breach between these two notions. These are *potentiality* and *actuality*—*δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. All Being consists in a relation of these two. And both are different stages of the same development. The seed is the potentiality of the tree—the tree is the actuality of the seed. The marble block is the potentiality of the statue—the statue is the actuality of the marble. Thus matter and form, potentiality and actuality, cannot be separated. There is

no such thing as matter existing for itself. It always contains within it that which it may become. Nor is there any such thing as pure form. It always requires a certain substratum or potentiality as a basis for its realization. From matter arise the imperfections, limitations and individual qualities. From form come the essential, unalterable attributes, the specific nature of the thing. Matter is never pure privation. It is always something, which by its nature is disposed to become determined by means of form. There is even a certain longing or desire in it for realization. There is an idea or form in every piece of matter: there is matter underlying every special form.

Matter and idea are therefore correlative terms, which, instead of excluding, presuppose and supplement each other. *Motion* is the term which mediates between them. Hence the importance, as we have seen, which Aristotle attaches to the notion of movement. By the employment of this category, which inheres both in the matter and form and belongs to each, Aristotle escapes the duality of Plato. Everything is in a process of development, of becoming. All potentiality is actuality: all actuality is potentiality. The organism is the actuality of the germ. Nay more, each thing looked at from a different point of view is both matter and form. Brass is form or energy in relation to the raw material, matter or potentiality in relation to the finished statue. The tree of which a table is made is form in relation to the seed from which it grew; but it is matter in relation to the table. The boy is form in relation to the infant; but matter or potentiality in relation to the man. Thus there is a continuous gradation rising from lower to higher forms—each thing being the substratum of that which is above it and idea of that which is below it. The whole universe of inorganic and organic forms presents a continuous development which has its worth and meaning in the final cause or end towards the realization of which it is moving.

This teleological view of the world naturally suggests



a final and intelligent cause, and therefore *theology* is the cope-stone of Aristotle's metaphysics. Metaphysics he called the theological science, because God is the highest object of inquiry. The universe is a thought in the mind of God. Although matter never exists without form, nor form apart from matter, there is one essence which is self-existent, and unmoved—the first great final cause of all that is—the intelligence which originally sets in motion the whole universe. Everything that is moved must have its cause. But if we follow the series of causes back, we reach at last the immaterial prime mover (*πρῶτον κινῶν*), that which moves all but is itself unmoved, the one perfect incorporeal and, therefore, divine spirit. In his proofs of God's existence it was natural for Aristotle, who sees adaptation and design everywhere, to accept the teleological view which had already been suggested by Socrates and Plato. But the argument from design is not the only or chief one with him. He argues also that, although motion is eternal, there cannot be an infinite series of causes, and therefore there must be a first, which is the source of all others. Still further, he contends that the actual, though last in appearance, is really first in nature. Hence before all matter, before all generation and production, pure actuality must have existed. Actuality therefore is the cause of all things that are. This original ground of being and prime mover means for Aristotle very much the same thing as the idea of the Good means for Plato, and to it Aristotle ascribes all the predicates of the Platonic idea. It is eternal, unchangeable, immovable, wholly independent, separated from all else, incorporeal, yet the cause of all generation and change. He is, as Aristotle calls him, "the thought of thought" (*νόσις νοήσεως*), the absolute spirit, who dwells in eternal peace and self-enjoyment, who knows himself as the absolute truth and is in need of neither action nor virtue. Aristotle's conception of deity has had an incalculable influence upon the future of theological



thought. Not only has it laid the foundation of the cosmological argument, but it has shaped the monotheism of European theology.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that he has not completely succeeded in deducing the Absolute Spirit nor satisfactorily reconciled it with the rest of his system. Why the ultimate ground of movement should also be a personal being Aristotle does not clearly show. It is also impossible to see how there can be something that is a moving cause and yet itself is unmoved. How can that which is static and inactive, permanently self-identical and self-contained be the occasion of movement and change in others? His Divine being is without activity and influence, and enters in no way into the life of the world. Just as the duality between matter and form is never quite overcome, so here in the relation of God to the world the dualism becomes more apparent.

2. *Physics*. The physics of Aristotle, the second division of theoretical science, occupies a very large portion of his writings, and continues the consideration of the rise of matter into form, unfolding with a wealth of illustration and argument the graduated series through which nature passes upwards till it finds its completion in the soul of man. Among the physical treatises of Aristotle may be mentioned *De Coelo*, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, *Historiae Animalium*; and to these may be added his psychological writings—*De Anima*, *De Sensu et Sensibili*, and other minor works on Memory, Life and Death, etc. Though Aristotle's fame rests upon his labours in the realm of natural science even more than upon his metaphysical and ethical works, it will not be possible for us here to do more than indicate the trend of his thought on nature. He may be regarded as the founder of comparative zoology, botany and meteorology, not less than the first to give impulse to the study of biology and psychology.

Physics, or the study of nature, considers existence not

as it is in itself, but so far as it participates in movement. The works of nature differ from the products of art, for while the latter has no tendency to change, nature is essentially spontaneous and self-determining. Nature, however, does not determine this internal activity except according to definite law. There is no accident in nature. "Nature," he says, "does nothing in vain." She is always striving after the best. Everything in the world has an end in view. If nature does not always attain to perfection or to the realization of the idea, it is because it has to contend with matter, which is at once the vehicle and the obstacle of its realization. Hence nature must often be content with the less perfect. The end of all terrestrial life is man. In comparison with man, Aristotle considers woman generally as something maimed, incomplete—nature's failure; and the other animals he finds still more deficient. Did nature act with full consciousness these imperfect formations would not exist.

In his purely physical works, Aristotle considers the universal conditions of all natural existence to be *motion*, *space*, *time*. These elements he reduces to the two principles already considered—potentiality and actuality.

*Motion* is the transition of the possible into the actual. *Space* is the possibility of motion, and is infinitely divisible. *Time* is the measure of motion, and is also divisible and expressible in numbers.

Aristotle derives from his idea of motion his theory of the universe in his work *De Coelo*. *The world is globe-shaped*, circular, the most perfect form. The heaven, which is composed of *ether*, stands in immediate contact with the first cause. The *stars*, which are passionless, eternal, and in restless activity, come next in order. The *earth-ball* is in the middle of the world, and is furthest from the prime mover and least participant of divinity. All nature exhibits a *progressive series* of organisms rising from inorganic matter, to plants and animals. That which produces the movement from one condition to another is

the principle of life or the soul of things. Life is defined in the power of self-movement. The word  $\psi\chi\eta$  is not limited to intelligence, it is the living power in things. Even in plants soul is present, in virtue of which they are able to assimilate what is needful for their support and to propagate themselves. In animals the soul manifests itself in sensation, desire, and locomotion. The functions of this principle are directed and restrained by a moderating power which is wanting in plant life. Man is the goal of all the various forms of life. While in the plants the soul is the principle of nourishment, and in animals also, the source of sensation and the principle of production, in man there is added the fourth power, the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ , or active reason, which comprehends all the other principles, and has besides a power of imagination, of memory, and of free will.

In his first book of the *De Anima*, Aristotle presents an elaborate discussion of the nature of the *soul*. He begins by refuting some of the views held by his predecessors. The soul is not simply a distinct entity from the body. Nor is it a mere harmony of the body or blending of opposites. Nor is it one of the four elements nor even a compound of the four. There is something in it which defies all analysis and transcends all material conditions. In no sense can it be conceived as corporeal. The soul must be conceived as the form of the body, related as form to matter. Soul and body are not therefore two distinct things, but one in two different aspects. The soul is not the body, but it belongs to the body. It is the power which the living body possesses but the lifeless body lacks. It is, in short, the end for which the body exists—the final cause of its being.

But while the soul, which is the radical principle of all life, is one, we may distinguish its several faculties. These are nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and rational.

Of these the sensitive and rational are the most

tant. Sensation is the faculty "by which we receive the forms of sensible things, as the wax receives the figure of the seal without the metal of which the seal is composed." There are five external senses. In addition to these there are internal senses, of which memory and imagination are examples.

The intellect (*νοῦς*), which constitutes what is specific in man, is the faculty by which intellectual knowledge is acquired. It differs from the sensitive faculties in that it has for its object the abstract and universal. It may be called the "locus of ideas," in so far as it is there that ideas are received. But it must be remembered that Aristotle gives no countenance to the doctrine of innate ideas. All knowledge comes through the senses, and the intellect in no way creates the concept, though it is improper to attribute to him the view that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, afterward maintained by Locke. If Aristotle speaks of the "passive" intellect and distinguishes it from the "active" (though there is much diversity of opinion as to his meaning), it is possible that he intended the active reason to be regarded as the intellect in its purity, independent of and unaffected by matter—reason as it exists in God; whereas by the passivity of reason he implied reason as it is in man, subject to the impressions of the senses.

II. *Practical Philosophy*. Under this division are included the Ethical and Political doctrines of Aristotle.

1. *Ethics* is the natural outcome of his psychology. Man not only sums up the whole development of nature, but adds something higher. In virtue of his intelligence he stands out of the chain of causality and is able to make himself the object of his consciousness.

Aristotle started, like his predecessors, with the idea of an end. Man, being intelligent, must seek the highest end. The end of man has usually been held to be happiness. But there has been a diversity of view as to what happiness is. There have been four theories of happiness



1. Sensual pleasures.
2. Honour or social distinction.
3. Intellectual life.
4. The good, which belongs to certain things by nature.

All these Aristotle in part rejects. As intelligence is the distinguishing feature of man, intelligence must indeed form the chief factor in any true notion of happiness. In order, however, to ascertain the true nature of happiness for any man, we must first find out what is his proper work or place in the world. "Man's proper work," as defined by Aristotle, "is a conscious and active life of the soul in accordance with reason." Hence follows his definition of happiness. "Man's good or happiness is a conscious and active and rational life of the soul in accordance with virtue and carried on in favourable circumstances."

It is to be noted that in Aristotle's view happiness is (1) mental and not physical; (2) it cannot be obtained without the practice of virtue; (3) it is an activity or energy and not a mere potentiality; (4) it implies a life of favourable circumstances.

This definition leads to three ethical questions:

(1) What are the outward conditions necessary for happiness?

(2) What are the inward qualities?

(3) What is the energy and activity by means of which these conditions are to be brought into play?

Under the *first* question Aristotle discusses the dependence of happiness on external circumstances, and holds generally that sufficient means, noble birth, family, friends, personal advantages, are more or less necessary to perfect happiness.

Under the *second* question Aristotle discusses the nature and scope of virtue or intelligence, which is the peculiar gift of man. This intelligence manifests itself in two ways: (a) It has a life of its own; (b) it can govern the passions. Hence there are two classes of virtues: the intellectual and the moral. Virtue, in reference to intelli-

gence, is one; in regard to the passions, it is manifold. As the passions must be trained, virtue becomes a *habit*. Hence we have what has been called the "golden mean" of virtue. Virtue is defined as "a habit of observing the relative mean in action to be determined by reason."

Under the *third* question is considered the discipline or activity by which the highest good is to be brought about.

Virtue, it will thus be seen, is to be acquired through practice. Aristotle opposes the theory that virtue is implanted in man by nature, or is a mere knowledge of what is right, as Plato held. It follows, therefore, that virtue is not the same for every man, but is determined by the circumstances and relations of the individual. There are indeed as many virtues as there are relations of life. At the same time Aristotle gives a list of the principal virtues, which include, temperance, valour, generosity, magnanimity. Each of these principal virtues stands as a mean between two opposite vices, one being an excess and the other a deficiency. Courage is the due mean between cowardice and rashness. Temperance is related, on the one hand, to insensibility, and on the other to greed. In like manner liberality lies between avarice and prodigality, modesty between impudence and bashfulness, sincerity between self-disparagement and boastfulness, good temper between surliness and obsequiousness, just resentment between callousness and spitefulness, magnanimity between meanness of mind and pomposity.

According to Aristotle the highest virtue is wisdom; and the highest wisdom,—the supreme aim of man's life,—philosophy, the love of wisdom. Here the highest virtue and the greatest happiness are one. "To every man that energy is the most eligible which is according to his proper habit; and, therefore, to the good man that is most eligible which is according to virtue." Consequently, "happiness does not consist in amusement; for it is absurd that the end should be amusement. . . . The happy life seems to be, therefore, according to virtue." And if we

ask what kind of virtue? the answer is, "the virtue of the best part of man." The highest virtue, then, since the intellect is the highest part of man, is the life of reflection or contemplation. This energy is at once the noblest, the most constant, the pleasantest, and the most self-sufficient. It is true that even this perfect happiness is dependent on favourable circumstances. The contemplative man requires indeed the necessities of life, but he does not require, like those who practise the moral virtues, others to act upon. Contemplation can be loved for its own sake, and can be pursued in quietness and leisure. In this he differs from the statesman and the soldier, both of whom are immersed in the affairs of life. Indeed, such a life, the life of intellectual enjoyment, approaches nearest to the divine. Though this happiness is beyond man, yet, as there is in him something divine, he ought to aspire to the satisfaction of this divine nature, and not to mind only earthly things because he is mortal. "As far as it is in him, he should make himself immortal and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle in him." Besides, he should remember that "this principle is each man's 'self' if it is really the ruling and better part, and though it may be small as compared with his bodily frame, yet it immeasurably surpasses it in value." Moreover, the happiness of contemplation is that which the gods themselves enjoy. Moral virtues are human, but this is divine, "for it is ridiculous to suppose that the gods are engaged in pursuits like men." He who, therefore, would attain to the likeness of the gods and partake of their felicity, will seek to enter on this life of intellectual bliss.

It has been remarked that Aristotle's list of virtues lacks system, and is marred by significant omissions. There is no mention, for example, of humility, gentleness, or charity. The list is aristocratic. They are the virtues of a gentleman and not of man as man. He does not consider a slave as capable of either virtue or happiness, and

a poor man is handicapped in the exercise of his moral and intellectual energies. It is obvious that such an artificial parallelism as Aristotle presents in his classification of the virtues can scarcely be carried out without a considerable distortion of the facts. The only virtue which can be with truth described as a form of moderation is temperance. Sometimes, it will be observed, he seems to deduce the extremes from the mean rather than the mean from the extremes, and sometimes one of the extremes would seem to be created to balance the other. It has been objected by some that by the doctrine of the 'mean' Aristotle "obliterates the absolute and awful difference between right and wrong." Aristotle, however, anticipates this last objection by remarking that it is only according to the most abstract and metaphysical conception that virtue is a mean between vices, whereas, from a moral point of view, it is an extreme. If we substitute for 'mean' 'law,' as Kant suggests, some of the ambiguity is obviated. Still, after all extenuation is made, it may be questioned whether any qualitative term be a fit expression for a moral idea. "The theory of duty," says Sir Alex. Grant, "can scarcely be said to exist in Aristotle, and all that relates to the moral will is with him only in its infancy." Μεσότης expresses the beauty of good acts, but scarcely expresses the goodness of them.

But the main defect of Aristotle's treatment of virtue is that he regards the passions as wholly irrational and immoral. Passion in this sense can have no "mean," nor can habit of itself make a man virtuous. Mere habit may be a hindrance to higher pursuits. It is indeed a good master, but a bad servant. You cannot reduce morality to mechanical rules. The spiritual life of man is based on the possibility of breaking through habit and making a new start.

The discussion of the virtues or mean states, both moral and intellectual, forms an important part of the *Ethics*. In the practical consideration of each individual virtue,



Aristotle treats of the moral and intellectual virtues separately, but it must not be supposed that he implied that they could exist independently. According to his view, moral virtue implies the due regulation of our moral nature, with all its instincts, appetites, and passions; and this state only exists when they are subordinated to the control of the reasoning faculties. Again, the reason does not attain to its full vigour if our moral nature be not in a well-regulated state. Hence the different parts of human nature reciprocally act and react on each other; every act of self-control and every good resolution carried into effect increase the vigour of the pure reason and render this highest faculty of our being more capable of performing its work. On the other hand, the more powerful the reason becomes, the fewer obstacles the lower part of our nature puts in its way, the more effectually does it influence the moral life, and strengthen and confirm our habits of virtue.

It will be seen that several of the virtues discussed by Aristotle belong to man in his political and social, rather than in his individual character, and hence we are naturally led from the *Ethics* to the *Politics*, of which indeed it forms a part.

Among others of this nature he treats of *magnificence*, the virtue of the rich, which we nowadays would hardly consider a virtue, but which to the Greek mind was akin to patriotism. Aristotle also deals with *justice*, not merely in its universal aspect as implying right conduct towards god and man, but also in its special aspect as the virtue of a man engaged in the public and political exercise of authority. In its more general meaning justice signifies the observance of the right order of all the faculties of man, but in its more restricted sense it is the virtue which regulates a man's dealings with his fellowmen. It is divided into distributive, corrective and commutative justice. And lastly, he treats of *friendship*—the law of sympathy, concord, and love, existing between the good and virtuous,

inseparably connected with, and, indeed, based upon a reasonable "self-love." Friendship is a subject congenial to the Greek mind. "It pervades many of her historical and poetic traditions; it is interwoven with many of her best institutions, her holiest recollections." In the form of hospitality it was the bond which united the Greeks into one vast family, whose claims, even in time of warfare, were sacred. It is natural that both Plato and Aristotle should devote themselves to its consideration. Aristotle places it supreme among the virtues, regarding it as superseding even the necessity of justice itself. "When men are friends there is no need of justice: but when just, they still need friendship." Friendship, he says, is necessary to life. It not only encourages moral virtue, supplying opportunities for its exercise, but it is absolutely necessary to the happiness of man, which cannot be considered complete unless his amiable affections and social sympathies are satisfied. After treating of the grounds on which friendship is based—according to some, resemblance; according to others, dissimilarity; and to others, physical causes—he asks what is the object of friendship, which he discovers in the good, the pleasant, and the useful. Friendship, for the sake of the merely useful or the pleasant, is not real friendship, for when the object passes away the friendship is dissolved. The friendship of the good is the highest form of friendship, for it is based on mutual respect and reciprocity of service (*Ethics*, bk. VIII.).

2. The treatment of friendship naturally leads Aristotle to the discussion of the *social and political aspects of life*. Indeed, as we have already said, the *Ethics* is but a subdivision of the great and comprehensive science of *politics*. Man is really a political or social being; that science, therefore, which would investigate the subject of human good, must study the nature of man, not only as an individual, but also in relation to his fellows, as a member of a family, as a member of a State or political community.

The development, therefore, of the principles of man's moral nature must necessarily precede, and be an introduction to an investigation of the principles of human society.

Neither virtue nor happiness can be attained by the individual alone. Man is a part of a larger whole. The State is the measure of the individual. Life is only possible for a man in so far as he shares it with others. The basis of life is the family, which is composed of three relationships—man and wife, parents and children, master and slaves. The family gives rise to the community, the community to the State. The object of all civil and political order is the well-being of all the members, and as that ultimately depends on virtue, so the production and development of social virtue are the first object of the State. "Political science is concerned with nothing so much as with producing a certain character in the citizens, or, in other words, with making them good and capable of performing noble actions."

Aristotle proceeds to discuss the various theories of government which have been proposed and the different forms which the State has assumed. He criticises the republic of Plato, and takes exception especially to its communistic features. He justly says that it is not so much the circumstances as human nature itself which must be improved. In general, he says, there are three kinds of political constitutions, and three corruptions of them—monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy. Of these monarchy is the best and timocracy the worst. The three corruptions are—tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Of these tyranny is the worst and democracy the least bad. The best form of government is that which most fully meets the needs of the individual and family, and most effectively promotes the moral culture and activity of the greatest number. The rule of a single individual may be right as a kingdom, bad as a despotism. The rule of the few may be good if it is based on wisdom, bad if based on birth or property.

Aristotle emphasizes the necessity of *education* both for children and adults. It is not sufficient to be acquainted with the theory of virtue, but to possess virtue and practise it, education is needed, and must be enforced by law. Aristotle here agrees with Plato in his demand for a public system of instruction.

III. *Productive*. The last division of the philosophy of Aristotle he calls *The Productive* (ποιεῖν). Of this section there is preserved, besides the rhetoric, only a fragment of his theory of the art of poetry, under the name of the *Poetic*. It starts from the principles relating to the nature of art in general, but it offers only an outline of a theory of tragedy. Art, says Aristotle, is imitative production. The arts are distinguished both by their objects and materials. The object of poetic art are men and their actions. Its means are language, rhythm, and harmony. Tragedy in particular represents an important action as performed by speech and act. Poetry is divided into three parts—epic, tragic, and comic poetry. The purpose of these imitative arts is an ethical one. They, indeed, afford pleasure, but that is not their special aim. The passions of men, fear and sympathy, are to be excited, so that gradually, the purification of the soul and the conquest of the passions, may be achieved. The aim of art as of science is the highest good of man, and is to be reached in the realm of knowledge.

The intellectual life, as we have already seen, is the highest, to the cultivation of which all the arts and all the disciplines must ever be directed. The knowledge of the highest truths is designated by Aristotle "a beholding" (θεωρία), and with this contemplation of truth man gains a participation in that pure thought in which the essence of God consists, and thus also in the eternal blessedness of the divine self-consciousness.

We may now briefly sum up the position we have reached. With the realization of the mind and its ideas on the one hand, and of matter and its forms on the other,



Greek philosophy may be said to have attained its consummation. For Plato, the principal elements of knowledge are the universal ideas; for Aristotle the chief factors are matter and form. While Plato seeks the principle of things in the ideal world, Aristotle fixes his attention on the actual or objective world. Aristotle, indeed, does acknowledge with Plato reason and its functions as factors of knowledge, but he demands also due regard for the sensible world, which, he holds, must furnish the material for thought. In his view there are two essential elements which must be taken account of in any rational apprehension of the world. The first is the *ύλη* or raw material, which human activity shapes to various objects of use. The second is the "form" which the human intelligence imparts to the material that is already given. "The form," he says, "is the essential part of the thing." "The soul," he remarks, in a famous passage, "may be compared to the hand, for the hand is the tool of tools, as the mind is the form of forms." This conception of purpose or design, which Aristotle introduced into the philosophy of nature, may be regarded as one of his chief merits, marking as it does a distinct advance of thought.

But just as we saw the weakness of Plato lay in the abstraction of his "ideas," so the weakness of Aristotle lies in the abstraction of his "matter." He conceives of it as already given, and as throughout passive and inert, without qualities or motion in itself. The human mind may modify and work it into various shapes, but it itself has no movement or inherent force. The question which inevitably suggested itself was,—whence and how came motion out of matter? How are we to account for the perpetual change and evolution which the material world presents? How, in a word, did the world as we know it come into being? Aristotle, in so far as he realized the significance of the problem, was forced to resort to a *deus ex machina* or "prime mover" standing outside the world, the *πρῶτον κινούν ἀκίνητον* that set all things in eternal motion.

## *PART II*

### *PHILOSOPHY IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD*

PLATO and Aristotle form the two great pillars of Greek philosophy—the master-spirits of the ancient world. In their union and contrast they constitute the two poles of thought around which all human search for truth must revolve. With them Greek philosophy proper may be said to cease. Greek speculation comes forth from its isolation, and enters as a factor into the more general stream of civilization, which was created under the Roman power by the contact and fusion of the peoples who dwelt around the Mediterranean. This process of incorporation began after the breaking up of the Hellenic States. The conquest of Alexander changed the moral, as well as the political, outlook of the ancient world. Hellenism was no longer restricted to the cities and colonies of Greece, but was called upon to realize itself as a social and intellectual power far beyond its own territory. With the fall of its political independence, and its absorption into the Roman empire, the Greek nation accomplished its task of civilization, and by its dispersion over the world its philosophy became the common possession of mankind, and its thinkers the teachers of the nations. The three stages of future civilization are, Hellenism, Romanism, Christianity. Its outward bond is the Roman empire, and its inner union Christianity; while its three principal cities of influence are Athens, and the Hellenic cities; Rome,

and its colonies; and Alexandria, the seat of oriental and Christian theology.

Philosophy brought into contact with wider interests is no longer concerned with metaphysical problems, but is directed to more practical aims. With the scattering of populations and the revolution of states, the individual is thrown in upon himself and seeks guidance in the moral affairs of life. Philosophy is pursued not for its theoretic interests, but chiefly for its practical results. The conduct of life becomes the supreme problem of thought, and the aim of philosophy is to find a complete art of living.

In the cultured world, not in Greece only, but throughout the Roman empire, belief in the old religions was shaken, and men sought in philosophy the consolation denied them by their faith. As a result, philosophy took the form of ethical inquiry. Such was the character of the Stoic and Epicurean schools, whose immediate home was Greece, but which easily accommodated themselves to other countries. Stoicism, with its moral standards, its austere principles, and boasted independence of all emotion and impulse, was a philosophy specially adapted to Roman character, and it easily found among the Roman people a congenial soil.

But as time went on it was felt that philosophy alone, and least of all Stoic and Epicurean philosophy, could not satisfy the deep sense of dissatisfaction which had seized the ancient world amid all the glory of the Roman empire. Men were thirsting after what philosophy of itself could not yield, and hence there sprung up in Alexandria, the meeting-place of the east and the west, that fusion of oriental religion and Greek philosophy which, under the name of Neoplatonism, marks the last attempt of the ancient world to solve the riddle of life.

We have, therefore, to distinguish two periods under the Roman sway. A moral period and a religious period. The centre of the first is partly in Athens and partly in Rome; the seat of the second is Alexandria.

## CHAPTER I

### ETHICAL THEORIES

THE three systems of this period are—Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism. These different theories have this in common, that while Plato and Aristotle subordinated the individual to the State, they emphasize the individual. Man is an end to himself. There is a common brotherhood between men, and the ideal life is open to everyone.

Stoicism teaches that man is a law unto himself, that happiness is not to be sought in outward things, but in indifference to, and superiority over, all desires, passions, and changes.

Epicureanism maintains that personal pleasure is the supreme good, but that this pleasure lies not in self-indulgence, but in serenity of soul. Scepticism despairs of all definite knowledge, and recommends complete resignation to our lot.

I. *Stoicism* traces its ethical doctrine to Socrates through the Cynics, and while it is influenced both by the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, it may be regarded as a return to the standpoint of Socrates.

Its immediate founder was *Zeno*, a native of Cyprus. The date of his birth is uncertain, though we may assume his time to be about 340 B.C. He came as a merchant to Athens, but was shipwrecked, and lost his entire means. Turning to philosophy, he became a pupil of the Cynic *Crates*. Thereafter he started an independent school at



Athens, where he taught for nearly sixty years, and died at the age of 100. He is said to have practised what he taught, and to have lived a self-denying life. (The place where he discoursed with his disciples was the "Stoa," or porch, from which his adherents received the name of "Stoics," or the philosophers of the porch.)

Stoicism has, at its outset, a certain affinity with Cynicism. Both maintained the fundamental tenet that "the practical knowledge which they identify with virtue involves a condition of soul that is alone sufficient for complete human well-being." But while the Cynics emphasize the negative side of the sage's well-being,—its independence of bodily health and outward goods,—the Stoics dwell on the positive side,—confidence and tranquillity of soul, undisturbed by joy or sorrow, which inseparably attends the possessor of wisdom.) Zeno, we are told, was soon repelled by the intellectual narrowness and grossness of life of the Cynics, and while not abating the severity of life, sought to base his ethics on a more intellectual foundation. The immediate successors of Zeno were Cleanthes and Chrysippus (280-209). Chrysippus was considered the chief ornament and support of the Stoa in his day. It used to be said that "if Chrysippus were not, the Stoa could not be." He was so busy a writer that he is said to have composed no fewer than 700 books, but of all his works not any have been preserved. He closes the series of philosophers who founded the Stoa.

Among the later Stoics were Panaetus (180-110), a friend of the younger Scipio, and Posidoneus (about 135-50), the teacher of Cicero.

Under the Roman empire, where Stoicism widely prevailed, the three most distinguished names, whose writings have come down to us, are Seneca, Epictetus the slave, and Marcus Aurelius the emperor.

We shall not attempt to give a separate account of the views of each individual, but shall content ourselves with a general outline of Stoicism as a system.

While undoubtedly the strength of Stoicism lies in its ethical principles, these were based upon physical and psychological conceptions, a knowledge of which is necessary to an adequate understanding of the system as a whole.

Stoicism, therefore, may be considered under four heads.

1. *The Doctrine of Being.* Already in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, the conception of the *νοῦς* plays an important part. But with him, it was little more than a hypothesis to account for the origin of the cosmos. The Stoics, on the other hand, regard the *νοῦς* or rational principle to be, not merely prior to matter, but immanent in matter—the conditions and motive cause of every form of being—permeating and determining every kind of substance.

The most general and comprehensive names accorded to it are, from the physical side, *Pneuma*, from the psychical, Reason, or *λόγος*. But in relation to the universe as a whole it is called sometimes Nature, World-soul, Destiny, Necessity, Providence or Zeus. In many respects it was similar in its operation to the Heraclitean fire as the all-pervasive cause of all being.

The material world is not merely comprehended and sustained, but at every moment existent, only through the presence and virtue within it of the life-giving spirit. The universe is not to be regarded as a collection of atoms held together by accident, but as being interpenetrated and controlled by an inherent dynamic power. (This originating or dynamic force is called *Pneuma*.) This *Pneuma*, under certain conditions of activity, was supposed to experience a "tension," as the result of which it sparked into a new form of activity (Cleanthes). According to the various degrees of tension arise the different variations of being. At the highest grade of tension the *Pneuma* acts on the world-soul. At a lower, it becomes the indwelling reason of man by which he enters into conscious relation with the world around him; on a lower

grade still, the *Pneuma* expresses itself in the instincts, impulses, and affections of animals, which Marcus Aurelius dignifies with the name of soul ( $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ), though devoid of man's characteristics of mind. Lower still we have the grade of nature as evinced in vegetable life; and, lowest of all, the grade of the inorganic, or material world, in which the *Pneuma* expresses itself in the unity and cohesion of inanimate things. At every grade the permeation of the *Pneuma* is conceived to be co-extensive with the existence it supplies.

2. *Theology.* The stoical view of the world naturally leads to their theology, which is a form of pantheism. In the order and harmony of the universe there are abundant signs not merely of a first cause, but of a governing power. That power must have consciousness and reason, otherwise how can we explain the existence of conscious creatures like man and all the intricate machinery of interconnected means and ends? As we pass up the grades of being, we come to one whose moral and intellectual perfection must be conceived of as infinite. This being, however, does not exist apart, but pervades the universe with his energy, so that, in a sense, God and the world may be identified. He is the eternal substance underlying all moods and ever passing into different forms, as the creative work goes forward. From God all beings proceed, and to him all return at last. From this pantheistic view it naturally follows that the Stoic regards everything as equally divine. Nothing exists without a purpose, and even evil belongs to the perfection of the whole. This thorough-going pantheism is often expressed in materialistic symbols largely borrowed from Heraclitus. God is conceived as fiery ether. He is Zeus, the primaeval fire, from which the soul of man and the life of all animate things, as well as all being, emanate.

As a natural consequence of this pantheism, the forms of speech of the Stoics are often *fatalistic*. While there may seem to be nothing but chance and caprice around

us, all things really come and go in unconditional dependence on a universal law—a principle of causality running through everything. This fate or destiny is the reason of the world—the order of Providence—in which the deity unfolds his latent possibilities of being, and by which he rules the world by a rigid law of necessity. A theory which identifies the world with God and believes Him to exist in the evil as well as in the good, might be regarded as fatal to moral earnestness and inimical to religious fervour. Yet, as a matter of fact, Stoic morality was stern and rigid, and often the language of its adherents glows with intense devotion and is animated with a simple trust in a personal God,—as we may see from the hymn of Cleanthes, as well as from the writings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

3. *Psychology.* Passing from the Stoic view of nature and of God to that of man, it is surprising that in a system of such rigid necessity there should be any room for personal freedom or moral responsibility. Stoic psychology rests on the pantheistic assumption that every manifestation of life and every faculty are derived from the presence of the one world-life. The soul of man, which Epictetus calls simply "soul," but Marcus Aurelius the "master-power" (Hegemonic), is that which distinguishes man from the lower animals and comprises and controls all the activities of thought, emotion, sense, and life. The purest expression of the soul, the distinctively human element, which unites man with the highest in nature and keeps him in touch with God, is the reason or mind (λόγος or νοῦς).

The Stoics did much for the establishment of the idea of the unity of the soul, but in so far as they selected a single faculty or group of faculties, and assigned to them exclusive dominion over the rest, they failed to do justice to the emotional powers and instinctive impulses of the soul; and there was a tendency, among the zealots of the school, to decry all forms of feeling as aberrations



from right reason, and to require from the wise man their extinction. Hence arose the doctrine of "apathy" (*ἀπάθεια*), by which wisdom was to be realized.

For the Stoic, as for others, the problem of philosophy came to be, "How can I know the truth without going beyond my own mind?"—in other words, "How can I throw a bridge from self to the outward world?" Hence the search for a criterion of truth, by which a man may distinguish the true from the false, is one of the characteristic features of the Stoic psychology. All our knowledge, they held, springs from sensation. The soul is a blank page, sensation is the hand which covers it with writing. Thus they have an affinity with the school of Locke. The criterion of the truth of our ideas is the irresistible conviction with which an idea forces itself on the soul.

In connection with this theory of knowledge, they held that the only realities were bodily objects. Virtues and vices, thoughts, emotions, were material things. The human soul itself was, in a sense, material, for otherwise the outer world could not act upon it.

4. *Ethics.* Their metaphysical and psychological views, which are somewhat crude and naïve, led to their doctrine of ethics, which is their chief contribution to philosophy. All good, all virtue, all happiness, consist in harmony with law; just as all evil, misery, and vice consist in violation or defiance of law. Acquiescence in the established order of the universe or, as the Stoics put it, "living in conformity with nature," is the sum of the moral code of the Stoics. If we ask what this law is, conformity with which is regarded as good, the answer is threefold: (1) To be virtuous and happy, man must conform to the law of his own nature; (2) to the law which holds society together; and (3) to the law of Providence.

If it be further asked by what principle the wise man is to recognise this threefold law—the answer is, that he is able to know it by the principle of reason, which, as we have seen, is the distinguishing faculty of man. A

man is happy and good in proportion to the degree in which, under the guidance of reason, he accommodates himself, to the law of his nature, the law of society, and the law of Providence. In other words, the wise man is he who strives to live in agreement with his rational nature in all the relationships of life. From this moral principle all the features of the Stoic system spring. As virtue is the supreme aim of man, happiness must not be sought for itself. Pleasure and pain are really accidents, or at least incidents, in his experience, to be met by the wise man with indifference. All material good or evil, wealth or poverty, can neither add to nor detract from the soul, and are, therefore, to be despised.

If virtue is the only good, it follows that vice is the only evil. Other things,—hardship, poverty, pain, etc., are only seeming evils, taking their colour and character from the use to which we put them.

The wise man alone is free, for he alone can make himself independent of the whims of fortune, and can rise superior to so-called troubles, guard himself from care and fear and passionate desire, and enjoy the bliss of an unruffled calm.

This passionless serenity of balanced temper is what was meant by the Stoic "apathy," so famous in the schools of Greece and Rome. It postulated not only the absolute supremacy of reason, but its rightful claim to be the only motive force within the soul. The Stoics elaborated a detailed system of duties, or, as they termed it, "things meet and fit" (*καθήκοντα*) for all occasions of life, and sought further to comprehend them under one formula—conformity to that which is "natural" in man in contradiction to mere custom and convention.

Reason in man was the counterpart of reason in God, and its realization in any one individual was thus the common good of all rational beings as such. "The sage could not stretch out a finger rightly without thereby benefiting all other sages."

But virtue cannot be conceived merely as an individual thing, for the wise man cannot be considered apart from his social relations. Man is a social animal, and exists not for himself, but for mankind. To live in conformity with nature signifies, therefore, to live a life of reason that is common to all. As members of the "City of Zeus," men should observe their contracts, abstain from mutual harm, and combine to protect each other from injury. The wise man is the true citizen, the true kinsman and friend, because he considers the claims of others and limits himself in justice to his fellows. The later Stoics discovered in reason a bond of brotherhood, and they were the first to preach what is called "Cosmopolitanism." The State includes all the world. Seneca urges kindness to slaves, and Marcus Aurelius emphasizes the doctrine of humanity.

It will thus be seen that Stoic morality is largely negative. The wise man must rise above all passion, not by government or conquest, but by suppression. Hence the tendency of Stoicism towards asceticism, and as a system it enjoined self-repression, endurance, apathy, as the highest condition of the virtuous mind. This spirit of suppression led to a series of paradoxes with which the wits of Rome made merry. Nothing could happen contrary to the will of the wise man. Pain is no evil. There is no difference between the vices. The bad man can do nothing right, and he that commits one sin is guilty of all. On the other hand, the wise man is absolutely perfect, lord of himself and master of the world.

Local or national ties lay lightly on the conscience of the Stoic. There were occasions when it was his duty, or at least his right, to give up life itself if he could no longer play his part with dignity or profit. To the wise man death was no evil, and when brought face to face with conditions in which he could not turn his wisdom to a good account, or when some nobler end might be

attained, he might calmly and cheerfully seek, by his own hand, freedom from life.

The great merit of the Stoics is that they emphasize inner moral integrity as the one condition of all right action and all true happiness. In an age of moral degeneracy, especially under the Roman empire, they insisted on the necessity of virtue. As a reaction against effeminacy, Stoicism is to be commended, but in his protest against softness the Stoic became marble. Its weakness lies in its negativism, in so far as it taught men to resist the world rather than overcome it.

II. *Epicureanism* appeared almost contemporaneously with Stoicism, and may be regarded as its complement. Both systems start with a criterion of knowledge; but while Stoicism emphasizes reason, Epicureanism bases all truth upon sensation. Stoicism aims at suppressing feeling, Epicureanism seeks, on the contrary, to express it. They both agree in regarding happiness of one kind or another as the end of man—the highest good of man. They also agree in holding that a life according to nature is the only means of realizing this end. But they differ in their view of what happiness is, and in regard to what man's true nature is. Happiness for both lies in the satisfaction of man's true nature. But while the Stoics maintain that thought, reason, mind, is the highest element in man, the Epicurean holds that man's proper nature is feeling, sensation. Hence, while happiness or virtue for the Stoic lay in a life of thought, for the Epicurean happiness lay in a life of feeling.

*Epicurus*, the founder of the system, was born in the Island of Samos in 342 B.C., six years after the death of Plato. He was the contemporary of Zeno, and taught philosophy about the same time in Athens. After various changes, he ultimately settled in Athens and established a philosophical school in a garden or grove near the city, over which he presided till his death in 270 B.C. This garden became as famous as the Porch of the Stoics, as



the Academy of Plato, or the Lyceum of Aristotle. His character was pure and amiable. He established with his disciples a social union of which gentleness and humanity were the outstanding features. His writings were very numerous, but nearly all have been lost, and all we know of his philosophy is from Cicero, Plutarch, and Lucretius, whose poem, *De rerum natura*, is founded on the Epicurean theory of the universe.

Although the majority of the writings of Epicurus refer to natural philosophy, he seems to have studied nature with a moral rather than a scientific object. While the Stoics regarded the world, as a whole, as governed and pervaded by a living spirit, the Epicureans adopted an entirely mechanical conception of nature, basing their views of the world on the atomic theory of Democritus. The universe, they held, is wholly corporeal, infinite in extent, eternal in duration. The elements of which it was composed were made up of compound and indivisible atoms; and the world as we know it is produced by the whirling together of these minute particles.

While the Stoics held that a supreme rational purpose governed the world, the Epicureans sought to exclude from their explanation of nature everything that would suggest government or law or adaptation.

While Stoicism was pantheistic in its conception of the universe, Epicureanism was individualistic; and while the former had a certain religious or theological aspect, the latter in its whole nature is anti-religious, conceiving the task of science to be the emancipation of the wise man from the phantoms of superstition which arise from fear and ignorance. At the same time, Epicurus and his followers did not deny the existence of the gods, but they held that they have nothing to do with the constitution of the world or the affairs of men. The Stoic belief in Providence appeared to them but a refined illusion.

The *Psychology* of the Epicureans was in harmony with their physical conception of nature. The soul, they held,

was a bodily substance, composed of fine subtle particles, and though they employed, like the Stoics, the word "Pneuma," it meant for them a fiery atmospheric breath introduced into the body from without, and mechanically connected with it. In their theory of perception they followed Democritus in his doctrine of "Eidola," or images, which are incessantly streaming off from the surface of all bodies, and which are necessary to bring our minds into touch with the outer world.

With the dissolution of the body there naturally follows the annihilation of the soul, and therefore, that which man regards as the most terrible of all evils—death, is nothing to us. "When we are, death is not, and when death is, we are not." The sage may dismiss the thought of it.

The source and test of all *ethical truth* are the feelings, which are really two, pleasure and pain. Pleasure, therefore, is the sole ultimate good, and pain the sole evil. No pleasure is really to be rejected, except for its painful consequences, and no pain to be chosen, except as a means to greater pleasure. The wise man differs from the ordinary man in this, that while they both seek pleasure, the former knows how to forego certain enjoyments which will cause pain hereafter; whereas the ordinary man seeks immediate and indiscriminate enjoyment. Pleasure is really a matter of calculation and reflection, and must be regulated by a life of moderation in harmony with nature. When we say that pleasure is the end of life, it is obvious that the Epicurean does not mean the pleasure of the sensualist, but rather freedom of the body from pain and the soul from anxiety. Rightly to enjoy life, insight (*φρόνησις*) is needed, which not only makes it possible to estimate the different degrees of pleasure and pain as determined through the feelings in a particular case, but also decides when, and how far, one should yield to or deny his individual desires. Complete blessedness falls to the lot of him who rejoices in all good things without

stormy striving, in so far as they meet the highest and fullest wants of his nature.

For this end Epicurus prized mental joys higher than physical pleasures, which are connected with passionate agitation.

For the Epicurean not less than for the Stoic, happiness was to be found in apathy, or serene undisturbed contentment. The joys of the spirit which consist in imperturbable tranquillity, the feeling of the nobility of the soul, superiority to the blows of fate,—these, and not the temporary pleasures of the senses, are the elements of the philosophic life. The virtuous life in the end is really the most happy life, not indeed because virtue is an end in itself, but because it conduces to the serenest and most lasting happiness. Hence we have the golden rule of “temperance.” Simplicity is preferable to luxury. Contentment with little is a great good, and wealth consists not in having large possessions, but in having few wants.

Denying an abstract and eternal principle of right or wrong, Epicurus regards *justice* not as a good in itself, but merely as a compact of expediency to prevent mutual harm. In order to live peaceably with all men, justice is a necessary requirement of social life. While the Stoics held that man was already, by virtue of the relation of his soul to the world-reason, a being constituted by nature for society, and therefore under obligation to lead a social life, the Epicureans assumed that individuals first exist by and for themselves and enter voluntarily into the relations of society only for the sake of those advantages which, as individuals, they could not obtain or preserve. Friendship, family relationships, and political life, are based upon pure self-interest, and all social ties are to be formed only with the end of furthering the advantage of the individual. While Epicurus elevated and purified the idea of pleasure, he knew nothing of a moral purpose in man. His philosophy, though it appears in its noblest

form with him, degenerated in the hands of his followers into a pure theory of enjoyment. While he placed happiness in wise moderation and gave the preference to spiritual joys, recognising virtue and intelligence as the surest means of felicity, his disciples freely advocated sensual pleasure, scorning all higher endeavour and finding in indulgence of the senses the main object of life.

III. *Scepticism* as a school of philosophy arose in antagonism to the two systems we have just considered. Its characteristic feature was a denial of all objective knowledge or absolute truth and a consequent withdrawal of the wise man into himself. Historically, scepticism has three stages:

1. *The older Scepticism*, the founder of which was *Pyrrho*, a native of Elia in the Peloponnesus. The date of his birth is uncertain, but he was a contemporary of Zeno and Epicurus, and flourished about 300 B.C., and was thus a little later than the early academics and peripatetics. Pyrrho has left no writings, and we are indebted to Sextus Empericus, a physician, who lived in the third century of the Christian era, for a record of his opinions.

According to the early Sceptics, the object of philosophy is indeed happiness, but to acquire happiness the wise man must know what is the nature of things and how we are related to them.

What things really are, however, lies beyond our knowledge. Neither our senses nor our ideas teach us the truth. Every conclusion we form has a possible opposite. Hence arise the contradictory views of men.

Suspension of judgment, complete reserve of opinion, is the only satisfactory condition of thought, and happiness lies in a non-committal attitude of suspense. The Sceptic alone lives a life of peace, heedless alike of good and evil.

The Sceptics arrived at this state of apathetic reserve chiefly by means of polemical discussion, by which, like their predecessors the Sophists, they sought to involve



their opponents in logical contradictions. They agreed with the Stoics in regarding man as the measure of the universe. But while the Stoics sought to magnify the power and supremacy of man, the Sceptics sought rather to convict him of complete ignorance by proving that his faculties were altogether incapable of attaining to any degree of objective certainty.

The question which Pyrrho raises is,—“Are our faculties competent to give us any certain information as to what anything is in itself and out of relation to us?” And the answer is—Our faculties are not competent. They only declare what a thing is in relation to other things. Moreover, our faculties so modify the things we perceive that a knowledge of what they are in themselves is impossible for us. We can only know phenomena, the appearance of things, but the realities behind the appearance we cannot know.

2. *The newer Academy*, which claimed to be a continuation of the school of Plato, is usually reckoned to be a form of Scepticism. In recommending suspense of judgment, its representatives alleged that they were true to the teaching of their master, Plato.

Of this school the principal adherents are: *Arcesilaus* (316-240), a man of upright character and ready speech, and a keen opponent of Zeno the Stoic.

In opposition to the Stoic doctrine of cognition, he held that we can only form opinions and surmises. We cannot really *know* anything. I may say, “so it appears to me,” but not “so it is.” We can know nothing certainly, not even that we know nothing. In practical matters probability is our only guide, and the best way of attaining to that passionless tranquillity of soul which the Stoics and Epicureans extol, is by a settled abstinence from all dogmatic affirmation.

*Carneades* (213-128), a disciple of Arcesilaus, became a popular lecturer in Rome. Like his master, he engaged in an ardent polemic against the Stoics, and endeavoured

to formulate a positive doctrine of probability. It is told of him that on the occasion of a famous embassy of philosophers to Rome, he created a furore in the assembly by arguing on one side one day and triumphantly refuting his own arguments the next day.

3. *Later Scepticism* reappeared some centuries afterwards in the person of Sextus Empericus, who lived about 222 A.D. He has left two writings—*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, a sceptical treatise, and *Disputations against Mathematicians*, which is a systematic attack on all positive philosophy.

According to Sextus, there are ten tropes or sceptical arguments, which, however, we may reduce to six :

(1) Those arising from the variety of human customs and laws.

(2) Those dependent on the diversities of individuals.

(3) Those flowing from the various sensations of our organism.

(4) Those resulting from the position of things and the different impressions they make upon man.

(5) Those consequent on the fact that we can know nothing as it is in itself—but only the appearances of things.

(6) Those which follow from the dependence of an impression upon custom—the rare and unusual affecting us differently from the habitual and the ordinary.

These tropes or commonplaces have all to do with the relation of the subject to the object, and in general may be reduced to one, which has reappeared in later philosophy under the name of the “relativity of knowledge.” Sextus Empericus deserves attention as being the first who definitely stated this principle, viz.—that we only know things in relation to other things, and above all in relation to our own minds. To know the thing in itself became the problem of modern philosophy. There is, indeed, a sense in which all knowledge is relative. There can be no knowledge but that which the mind apprehends. The defect of

Sextus is the assumption that, because of this relativity, the mind of man is incapable of ascertaining truth or of knowing what things really are.

Scepticism, with all its boasted suspense of judgment, becomes in the end but another form of dogmatism. Absolute doubt is equivalent to absolute certainty. It must always assume the existence of the very thing it denies. The reality of the external world was affirmed in the very attempt of Scepticism to deny a knowledge of it.

## CHAPTER II

### RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES

THE speculations of the Stoics and Epicureans, as well as those of the followers of Plato and Aristotle, were at first developed chiefly in the lecture rooms of Athens, whose fame as a seat of learning drew multitudes from all lands. But by and by, with the decline of political power, her teachers spread throughout the Roman world, and new centres of thought sprang up, especially in Rome and Alexandria.

1. Though Greece had to acknowledge the military sway of Rome, intellectually Rome had to bow to Greece. The Hellenic language and literature became necessary elements in the liberal education of wealthy Roman families, and Greek rhetoricians settled in the Capital as teachers of youth. Various attempts were indeed made by the more conservative to exclude foreign ideas, but authority was powerless to stay the tide of invasion. In 161 B.C. a decree was issued by the Senate for banishing philosophers from Rome, but six years later (155) we hear of the famous embassy of philosophers sent from Athens to obtain remission of a tax. As late indeed as 93 B.C. we read of another decree against what was called the "New Learning," which had already become fashionable and was welcomed by the best spirits in the Capital. The natural bent of the Roman mind was towards practical affairs, and, therefore, Rome never developed a philosophy of its own, and its men of



culture simply became the exponents of the newly-imported systems of Athens. But the Roman was impatient of abstract speculation, and it was the practical side of philosophy which attracted attention. While the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle were little cultivated in the west, the moral philosophy of Zeno and Epicurus found numerous adherents. One of the greatest works of Roman literature, the poem of Lucretius, was the direct outcome of Epicurean philosophy, though it was not the ethical view so much as the physical theory of atoms that attracted Lucretius. The Academy in its more sceptical phase had a more eminent advocate in Cicero, whose work, *De Officiis*, presents Greek philosophy, especially the teaching of the Stoic Panaetius, in a Roman dress.

It was, however, in the sphere of Law and Jurisprudence that the independent contribution of Rome to the development of thought was mainly made, and consequently the influence of Cicero was felt most profoundly in his treatment of the legal aspects of morality. Stoicism, by its high conception of law, lent itself peculiarly to this form of thought, and it became the philosophic basis of that system of Jurisprudence which is Rome's gift to the world.

No one was more instrumental in accommodating Stoicism to Roman life than *Panaetius* of Rhodes (about 180-110 B.C.), who was a friend of Polybius the historian, and also of Scipio and Laelius. Panaetius, like all the later Stoics, regarded almost exclusively the practical bearings of philosophy. He was something of an Eclectic, and did not hesitate to mingle the teachings of Plato and Aristotle with the tenets of Zeno.

*Posidonius*, a Syrian (130-50 B.C.), maintained the same intercourse with Rome, and pursued the same Eclectic tendencies as his master. Cicero and Pompey are said to have attended his lectures at Rhodes. Strabo calls him the most learned man of his times.

It was not uncommon at this time for some wealthy man of culture to maintain a philosopher in his house. Of this

custom Cato is an instance, and on the night before his suicide he and his domestic spiritual adviser discussed the paradox,—that the wise man alone is free. Cato is often cited as the typical Roman Stoic, and even when there was little acquaintance with the philosophical tenets of Stoicism there was in the general character of the noblest spirits of the period a sternness of mood and a sublimity of virtue which were doubtless the outcome of Stoic influence. From Cato to Marcus Aurelius we find an immense diffusion of the principles and practices of the Stoics.

But in its transference to Roman soil, Stoicism underwent a change. Instead of being, as it originally was, a theory of ideal virtue, it became in the hands of its Roman representatives a doctrine of deliverance and redemption. While the earlier Stoics were occupied with the theoretic questions as to the ideal of wisdom, its adherents in Rome were more concerned with the practical realization of wisdom.

Passing over the few and unimportant philosophical efforts of the last century of the Roman republic, which were mostly of an eclectic and sceptical character, as manifested in the atomic theory of Lucretius and the more literary and political studies of Cicero (106-43) and Varrus (116-27), we may mention the earliest outstanding names of the imperial period.

1. *Seneca* (3-65 A.D.) was born at Cordova in Spain. He came early to Rome, but just as he was attaining to celebrity he was banished to Corsica by the Emperor Claudius. After eight years' exile he was recalled by the influence of Agrippina, who made him tutor to her son, the future Emperor Nero. These years of banishment seemed to tinge his life and thought if not with bitterness at least with melancholy. Seneca has been most differently estimated, according as he has been judged at his best or his worst. In the Museum at Naples may be seen a fresco, recovered from Pompeii, representing a butterfly acting as a charioteer to a dragon. The design is meant to carica-

ture the relation of Seneca to his pupil. He may have attempted to hold in the reins of license, but they were too strong for him. It is also probable that he sometimes connived at vice, and not seldom pandered to Nero's weaknesses. He has been charged with complicity in the murder of Agrippina and with the accumulation of wealth by unworthy means. Whether these charges are true or not, it must be admitted that his was a difficult position, and that neither physically nor morally was he endowed with those qualities which fit a man for a heroic part. If we judge him not so much by his outward life as by the sentiments of his letters, we shall see that he possessed at least one feature of Stoicism—an intense and no doubt earnest desire for moral improvement. He does not claim to be a sage, but only a seeker after wisdom who has to wage an incessant conflict with the weaknesses of his nature, and who can only hope to gain the victory over himself by constant watching and habitual abstemiousness. The picture of the inner life of Seneca—his daily efforts after self-discipline, his untiring asceticism, his expressed enthusiasm for all that is true and of good report—a picture often marred by pedantry and vain conceit—stands as a contrast to the voluptuousness and vice of the higher classes of his day. The conscious desire for moral progress is easily perverted, and is apt to degenerate into minute and morbid self-analysis. While a comparison has often been drawn between the teaching of Seneca and the doctrines of Christianity, and in many respects the similarity is striking, in one aspect at least the contrast is not less notable—the difference between Seneca's views of death and the hereafter and those of the Gospel. Seneca is constantly speaking of death, and all his writings are shadowed by the thought of it. But everywhere there is an absence of hope. And the only temper which he commends in view of the end which sooner or later awaits all is one of fearless indifference. He even approves of suicide when the trials of life can no longer be worthily

borne. 'Death,' he says, 'is either an end or a transition.' In any case there is nothing to fear. He himself met his end with fortitude and in anticipation of that tranquillity of mind and freedom from care which, he said "await us when we shall have got away from these dregs of existence into the sublime condition on high."

2. *Epictetus*, the slave philosopher, who lived in the time of Domitian, offers in every respect a contrast to Seneca. In him we pass from the florid and sentimental rhetorician to the pious devotee. No writings of Epictetus remain, but a faithful record of his conversations has been preserved by Arrian, the historian. He was born in Hierapolis in Phrygia, and was brought to Rome as a slave in the court of Nero. While yet a slave he became a Stoic, and on obtaining his freedom taught at Rome and afterwards in Greece. What is most striking about his discourses is their religious spirit. In them Stoicism reaches its climax and attains almost a Christian character. There is nothing speculative in his reflections. Philosophy for him is a means of comfort rather than an intellectual discipline. He lays stress on the impossibility of finding the wise man in actual experience, and he regards philosophy as the source of help and salvation amid the imperfections of life. Character, at the best, is but an approximation to virtue, and the wisdom which is to heal the ills of the world is not to be found by dialectic subtlety so much as by practice and self-discipline. The soul, conscious of weakness, depends less upon philosophic acumen than upon fellowship with God. His words often present a striking coincidence with the language of the New Testament. He repeatedly speaks of Divine Providence, and commends purity, submission and forgiveness of injuries. Perhaps the main feature of his philosophy is the emphasis he lays upon the power of the will and the distinction he draws between the things that are within our command and the things that are beyond our control. The



body, outward possessions and worldly fame are beyond our power. But nothing can touch the will.

3. *Marcus Aurelius* (121-180), the Emperor, was as exalted as Epictetus was humble. In his *Meditations* he strips Stoicism of its sterner aspects and invests it with a warmth and fervour of emotion which gives it the character of a religion rather than a philosophy. "To reverence the gods and help men" is his summary of a good life, and his philanthropy contains an element of sympathy and tenderness towards weakness which is alien to the somewhat cold and rigid spirit of the earlier Stoics.

In Marcus Aurelius we see for the first time Plato's desire fulfilled—a philosopher on the throne. But the philosophy of the Emperor did not add to his political influence. Instead of helping him to transform the world by bringing him into contact with its needs, it withdrew him from men into the seclusion of self-scrutiny and divine communion. While the Emperor was intent upon the salvation of his own soul, the affairs of the State were neglected. He sought to be just to all, but by a remarkable lack of insight into character, he was a prey to unscrupulous advisers, and with all his general clemency, he lent his authority to one of the fiercest persecutions of Christianity which stain the imperial age.

There is so much that is noble and exalted in the teaching of these Roman Stoics, so much indeed that is in harmony with the Ethics of Christianity, that the question has frequently been discussed as to whether Stoicism did not borrow some of its sentiments from the precepts of Christ: and it has been maintained by some, but wholly without evidence, that Seneca actually came into contact with St. Paul, and became familiar with the tenets of the Gospel through intercourse with the Apostle or some of his friends.

As we have seen, Roman law was largely shaped by Stoicism, and partly through the spread of jurisprudence and under the influence of later Roman writers that ancient

system of morals, which took its rise in Greece, but assumed in the West a practical cast, has left its mark on history and modern life. In its preference for the joys of the inner life and its scorn of the delights of sense; in its emphasis upon the duty and responsibility of the individual and its conception of the power of the will; in its disregard of all national restrictions and its advocacy of a common humanity and brotherhood of man, together with its belief in the direct relation of each human soul to God—Stoicism in the Roman Empire not only showed how high Paganism at its best could reach, but it proved in a measure a preparation for Christianity, with whose practical tenets, in spite of its imperfections and onesidedness, it had so much in common.

2. Greek philosophy spread, however, not only westwards to Rome, but eastwards and southwards to Syria and Egypt; and in both directions it assumed a religious form. While it was the practical teaching of the Stoics which naturally attracted the western mind, it was rather the mystical idealism of Plato that appealed to the spirit of the east.

Everywhere a feeling of dissatisfaction, of which Greek scepticism was the philosophic expression, was manifesting itself throughout the Roman world. The ideal which philosophy had conceived could not be realized in any human being, and it was felt, not in Rome alone, but everywhere, that man in his own strength could attain neither to knowledge nor to virtue. The old desire for sensuous pleasure gave place to a new craving for purer joy, and a deep yearning for something more than this world offered became the urgent need of the soul. Men were beginning to turn to the religions of the east, and especially to Judaism and to the religion of Christ, for the satisfaction of that deep heart-hunger which philosophy of itself could not meet, and it was hoped that by a combination of Greek thought with oriental worship, peace might be attained and the riddle of being solved.

The centre of this new movement was *Alexandria*, the meeting-place of the east and the west, the focus of Greek culture and oriental enthusiasm. Here Greek and oriental spirits met and commingled; method and ecstasy were interwoven, scientific exactitude and poetic mysticism were united in a complex system which at once completed and exhausted ancient philosophy.

The name generally given to the philosophy which arose in Alexandria is *Neo-Platonism*, from the attempt of its representatives to combine the systematizing of Plato with the mysticism of the east.

The first effort to unite Greek thought with Hebrew religion was made by *Philo*—the great Jewish commentator—who sought to find higher philosophic meanings in the ancient Scriptures. He may be regarded as the precursor of the Alexandrian school. He was born shortly before the beginning of the Christian era, and was, therefore, a contemporary of Jesus. Many legends have gathered around his name,—among others, that he came to Rome in the reign of Claudius, and there met the Apostle Peter. He was a prolific author, many of his works being still extant. His principal treatises are—*De Mundi Opificio*; *De Praemiis et Poenis*; *Quod Deus sit Immutabilis*. He seeks to expound Scripture in the light of Plato and to discover an allegorical significance in the ancient records of Moses and the prophets. In his teaching there is a sharp antithesis between God and the world. To God we may attach none of the predicates which characterize finite things. There can be no action of God upon the world of matter except through intermediate agents, which are the angels of the Jewish religion, and the demons of heathen mythology. The conception of the Logos has a central place in Philo's system. The Logos is the power of God, or the divine reason, endowed with energy and comprehending in itself all subordinate powers. The Logos is conceived of as personal in its relation to the world and yet as impersonal in relation to God. He is the only first born

of God, the chief of the angels, the viceroy of God and representative of man. The world is not created at once, but is gradually moulded out of matter. Hence arises evil. Souls are pre-existent, and are imprisoned in flesh. The end of life is to break the thralldom of the senses and to rise by a sort of ecstasy to the immediate vision of God. Philo inaugurated a school of philosophy, which existed for centuries, as a rival of Christian faith, and much of his teaching was gradually incorporated into the creeds of the church. Following the example of Philo, the *Gnostics* sought to harmonize the Apostolic traditions with the ideas of Greek philosophy and to change faith (πίστις) into a special kind of knowledge (γνῶσις). The term "Gnosticism" is applied to all these sects, which, during the first three centuries, endeavoured to introduce into Christianity a so-called higher knowledge, founded partly on the philosophy of Plato and still more on the religions of the east, especially those of Persia and of India.

The earlier forms of this teaching appeared in the Apostolic age, and are dealt with by St. Paul and St. John in the Epistles to the Colossians, Timothy and Titus, and in the Revelation. The chief representatives were Basilides of Alexandria (125-140 A.D.), Carpocrates, Valentinus, Marcion, and Tatian. Gnosticism had many features in common with Philo.

"There is a body of men," says Irenaeus, "who set aside the truth, putting in its place fables and vain genealogies which, as the apostle says, minister questionings rather than godly edifying, which is in faith. They wickedly pervert the good words of Scripture. They destroy the faith of many, leading them astray by the pretence of 'knowledge' (γνῶσις) from Him who hath established and adorned the universe, claiming to reveal something higher and greater than God, the Maker of heaven and earth and all that is therein."

These words, with which Irenaeus begins his *Refutation of Heresy*, indicate the main features of the Gnostic



sees in the second century. Their theology was not a connected system, but was embedded in a fantastic cosmogony: their exegesis was fanciful: they claim to possess a special doctrine or Gnosis only revealed to the initiated, and between the Supreme Being and the world they interposed a number of spiritual powers or Aeons, attributing the creation of the visible universe to a subordinate agent, the Demiurge. That a doctrine of this kind was inconsistent with Christian truth and in practice led to anti-nomian licence or to asceticism is true, and we are not surprised that the Bishop of Lyons should warn his flock against these "wolves in sheep's clothing," as he calls them.

Against such attempts to rationalize Christianity a reaction set in, and men like *Justin Martyr* (beheaded 166 A.D.), who has been described as "the first among the fathers who may be called a learned theologian and Christian thinker"; *Irenaeus*, of Lyons (b. A.D. 115), whose most important work is his *Refutation of Gnosticism*; *Hippolytus*, the greatest scholar of the Church next to Origen, his chief work being *Philosophumena*, or *Refutation of all Heresies*—sought to vindicate the Christian faith.

It was not, however, till the beginning of the third century that a positive Christian theology was established, which took its rise in the school for Catechists at Alexandria through its founders, Pantaenus, Clement (b. A.D. 150), and Origen (b. 185).

*Origen* was the great master of the Alexandrian school, and philosophically the most important representative of Christianity of early times. He was a profound thinker and scholar. His great critical work is his *Hexapla* or *Sixfold Bible*, while his most famous theological work is his treatise against Celsus, composed about 248, the most complete defence of Christianity belonging to the ante-Nicene period. His theological system contains strange doctrines as to the eternity of creation by the logos; the

pre-existence of all souls; the power of free will and the extension of the work of redemption to the inhabitants of the stars and to all rational creatures; and the final restoration of all men and fallen angels.

Contemporary with Origen there went forth from the Alexandrian philosophic school the man who sought to erect a philosophy of religion solely upon the Hellenic basis—*Plotinus*, the greatest thinker of this period. His aim was to systematize the main doctrines of Greek philosophy under a religious principle, and his system is the most thorough and most complete that antiquity produced. He was a disciple of *Ammonius Saccas* (died 243 A.D.), of whom we know nothing beyond the fact that he was one of the first who expounded Plato in Alexandria. *Plotinus* (204-269 A.D.) was a native of Egypt, but after a life of adventure he settled as teacher in Rome. Inspired with oriental fanaticism he set forth his views in brief, irregular tractates, which were afterwards edited by Porphyry (in six *enniads*), his most celebrated pupil and biographer.

The Emperor Galienus and the greatest men of Rome regarded his teaching as a message from heaven, and venerated him as a prophet.

To overcome the dualism between subject and object or between matter and thought, the world and God was the problem which Greek philosophy had bequeathed to humanity. This had been the aim of the Platonic ideas as well as of the practical systems that had flown from him. Platonism strove to reach a final God, in whom all distinctions are abolished. For Plato the highest good lay in transcending the world of matter and attaining peace in a life of pure thought. This object, which was largely theoretic or intellectual with Plato, became the practical aim of the Neoplatonists. *Plotinus* professes to carry out the system of Plato to its logical conclusion and to find in the One—the Supreme Being, that unity of thought and life after which all reflection is striving. The way of salvation is to outgrow the life of the senses, to exterminate the

bodily desires and seek by communion with God purity and blessedness of spirit.

He held that the knowledge of truth cannot be gained by proof, but only by the seeker becoming one with the object of his search. The highest stage of cognition is the vision of God, in which separation between the subject and object, the soul and deity, is obliterated. Variety and unity are but opposite aspects of existence—the various phenomena of the universe but modes of the divine being. He who would attain to a perfect union with the Supreme must seek, by means of swoon and trance, to be absorbed in the infinite. It is this mystical absorption into the divine which gives the distinctive character to Neoplatonism.

The fundamental conception of Plotinus' theory is a kind of Emanistic Pantheism. He regards the world as an overflow or diffusion of the divine life, and a reabsorption in God, the goal of existence.

1. Plotinus starts with the *notion of God*, whom he variously describes, now the *First*, now the *One*, and now the *Good*. This unity transcends all being—it produces all things, yet is produced by none. It is the source of all thought without being intelligence itself. It is the principle of goodness without being good. To attribute any of these attributes to God is to limit his perfection. In the strictest sense he can neither strive nor will, for there is nothing desirable outside of himself. He is complete rest, perfect peace, pure being. All that we can say of God is that He is above all thought. Every affirmation limits, every definition diminishes His perfection. We cannot even say He exists. The moment we give expression to our thoughts about Him He eludes our grasp and vanishes into nothingness. We cannot express the highest. With Goethe, Plotinus would have said God is the great unutterable.

2. But the question now arises, How are we to account for the world which we see? Plotinus is unable to rest in

this pure abstraction, and finds it necessary to assume some kind of breaking up of the pure unity of God into the manifold of the world. Hence he explains that created things come from the primal one—not by transference of the nature of the one to the many, not by an act of will nor a principle of causation,—but by a process which he calls *Emanation*. The world is an effluence of God, in such a way that the remotest emanation possesses a lower degree of perfection than that which precedes it. Fire emits heat, snow cold, fragrant bodies exhale odours, and every thing, as well as every organized being, generates what is like it. In the same manner the all-perfect being, in the fulness of his perfection, sends off from itself that which is like itself, in successive images or reflections. Plato had already used the figure of the sun and its radiating beams of light to express the relation of the one to the many. And Plotinus borrows this metaphor. The visible world is an absolute counterpart of the heavenly source of being. Like the sun, the infinite light radiates into the fathomless distances of space, sowing the seeds of worlds and planets: itself always full, yet always giving forth its influences, itself impalpable, pure, sheer flame without admixture, yet the cause of the light and warmth and existence wherever its beams can reach: touching the lowest dregs of matter, penetrating into the dimmest depths, immanent everywhere, yet transcending all things.

But obviously there are many difficulties in connection with the genesis of the world which the theory of radiation or emanation does not explain. Was the plurality of the world which the One discharges from itself originally contained in the One or not? If so, then the One cannot be strictly one,—the pure repose which Plotinus assumes. If the world is not originally in the One, how could it give forth that which it did not possess? The difficulty is got over by Plotinus, by attributing to the One both transcendence and immanence. It is everywhere, yet nowhere.



3. The first emanation from the one is the *Nous* or Reason—the image of the One,—and being next to it possessing the greatest perfection—scarcely less than the primal essence itself. As the product of the One, the image turns towards the One to grasp it, and in this ‘turning’ it becomes reason, which implies by its very nature a dual element,—a knowing subject and a known object. The *Nous* therefore includes within itself the world of ideas.

Everything that exists in the visible world has its corresponding idea or prototype. Each one of us realizes a distinct idea, and there are as many ideas as individuals. These ideas are not, however, merely thoughts, but moving powers. Hence they propagate themselves, and give rise to the world of phenomena.

4. From Reason again there radiates forth the *World-Soul*. And just as the *Nous* is the image of the One, so the world-soul is the image of the *Nous*. This world-soul is the mediator between the ideas and the corporeal world. It shares both. Receiving the contents of the spirit by reflection, it forms them after its image into the world of sensible things. Matter is thus the last emanation, and even it retains something,—a faint far-off reflection—of the primitive light.

Individual souls, like the soul of the world, are a compound of matter and reason. They belong to the highest element of reason, but by a mysterious fate they are imprisoned in a world of sense, and are ever striving to regain their proper sphere. Creation is thus represented by Plotinus as a descent or degeneration from the divine. The union of the human soul with a material body—which, as the complete antithesis of the primal essence, is the source of all evil—is a fall, and it is our vocation by the conquest of new desires, through devotion, contemplation and asceticism, to regain our own original home.

5. As there has been a descent, so there must be an

*ascent*, and the soul must retrace its steps upwards again to God. We must mortify the senses, rid ourselves of the restrictions of matter and find our true life again in the divine.

The Ethical system of Plotinus reminds us partly of Plato and partly of Stoicism. The end of human life is the purification of the soul. Three roads lead to God—art, love, and philosophy—one path with three stages. The upward way is slow. We are not fitted at once for the full enjoyment of heaven. We must be gradually prepared by the contemplation of beautiful things, by intercourse with beautiful souls, and finally by meditation on beautiful and holy thoughts for final union with God. Beauty in art, nay living beauty itself, is but a pale reflection of absolute beauty. We may refuse the higher life and may elect to live in bondage to the senses, with the result that we shall sink lower and lower, and may be sent back into the bodies of animals or even plants. This doctrine of retribution implies freedom on the part of the soul. Each man is indeed the author of his own fate. The true goal of life is only reached when the soul loses all thought, desire, and activity; when, in short, the enraptured spirit loses the consciousness of individuality and attains ideal blessedness in the embrace of the Supreme Being.

Primal Essence, Pure Intelligence, the World-Soul—these constitute the Plotinian triad, which are connected with each other as the successive stages of an eternal emanation.

The one watchword of Neoplatonism is *Continuity*. The doctrine of Emanation professes to solve the irreconcilable antithesis of God and the world, spirit and matter, mover and moved—the perennial problem of philosophy. It does not posit an artificer, nor even a material substratum. The world is to be regarded as the body of the Almighty, the incarnation of his inmost thought. There is no abyss yawning between the creator and the created. All being

is one—a permanent outflow of the fulness of divinity. The one becomes the many in order that the many may become the one. Thought forms an eternal cycle. It goes forth and comes back. There is no breach, no cataclysm anywhere. By almost imperceptible gradations heaven and earth are united, and the lowest form of matter is connected with the inmost essence of God. The problem of alienation, of duality, of estrangement, is solved. If the question be asked, how can man be reconciled with God?—the answer of Plotinus is—he has never been separated.

The monism of Neoplatonism is the last word of Greek philosophy. The spirit of inquiry comes back to where it began. The duality of God and the world is not really solved. The many is simply merged in the one. This bare contentless abstraction, which has no movement or actuality in itself, which is only to be grasped by the annihilation of self and the arrestment and negation of thought, is the practical dissolution of ancient philosophy.

Neoplatonism spread itself wherever the Greek tongue was spoken, but with its extension its decline went hand in hand. Towards the end of the fourth century it changed its character without essentially modifying its principles. Among the successors of Plotinus the search for truth was gradually subordinated to the interests of religion. Philosophy became the opponent of Christianity and the palladium of the persecuted gods. Everything Pagan was regarded as good, and to promote polytheism at all hazards was her desperate task. We need not dwell upon those who took up the mantle of Plotinus. Porphyry (233-305) was his immediate disciple and the faithful expounder of his teaching. He too was a fierce antagonist of Christianity. Among the few surviving defenders of the dying polytheistic faith we may mention two here—Iamblichus of Chalcis and Proclus of Byzantium, who bring the history of ancient philosophy to a close.

*Iamblichus*, a pupil of Porphyry (died 333), sought to introduce a magical element into Neoplatonism, teaching that certain mystical symbols exercised a supernatural influence over the divinities. From the school of one of his disciples, Maximus, came the Emperor Julian, whose patronage shed a passing lustre over the doctrines of Neoplatonism.

*Proclus* (412-485) was the last of the Neoplatonists worthy of mention. He was a man of great learning and enthusiastic temperament, also strongly opposed to Christianity. In its success he saw only the triumph of a vulgar superstition over a beautiful philosophic theory. He piously held to the old traditions, and built upon the basis of oriental daemonology his theosophic system, "a veritable pantheon of heathen dogmas and philosophies." He begins like Plotinus with the One, but does not immediately deduce from it the *nous*. The many-sided world is not so much deduced from the One as contained in it. The many is the negative of the One, and God is conceived as the Being without negation or limitation. Proclus also speaks of a Trinity, but it differs from the triad of Plotinus. The three moments are, the One, the Infinite, and the Limited, or identity, difference, and union. This Trinity is the explanation of the world. Everything is threefold. The logic of thought is the logic of the universe. Therefore, to know the nature of one's own mind is to know the whole universe. The idea of Proclus, as will be seen, exercised a profound influence upon later German speculation, especially upon the philosophy of Hegel.

The three essential points of Neoplatonism are: its theory of the Trinity, its doctrine of Emanation, and its belief in Asceticism. Its later representatives, Isodorus, Damascius, and Simplicius, tended to magic, thaumaturgy, and theosophy. Under the Emperor Justinian, by whose edict all Pagan philosophies were suppressed, Neoplatonism ceased to exist as a school. Its exponents neglected



the experimental sciences, and strove by annihilation of self and mystic absorption to attain to union with the Absolute. At the same time Neoplatonism had much in common with Christianity, and had no little part in shaping the theology of the mediaeval Christian thinkers.

*PART III*

*PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES*

CHAPTER I

THE PATRISTIC PERIOD

WITH Proclus ancient philosophy comes to a close. The first period embraces a thousand years, from Thales 550 B.C. to Proclus' death, 529 A.D. The second period reaches to the beginning of the sixteenth century, to the time of the Reformation, and includes also about a thousand years. Hitherto philosophy fell within the heathen world. From this point onwards it has its place in the Christian world. A new religion has entered the world—Christianity, and with its advent a new note has been struck. Christianity has become a force in life and thought which has to be reckoned with. An event has taken place in the world's history which claims to be all-important for the understanding of God and man. The dualism between subject and object, the separation between the human and the divine which ancient philosophy attempted to overcome, was met in a practical way by the Christian religion. The Incarnation of God in man and the reconciliation of man with God through the God-man, Jesus Christ, gave expression to the very idea which ancient thought had been struggling to realize. We have already seen the prepara-

tion for this new phase of God in the various lines of speculation which went forth from Alexandria. It became the task of philosophy to show how the truth, which had been revealed in Christ and was taken for granted on authority, was acceptable to reason and capable of being justified by it.

From the decline of the school of Alexandria to the revival of learning, the Church became the depository of truth, at once guarding and dominating its expression.

When the Roman empire, weakened and disintegrated by inner moral corruption, became a prey to the incursion of the northern peoples, civilization was in danger of being wholly crushed out, had not the new spiritual power which had grown up within the empire accomplished what neither State nor science could achieve—the intellectual and moral subjugation of the conquerors. Incapable of appreciating the finer results of aesthetic culture and abstract thought, the German hordes, in their rude and primitive state, were conquered by the might of the Gospel. A period of ignorance succeeded the age of Roman brilliance, and all the treasures of Hellenic thought would have been hopelessly lost had not a few Christian scholars within the Church saved a remnant of ancient lore and guarded it till the time when the destroyers were able to appreciate and employ it. The Church as a whole, indeed, was opposed to the cultivation of heathen literature, and during the centuries known as the “dark ages,” it was the monasteries which provided a home for learning, and proved the seed-plots from which eventually sprang those fruits of thought which the modern world reaped.

The Church became the educator of the European nations, and its first work was the converting and training of the people of Germanic origin. They were taught its doctrines, but in general there was no question what these doctrines were. They were transmitted as an inheritance from the fathers, a sacred tradition, attested by ecclesiastical authority, and guarded by the Roman hierarchy.

There was little room left for theological inquiry or discussion. Thought had to work within prescribed limits, and the task of the mediaeval theologians was simply to give precision and harmony to accepted beliefs and to defend them. Philosophy became subsidiary to revelation, and reason was the handmaid of faith.

Christian philosophy has been divided into two periods. The first begins with the opening of the Christian era, the epoch of the Church fathers, and practically ends with the great father of the Church,—Augustine (354-430), though it is continued by some historians until the ninth century, under the name of the Patristic period.

With that first period the history of philosophy has little to do, except to mention some of the great theologians, whose work it was to formulate the faith of the Church and defend it against heresies within and attacks from without. Some of these we have already referred to when speaking of the leaders of the Alexandrian school, such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Hypolitus, Clemens and Origen. We have also to mention the name of Cyprian, who was born at Carthage about A.D. 200, and was the greatest theologian of the so-called African school. As one of the great teachers of the Church, he cannot be passed over, but his work lay not so much in the field of theology or philosophy as that of Church government and discipline.

The most prominent figure among the patristic fathers was *St. Augustine*, who was born at Tagaste, in Numidia, in 354 A.D. He continued a Pagan till advanced in years, but through the influence of his mother was converted to Christianity. In 397 appeared his *Confessions*. It is an earnest, sacred, autobiography of one of the greatest intellects the world has ever seen. In 426 he finished his *De Civitate Dei*, his most powerful work. It is a splendid vindication of the Christian Church, conceived of as a new order rising on the ruins of the old Roman empire, and is not only the most philosophic treatise of Christian



theology, but one of the most profound and lasting monuments of human genius.

No mind has exerted a greater influence on thought than that of Augustine. No controversy of the age was settled without his voice, and his comprehensive systematic treatment of the doctrines of the Church became at once the standard of judgment and the basis upon which the structure of mediaeval theology was reared. He was the true teacher of the middle ages. In his philosophy the threads of Christian and Neoplatonic thought, the ideas of Origen and Plotinus, are united. He combines the old and new—preserving the best results of Greek philosophy, but infusing into it the Christian spirit and concentrating the thought of the times upon the great practical needs of the soul—the sense of sin and the necessity of salvation.

Augustine studied in his youth the dialectics of Aristotle, but his philosophy is mainly based on Plato. Faith with Augustine precedes knowledge and is the key to knowledge. What faith holds certain should be verified and comprehended by reason; philosophy and religion have the same goal. The first truth is that of the soul's own existence, which is involved in every conscious thought. Besides our sensations as sources of knowledge, we have reason which seeks after truth and is itself a test of truth. In God are the rational grounds of all things, and to know ourselves is to know God. The world is the creation of God. The connecting link between God and the world is the Logos, in whom, as the wisdom of all, are the invisible grounds of all created things. The attributes of God are relative to our apprehension. "He is good without quality, great without quantity." Respecting the Trinity Augustine insists on the divine unity. The distinction of the persons is limited to their relations to one another. There is but one substance or essence; but when we speak of three persons, it is because of poverty of language to express the distinction between Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost. All the Persons are omnipotent, but these are not three omnipotences. In his conception of the Person of Christ, he gives due weight to the humanity, and he emphasizes the voluntary humiliation of Christ in becoming incarnate. An important element in Augustine's system is his doctrine that God's plan is universal; His will is completely carried out. Nothing lies outside the providence of God; nothing is unimportant or insignificant in the divine economy. Evil exists, but it is really the absence or privation of good. It is, therefore, not an object of creation,—God is not its author. God's will is never defeated. Evil is turned into good, and the opposition of the creature is used to further the divine purpose. Where evil exists God permits it, and wills to permit it. In the *Civitas Dei* Augustine maintains that there are two communities: one, the City of God, composed of the people of God, destined to everlasting blessedness; the other, the city of the world, composed of the wretched, both of the flagrantly bad and the virtuous according to a human estimate, whose end is eternal misery. With regard to his doctrines of Sin and Grace—the most distinctive part of his theology—he held the corruption of human nature through the fall of man and the consequent slavery of the human will. As a consequence, he affirmed the doctrine of predestination and election. Faith itself is the gift of God. The number of the elect is fixed. Those who believe in the Gospel are not merely elected to be recipients of heavenly reward; they are elected to be recipients of faith. The holy life is the gift of God, and is bestowed on those to whom God, in His inscrutable wisdom, chooses to grant it.

## CHAPTER II

### SCHOLASTIC PERIOD

THE second period of Christian philosophy, which extends from the ninth century to the fifteenth, is called the Scholastic period, so called because the monks were the chief scholars and the monasteries were the chief depositories of learning.

During the middle ages the continent of Europe was divided into a number of small states, feebly governed and often at feud with one another, over which the Roman hierarchy exercised universal sway. The chief power was ecclesiastical and not political. The Church was supreme, the arbiter in all disputes. In consequence of this religious autocracy life was corrupted and thought crippled. A spirit of despotism crushed intellectual activity. With the exception of a temporary revival of intellectual interest, consequent on the union of the empire under Charlemagne in the beginning of the ninth century, the earlier portion of the middle ages presents a dreary story of superstition, corruption, and mental torpor. The tenth century was a dark age in mediaeval history. In the eleventh the sky began to clear. The ecclesiastical reforms of Hildebrand, the renewed communication with the Greek empire through the crusades, where learning was still cherished, the intercourse with the Arabians in Spain among whom the sciences were cultivated—these were among the causes which stimulated philosophic thought,

The intellectual life of the middle ages is represented by Scholasticism, which is not to be regarded as a fixed doctrine or school like Platonism, but as a name which comprehends the philosophic endeavours of Christendom for nearly a thousand years. The Schoolmen were theologians, who prosecuted philosophy wholly in the interests of the Church, and whose aim was to reconcile faith and reason and to give to the dogmas of Christianity a scientific form.

The first impulse to Scholastic theology was given by Augustine, whose works directed and shaped theological thought, and long remained the authoritative source of doctrine. Side by side with the teaching of Augustine a Neoplatonic influence was exerted which took the form of *Mysticism*. Accordingly, Scholasticism and Mysticism supplement each other without being mutually exclusive. The one emphasizes more the doctrine of the Church; the other the conduct of the individual life. Along with these two tendencies a third characteristic of mediaevalism is to be noted—the *secular interest in Greek and Roman literature*, which languished during the earlier centuries, but revived with the introduction of the writings of Aristotle into the Christian schools through the medium of Arabian commentators.

While, therefore, Scholasticism is the general name given to the whole intellectual activity of the middle ages, these three features of it must be clearly distinguished—the theological, dealing with the dogmas of the Church; the mystical, having to do with personal piety; the classical or secular, relating to Greek philosophy.

The great philosophic problem which exercised the minds of the Schoolmen was that of *Nominalism* and *Realism*—an antithesis, the origin of which is to be found in the relation of Scholasticism to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The question as to whether universal notions have a substantial existence or whether they consist in bare intellectual concepts only was raised by a passage



taken from the introduction to the *Isagoge* of Porphyry as translated by Boethius. The great battle over this problem, left undetermined by its author, was opened towards the close of the ninth century by John Scotus Erigena. But it is not till we come to the last years of the eleventh century that the strife became keen as between Roscellinus and Anselm. It continues throughout the whole course of Scholasticism, and is brought to bear on almost every question of life and ritual.

The Realists, following the teaching of Plato, held the existence of universal notions prior to concrete things in which they were embodied. The genus is the real, and is identical in all the individuals composing it. The Nominalists, on the other hand, maintained that universal notions were mere names, empty abstractions of the mind, without any objective reality. An intermediate theory, which sought to unite the two, called Conceptualism, was upheld by some, particularly by Abelard.

The spread of Scholastic philosophy was greatly helped by its teaching in the universities, which began to arise both on the Continent and in England about the beginning of the twelfth century. Paris became an important centre of erudition as well as Oxford. To these and the other seats of learning students streamed from all parts of Europe.

In the instruction of the schools and universities importance was attached as much to method as to matter. The logic of Aristotle was the instrument of discussion. The syllogism was the weapon of assault and defence. Every subject was taken up into the formal scheme of logic, with its premisses and conclusions—analysed and defined and argued with keen dialectic skill. Gradually the Schoolmen lost interest in the practical questions of faith and busied themselves with mere speculative abstractions and subtle logical puzzles. The whole Scholastic era naturally falls into two sections; the first being more under the influence of Plato, the second of Aristotle.

The first period extends from the rise of Scholasticism to Alexander of Hales, who was the earliest Schoolman to make use of the other works of Aristotle besides the *Logic*. The second section begins with the thirteenth century, during which Aristotle rather than Plato dominates and shapes philosophic thought.

## CHAPTER III

### SCHOLASTICISM INFLUENCED BY PLATO

IN the earlier portions of the middle ages there was a lack of original authorship, and intellectual activity consisted chiefly in drawing up compilations from the fathers, particularly from Gregory and Augustine. In the eighth century there was more culture in England than in any other country, except Italy. From the cloister of Yarrow went forth the Venerable Bede, famous for his learning throughout the west. In 782 Alcuin, also an Englishman and profound scholar, became head of the domestic school of Charlemagne. Under Charles the Bald, Manrus, Radbert, and Hincmar were conspicuous theologians. But the earliest noteworthy philosopher of the Scholastic period was *John Scotus* (b. about 800, d. 870), called "Erigena," which means born in the "Isle of Saints," a frequent designation of Ireland. Shortly before the middle of the ninth century he was invited by Charles the Bald to take charge of the school at Paris. He was deeply influenced by the Neoplatonism of Augustine's writings. His speculations were of a pantheistic character, and he got into trouble with Rome. He held that true philosophy and true theology are identical. Faith belongs to the earlier stages of intellectual life and leads up to reason. The universe is the unfolding of God. God reaches self-consciousness in man. Natural things have only a semblance of reality. In his work on the *Division of*

*Nature* he maintains that all existence is a theophany. All being runs through a cycle. Everything begins with God and returns to God again.

During the eleventh century the schools of Tours and Bec, in Normandy, rose to great celebrity as seats of learning. Bec had for its prior *Lanfranc*, and at the head of the school of Tours Berengarius presided. The controversies of these two scholars regarding the change in the elements of the Lord's Supper, involving the deeper question as to the relation of substance and accident, may be considered as the beginning of the Scholastic era.

(1) But if Scholasticism was introduced by Lanfranc and Berengarius, *Anselm* may be regarded as its real founder and father. He was born in 1033, became Archbishop of Canterbury, and died in 1109. In him the two elements, the speculative and the mystical, were united. His doctrine, *Credo ut intelligam*, was the watchword of the movement. Anselm discussed the deepest questions of philosophy. In the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists Anselm supported the Realistic position as against Roscellinus, who was the foremost advocate of Nominalism. Roscellinus applied his views to the doctrine of the Trinity, holding that the general idea of Trinity can become a reality only in its individuals, their unity of substances disappearing as a mere name. This tritheistic doctrine was opposed and confuted by Anselm, and Roscellinus was impeached by the council of Soissons in 1092.

The principal work of Anselm is *Cur Deus Homo*, which treats of the humanity and sacrifice of Christ. In this work he shows that the need of an atonement for sin is the ground of the Incarnation. Satisfaction must be made for sin, but it must be made from the side of the sinner, hence the necessity for the *Deus Homo*. His life outweighs the evil of all sin. In this treatise Anselm sweeps away for all time the fatal theory that had hitherto satisfied the Church, that the final cause of redemption was the



devil rather than God, and that man was rescued by purchase from his power. By his doctrine of satisfaction Anselm supplied theology with a working theory of the atonement. Anselm's view is that a debt is due to God, and that amends must be made for the dishonour done to Him. It was not merely Christ's sufferings, but His whole life which constituted the act of obedience rendered on man's behalf.

In his more strictly philosophical work Anselm is chiefly noted as the author of what has been called the "Ontological Argument" for the existence of God. God's existence is bound up with the very nature of the human mind. The idea of God involves the reality of that idea. The rational and real are one—an idea which has its germ in Plato, and has been emphasized in modern times by Hegel. Anselm combined in a wonderful degree devotion and piety of life with intellectual vigour.

(2) *Peter Abelard*, at once the pupil and opponent of Roscellinus, was born near Nantes, 1079. Fired with a passion for knowledge, he became the greatest leader in the intellectual movement of the age. An expert logician, he surpassed all his contemporaries. After wandering from one school to another he was attracted to Paris by the fame of the Realist, William of Champeaux, whose philosophy soon provoked Abelard to combat, with the result that he was finally installed in his master's place. His bold and reckless intellect was ever broaching new problems. While he believed in the capacity of reason to compass all mysteries, he did not renounce the principle of the pre-eminence of faith. But he held that faith without knowledge lacks stability. In his teaching he proclaims his object to be to awake inquiry. He controverts the saying of Anselm, *Credo ut intelligam*. He argues that man believes not because of authority, but because of conviction. With regard to the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists Abelard took an intermediate position. He held that the universal is only

real in thought, but at the same time it is no mere product of thought. You cannot abstract the thought of the thing from the thing itself.

Abelard took what might be called the moral view of reconciliation to God through Christ. He scorns the idea that God is propitiated by the sufferings of His Son. The whole work of Christ, including His life and death, is a manifestation of divine love to the unworthy, calculated to kindle their gratitude and win them back to obedience. He gave offence by his views on the Trinity. God, he held, as the absolutely perfect being combines in Himself absolute might, wisdom, and love, which constitute His threefold personality.

At the instigation of Bernard, his teaching was condemned at a council of Sens in 1141. His work on the Trinity was burned, and he himself confined in a cloister. He died in 1142. Though disgraced and defeated, Abelard was one of the keenest logicians of his age. He did much to clear away the verbal sophistries in which the Scholastics delighted. In his work *Yes and No—Sic et non*—he brought the various opinions of the fathers together with the object of showing how they contradicted one another.

(3) The great opponent of Abelard was *Bernard of Clairvaux*. In the relation of these two men, so strongly contrasted in character and mental gifts, we see the collision between the dialectic of the Schoolmen and the authority of the Church. The attempts of Abelard to explain divine things Bernard regards as destructive rationalism, and he sees in him the rash innovator who, with the devil's daring, sought to penetrate into the secrets of religion, and to set his own private opinion above the united testimony of the Church.

Bernard, though no enemy of learning, exalts piety and regards feeling as the pathway to knowledge,—contemplation, the secret of blessedness. There are three ways of grasping divine truth. The first is by the intellect, which

is not possible in this life. The second is opinion, which is, however, void of certainty. Between intellect and opinion he places faith, which proceeds from the heart and will, and anticipates the knowledge which will at last be clearly given to the mind.

Bernard may be regarded as the founder of Monasticism, and the forerunner of the mystics.

The many rare qualities of his heart and mind—his consecrated learning, his commanding eloquence, his practical wisdom, and, above all, his ardent piety—constitute him one of the most beautiful spirits, as well as one of the most influential forces of the Scholastic period.

(4) *Peter Lombard* (1159-1164) took a middle path between the dialectic and churchly tendencies, and may be regarded as the founder of systematic theology. He set forth the doctrines of the Church in methodical form, placing them upon a metaphysical basis while supporting them by quotations from the fathers, especially from Augustine. Peter Lombard did not escape accusation on account of his views on the Trinity and the person of Christ. But the book of sentences (*Liber Sententiarum*), of which he was the chief author, long continued to be the text-book of theology from which the university teachers lectured.

## CHAPTER IV

### SCHOLASTICISM UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE

THE event which divides the history of Scholasticism into two periods was the introduction about the end of the twelfth century into the Christian schools, through the medium of Arabian commentators, of the writings of Aristotle. For generations Aristotle had been known in the Church in a fragmentary way, and his dialectic method obtained from the *Logic* was the approved instrument of Scholastic reasoning. But his more systematic works were unknown. With the rediscovery of his works as a whole, speculation received a new impulse, and the task of the later Schoolmen was to harmonize the teaching of "the philosopher," as he was called, with the doctrines of the Church.

(1) *Alexander of Hales*, who was trained in the cloister of Hales in Gloucestershire, studied in Oxford and Paris, styled "Doctor irrefragabilis," has the honour of being the first who became acquainted with the writings of Aristotle. The Emperor Frederick II. had obtained Aristotle's works from Constantinople and caused them to be translated into Latin. At first they were received by the Church with considerable suspicion. But eventually by the Pope's approval—Gregory IX.—theologians were permitted to use the philosopher's writings. The enthusiasm spread. Aristotle was considered to have exhausted the power of human reason in ascertaining truth, and his metaphysics,



as well as his physics and psychology, were commented on and explained at all the centres of learning.

(2) *Albertus Magnus*, so styled from the extent of his erudition, born 1193 in Lauingen on the Danube, is the most famous of the German Scholastics. He was a profound student of Aristotle, and has left a large number of writings, consisting chiefly of commentaries upon the Master. But it is said that he did not hesitate to modify the doctrines of "the philosopher" to meet the views of the Church. He was conscious of a distinction between natural and revealed religion, but it became the aim of his labours to minimize the difference and to harmonize philosophy and theology. He contended that what is known in philosophy by the natural light (*lumine naturali*) holds good also in theology. But he abandoned the position that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation can be made rational. When the soul is confronted with contradictions, revelation gives the decision.

Revelation is above reason, but not contrary to reason.

(3) The same attitude toward natural and revealed truth was taken by *Thomas Aquinas*, the renowned pupil of Albert, and, like his master, a Dominican (1226-1274). He was one of the profoundest as well as one of the clearest of Scholastic writers. He brought his wonderful classical lore into the service of the Church and endeavoured to make Aristotle a chief pillar of Christian dogma. While agreeing in the main with Albert, he even goes further in limiting the exercise of philosophical insight and enlarging the domain of faith.

The distinction, overlooked by Anselm and the earlier Schoolmen, between philosophy and theology, is clearly maintained; and according to the fundamental thought of his system, he conceives their relation as a relation of the different steps of development by which the knowledge which a man acquires by natural faculties may be brought to full realization by the working of grace in revelation. His *Summa Theologiae* covers the entire field of ethics

as well as of theology. The work purports to be a treatise on God, and it is divided into three parts. The first part treats of the nature of God—the Trinity and the relation of God to the world. The second deals with man or “the motion of the creature towards God”; and here he discusses sin, law, the virtues and the blessed life. The third part is occupied with the Person and Work of Christ, the Sacraments and the Last Things. Christ is the way to God; with God the theology of Aquinas begins and ends.

He contends for the need of Revelation to complete the powers of man, which are inadequate of themselves to discern the highest truths. He distinguishes two classes of truth. There are truths above reason, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation. There are also truths accessible to reason, as, for example, the truth that there is a God. But even the second class of truths needs the confirmation of Revelation, as such knowledge is obtainable only by the few.

Aquinas describes God as endowed with thought and will. With Aristotle he says he is *Actus Purus*, i.e. energy realized instead of being potential. Aquinas does not wholly reject the Ontological argument of Anselm, but relies for proof rather on the Cosmological argument,—the argument from design. But he holds that prior to all reasoning a knowledge of God is dimly inherent in all men.

In relation to the world, Aquinas holds that God is omnipresent. He is in all things, but not as part of their essence, but as an agent is present, in regard to the object on which he acts. Creation is an act of the divine will, and the preservation of the world is the continuous act of creation. But while God is the Creator of the world, and the determining energy in the human will, He is not the author of evil. Moral evil, he holds with Augustine, is purely negative, a thing which God permits and overrules for good, but does not will. In regard to original sin, and the transmission of evil, his views are essentially those

of Augustine, while his theory of the Atonement agrees with that of Anselm, though he maintains that God was at liberty to grant pardon, had He so desired, without any satisfaction being rendered.

(4) Closely connected with, though differing in many points from Aquinas, is *John Duns Scotus*, called "Doctor Mirabilis." He lived nearly a generation later, and died in 1308. In him a return is made to Plato, and in his subtle hair-splitting dialectic he may be said to have begun the work of undermining Scholasticism. He still further enlarged the sphere of authority, and on many subjects closed all argument by referring them simply to the Will of God.

Aquinas and Scotus were the heads of two great conflicting schools, which were called after their founders, *Thomists and Scotists*.

The great problem which was discussed by these two schools was the psychological question whether among the powers of the soul the higher dignity belongs to the *will* or to the *intellect*. The Thomists followed Aristotle, and claimed the place of honour for the intellect, while Duns Scotus and his adherents emphasized the superiority of the will. The intellect, the Thomists held, not only apprehends the idea of the good, but also in each individual case recognises what is good, and thereby determines the will. The will naturally strives for that which is known to be good, and it is, therefore, dependent upon the intellect. But, said their opponents, this theory of determinism takes from man all moral responsibility and deprives him of freedom of will. Responsibility can only be preserved if it is acknowledged that the intellect exercises no compulsion over the will. The intellect may indeed present various objects to the will, but the possibility of choice and power of action remain with the will. So far, indeed, from the will being determined by the intellect, Scotus and Occam maintain that the will determines the development of the intellectual activities.

The question which was at first a purely psychological one was lifted up into the realm of theology, and the problem came to be as to the relative rank of "will" and "intellect" in God. Thomas Aquinas, indeed, recognises the reality of the Divine Will, but he regards it as a necessary consequence of the Divine Intellect. God creates only what in His wisdom He knows to be good. Thus the Divine Will is bound and determined by the Divine Reason.

Duns Scotus and his followers, on the other hand, see in this view a limitation of omnipotence. God's will must be sovereign without restriction.

God created the world solely from His own will. He might have created it in any form He chose, and in selecting this form He was unmoved and unconditioned by any cause outside of His own will.

The controversy was not only brought into the realms of theology and applied to questions as to the nature of God and the relations of nature and grace, but it came to its sharpest antithesis in the sphere of ethics, and especially in regard to the duty and destiny of man. On both sides the moral law was regarded as God's command, but while the Thomists thought that God commands the good because it is good, the Scotists maintained that it is good only because God has willed it to be so, and has commanded it. And Occam went the length of saying that God might even have selected something else than the moral law as the duty of man. Hence with the Thomists duty or morals is a discipline whose principles may be perceived by "natural light." With the Scotists, on the contrary, Good cannot be the object of unaided knowledge, and can only be learned from Revelation.

Along with the two features of the Scholastic period, the ecclesiastical and the classical, the churchly and the intellectual, there was, we saw, a third,—the Mystical. While, in general, the aim of the Schoolmen was the reconciliation of reason and faith, the harmony of the



dogmas of the Church with the tenets of philosophy, there was a parallel movement towards the exaltation of personal piety, which came into special prominence in the declining period of Scholasticism. Mysticism and Scholasticism were not wholly opposed. Among the greatest theological leaders many of them were mystics. Already in Bernard of Clairvaux we noted this tendency, to find in piety of life, in rapturous devotion and in self-surrender of the soul, the true aim of life, and the solution of all mysteries.

In the case of some of the Schoolmen, such as Hugo of St. Victor and Benaventura,—“Doctor Seraphicus,”—who in 1256 became the head of the Franciscan order, Mysticism was wrought into a theological system in which the end of knowledge and of life was conceived to be the direct communion with God.

*Francis of Assisi* (b. 1182) and *Dominic*, the founders of the famous orders bearing their names, are the outstanding representatives of Mysticism in the thirteenth century. In both of these men the love of Christ was an absorbing passion; and while His divinity was dwelt upon almost to the exclusion of His humanity, the ideal of the Christian life was regarded as the rapt contemplation of the sufferings of Jesus and the literal reproduction of His life of poverty.

The German Mystics of the fourteenth century had little in common with the Scholastics, and were largely, as they have been happily called, “Reformers before the Reformation.” For them doctrine was subsidiary to life, and the value of truth consisted in its power to stimulate personal piety. Among the most notable of the later mystics may be mentioned Master Eckhart, professor in Paris in 1300; John Tauler of Strassburg (1300-61); Henry Suso of Constance (1300-65); Thomas à Kempis (d. 1471), the author of the *Imitatio Christi* and also of a work prized by Protestants, *The German Theology*. Many of these belonged to the Dominican order, and were men whose thoughts were deeply influenced by the writings of

Thomas Aquinas. Eckhart, in his view of God, tended indeed to pantheism. Most of them, while exalting the life of contemplation and communion with God as the end of blessedness, did not disparage an active life of duty and charity.

For more than two hundred years Scholasticism was the mighty bulwark of the Roman hierarchy, but in the hands of *William of Occam* (1270-1349), a pupil of Duns Scotus, Scholastic philosophy assumed a form which led to its dissolution. By his trenchant demonstration of Nominalism, thought was emptied of its content, and Scholasticism ceased to have a *raison d'être*. All our knowledge, said Occam, is only of phenomena. Individual things alone exist. Common names are but equivalent to algebraical signs. Logic applied to Christian truth leads to contradiction. The doctrines of our faith are revealed to us directly in Scripture, and are assured to us by the authority of the Church. Nothing more is to be said. There is no room for reason. William of Occam was practically the last of the Schoolmen.

As a phase of thought, Scholasticism was not without interest nor was it devoid of results. Though under the strict dominion of the Church and jealously watched, it provoked a spirit of inquiry and a love of truth. The discredit which the Humanists cast upon it applied chiefly to its later developments. Its weakness lay in its aim to reduce every subject to syllogistic form, and its attempt to reach conclusions on the profoundest mysteries of thought by the laws of formal logic. The arbitrary definitions and subtle distinctions, in which some of the Schoolmen delighted, caused the whole movement to degenerate through time into a meaningless jargon, void of all spiritual contents, from which the best spirits turned away in despair. At the same time, a system which produced such types of men as Thomas Aquinas on the one hand, and Dante on the other, is one which, in its far-reaching results, the history of philosophy cannot ignore.

## *PART IV*

### *REVIVAL OF PHILOSOPHY*

THE Reformation marks a new epoch in the history of thought. It is the moment of conversion,—man coming to himself and asserting his individuality. The opposition between ecclesiastical authority and secular life which had begun to disclose itself even in mediaeval times was now forcing itself to the front. Science was beginning to free itself from the bondage of the Roman hierarchy and to set in motion the manifold activities of modern life. The abstract unity of the world is broken up; the tradition and dogmas which the Church had imposed on the nations are burst, and the spirit of man freed from its bonds awakens to the wonders of nature and life. A passionate desire for novelty fills all minds, and a multitude of new interests, political, commercial, scientific, artistic, assert themselves. Philosophy, no longer dominated by theology, becomes fuller and richer in its contents. Knowledge is pursued, not in the interests of a church or a class, but for its own sake. The new birth of the Spirit is that which gives to the period of the Renaissance its character and importance. It is in one sense a return to the standpoint of Greek thought; in another it is a new outlook upon the world and upon life.

## CHAPTER I

### THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

THREE great historical movements may be said to have prepared the way for modern philosophy. These are—the Revival of Learning; the Reformation; and the Rise of the Natural Sciences. Though these, for the sake of convenience, may be distinguished, they were closely connected, and are, indeed, but different manifestations of one movement.

(1) The *Revival of Letters* or the Renaissance,—which is the comprehensive name for the intellectual movement which marks the transition from the middle ages to the modern world,—was substantially a revolt against the barrenness and dogmatism of Mediaevalism. It claimed an entire liberation of reason, and by its earnest study of the rich humanity of Greece and Rome, sought to rehabilitate the human spirit with all the arts and graces which had invested the classical age. Zeal for the *Litterae Humaniores* brought forth a new ideal of culture and a new view of life, which have received the name of Humanism.

It would be impossible to fix a date for the Revival of Learning. For the first heralds of the New Spirit, we may go back to Petrarch and Dante. Before the close of the Dark Ages, there were already isolated thinkers who anticipated the new light. With the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 numbers of Greek



scholars escaped from the east and sought refuge in Italy and the north. The movement spread to every land. In the earliest period of the Renaissance, Florence was the centre of enlightenment. The president of the Republic, Cosimo di Medici, himself a scholar, philosopher, and artist, was the patron of classical learning, the founder of a new Academy of Athens in the gardens of Medici, and the first of a long series of distinguished scholars, among whom may be mentioned Bessarion, Ficino and Pico of Mirandola.

In Germany the new movement produced such notable leaders, who were also leaders of Protestantism, as Melanchthon—who introduced Aristotle—Reuchlin (1455-1522), Erasmus, and Von Hutten.

(2) The second influence closely connected with the Revival of Letters was the *Reformation*, which began in Germany, but spread to other lands. The revolt against mediaeval tradition, the zeal for learning, the desire for national independence and the direction of men's minds to nature and life, which were affecting every country and every class of society, found religious expression in the spirit of Protestantism. Man awakened to a consciousness of himself. He realized his individual worth and became aware of his spiritual nature. The desire for individual freedom, manifest in the Renaissance generally, is the special note of the Reformation. This tendency showed itself in a revolt against the authority of the Church and by an appeal to private judgment. Man became convinced that within himself the work of salvation must be accomplished: that he stood in a direct relation to God, and needed not for his reconciliation the intervention of the priest. The Bible was translated into the language of the people, and by means of the newly-invented printing press the humblest peasant could read and examine it for himself. The head and front of the Reformation, in Germany at least, was Luther. He did not start on his career as reformer. His first purpose was

simply to correct certain religious abuses which came to his notice. He was affected by the Mystics, especially by St. Bernard and the Sermons of Tauler, but his strong practical sense prevented him from adopting the more extreme views of the Pietistic school. His public attitude was the outcome of his own religious history, and his theology, of which the two leading principles were Justification by faith alone and the normative authority of the Bible, was shaped in the crucible of his own experience. But in the development of Protestant dogma Luther's genius was aided by Melanchthon, whose humanistic breadth balanced and corrected the Reformer's dogmatic zeal.

(3) Along with these two movements, which were indeed causes as much as signs of the modern spirit—another has to be added—*the Rise of the Natural Sciences* and the observation of nature by the method of experience. The discovery of America and the maritime route to India had already widened the visible horizon. The new-world system of Copernicus, who took the decisive step of placing the earth among the planets and the sun in the centre of the system, the scientific investigations of Tycho de Brahé, Galileo, Kepler, Gilbert, and others, overthrew the presumptions which had long held sway and turned men's minds from the distant and unseen world to the possibilities of nature and the interests of actual life. The heliocentric theory aroused great alarm in the Church. Kepler was persecuted. Galileo was forced to retract. But nothing could put back the clock of advancing thought. The new theories spread, discoveries and inventions multiplied. First came the invention of printing, next the compass, and then the telescope. Science began to shake off the yoke of Scholasticism. "Experience" became the watchword of the new period. Luther not less than Erasmus, Descartes as well as Bacon, sought to bring man back to observation and experiment. Everything must be brought to the bar of experience and the test of

the human mind. The Protestant right of private judgment takes the form in philosophy of investigation, scrutiny, induction. An opposition is now established between theology and philosophy. Leaving questions connected with the supersensuous world and with man's religious life to the theologians, philosophy betakes itself to what it considers its own proper task of apprehending nature. While theology, therefore, teaches how God reveals Himself in Scripture, it is the business of philosophy to study His revelation in nature. Hence, as has been said, the beginnings of modern natural science were theosophical—a return to the view of the world taken by Neoplatonists—the view of the divine unity of the whole. The world is regarded as a macrocosm—as a mighty living organism of which God is at once the beginning and the end. These views find expression in the most distinguished philosophers of this period—the Italian Bruno, the German Böhme, and, in a less degree, in the French Montaigne.

1. *Giordano Bruno* of Nola (1550-1600). After various experiences in Geneva, Paris, London, Wittenberg, and Frankfurt, in 1592 he was imprisoned by the inquisition, and in 1600 burned as a heretic at Rome. Philosophy as well as religion has had its martyrs. His first important work, *Della Causa Principio et Uno*, reproduces in poetic form the pantheism of Greece. He revives the Stoic idea that the world is co-extensive with God, the *substantia Suprasubstantiales*, and is instinct in all its parts with the Divine Spirit. Reason, which is present in nature, is the artificer of the material world. Every individual thing, not man merely, is a mirror of the world's substance. Each monad or individual particle is a manifestation of God, and is corporeal as well as spiritual, and, therefore, imperishable. Everything follows the law of its special nature, and is at the same time the expression of a more general law; just as the planet moves at the same time on its own axis and about the sun.

All nature is alive. A World-Soul permeates everything. The universe is a great organism. The eyes of Bruno have been opened to the immensity and diversity of the natural world by the new astronomical theory of Copernicus. Nothing now is limited. By this knowledge we have been loosened from our chains and set at liberty to roam in a most august empire. It is not reasonable to believe that any part of the world is without a soul, life, and sensation. There is but one centre from which all species issue, as rays from the sun, and to which all return. We are surrounded by eternity and united by love. God is the whole, but a whole which is present in every part. He is in the blade of grass, in the grain of sand, in the atom that floats in the sunbeam, as well as in the boundless all.

The aim of all philosophy is to discern the unity of matter and form, the sequence of cause and effect. Harmony for Bruno is the inmost nature of the world. The world is perfect because it is the life of God, and to gaze upon its beauty with rapture is the religion of the philosopher. A universal optimism is the note of Bruno's poetic rhapsodies.

(2) *Jacob Böhme* of Seidenburg, near Görlitz, in Upper Lusitania (1575-1624), was the son of poor parents. In boyhood he tended cattle, and ultimately became a shoemaker in Görlitz. He was a humble, God-fearing man, but of excitable nature. Besides the Bible, which he knew well, he had read but a few mystic books, especially those of Paracelsus. He professed to have had supernatural revelations. In 1612 he published his work, entitled *Aurora*, a strange enigmatic writing, full of dark utterances and wild yearnings—which brought him into trouble with the town authorities. Böhme is the founder of Theosophic Mysticism, and is really the first German philosopher, though his writings have received more attention in Holland and England than in his own country. His ideas lack system, and he deals in metaphors rather than in definite statements.



The ground idea of all things is the absolute divine unity—the harmony of all opposition in God. God is the *Urgrund*, the original and indistinguishable unity, at once everything and nothing,—which contains in Himself the principle of separation, whereby all things come into existence. His principal, indeed, his only thought, which he never tires reiterating, is the presence of the Holy Trinity in all things.

All knowledge, he holds, is the union of opposites; nothing exists without its counterfeit. Every proposition has its antithesis, and no positive truth can be affirmed till its negative is also realized. Indeed, without difference, no knowledge is possible. The “other” must always be opposed by the “one.”

This duality runs through the whole world. It rules in Heaven as well as on earth; and since God is the sole cause of all that there is, opposition must be conceived in Him also. Everywhere there is difference. Light can only be revealed in relation to darkness, and God’s goodness is only apprehended in connection with His anger.

God can only reveal Himself to us by going out of Himself, and the world is simply the self-manifestation of the Divine.

In “yes” and “no” all things consist. The “yes” is the Divine, pure power and love. The “no” is the counterpart of the Divine, which is necessary to it in order that the Divine may be revealed as active love.

The philosophy of Böhme is an application of the principle of contradiction to the problems of creation and the nature of evil; and, as has been already noticed, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity underlies his conception of the Divine life and its mode of manifestation.

Böhme may be regarded as the complement of Spinoza, while the latter affirms the return of the finite into the infinite, the former emphasizes the issue of the finite from the eternal.

In later times the idea of diversity in unity, which plays

such an important part in Böhme's teaching, was developed in a systematic way by Schelling and Hegel.

(3) While the separation between theology and philosophy consequent on the emancipation of the individual led such men as Bruno and Böhme to subjective theosophy, it led others to a light-hearted indifferentism, or even to scepticism.

Wearied with the arid abstractions of the Schoolmen, many of the Humanists regarded all metaphysical speculation with indifference, and conceived that the proper attitude of culture was that of a graceful tolerance or refined scepticism.

*Montaigne* (1553-1592) has given expression to this aspect of Humanism. Possessed of classical erudition and literary taste, he was one of the earliest to give to French literature a note which it has not lost. Montaigne is largely influenced by such Roman writers as Cicero, and his philosophic thought is tinged with Pyrrhonism.

In his *Essais*, as the result of his observation, he gives utterance to the view that all human knowledge is uncertain and reason is always unreliable, therefore, we must in the last resort rest satisfied with faith in revealed truth.

The relativity of opinion, the illusion of the senses, the contradiction between subject and object, the dependence of our reasoning faculties upon the doubtful data of observation—all these arguments of ancient scepticism are revived by Montaigne, not in systematic form, but in the incidental treatment of individual questions.

## CHAPTER II

### SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. BACON

MODERN philosophy may be said to begin with Bacon on the one hand, the founder of a new empirical method, and on the other with Descartes, the author of a new speculative system.

The keynote of the new period is revolt against all authority and assumption and a return to experience. It is an age of inquiry and investigation. The demand is made for a new method, a sure and reliable instrument of discovering truth. All modern thinkers agree in their determination to clear the mind of every assumption and to accept nothing but what experience offers. But they differ as to what is to be included in that term. Descartes not less than Bacon assumes only what is given; but while Bacon accepts the facts of outward experience only, Descartes recognises the phenomena of the mind. Both start with doubt; but both accept as data what comes within their own consciousness and can be vindicated by reason.

(1) *Francis Bacon of Verulam* was born in London in 1561, and died in 1626. At the age of thirty-two he entered Parliament and soon become distinguished as a debater. In 1619 he attained to the Lord Chancellorship of England. After a brilliant career, as the result of political opposition, he was convicted of venality and deposed from office.

The character of Bacon has called forth most diverse

estimates, and it may be regarded as one of the unsettled problems of history. His nature was certainly a most complex one, full of lights and shadows. Bacon the philosopher of science and author of the *Novum Organum*, and Bacon the courtier and political place-seeker, seem not one man, but two. If we consider him as a thinker, we cannot but admire his zeal for truth, his penetrating insight and comprehensive grasp of mind; while, on the other hand, if we view him as a statesman, his vulgar ambition and cringing sycophancy in some measure justify Pope's description,

"The greatest, brightest, meanest of mankind."

When we remember that his whole life was spent in the throng of the world amid the demands of professional and public life, we cannot but wonder at the number and variety of his literary labours. Whatever the verdict as to the value of his philosophy may be, there is no doubt that among the forces in English literature and life he stands second to none.

Besides his *Essays*, which consist of prudential maxims, miscellaneous reflections on human conduct and sagacious considerations upon life generally, his principal writings are the three great works: *Instauratio Magna*, *The Dignity and Advancement of Learning* (1605), and the *Novum Organum* (1620).

It has been remarked by Kuno Fischer that, as a philosopher, Bacon has not received his due, especially from German writers. In histories and compendia of modern philosophy Bacon either plays no part at all or, at best, but a very insignificant part as one of the unimportant names of mediaeval philosophy. It has been said, indeed, that the point of contact between English and German philosophy is to be found not so much in Bacon as in some of his successors. Erdmann, Ueberweg, and others have maintained that it was not Bacon but Hume who influenced Kant, while it was Locke who affected Leibnitz. Spinoza



speaks of Bacon with contempt, and if he drew anything from English philosophy at all it was from Hobbes. But it must not be forgotten that Hobbes, Locke, and Hume are all descendants from Bacon, that in him they all have their root, and without him they cannot be adequately accounted for. Bacon is the true father of Realistic philosophy, and it is his genius which gives the direction and character to the age in which he lived. He is essentially a pioneer. He stands in the same relation to Realism as Descartes stands to Idealism, Leibnitz to the enlightenment, and Kant to modern philosophy. He opens a path which others follow, and there is scarcely a line of thought which does not, indirectly at least, lead back to him.

Bacon sets himself the ambitious task of reorganizing the sciences. He begins by describing the state of learning in his day, and he institutes a contrast between the barrenness of philosophy and the vitality of the mechanical arts. While philosophy is at a stand-still, these are advancing towards perfection. This condition of things is due, according to Bacon, to certain "distempers of learning," viz., vain affections, vain disputes, and vain imaginations.

The first disease consists in "luxury of style," in which the manner is considered more than the matter. Phrases, figures, tropes take the place of the dignity of the subject and depth of judgment. The second disease consists of "the pursuit of fanciful speculation." This is specially the error of the Schoolmen, "who spin out of a small quantity of matter those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books." The third disease consists in a disregard of truth. This vice branches into two—a delight in deceiving others and an aptness to be deceived, imposture and credulity, which show themselves in superstition and fanaticism.

From these vices there spring innumerable errors which infect philosophy; among others, the unreasoning deference to great names, the exaggerated estimation of the

human understanding, distrust of past discovery, a tendency to rash and hasty conclusions, and, greatest error of all, that of mistaking the ultimate end and purpose of all knowledge.

In order to overcome these "peccant humours" which have tended to retard the advancement of learning, it is necessary to make a new beginning, to establish a complete change of standpoint and an entirely new method of procedure. Science must be raised to correspond to the advanced state of the world. Thus the problem which Bacon sets himself is to extend the intellectual world that it may be able to comprehend the material world.

What is it, asks Bacon, which has created the mighty changes which characterize the new age? It is, in a word, the spirit of discovery. Man has for the first time taken possession of the planet. The inventions of the mariner's compass, of gunpowder, and of printing have changed the entire outlook of man. The inventive spirit is the feature of the age. Hence the subjection of science to the spirit of invention and the liberation of knowledge from all chance and guess-work are the task which now confronts men. Bacon would establish a new logic corresponding to the spirit of observation and discovery by which man may achieve systematically what has been attained formerly by accident. This is the *Novum Organon*, the logic of invention, the *Ratio Inveniendi*, which Bacon opposes to the *Organon* of Aristotle.

Herein then consists Bacon's principle. He is not characterized with sufficient accuracy when he is styled "the philosopher of experience." He is rather the philosopher of invention. It is his endeavour to philosophically comprehend and fortify the inventive spirit of man. From this point of view his opposition to antiquity and his new philosophy are to be explained. "Our determination is," says Bacon, "to try whether we can really lay firmer foundations and extend to a greater distance the limits of human power and dignity."

Invention is the aim of science. But what, it may be asked, is the aim of invention? Obviously the service of man. A science which is not practically useful is in Bacon's eyes of no worth. The dominion of man, in short, over all things, is the highest end of science. To meet the wants of life, to minister to human satisfaction, to multiply pleasure, and to increase power, that is the purpose of all knowledge. "Human science and human power coincide." "Knowledge is power," as Bacon never tires reminding us. We can only dominate things by knowing them. To understand the world and make it serve us we must form an acquaintance with it. This acquaintance consists in experience, and, therefore, experience is the beginning of science. All human knowledge has ultimately for its sole task to procure for man dominion over the world, which, on the other hand, can only be gained by careful observation and sober investigation. For Bacon, therefore, the interpretation of nature is a necessary condition of man's dominion.

But in order that we may attain to a faithful and correct knowledge of nature, two things are necessary—a negative and a positive condition; the mind must be purified of all preconceptions, and it must proceed by a gradual method of observation and induction from particular to more general facts.

*First*, the mind must be freed from all assumptions. These perversions of pure experience Bacon calls "Idols," which are four in number.

(1) The Idols of the Tribe, which are errors inherent in human nature, and, therefore, belonging to the human race generally.

(2) The Idols of the Den, errors which are peculiar to the individual. "For everybody has his own cavern which intercepts the light of nature," arising either from his disposition, education, or intercourse with others.

(3) The Idols of the Market, which arise from intercourse

among men, and are especially due to an improper and fallacious use of language.

(4) The Idols of the Theatre—the idols which have crept into men's minds from “the various dogmas of philosophy and perverted rules of demonstration”—the illusory phantoms and traditionary axioms which are credulously received from history and repeated without examination. They are called Idols of the Theatre because all systems are but “so many stage-plays representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion.”

These idols, according to Bacon, are “the duties of omission” in the world of science. They represent the *ignes fatui* which travellers must know to avoid.

In order to rid the mind of these idols or prejudices science must begin with doubt, uncertainty. We must entirely clear away the old fabric before we can start to build a new and firm edifice. In this respect Bacon is in agreement with Descartes. They both withhold their assent from all previously accepted truth that they may obtain a clear field for their labour of renovation. But while Descartes affirms that the pure understanding must be left wholly to itself in order that from itself alone it may derive its judgments, Bacon declares that we must go again to nature and build up the structure of our knowledge from outward experience. We thus stand here at the parting of the streams of modern philosophy. From these different and opposite methods the two great historical movements of philosophy have proceeded—Idealism and Realism, or, as it is sometimes called, Empiricism. From Descartes there sprung a Spinoza and a Leibnitz; from Bacon a Hobbes and a Locke, both of which tendencies led to a new epoch in philosophy, the one to the German enlightenment, the other to the English—to be united at last in the higher synthesis of Kant and his followers.

*Second*, having thus freed the mind of all error, a *positive method* must succeed the negative process. This is the method of induction which, according to Bacon, is



the only correct mode of elaborating facts. By its aid we proceed from particulars to general truths, carefully examining, arranging, comparing, and sifting truth lest any theological presumption should mingle with the facts.

While Bacon admits that all knowledge has for its end the causes of things, of the four kinds of causes instituted by Aristotle, he treats only of formal causes. All that takes place has its ground in the nature or form of things. How am I to know the causes or forms on which some particular phenomenon depends? How, in other words, shall I discover its essential conditions? "By setting aside whatever is non-essential or contingent." What remains after this operation will be that which is essential and true—"the form" of the given phenomenon. The whole physical world, according to Bacon, consists of a limited number of simple elements or qualities variously combined, so that all that is required to obtain a complete knowledge of all concrete objects in nature is simply, by a progressive process of exclusion, to reach the simple elementary qualities of an object. The form of heat, for example, is that which is everywhere present where heat is found and which is nowhere where heat is lacking. It cannot be weight, for we find heaviness both where heat is and where it is not. Thus by a method of abstraction we find at last that it must be motion, as the one quality which is always present where heat is, and is always absent where heat is not. Induction—generalization by abstraction—is the process by which the primary forms are to be discovered and by which nature is to be interpreted.

Bacon thus declared that natural science is the parent of all the sciences. He attempted to apply his empirical method not only to the physical disciplines such as astronomy, optics, mechanics, medicine, but to humanistic subjects as well, such as morals, politics, and logic. He demanded that the whole of human life and all forms of thought, the movement of ideas and the activities of the will, the social and political conditions of humanity should

be examined and reduced to their "simple forms" by the method of natural science. But while this demand is made by Bacon, he himself has by no means fulfilled it. Of a moral theory he has only given us hints and suggestions, on politics he has little to say, and with regard to religion he is altogether silent. With regard to these two subjects he found it no doubt prudent to be silent. His contention that science has nothing to do with religion is an evasion. Everything, according to his principle, must be brought within the range of knowledge, but he was well aware that if he attempted to explain spiritual facts on naturalistic principles he would involve himself in trouble. The question as to the natural basis of man on which his social and religious life is reared—hinted at but never answered by Bacon—his successors were not slow to take up. How does the moral order result from the natural, or, in Bacon's language, "how does the *status civilis* follow from the *status naturalis*?" This was the problem which Hobbes, the disciple of Bacon, as we shall see, sought to solve.

Bacon everywhere promises more than he achieves, and his philosophy, like his life, must be pronounced something of a failure. Such a mechanical and formal process—classification and abstraction—was not fitted to cope with the deeper problems of thought. Of the nature and origin of things in themselves, Bacon has nothing to say. The Baconian philosophy, from its very nature, is incapable of explaining religion. It could neither comprehend the creative imagination in art nor the essential nature of the human mind.

The merit of Bacon lies in his having been the first to establish the principles of empirical science, and generally, in an age of false assumption and verbal abstraction, to direct men's minds to the accurate observation of facts.

If Bacon had a passion which sincerely occupied his mind it was the passion for science alone. She was the only friend to whom he remained entirely true. She accompanied him through his restless and busy life, and to

her he delighted to return in his hours of leisure. This passion alone consoled him in his misfortunes when other ambitions were frustrated. "Science," says Fischer, "was Bacon's last destiny, and even death bore witness to her fidelity." He died on the morning of Easter Sunday, 1626, in consequence of a physical experiment. "It is not," says Sir John Herschel, "the introduction of inductive reasoning as a new and hitherto untried process, which characterizes the Baconian philosophy, but his keen perception, and his broad, spirit-stirring, almost enthusiastic announcement of its paramount importance, as the alpha and omega of science."

Bacon, in short, was the interpreter of his age—the emancipator of the mind from the traditions of the past and the herald of a new and brighter era.

Closely connected with Bacon and Descartes two contemporary writers must be mentioned who have been rightly regarded as the revivers of the material theory of the universe. Gassendi and Hobbes—the first of whom was to some extent an antagonist of Descartes, while the latter was a follower of Bacon—were strongly influenced by the new scientific ideas of the time, and became the earliest modern exponents of views which were destined to exert a powerful influence on scientific as well as ethical thought.

(2) *Pierre Gassendi*, born in 1522 at Champtercier, in Provence, is the founder of the modern atomic theory. The doctrines of Epicurus and Lucretius were revived by this Frenchman, interspersed with a little Christianity to suit the taste of the time and his profession of a Catholic priest. What hindered the progress of the material theories of antiquity was the want of strict scientific observation and experiment. Ingenious and acute as the observations of these ancient writers were, they remained in the region of hypothesis, because they were not founded on exact scientific research. By the application of the mathematical method of Descartes Gassendi gave a new impetus to the doctrine of Epicurus. Under the trans-

forming influence of Baconian empiricism he believed that Atomism was to become the mould in which all correct ideas of the natural world were to be cast and shaped. Descartes' idea of a material substance is united by Gassendi with Bacon's "simple forms." Atoms are the primal constituents, the dominant entities of the world. They are the original seeds of all things. They have indeed been created and set in motion by God, but from them, by generation and destruction, everything has been formed and still continues to be. All growth and decay are but the results of the combination and separation of atoms. A feature of Gassendi's theory is his connection of the atom's weight with its motion. He regards space and time as distinct from matter, "neither substance nor accident." When all things are ended, space will extend unbrokenly into infinity. Time was before all creation and will outlast all change. While going back to the ancients, Gassendi was master of the science of his day and incorporated the results of the most recent research in his works. He has anticipated many of the ideas of modern science. It is interesting to observe that, like Newton, he explained the fall of bodies by the earth's attraction. His principal works are: *De Vita Epicuri*, written in 1649, and the *Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuriae*, which contains a complete exposition of the system of Epicurus. The best account of his position in philosophy may be obtained from Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*, a work of great value to the student of philosophy. The significance of Gassendi lies in the fact that, along with Bacon and Descartes, he revolted against the predominant Scholastic philosophy, and was among the first to employ the methods of Baconian empiricism in his attempt to formulate a systematic view of the world. He may be regarded as a link in the chain connecting Bacon with Hobbes and also with Descartes.

(3) *Thomas Hobbes* is connected with Gassendi by his mathematico-physical interpretation of nature. He was



born at Malmesbury in England in 1588. He studied in France, where he met Gassendi and Descartes. In his own country he became acquainted with Bacon, Ben Jonson, and other distinguished men of his age. The Civil War, which began in his time, turned his attention to political themes—an interest which dominated his whole philosophy. As a youth he was an ardent student of Euclid, and was powerfully drawn to the new “mechanical philosophy” of Galileo as well as to the teaching of Descartes’ *Discourse on Method*. According to Hobbes geometry is the only certain discipline. In mathematics all our knowledge is rooted, and the law of motion is the principle of all things. Philosophy is simply “the knowledge of effects or phenomena derived from correct conclusions about their causes, or the same knowledge of causes derived from their observed effects. The aim of philosophy is to enable us to predict effects, so that we may be able to utilise them in life.” Our knowledge is due to impressions of sense, and these again depend on certain motions in the external world. All knowledge, therefore, can be traced back to the motions of bodies in space. Philosophy deals only with bodies and must leave everything spiritual to revelation.

The connection between causes and effects leads to the recognition by Hobbes of a *causa prima*, an ultimate source of all motion, which, as contradictory to the nature of thought, remains inscrutable to us. Faith and reason must not be confounded, and where science ends revelation begins. “All reasoning,” he says, “is calculation, and all calculation is reducible to addition and subtraction.” Thought consists in a combination of verbal signs which are invented by us to retain our impressions in the mind. Thinking, in other words, is dependent on words, and accurate definition of language is the first requisite of philosophy. “Words,” says Hobbes, “are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas” (*Leviathan*, pt. i. chap.

iv.). We are constantly being deceived by the counters of our mental currency.

According to Hobbes, there is only one substance—matter. But matter, as we know it, consists of bodies. He holds that the accidents of bodies, extension, form, colour, etc., have really no objective existence, but are the ways by which our senses are affected by bodies. “Matter itself is nothing real, but only a general notion derived from the principal qualities of bodies.”

It will thus be seen that though Hobbes insists upon a material explanation of the world, in his very explanation of the way in which the mind perceives things, he seems to transcend his own theory and imply a doctrine of Idealism, assigning to the thinking subject a positive part in the formation of ideas—a line of thought which, had he pursued it, might have anticipated Kant’s teaching. But as a matter of fact Hobbes is not interested in any account of perception, and is only concerned in the interests of a complete realism to show that all sensible perceptions are simply the movements of infinitely small particles or atoms that act upon the senses and cause reaction in them.

It is, however, in the sphere of social and political philosophy that the principal distinction of Hobbes as a thinker lies. The world, in his view, consists of natural bodies and political bodies—things and men. Natural philosophy and civil philosophy, therefore, are the two branches of science. Man forms a bridge between nature and society. Accordingly Hobbes planned three systematic treatises, *De Corpore*, *De Homine*, and *De Cive*; but owing to the pressure of political events he was only able to carry out the latter part of his programme.

Hobbes’ vigorous materialism reappears in his political theory. The State arises out of atomism. It is an aggregate of bodies, just as matter is a combination of particles. As in the natural world so in the world of mankind, movement and antagonism are the original conditions. Humanity is in a state of strife. The savage state is

war of all against all. Self-preservation is the supreme good; death the supreme evil. To promote the one and prevent the other is the first law of nature. Every man regards his neighbour with fear and suspicion. This condition leads men to enter with one another into a kind of treaty or contract, in which each renounces his freedom and limits his desires, on the understanding that all do the same. This social contract becomes, as with Rousseau, the original foundation of the State's constitution. Such a compact, however, can be realized only through the subjection of all to one. Thus the sovereign becomes the State, and his will, law. Right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice, have no meaning in themselves. They are only constitutional ideas which exist by the supreme will of the government. Outward morality arises out of this state of peace. Order prevails when all men come to see that they gain by this mutual respect for and united subjection to a common head.

The political system of Hobbes, it will thus be seen, was the direct outcome of his materialism. The conception of the State as a vast machine from which was to be excluded every private judgment, every dictate of conscience or religious conviction in so far as it interfered with what the State ordained as right, was a counterpart of that mechanical theory of the universe in which nothing is recognised but the necessary working of material forces.

His political and social views were framed on the basis of the atomistic philosophy of Bacon. But that which Bacon hinted at, but did not develop, is effected by Hobbes, viz.—the reduction of the whole moral world to natural laws. Hence he calls the state the "mortal God" or "the great Leviathan" which swallows up all individuals. He rejects all ecclesiastical authority, and opposes every religion which seeks to be independent of the State. He is the uncompromising opponent of the Puritans on the one side, and of the Papists on the other.

His *Leviathan* was specially directed against Cromwell, who, by the aid of dependency, had overthrown the monarchy of England.

Religion is only possible through the State. It is the government alone which must determine what is useful or what is hurtful, what is to be revered and what may be believed. The legal worship of God is religion; the illegal worship of Him, superstition. The distinction between morality and legality, on which Kant afterwards laid so much stress, does not exist for Hobbes. There is only one standard for the worth of actions, and that is public law. Neither without nor within man is there any tribunal of truth except the voice of public authority. Religion and morality of themselves do not exist. The natural man is purely selfish. That is good which is the object of his desire; that is bad which is hurtful to himself. All moral definitions are relative. Selfishness alone decides the value of things. Religion is the child of fear, and duty the offspring of self-interest, and both are the creatures of law, the artificial appointments of political expediency.

While Hobbes thus carries the physical postulates of the *Organum* to their legitimate conclusions in the spheres of morality and religion, reducing their facts to mere laws of nature, it must be conceded that he is very far from being an echo or even an out and out disciple of Bacon. He shows an intellectual vigour and independence of thought which are all his own. He is indeed one of the most original writers of England. He is in many respects much in advance of his age, and in the departments of ethics and politics his influence may be detected in the most different schools of thought. His moral theory determined ethical speculation for more than a generation, and all the great moralists have made his views the starting-point of their own.

In the realm of politics also his influence has been not less marked and various. The writings of Montesquieu, Locke, and Rousseau, as well as those of the English and



French political thinkers, cannot be correctly understood without a careful study of Hobbes' position.

His point of contact with Rousseau is especially interesting. Both agree in the theory of a social contract as the foundation of the State. Both would deduce the civil from the natural condition of man. But while Hobbes conceives of men as being at enmity and as making a contract for the sake of mutual safety and preservation, according to Rousseau men are not foes by nature, but are naturally drawn to one another for the sake of mutual advantage and development. With Hobbes the contract is based on the idea that might is right, and therefore the might which would be self-destructive is lodged in the person of one, —the sovereign, who is alone all-powerful. With Rousseau the contract unites all in the enjoyment of equal rights and equal duties. With Hobbes the contract is, as has been remarked, only on one side; with Rousseau it is reciprocal, and the power is lodged in the people themselves. Hence, according to Rousseau, the State is a democracy; according to Hobbes it is an absolute monarchy. These opposite points of view have important bearings on morality. While Hobbes finds in the natural state of man only fear and selfishness, Rousseau sees in nature the source of all morality and religion, and instead of hate and repulsion, regards the natural condition of mankind as one of brotherhood and love.

## CHAPTER III

### IDEALISTIC TENDENCY. DESCARTES

BACON and Descartes have often been compared, and indeed there is a certain resemblance between the two. Each regarded himself as the prophet of a new era. Each recognised the need of a new method of science. Both had unbounded belief in their own powers. "Give me space and movement," said Descartes, "and I will construct the universe." Schopenhauer has said that what Bacon did for Physics was done by Descartes for Metaphysics—viz., to begin at the beginning. Hence with Bacon Descartes shares the distinction of creating a new starting-point for philosophy. But while Bacon only proposes a novel method, Descartes propounds also an original system, from which has proceeded the most important development of modern thought. He has been called, therefore, not without justice, the father of modern philosophy.

*René Descartes* (1596-1650) was born at La Haye, in Touraine. On the completion of his studies, being dissatisfied with the prevalent philosophy and sceptical with regard to all truth, he took service under Moritz of Nassau and afterwards under Tilly. After travelling for some time, he settled in Paris, and later in Holland, where, drawn to study, he wrote most of his books. At the invitation of Queen Christina of Sweden he ultimately went to Stockholm, where he died in 1650. Reserved by

nature, Descartes lived an isolated life. He played his part, as he himself says, like a man in a mask, which implied, not indeed any conscious duplicity, but a certain apartness of mind which characterized both his life and his writings. Though his system of thought was irreconcilable with Christianity, his profession of the Catholic faith was apparently sincere. There is no evidence of the hypocrisy which Professor Mahaffy has attributed to him. His practice of religion was no outward show, but the expression of his heartfelt belief.

The interest of Descartes' life lies in the story of his mental history, of which his *Meditations* give us an account. His most important works are: *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason* (1637); *Meditations on First Philosophy*, in which the existence of God and the distinction of mind and body are demonstrated (1641); *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644). The *Discourse on Method* has been truly named one of the epoch-making books of the world.

If Bacon was the founder of the inductive method, Descartes may be said to be the author of the deductive. It must not, however, be understood that Descartes denied the value of observation and experience in obtaining knowledge. All that he maintained was that these of themselves were insufficient. Induction had its place, he acknowledged, in observing and collecting facts, but he demanded that the method of induction should lead to a single principle of highest and absolute certainty, from which, by a process of composition, the whole compass of experience must find its explanation.

Descartes, like Bacon, recognised the need of a method if certainty of truth was to be obtained. His earliest writing, therefore, is a treatise on Method, in which, while tracing the course of his mental development, he lays down the rules by which he is resolved to guide his inquiries, and by the observance of which he hopes to gain absolute certainty: (1) Never to accept anything for true which

I did not clearly know to be such; (2) to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible; (3) to commence with the simplest objects and ascend, step by step, to the more complex; (4) in every case to make enumerations so complete that I might be assured nothing was omitted.

The distinguishing feature of his method, therefore, is that he seeks by an inductive enumeration and critical sifting of facts to reach a single point from which he may deduce all further truths—to attain to that truth which itself, contained in no higher, affords the condition of reaching all other truths. Philosophy is, therefore, first analytic and then synthetic. These ideas or principles, which, as being self-evidencing, stand in need of no proof as their guarantee, Descartes names ultimate truths or innate ideas.

The analysis of Descartes presupposes a preliminary condition. That preliminary is *doubt*—which is equivalent to the absence of any decision, whether affirmative or negative, regarding the relation of the subject and the predicate of a judgment. This suspension of judgment is not an end in itself, and must be distinguished from scepticism, which is a permanent state of mind, and involves despair. It simply arises from the absence of adequate grounds to determine either affirmatively or negatively, and passes away when the mind can attain to any position of certainty.

*Doubt* is, therefore, the starting-point of all thought, the solvent which must be brought to bear on all our inherited beliefs and opinions bequeathed by education and authority. By this act of doubt Descartes asserted a right to decide on the truth or falsity of what authority had laid down, and therefore vindicated the superiority of another principle in the sphere of truth—viz., human thought itself, unfettered except by its own laws. If Descartes had no other distinction, he must be acknowledged as the champion of independence in the realm of thought,



and the vindicator of the rights of the intellect to pursue truth untrammelled by authority. In this respect what Bacon achieved in Britain, Descartes accomplished on the Continent.

Proceeding from the principle *de omnibus dubitandum* the whole circuit of ideas is reviewed, and one after another is shown to be uncertain.

"All that I have hitherto accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. But I have observed that these sometimes mislead us, and it is a part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived." Descartes finds it possible to doubt the presentation of his senses, the contents of his memory, and even the demonstrations of mathematics. "I will suppose that not God, but some malignant demon, which is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifices to deceive me. I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, figures, sounds, and all external things are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity. I will suppose all the things which I see are false. I will believe that none of those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever existed. I will suppose that I possess no senses, and that body, figure, extension, etc., are fictions of my mind. What is left? Am I, who am deceived, at least not something? Do not my very delusions involve my existence? May I not say—'I exist, since I am deceived?' Let a malignant being deceive me as he may, he cannot bring it about that I am nothing. So that it must be maintained that this proposition, *I am, I exist*—is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me or conceived in my mind. What I am I know not, but I am assured that I am."

Subjecting his sensations and thoughts to a rigorous examination, Descartes found that he could think away all the attributes of body and mind except one—his think-

ing; he could doubt all things but this—that he, the thinker, existed. In doubting, we think. But in affirming the fact of our thought, and in being necessitated to affirm it, we affirm and are compelled to affirm, the fact of self-existence. This fact, therefore, is above all proof, as it is above all doubt, and is the fundamental certainty. *Cogito, ergo sum*, the relation between consciousness and existence, is for Descartes the starting-point of all philosophy.

Descartes' principle of certitude has been subjected to keen and varied criticism. There is a sense, indeed, in which it may be said that the dictum is a begging of the question; he assumes at the outset the very thing he wants to prove. "When he says, 'I will question everything which I can doubt,' he virtually posits the 'I' as the umpire by whose verdict everything is to be decided." *Cogito, ergo sum*, is only in form a syllogism. It is not based on any higher premiss. Yet it has, in a true sense, all the validity Descartes claims for it. It is the expression of the ultimate unity of thought and being. It is the assertion of self-consciousness as the principle upon which all knowledge must rest.

This utterance of Descartes must be acknowledged as one of the great moments in the history of philosophy. Its very simplicity tends to conceal its significance. "Herewith," says Hegel, "has philosophy regained its proper ground, in that thought starts with thought as from something certain in itself; not from something external or given, not from authority, but simply from the freedom contained in 'I think.'"

This base-rock of self-consciousness to which Descartes has got back affords at once a *source* and *test* of all further knowledge. From this primal idea of self, Descartes conceives that he can re-establish the world which doubt has destroyed. And not only does he feel that from this principle all knowledge can be developed, but by it also there is provided for him a test or criterion by which all

knowledge can be evaluated. What was it that gave certitude to this truth—"I think, therefore I am"? "It is just the clearness and distinctness with which I apprehend it." Here then must be my *criterion* of all truth, my touch-stone of all knowledge—that only is certain which I clearly and distinctly recognise to be true—that which I feel to be as certain as the proposition, *Cogito, ergo sum*.

It must be admitted, however, that there is some ambiguity both with regard to the *source* and the *test* which Descartes here assumes. If self-consciousness be conceived as merely subjective and individual, as Descartes seems to have conceived it, it is difficult to see how he can ever get beyond his own individuality to the world that lies outside. He has by his own definition cut the connection between self and not-self, and henceforth there is "a great gulf fixed" which the mere subjective mind cannot bridge over. There is, indeed, a sense in which self-consciousness does imply being, in so far as subject and object are bound up with every act of thought.

It must be felt, moreover, that there is considerable ambiguity with regard to the terms "clearness and distinctness." For one thing, they are at best comparative terms, expressing merely a higher or lower degree of consciousness; and they are also subjective or relative, dependent on the consciousness of a particular individual.

Furnished with this criterion of truth, Descartes passes in review his various ideas, and is able to bring back to his possession most or many of the truths which he formerly doubted.

Among our ideas, some of which are intuitive or innate and some derived from without, we find the idea of God. Whence do we get this idea? Not from ourselves; for the imperfect cannot originate the perfect. It must, therefore, be innate, part of the original constitution of the understanding, and implanted there by a being that possesses in His own nature every perfection. If we ask

further how we are capable of conceiving a nature more perfect than our own, we are driven to the answer that we must have received it from some being whose nature actually is more perfect. In other words, this idea of perfection which we find in us must have a cause, which we cannot discover in our own nature nor in that of any other finite being. For the principle of causality requires that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the effect. If, then, there exists in my mind an idea which is too great to have proceeded from my own nature or the nature of any other finite and imperfect being, then it must have come from some source which is commensurate with its greatness and perfection. In short, this idea of God, as a perfect being, could not have existed in my mind had it not been produced in me by such a being Himself.

In the formulation of this proof we are reminded of the ontological demonstration of St. Anselm, though Descartes repudiates the similarity, and indeed of the arguments of the Schoolmen generally. The Cartesian proof labours under certain assumptions which beset all such attempts. For one thing, Descartes assumes without proof that the individual consciousness knows itself to be finite and imperfect, and that it also knows what perfection is. Furthermore, it contains the fallacy of arguing from the conceptual to real existence; and indeed the argument moves in a circle, for the objective reality of external things is subsequently demonstrated from the existence of God, while here the existence of God is proved from our idea of Him. In other words, Descartes seeks to deduce from consciousness a being who is to guarantee the veracity of consciousness.

Descartes' proof of the existence of God takes a second form. The very idea of perfection, he holds, involves necessary existence. Amongst the various ideas of our minds we find one, the highest of all—that of a being absolutely perfect; and we perceive that this idea, unlike



others, contains in it the characteristic, not of possible, but of absolutely necessary existence. Hence we conclude that such a being must necessarily exist. Kant's well-known objection to this proof is that existence is not a reality or real predicate that can be added to the notion of a thing. Existence does not increase the comprehension of the subject. "A hundred real thalers do not in the slightest degree contain more than a hundred possible ones." Nothing more is proved, Kant maintains, than the existence of the thought of the most perfect being.

The existence of God being thus proved from the very idea of Him as one of the innate ideas implanted originally in the mind by God Himself, important results follow. At first we were compelled to doubt every seeming truth, because we knew not whether our errors arose from our own nature or by the deception of a being greater than ourselves. But now being convinced of the existence of a perfect Being, we at once ascribe to Him veracity as one of His perfections; and as it would be a contradiction of His nature as an all-wise and all-powerful Being, to will to deceive us, we conclude that what is clear and distinct to our reason must be true. For though the ability to deceive might appear as a proof of power, still the wish to deceive would be a proof of evil.

From the idea of God follows that of substance. How are we to represent God philosophically to our minds? We must think of Him as the only substance. "By substance we conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence." There can, therefore, be only one substance, and that is God. All other things can exist only by help of the concourse of God.

Hence from this idea of God as the only substance, there arises one of the most notable features of Descartes' philosophy—the sharp distinction which he draws between mind and matter. In a secondary sense mind and body may be considered as substances—the one having as its

attribute, thought; the other, extension, which are their real "essences" or nature. For just as everything that can be attributed to mind implies thought, so everything that can be attributed to body presupposes extension. Furthermore, we clearly and distinctly perceive that the qualities of the one substance are wholly distinct from the qualities of the other. Thought and extension are, therefore, not only different, but mutually exclusive. This insistence on the part of Descartes on the opposition of spirit and matter has given rise to the vexed problem which has dominated modern philosophy and divided thinkers into Idealists and Empiricists—the relation of mind and matter. According to Descartes, these two being mutually exclusive, their union can only be brought about in an artificial way, by the intervention of the supreme being, the infinite substance.

Descartes' transition from God to the outer world is arbitrary and mechanical. We can understand how he is convinced of the thought-substance, for he starts with thought—his own consciousness. But if by his own showing there is no interaction of mind and body, how does the external world become known to him? His answer is that God's truthfulness is pledged for the reality of that of which we have clear and distinct ideas. We have clear and distinct ideas of the external world so long as we conceive it as simply extended matter, infinitely divisible and moved from without—so long, in short, as we conceive of it in opposition to mind. We must banish from our notion of matter all ideas of action at a distance; *e.g.* we must explain weight, not as a tendency to the centre of the earth or as an attraction of distant particles of matter, but simply as a consequence of the pressure of other bodies. In his physical philosophy Descartes explains everything on mechanical principles, starting from the hypothesis that a certain quantity of motion has been imparted to the material universe by God at the first—a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished—

and that space is an absolute plenum in which motion propagates itself in circles.

The reason of this mechanical explanation of the universe is that, in his view, real or substantive existence is a complete thing, a whole, that has no reference to anything else. Matter, to Descartes, is essentially dead, which has no principle of activity in it beyond the motion which it received from God at the beginning. All its energy is communicated from without. There is no room for gravitation or chemical affinity in his theory. God stands without the world, foreign to it, and unrevealed by it.

This view of the world led to the difficulty of explaining the union of body and spirit in man. The body being regarded as a mere machine, a lifeless fabric connected somehow with a reasoning soul, there can only be an artificial unity, a unity of composition which still leaves them external to each other.

All animals are conceived as machines whose motions are determined by the mechanism of the nervous system, and even in the case of man, he conceived of this mechanism as a motion of fine substances, the so-called *spiritus animales*, and sought the point of transition from the sensory to the nervous system in a particular part of the brain, which is not double as others are—the “pineal gland.” This point of union makes a reciprocal action between mind and body possible, though for the most part their activities are entirely independent.

The world thus falls into two completely separated realms—that of bodies and that of minds. But behind this dualism, according to Descartes, there lies the conception of deity, as the one perfect substance in which both find their place and activity.

Descartes was an acute mathematician, and made several valuable contributions to mathematical science. He was the first who applied algebra to the properties of curves, and was one of the pioneers of the calculus.

To ethical philosophy he devoted only subordinate attention. It ought to be our aim to abstract ourselves as far as possible from external things and to free ourselves from all bondage to the passions. We must cease to desire the impossible. There are things within our power and things beyond our power. Let us subdue our passions. That which is within our power is virtue, which is just the harmony of reason with itself—the equanimity of the Stoics.

It will thus be seen that both in his *Ethics* and in his *Metaphysics* Descartes fails to reconcile the opposed elements of our nature, and ends in a dualism.

The weakness of Cartesianism is that the three notions, the thinking substance or spirit, the extended substance or matter, and the infinite uncreated substance or God, in whom the other two are contained—are empirically assumed. He begins by divesting the mind of all assumptions and then forthwith reaffirms them as postulates of thought, moving in a circle and making the one depend on the other, and *vice versa*.

Descartes fails, moreover, to reconcile the duality of mind and matter which his system exhibits. The union is an artificial one. God stands outside both created substances, and connects them only in an external and abstract fashion. On the one hand his suggestion of a mechanical interaction arising in the brain opens the door for a material explanation; and on the other, his assumption that both are elements in the infinite substance paves the way for the pantheistic conception of the universe propounded by Spinoza.



## CHAPTER IV

### PANTHEISM. SPINOZA

THE starting-point of Cartesian philosophy was idealistic, but the development of it was essentially materialistic. It was not surprising that, on the one hand, materialism attempted to found a new system upon the basis of Baconian Empiricism. On the other hand, it was inevitable that the doctrine which Descartes had left unsolved should also be attempted from the idealistic side, and that the suggestion which he had thrown out of a transition from mind to matter by means of the idea of God, should be taken up afresh.

We have, therefore, to give some account of those thinkers who developed the principles of Descartes on their idealistic side and brought them to their natural conclusion—viz., Geulinx, Malebranche, and Spinoza.

1. The name of *Geulinx* is usually associated with the theory of Occasionalism,—the attempt to overcome the difficulty created by Descartes in his separation of mental and physical processes. He was born at Antwerp in 1625, was professor of philosophy at Leyden, and died in 1669. He applied himself to the system of Descartes and attempted, by attributing all movements, both mental and physical, directly to God, to account for their relation and sympathy. According to him, neither the soul acts directly on the body, nor the body on the soul. Were the soul to act immediately on the body I should be con-

scious of the manner in which the influence was produced, which I am not. Nor can the body act directly on the soul, for the soul is something entirely distinct, and a material thing cannot be the cause of anything so immaterial as thought. How then, it may be asked, do we receive our impressions of the outside world? The answer must be, Geulinx held, that God alone makes the world visible to the mind. We are merely spectators. It is God who is the direct agent of all our perceptions of the soul and of all the movements of the body. *On the occasion* of the action of my will, God moves my body. And on the occasion of the movement of my body, He creates a thought in my mind. The one is but the occasion, not the cause of the other. It is a concomitant movement, produced directly by the Divine Being. Their harmony is similar to that of two watches which keep the same time and strike the same hours, without the one in any way acting on the other. Corporeal movement and mental volition, while acting in harmony, are independently produced by the supreme artificer of both. This relation is based on the assumption that everything in the world, including the human will, is absolutely determined by divine causality, and that God is the one and only moving-cause in the universe. The further consequence can scarcely be avoided that the independent existence of finite things is annulled. Geulinx calls the human spirit, with Spinoza, only a form of the Divine, and in common with that same philosopher, he maintains that we are nothing more than beholders of what God, as the supreme agent, Himself does and causes us to do, and that, therefore, the true attitude of man to his Maker is one of humble acquiescence in His will.

2. With this position is closely connected that of the French priest, *Nikolas Malebranche* (1638-1715), whose chief work is *De la Recherche de la Vérité*. This devout Catholic, whose meditative spirit was fostered in the cloister, though an ardent disciple of Descartes, was only

restrained by the traditions of the Church from carrying the principles of his master to their utmost consequences. According to Malebranche, God is the mirror in which we behold the outer world. The ideas of things are derived neither from the soul nor from the things themselves. The spirit apprehends the world through a third being,—God,—who contains all thoughts and all things in Himself. The idea of the infinite is prior to the idea of the finite. God does not derive His being from His creatures, but all His creatures are imperfect manifestations of Him. God is indeed the only cause of all that happens, the source of all being, both physical and spiritual. But in Himself He must be conceived as neither physical nor spiritual. He alone moves our bodies and is the inspiration of our minds. It is really the thought of the good which moves our will. God is the highest and only true good, and, therefore, even when seeking material and temporal benefit, man is really seeking God.

While the first part of Malebranche's work is metaphysical, dealing with the origin of our knowledge, the greater part is experimental and devotional, and as such is full of many beautiful and suggestive sentiments touching the soul's attitude to God. "God is the home of Spirits." "The true will of man is love to God." "The light which God has implanted in us impels us to seek Him who is its source." "The object of the union of our spirit with the Word of God, and of our will with His love, is to create in us His own image and mould our souls to His likeness." "The love of God consists in directing our affections to the idea of God. He who knows himself and clearly perceives his affections, loves God. There is nothing true but God. All truths, which are eternal and unchangeable and stand above the fleeting things of time, exist in the mind of God; therefore, to know the truth is to see God." There is, in short, no other knowledge but the knowledge of God, and only as we know ourselves and the world in God, do we know

them truly. Unless we saw God we should not be able to see anything else.

Thus, though Malebranche started with the principle of Cartesianism, the path he entered could lead only, if followed further, to pantheism. This final step was taken by one who brought to its legitimate conclusion the line of thought which Descartes started—Spinoza—who sought to restore to its original unity that which had been sundered in thought.

It would seem to be something more than a coincidence that a Jew should develop the philosophy of idealism to its ultimate issue. Absolute unity and abstract monotheism are ideas peculiarly characteristic of the oriental mind, and it was not unnatural that one who was specially fitted by nationality, disposition, and education, should be the agent to introduce into Europe the idea of an absolute unity in which the differences of the finite and infinite are merged.

3. *Benedict Spinoza* (1632-1677) was born at Amsterdam. His parents were of Jewish-Portuguese extraction. From them he received a liberal education. His teacher in Hebrew was the celebrated Rabbi Marteira, who introduced him to the study of the Talmud and the Bible. He studied Latin also under the noted physician, Franz van der Ende. He was brought up in the Hebrew faith, but he was expelled from the Jewish communion on account of "frightful heresies." Though interested in Christianity and a warm admirer of the life and teaching of Jesus, he never formally accepted the Christian faith. He lived in great retirement engaged in his philosophical pursuits, and supporting himself by the polishing of lenses. He lived a frugal life. He was not without friends and protectors, from whom, however, he refused to accept monetary aid. He was called to a professor's chair in Heidelberg, but declined it on the ground that he might be there hindered in the full liberty of thought. Of delicate constitution, he died at the age of 44 of consumption. He was a man



of pure life and simple habits, kindly and gentle of disposition; unselfish, somewhat sad, free from hypocrisy and guile, devoted to the pursuit of truth, he was the image, as one has said, of a true sage.

His writings are: *The Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes*, 1670; *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, 1670; *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*; *Epistolae*; *A Recently Discovered Treatise Concerning God and Man*; and his *Ethica*, which was published by his friend Ludwig Mayer after his death. This latter work contains the gist of his system, and sets forth at once the principles and aim of his philosophy. It consists of five books. The first treats of God; the second, of the nature and origin of the mind, in which he deals not so much with the nature of the mind as with the spiritual life of man on its ethical side; the third book treats of the nature of the emotions and passions; the fourth deals with human bondage to the passions (*De servitute humana sive affectuum viribus*); the fifth treats of the "Power of the Intellect," or of "Human Freedom."

Most diverse estimates have been formed of Spinoza. By some he has been execrated as the arch enemy of religion. By others he has been extolled as the prophet of a higher cult. Dugald Stewart sees in his philosophy the seeds of blank atheism. Novalis, on the other hand, calls him "that God-intoxicated man."

While it must be admitted that Spinoza has little in common with doctrinal Christianity, denying as he does the personality of God and repudiating the idea of a divine revelation through the God-Man, no one can peruse his ethics without being impressed with the exalted spirituality of its tone and purpose, and it must be conceded that he himself regarded his philosophy as a vindication of the principles of true religion.

An atheist he by no means was, and it would probably be more correct to call him, as Hegel does, an Acosmist, rather than a Pantheist. He begins and ends with God.

The world is in God, and we can only know it and ourselves through and by Him. In spite of his rigid method and abstract reasoning, his aim is purely practical. It is wholly ethical, as his principal work indicates; it is, as he himself calls it, a theory of freedom and redemption.

Descartes had split up mind and matter into two substances which were only united in a supreme substance—God. On the one side was placed God, and on the other the world. Spinoza perceived the duality. The first aim of all philosophy is to attain to unity. There can be only one substance—only one all-embracing being, of which all finite and individual things must be but accidents. The unity of all things in God is at once the starting-point and the central thought of Spinoza's system.

The outward form in which Spinoza presents his system, his mathematical or demonstrative method, creates not only its greatest difficulty, but also one of its chief defects.

Descartes had suggested that metaphysics might be dealt with in the same manner as mathematics, though he himself never fully carried out his idea. Spinoza, however, acting on this hint, thought that if he followed the same method as Euclid he would obtain for his reasonings the same certainty. But Spinoza failed to see that this method, though suitable to the finite sciences, is wholly inadequate to the treatment of speculative subjects. Euclid was dealing with a different subject-matter from that of Spinoza. Geometry proceeds on the assumption that the matter is given. Philosophy has to investigate what is given, and why it is given. Thus, while Spinoza starts with definitions, he gives us no reason why he should select just these definitions. When he has formally defined substance, he has said all about it that his method will admit. It is the mere abstract unity of all things in which everything is merged, but out of which nothing flows. Philosophy admits of no unexplained presuppositions, and a system which neglects to verify its own

assumptions would require another to explain it. The strict and formal method which he has adopted has reacted both on his view of God's being and of man's freedom. Not only has it suggested a false idea of the infinite as that which has no limitations or qualifications, and of which only positive existence can be affirmed, but it has also caused him to reject a teleological conception of the world. A philosophy which regards all things as following by mathematical necessity from its first principles has obviously no room in it for any idea of a final cause or end of things. The world and the things of the world, man and his powers, are simply there, as necessary parts of a whole, just as the angles are there as necessary elements of a triangle. And so too with regard to human freedom. Where all things flow from the first principle with the same necessity as the properties of a geometric figure from its definition, individual freedom is an impossible idea. The illusion of liberty arises from the tendency of ordinary beings to take a part for the whole, and to see things separate from the conditions which determine them. But as a matter of fact, according to Spinoza, a man can no more act differently from what he does, than a false conclusion can follow from certain given premisses.

Having so far considered the general form, and particularly the method of Spinoza,—the source of many of its shortcomings,—we may now proceed to examine his philosophy more in detail.

According to Spinoza every fact that is known to us must come under one of three heads, which he calls Substance, Attributes, and Modes. On these three notions his whole system is based, consequently we have to speak of Substance, or his doctrine of God; of the Attributes, or the doctrine of mind and matter; of the Modes, or the doctrine of particular things.

(1) *Substance*. Spinoza starts with a definition of Substance. "Substance is that which is in itself, and is

contained through itself, *i.e.* the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing in order to its formation." This substance he characterizes as infinite, indivisible, unique, free, eternal, as the cause of itself and of all things, and as consisting of an infinite number of infinite attributes, two only of which are cognisable by human intelligence. Furthermore, he expressly identifies this substance with God, whom he defines as "a being absolutely infinite, *i.e.* substance consisting of infinite attributes of which each expresses an eternal and infinite essence."

Spinoza follows Descartes in his definition of Substance, but he sees that there can be legitimately only one substance. It must be independent of all else, and it must be at once the Self-existent and All-embracing, at once "the cause of itself and the cause of all things."

Much discussion has taken place with regard to the expression *causa sui*, which at first sight would appear to be open to the objection that it contains a logical contradiction. To say that a thing is the cause of itself implies that the thing exists before itself, which is absurd. But all that Spinoza probably means is that substance is eternal and infinite cause. It is that which the mind necessarily thinks as the ground-notion of all being. "By the cause of itself," he says, "I mean something of which the essence involves existence, of which the nature is conceivable only as being in existence." To Spinoza, in other words, the self-existent is the starting-point of thought; it is the character of reality as a whole. From this notion he thought he could unfold the universe. The conception of causality in the sense of dependence as between cause and effect is absent from the very method by which he proceeds. With him the relation rather is a statical one of ground and consequent, and his constant parallel is geometrical properties in relation to their figure.

In thus beginning with the universal and descending to the particular, it has been objected that Spinoza



neglects, or at least anticipates, experience, and attempts to explain the world simply by an *à priori* notion, arbitrarily chosen. Ought not the unity with which he starts, to be the goal rather than the beginning of knowledge? Is Spinoza not guilty of a premature and capricious generalization, taken up at haphazard without a preliminary examination of the facts of experience?

It may be sufficient to answer that, in one sense, Spinoza has only begun where philosophy in all ages has begun. Thus the Eleatics commenced with the  $\tauὸ ὄν$ ; and if we are to explain the world at all we must present to our minds the totality of being, the unity of all things as the starting-point of thought.

But though Spinoza begins in his *Ethica* with definitions and axioms, he was not so wholly independent of a preliminary examination of experience as he seems to be. In another work, *De Intellectus Emendatione*, and also in the second book of the *Ethics*, he draws a distinction between the procedure of reason and imagination. He says it is the province of reason to grasp things in their totality and universality, and for this end we must get beyond the illusions of sense and the abstractions of ordinary thinking, and view things *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*. The defect of the ordinary unreflecting way of looking at things, which like Plato he calls “opinion,” is that it is apt to take the part for the whole, to make the individual the standard of the universe, and, generally, to be satisfied with a partial, fragmentary view of things. But as a matter of fact, if we think of it, nothing is isolated. All things are connected and are parts of each other, linked together by an inner bond of causality. So it also is with the minds of men. Individuality is a mere semblance, caused by our narrow, one-sided way of looking upon life. Isolate men and you destroy their whole character as intelligent beings. No man lives to himself alone. Every life is inextricably bound up with the lives of others. Pure intelligence corrects this fragmentary

view, and forces us to connect things together and regard the universe not as an aggregate of isolated facts, but as a unity.

The problem which presents itself to Spinoza, therefore, is, how are we to reach the apprehension of things in their unity? Must we simply proceed from part to part, from fact to fact, reach wider and ever wider generalizations? Or can we at once, from the standpoint of pure reason, seize the idea of an all-embracing unity in which all the parts are seen to have their necessary place and function? In other words, may we not at once view the world *sub specie aeternitatis*? Spinoza holds that we can, and indeed must. "The essences of individual things are not to be discovered by looking at the series or order of their existence, for in that way we can only get external marks or relations, but not the explanation of things in themselves. For such an explanation we must look to that which is eternal and unchanging, in which, as on tables of stone, we find inscribed the laws according to which all individual things are produced and ordered. Nay, these changeable things are so intimately, and in their essence, dependent on those things which are eternal, that, apart from them, the former can neither exist nor be conceived" (*De Intell. Emend.*, chap. xiv.).

It is obvious, he affirms, that our knowledge cannot be real or adequate except in so far as it is determined by the idea of the whole. He holds also that there are certain first principles to which the mind is capable of attaining, from and through which everything exists and may be known. His philosophy, therefore, begins with the idea of God, the one substance, the infinite unity, in which all things are. We can get no further back than that. The mind can rise no higher. Here then we must start. Of this ultimate idea, this basis of all thoughts and things, it must be affirmed that whilst all other ideas rest upon it, it rests itself on no other. It is beyond doubt or demonstration. It cannot be proved by anything outside itself.

It can only be defined as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself."

The position of Spinoza then is that the individual can only be explained in the light of the whole of which it is a part, that all differences in the finite world presuppose an ultimate unity. But when we ask what is the positive nature of the substance we perceive the unsatisfactoriness of Spinoza's doctrine. His infinite unity is merely abstract. The world of particulars is simply merged in it, not organically accounted for by it. The substance has really no contents. Finite things are nothing; the substance is all. This abstract conception of God arises from Spinoza's formal mathematical way of looking at things. His idea of the infinite is that which has no limits. The kernel and keynote of his system is his famous sentence,—*"every determination is a negation"* (*omnis determinatio est negatio*). A determination would imply a defect of existence. Only that which has no qualifications is perfect, is real. All elements, therefore, which define God must be thought away. All ideas of number, degree, time, which imply separation or relation of parts; nay, all conceptions of good or evil, of human freedom or responsibility, must disappear. Special positive designations would reduce the substance to something finite. It must, therefore, be only described in negative terms. We do not know what God is; we can only say what He is not. He is the limitless infinite, indivisible, eternal essence. He is eternal in the same sense as space is eternal,—existence without limit. He is free also in the same sense,—negatively free, in so far as He is conditioned by nothing outside Himself.

It need hardly be pointed out that this idea of God is very different from the Christian conception of the Deity. All idea of personality is precluded. Spinoza expressly repudiates the notion of a personal being conceived in our own image. Every determination detracts from perfection. We can, therefore, ascribe to God neither passions nor

purposes, neither intellect nor will. He is a Being absolutely perfect, "purged of all anthropomorphism." He is neither the "magnified man" of popular thought, nor the "All-wise Creator and Governor" of natural theology. He is simply the ground of all being, the infinite, all-embracing Substance.

(2) *Attributes*. Having thus defined Substance as the alone existent, it might be assumed that there was nothing more to be said. But the question still presses, how are we to account for the world as we know it? How are we to explain the variety and manifoldness of existence? For even though it be a negation, an illusion, it must be justified. The answer to this question is contained in Spinoza's doctrine of attributes and modes. Substance is not merely *causa sui*, it is also *causa omnium rerum*. The unity as we know it differentiates itself into infinite attributes and then into finite and infinite modes. The first thing we are conscious of is a distinction of mind and matter. How are these to be reconciled with our idea of the infinite substance and with one another? Descartes had assumed two derivative substances, the one, spirit, the other, extension. But obviously these cannot be regarded as real in the same sense as the one substance is real. There was only one course left for Spinoza in order to account for thought and extension. They must be conceived as attributes of the substance, that is to say, as different modes *for us* of expressing it. They must be regarded as the two sides of the same thing. God in Himself has no attributes. But when *we* think of Him, we must think of Him under the form of our intelligence. And, therefore, the attributes are but the necessary categories under which the mind represents God. "By attribute," he says, "I understand that which the intellect perceives in Substance as (*tanquam*) constituting its essence." In other words, an attribute does not constitute the real essence of the substance in itself, but only in relation to the *finite intelligence* which contemplates it. Though Spinoza says there must be an



infinite number of attributes in an infinite substance, which might be discernible to minds differently constituted from ours, only two are cognisable by the human mind, viz., thought and extension. These attributes, though seemingly distinct, do not constitute two different entities. The one cannot be produced by the other. Each expresses by itself the whole reality of the substance. He represents the relation by various illustrations. They are like the different ways of reflecting the same light, or they are like the two names of the patriarch, Jacob and Israel, each of which included the whole reality of the man. There is a complete parallelism of thought and extension. Each covers the whole notion. Thought does not contain more, or less, of God than does extension. The contents of both are absolutely the same.

It is by an application of this same principle that Spinoza explains the relation of body and mind in man. To every mode of thought a mode of extension corresponds, and we may say of every existing thing that it may be regarded as a modification, both of thought and extension. Of man, we may say he is composed of mind and body, but these are not two opposing elements; they both express the man in different aspects. "The soul is the idea of the body"; the body is the objective of the soul. Though there is no identity or dependence, there is complete agreement between them, "just as the idea of a circle and a real circle are the same thing, now under the attribute of thought, now under that of extension." Body and mind, nature and spirit, are everywhere united, as type and anti-type, subject and object. Running through all nature, in man, as everywhere else, there is this inseparable dual aspect, through which the single substance is expressed. There is no necessity here to resort to the *Deus ex machina* of Descartes, or to the "occasional causes" of Geulinx or the "pre-established harmony" of Leibnitz, to explain the relation of body and mind. Each is a whole in itself. There is no interaction to be explained. As two equal

triangles completely coincide, so body and mind each represents completely the whole action of God, contemplated only in different aspects.

Spinoza's theory of Attributes lays itself open to various criticisms.

1. One cannot but feel that the attributes are *not derived from the substance*, but are merely brought, as Hegel has pointed out, from without. According to his own definition, the very idea of Substance would seem to exclude any difference or determination. Thought and extension are not given in the definition. The blank substance is at one stroke filled with contents, and without any explanation that which he defined as purely indeterminate, suddenly becomes possessed of an infinite number of qualities.

2. The attributes are, moreover, *arbitrarily chosen*. There is no justification offered for their number or their relation to each other. There is no necessity shown why the Deity should manifest Himself just in these and no others. To say simply that a number of attributes coheres in one substance is not to explain their unity or necessity. Thought and extension are not shown to be organically connected with each other or with the substance. They simply lie within it, in an external formal manner.

3. But a more fatal objection is that Spinoza has conceived *a mind outside of the Substance*. Whence comes this intelligence of which he speaks? The mind, he says, apprehends the attributes as constituting the nature of the Substance, but yet he also says that thought cannot be ascribed to the Substance as such. Hence an external understanding must bring with it the attributes of thought and extension, in order that it may conceive the substance. In other words, in order to apprehend the substance Spinoza has to suppose a man outside of it. But every determination is a negation, yet in order to conceive the infinite he must assume a mind which is not a part of it—a something which the substance is not and by which it is, therefore, conditioned.

4. It might also be maintained that while Spinoza regards thought and extension as equal expressions of Substance, *he gives the pre-eminence to thought*. It is by thought or intelligence that both attributes are conceived. Thought is conscious not only of itself, but also of extension. Thought, in other words, has a priority, and enters into every presentation we form of the substance or of the attributes. It is not simply one of the attributes, but is a universal factor in all our knowledge of God or of the world.

(3) *Modes*. From thought and extension, the two attributes of God, Spinoza descends to finite things, which, according to his definition of Substance, can have no real existence, and are only to be regarded as modifications of it. "By mode I understand a modification of Substance, or that which is in something other than itself by means of which also it is conceived." Modes can neither exist nor be conceived without substance, and are indeed nothing but the affections of the attributes of God. They have no independent being, but are related to the substance as the waves are related to the sea. They are simply the ever-varying shapes or modes in which God expresses Himself. Every thought, wish, feeling, is a mode of God's attribute of thought; while every visible thing is a mode of His attribute of extension. God is the all in all, the *omne esse*, and beyond Him there is nothing real.

As we had a difficulty in perceiving how the attributes were deduced, so we have a corresponding difficulty in realizing how the modes come into being. They are not to be conceived as being caused by the Substance, but rather as contained in it. "God," says Spinoza, "is not the transient but the immanent cause of the world." He is only the *causa omnium rerum* in the same sense as He is the *causa sui*. Spinoza's conception of God is not dynamical, but statical. Under the usual idea of causality we think of the cause contributing something of itself to the effect and of the effect as becoming something different

from the cause. But with Spinoza there is no thought of transference of energy. The infinite cannot be conceived as passing over into the finite. It has no separate existence. All we can say is, that the finite is contained in the infinite, just as the properties of a triangle are contained in the very definition of it.

It might be objected to Spinoza's view of the finite world that if the modes are only transient forms, there must be a reason in the nature of the substance for their existence as such. Even though everything in the world be resolved into a negation, the negation itself exists. When you have reduced all finite things to phantoms, the world of phantoms must still be accounted for. And this Spinoza virtually admits, for not only does he speak in some passages of the *Ethics* in a qualified form of the modes as being "only in part negation," but in ascribing to the intelligence the power of rising above the illusions of the world, he really exempts the intelligence from the passing and transient existence which belongs to mere modes as such. There is, he would seem to imply, an element in all finite things which is eternal and universal; and, indeed, the practical purpose of his philosophy is to show how man from being a part of the phenomenal world may rise out of it and attain to participation in the eternal spirit.

But this suggestion which Spinoza thus casually throws out of finite things possessing an element of universality and infinity, while it gives to them a permanence and independence which the original idea of substance does not allow for, and thus saves Spinoza from the imputation of pantheist, only discloses the antithesis in a more glaring form. We are still left without any principle of mediation between God and the world. Spinoza himself seems to have felt this difficulty of deducing the modes from the substance, the finite from the infinite. Hence in certain passages of the *Ethics* we meet with a conception not yet referred to, that of *Infinite Modes*, which may be regarded as an attempt to fill up the gap. On the one



hand we have the infinite indeterminate substance—on the other, a world of finite modes or determinations: and in order to bridge the gulf between them we have a third something which, as its name implies, has affinity with both, with the finite world as being itself a “mode”: with the infinite as an “infinite” mode. “These infinite modes are either modifications of the absolute nature of some attribute or modifications of an attribute already modified, but so modified as to be eternal and infinite.” When asked for examples, Spinoza answers: “Examples which you ask are, of the first class, in thought, the absolutely infinite intellect, in extension, motion and rest; of the second class, the form of the whole universe, which although it varies in infinite ways, remains always the same.”

This final attempt at mediation between the infinite and the finite can scarcely be regarded as satisfactory. Spinoza would seem to combine here two ideas which are reciprocally exclusive. In their ultimate analysis the modes must be either infinite or finite. They cannot be both. Furthermore, when we examine what is meant by infinite modes we find that it involves on the one hand the introduction into the idea of the infinite substance an element of activity and self-differentiation which is lacking in the abstract unity as first conceived. And on the other hand it is an endeavour to give to the finite world a meaning which he had already denied to the individuals which compose it. We cannot fail to be struck here with the resemblance of the infinite modes to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the Logos or World-Soul, as an intermediary between the one and the many.

From the consideration of the modes we are naturally led to a consideration of the *practical philosophy* of Spinoza.

In the second book of the *Ethics*, which bears the title,—“The Nature and Origin of the Mind,”—he deals with the results which necessarily follow from the nature of God,

*i.e.* those results which lead us to a knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.

Here it is evident Spinoza's aim is a practical one,—the discovery of the way to spiritual felicity. But, as in his view all moral advancement rests on the intelligence, the true way to perfection is to clear our minds of all error and illusion, and see things as God sees them, under the form of eternity. The question, therefore, comes to be, is the mind capable of what he calls "adequate knowledge"? Spinoza's answer to this question is contained in his theory of the development of Knowledge.

There are three orders of knowledge recognised by Spinoza.

(1) There is the knowledge which is derived from the particulars of sense-experience. It is simply the individual point of view, and consists of confused ideas, opinions, and imaginations. This is the condition of the ordinary mind in which the reason is not exercised, and in which conclusions based on mere hearsay, tradition, or inaccurate observation, are accepted.

(2) The second kind of knowledge is that which Spinoza calls "reason" (*ratio*). Reason is that knowledge which arises from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things." It is a kind of knowledge "which is common to all men," and is of "that which is common to all things." In other words, it is knowledge which is derived from reasoning, of the laws and properties of things. But this kind of knowledge is not the highest. It, indeed, raises us above the crude conception of things which pertains in the unreflective stage, but it is only a reasoning from cause to effect. We never attain to a final unity by this method. All we get by it is an indefinite succession of facts.

(3) The highest form of knowledge, therefore, is what he calls *Scientia intuitiva*—a direct knowledge of the essence of things, and ultimately of the Divine essence. Reason must not be conceived merely as our individual reason

working under the conditions of time, it is also to be regarded as eternal, freed from all restrictions—a part of the infinite mind of God. The truths which we have laboriously reasoned out may be apprehended by a flash of intuition. To see things as God sees them,—that is the highest form of knowledge. Thus men may rise above illusive opinion to adequate and real knowledge. From this third kind of knowledge springs the highest possible satisfaction of the mind. Man's blessedness lies in the intellectual love of God. "The highest virtue is to know God, to view all things from their centre in God, and to be moved only by the passion for good."

The ethical philosophy is the natural outcome of his metaphysical views.

To be free from the bondage of the senses and to attain to the realization of ourselves in God is the true end of life. Hence the essence of life is self-preservation. Spinoza teaches a morality which is opposed to asceticism—a morality not of self-denial, but of self-assertion. The *conatus sese conservandi*—the effort of self-realization—is the principle of virtue.

This self-realization must take place under the control of reason, the aim of which is to identify itself with the love of man and the love of God. Spinoza will not admit any negative element to enter into this effort. Indeed, his former idea of human life as a mere negation seems now to be discarded. Man is not merely a part of his environment, there is that in him by which he can transcend his limits and lift himself out of his bondage. Even in the lower animals, he says, this striving takes place. But while in them it assumes the form of appetite, in man it becomes conscious desire. When this act of self-assertion depends wholly on ourselves it is called an "action," when it depends partly on what is beyond our control it is a "passion." We are in bondage to passion so long as we are bound to the contingent world and are subject to the illusions of sense and the emotions of the body. An

emotion is just a confused idea. All the varied emotions may be referred to one of three sources,—desire, pain, or pleasure. To rise superior to those emotions is to be free. In other words, freedom consists in the deliverance from confused and false ideas and in the attainment of true or adequate knowledge. Reason masters passion by showing its true nature. “An emotion which is a passion,” he says, “ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it”—that is to say, when we reach the stage of true knowledge,—union with God,—passion has no more power over us.

Spinoza denies the freedom of the will in the common acceptation. Men think that they are free because they are not conscious of the determining causes. He identifies will and intelligence. They are one, in so far as both affirm their objects. Man, like other things, is under an absolute law of necessity. All the actions of his will, as of his intelligence, are but different forms of the self-assertive tendency to which he cannot but yield. To be true to the end of our being is the only freedom possible for us, and that end is the life which intelligence dictates. We are free in so far as we partake of the nature of God. God does not act arbitrarily, but solely from the laws of His own nature. He is not determined by anything external to Him. In like manner man is free when he intelligently strives to fulfil the inner necessity of his being. Here reason is our guide. To know our limits is to transcend them. Our passions belong to us only as finite creatures. But even in them there is an element of infinity. Let us but obtain an adequate idea of a passion and it can be transformed into an instrument for our self-realization. Brought into contact with the idea of God, all our ideas become true and adequate, and, therefore, subservient to our life in Him. The transition of the mind to greater perfection is joy; the transition to a lower stage is pain. Spinoza condemns all ideas of rivalry and ambition as springing out of a false estimate of finite things and a false



desire to take advantage of our fellowmen. The highest good is that which can be most fully shared with the greatest number. That is of real usefulness which first contributes to the highest perfection of the individual, and through him to society. But as the true nature of reason is knowledge, nothing is useful but that which serves knowledge. Knowledge is our true being, and the highest knowledge is the knowledge of God. Happiness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself, and that is to be found in "the intellectual love of God."

"The human mind cannot be destroyed with the body, but there remains something of it which is eternal, and it is only while the body endures that the mind is susceptible to those emotions which are referred to passion." Yet from this view of eternity we must eliminate all ideas of personal and conscious immortality. The idea of eternity has nothing to do with time or duration. It is simply participation in a sphere where beginning and end have no meaning. It is life in the eternal present—life in God.

The union of the soul with God has suggested the question whether Spinoza did not pass from the one Substance of the first Part to a plurality of substances at the end. Hegel regards the substance of Spinoza as "an abyss in which all particulars are annihilated." Others see in this final absorption an advance to Hegel's own more concrete unity—the unity in which the differences are preserved.

The goodness of his heart seemed to suggest truths which the stringency of his logic would not admit, and, if we judge the system by its aim, we must conclude that Spinoza only solved the Cartesian dualism by suppressing one of its sides, by merging the finite in the infinite. Later philosophy, as we shall see, asserted the reality of the finite and the value of experience. Spinoza, it has been well said, "declared the value of seeing things under the form of eternity, but it is necessary first to see them under the form of time." The one-sided assertion of individuality and difference in the schools of Locke and Leibnitz was the

natural complement of the one-sided assertion of the universality of Spinoza. When the individualistic tendency of the eighteenth century had received at the hands of Kant its refutation, it was not unnatural that thought should again return to that great idea of unity in difference which Spinoza was groping after, but did not achieve.

## *PART V*

### *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT*

THE second stage of Modern Philosophy has been called the period of the Enlightenment. This period corresponds very nearly with the eighteenth century. Just as in Greece the Metaphysical era was followed by the more practical inquiries of the Sophists, so in modern times, the feature of this age is a revolt against the scientific or purely theoretic problems with regard to nature and existence, and a return to the more individualistic questions of life and duty. Investigation is transferred from the origin and grounds of being to the nature and limits of the human mind itself. The question is not so much what do we know, as how do we know? Thought has become subjective and empirical, and is inclined to run in psychological channels. Metaphysical speculations give place to the more practical consideration of man's inner nature and actual experience. "The proper study of mankind is man." This saying of Pope may be taken as the keynote of the Enlightenment. The tendency of the age is practical, and the interest centres in the discussion of life and society. Philosophy, moreover, has ceased to be a special and isolated pursuit. It has now become less technical and more popular. Its spirit has penetrated the wider circles of general culture, and has mingled with the literary and scientific activities of the age.

In the sphere of practical life the spirit of the Enlightenment revealed itself in the criticism of old institutions and long-established customs. All past enthusiasms and ideals were discarded and everything in the social and political world was subjected to the test of reason, while man, with his individual rights and powers, became the measure of all belief and conduct. A general revolt against the conventions of society and the assumptions of religion; a determination to be free of all restraints; a claim for individual liberty of thought and action, were among the more distinctive features of the Enlightenment. It was the justification of the individual against authority, privilege, and vested interest. The process was naturally, in the first instance, negative and destructive. Nothing was sacred. Every religious sentiment and traditional belief was held up to the cold, severe light of the intellect and condemned if it could not justify itself to reason or fit itself into the logical scheme of life. The movement reached its height in the French Revolution, which was at once its natural effect and its most characteristic expression.

The Enlightenment first took its rise in England, where, on account of the more stable security and larger liberty of its political life, intellectual inquiry was comparatively unmolested; and where philosophic thought more naturally allied itself with general culture. From England the movement passed to France. Here, however, the new doctrines of liberty and individualism provoked a fierce antagonism to the existing conditions of Church and State, and became the occasion of political strife and revolution. From France and England combined, the influence of the Enlightenment affected Germany, where it worked in a quiet though not less effective way, interpenetrating not only the philosophy, but the general literature of the period.

John Locke was the leader of the English Enlightenment, who gave to the philosophy of Descartes an empirical



complexion. While, on the one hand, the empiricism of Locke evoked its idealistic counterpart in Berkeley, it led to its natural conclusion in the general scepticism of Hume, which, in its turn, called forth the protest of the Common Sense philosophy of the Scotch school under Reid and his followers.

The pioneer of French Enlightenment was Pierre Bayle, whose *Dictionnaire* turned the minds of the cultivated world in the direction of political and religious scepticism, which, in the hands of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, took the character of materialism and sensualism.

In Germany it was Leibnitz and Wolff who gave to the movement its philosophic form, while Lessing and Herder, by their poetic genius, imparted to it its more popular literary shape.

It will be convenient to consider the various manifestations of this period under three heads: British Enlightenment, French Enlightenment, and German Enlightenment.

## *SECT. 1. BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT*

### CHAPTER I

#### EMPIRICISM. LOCKE

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) was the originator of Modern Empiricism in England. He was born at Wrington, near Bristol, in the same year as Spinoza. In his youth he studied philosophy, science, and medicine in Oxford, but the University was dominated by the spirit of Scholasticism, and he received little impulse from its teaching. For three years he was secretary to the Embassy in Berlin. In 1666 he came under the influence of the Earl of Shaftesbury, one of the greatest statesmen of Charles II., whose friendship he enjoyed throughout his life, and in whose house he held intercourse with some of the most distinguished men in England. On the fall of his patron, he was compelled to seek refuge on the Continent, and from 1675 till 1679 he lived in France, and latterly in Holland. On the accession of William of Orange, he returned to England, under whose government he filled several high offices of State, and took a prominent part both by his writings and activities in shaping the policy of the new regime. His last years were spent in retirement in the county of Essex. He died at the age of seventy-three in 1704. All his contemporaries testify to his sincerity of life and to his ardent attachment to the cause of truth and liberty. Moderation and prudence marked his public

career, while his writings are distinguished by candour and toleration of spirit and clearness and precision of style.

His works include: *An Essay on Civil Government* (1690); *Letters on Education* (1693); *Letters on Toleration*; and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1693); and also his greatest work, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, which appeared for the first time in 1690.

In all these writings we may detect the same general aim, which is to expose the uselessness of empty opinion and traditional assumption, and to vindicate the freedom of the intellect to examine facts and form judgments. The immediate object of the *Essay on Civil Government* was to reply to the partisans of the Stuarts, who accused the new Government of usurpation. Locke attempts to show that government really rests on the will of the people, and he agrees with Hobbes, and anticipates Rousseau in his contention that it is a matter of social contract. His treatises on *Toleration and the Reasonableness of Christianity* have a similar aim. In the former he defends the right of individual liberty, and advocates toleration on the ground that it is irrational to compel men to believe. In the latter he seeks to encourage unity among the diverse sects of religion by emphasizing the points which are common to all, and minimizing those on which Christians differ.

The *Essay on the Human Understanding* has also a practical aim, and was written in the interests of political truth and liberty. But in order to attain his ultimate object, he finds himself compelled, at the outset, to examine and vindicate the human understanding as an organ of knowledge. Locke's attention was first directed to this examination in an almost casual manner. Twenty years before the book was actually published a few friends were gathered in his chambers to discuss some scientific topics, but found they could make no headway. "After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, and

that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with."

These words indicate at once the caution and individualism of Locke. Like Descartes, it may be said, he begins with doubt; but while Descartes' tone is assured and self-confident, that of Locke is distrustful and cautious. He must, he feels, be careful to admit no truth which does not justify itself to his mind, and he must, therefore, keep within the limits of his own sensations and thoughts. His object is not so much to discover objective truth as to discover the means of knowing the truth. It is, as he says, "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge."

Locke may be called the founder of modern Psychology. He is concerned with the origin of our ideas. He himself clearly distinguishes psychology from physics and metaphysics. "I shall not at present meddle with the physical considerations of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consisteth. It shall suffice my present purpose to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with."

The purpose of the essay, therefore, is clearly set forth and its limits defined. It is a work of psychology and not of ontology. It does not investigate the principles of the understanding, but rather the action of the faculty, the phenomena by which it is developed and manifested. These phenomena Locke calls "ideas." "I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantom, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." This is the very watchword of Locke. His philosophy is a study of ideas. It is the distinction of Locke, that the demand which the *Criticism* of Kant attempted to satisfy—viz., that philosophy should ascertain and trace the limits of human knowledge—was by him



clearly and expressly stated. Locke is the first of a long line of thinkers who maintain the limitation of knowledge, and the inability of the mind to deal with certain matters which transcend it. We must not go "beyond the reach of our capacities," he says. Men are apt to let their thoughts wander into depths where they can find no sure footing, with the result that they only increase their doubts and bring themselves to perfect scepticism. "Whereas, were the capacities of our understanding well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found, which set the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between what is and what is not comprehensible by us; men would perhaps, with less scruple, acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other."

The essay is divided into four books. The first book is a preliminary argument against the innateness of any part of our knowledge, which prepares the way for the statement of his main position, that whatever a man knows or can in any way conceive, is dependent on experience. All our ideas, the most complex as well as the simplest, are ideas which refer either to data, which happen to have been presented through our five senses, or to operations of the mind which have been made objects of reflection. In other words, all our experience is due to sensation or reflection. Words which do not mean either what is sensuous or what is mental must be empty words. The proof of this thesis is offered throughout the second and third books, and thus prepares for the subject of the fourth, which deals with the intuitive facts and principles constituting our real knowledge. Much of the second and third books is occupied with an examination of the ideas of space, time, infinity, identity, substance, causality, power, with the object of showing that even these ideas depend upon experience, and must wholly disappear if all the elements which are due to experience are left out.

The two great principles, then, which Locke seeks to establish are: (1) That there are no innate ideas, and (2) that all knowledge is derived from experience.

(1) On entering on the investigation of the origin of our ideas, Locke is confronted with an assumption which, if well founded, would cut short his inquiry, viz., that the human mind possesses *innate ideas*. This is a notion which before Locke's time held undisputed sway, and was defended by Descartes. "When men have found some general propositions which could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was a short and easy way to conclude them innate." It is no explanation to say ideas are innate. It is simply to acknowledge they are a mystery, not to be questioned or investigated. Locke proceeds, therefore, to combat the theory of Descartes. There are two reasons which have been commonly given in support of this doctrine: First, that these propositions are universally admitted; second, that they are primitively admitted, that they are known as soon as the soul awakes. But that these ideas are neither universally nor primitively known Locke proves by an appeal to the experience of children and of various races. Neither in the speculative sphere, nor in the practical, is it possible to discover a notion that can be called innate. Take the most self-evident proposition, that of identity, what is, is,— $A$  equals  $A$ ; or that of contradiction,—it is impossible that the same thing can be and not be at the same time,—they are so far from being innate that neither children nor savages nor idiots possess them. The ideas of identity, of difference, etc., are extremely abstract ideas, which we are so far from possessing at birth that we only acquire them after long experience. Nor can it be assumed that there are any propositions in the practical world which are primitively known or universally held. Locke submits moral maxims to the same test. Take, for example, the maxim, "Do to others as you would be done by." If we examine the manners of savages, the narrations of travellers, and the observations of children, we by

no means find that it is generally assented to. Nor does he except from this demonstration even the idea of God; for not only are there some nations which are entirely devoid of it, but among others who acknowledge a God, He assumes most diverse forms. Nor will Locke allow that these ideas might be contained in the soul implicitly, though not actually,—that they might be already outlined in the soul and pass into consciousness as the reason ripens, for this would be virtually to say that reason makes men know what they know already, in other words, that the soul is capable of forming them. And if that were so, where would you draw the limit? If mathematical truths are innate, all relations of space and number must be equally so, indeed, all self-evident propositions, such truths as sweet is not bitter, black is not white, etc., must also be innate.

It has been objected by Cousin and others that this method of appealing to savages and children, in regard to whose state it is so difficult to get accurate information, is by no means scientific or trustworthy. Moreover, children and savages do not understand your abstract questions with regard to identity, opposition, or even with regard to the idea of a God. But put your question in a concrete form adequate to their capacity and it will be found that many of those ideas which you imagined were the result of a process of education or experience, are really already present.

(2) But, now, if there be no innate ideas, as Locke claims to have demonstrated, what is the *source of our ideas*? whence comes our knowledge? This is the question he deals with in the second book. "Let us then suppose," he says, "the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters without any idea, how comes it to be furnished? . . . To this I answer in one word, to experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself." And let us see what Locke understands by experience. "Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal

operations of our mind, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These are the two fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." Experience, therefore, is two-fold. It comes to us either by sensation or reflection. It has been objected by Cousin that Locke confounds reflection with consciousness. While reflection is a faculty exercised only by the few, consciousness belongs to every man as an intellectual being. Moreover, he limits the reach of reflection by limiting it to the operations of the soul, whereas it has for its objects all the phenomena which pass within us, sensations as well as mental operations. If we ask whether sensation or reflection comes first into exercise, Locke has no hesitation in saying that our first ideas are furnished to us by sensation, while those which we owe to reflection come later. "These alone, so far as I can discover, are the windows by which the light is let into this dark room; for methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left, to let in some external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without." It will thus be seen that, according to Locke, the mind is a wholly passive faculty; it cannot do otherwise than perceive what is given to it through the organs of sense. It is as little able to create ideas out of nothing or destroy those which have been framed as a man is able to create or destroy a mote in the sunbeam. It simply acts as a mirror reflecting the images of objects presented to it. Yet when Locke deals with the operation of the mind he seems to imply a certain degree of activity. While the mind receives its first materials from sensation and reflection, he seems to attribute to its several faculties,—perception, retention, discernment, comparison, composition, abstraction,—a certain power of combining the isolated and transitory impressions into complex ideas. This power, indeed, he regards as merely formal, as adding nothing to the matter of the



ideas. But the very fact that he acknowledges any activity of the mind at all, would imply that it is not merely a passive receptacle, but an active agent or factor in the formation of our knowledge. May we not say that the co-operation of the mind, with the elements of experience, insisted on by Kant, was already dimly, though unconsciously, suggested by Locke?

(3) *Classification of ideas.* Though all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, if we analyse them we find that they may be divided into two classes—simple and complex.

(a) Simple ideas are those which the mind receives from without. They may come through a single sense, as ideas of colour through sight, or sound through hearing, or solidity through touch. Or they may be those which come through several senses at once, as extension, form, motion. Or they may be those which arise from reflection alone, as the ideas of doubt, belief, will. Or yet again, they may be such as are derived from sensation and reflection together, such as pleasure, pain, or the ideas of unity, power, and succession.

Locke reckons our ideas of Space, Time, and Number in the class of the simple, "being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may or does attain to." Locke sets aside the erroneous identification of matter with extension, introduced by Descartes, and substitutes for it the idea of solidity which "we receive by our touch, and which arises from the resistance which we find in body, to the entrance of any other body." Space and body are, indeed, distinct. But we cannot conceive of the second without the first. Space may be imagined "either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there . . . or else as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty space may be placed in it." We obtain the idea of space, therefore, by means of sight

and touch. In like manner our idea of time springs also from the two universal sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection. We reach the conception by reflecting upon our feelings and thoughts in the order in which they succeed each other in our minds. Without perceptions we should have no idea of duration or time. Time and space have much in common: both are infinite, and cannot be limited by the world of matter. It is always possible to think away bodies and motion, but we are unable to conceive limits to space and time. The difference between the two is that while space can extend itself in many directions, time has only one dimension. Of all ideas, says Locke, none is so simple as that of number. All things are united in number. Number gives fixity and definiteness to the infinite mass of things presented by sensation or reflection. Numeration consists only of addition and subtraction, and both operations may be continued to infinity.

(b) *Complex Ideas*. "When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas." These may be brought under three heads: *Modes*, *Substances*, *Relations*.

*Modes* are such as have no independent existence. They are complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of existing by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of, substances; such are ideas signified by the words, "triangle, gratitude, murder, etc." They may be simple or mixed modes, and may consist of all the various modifications of space, time, number, thought.

*Substances* are such ideas as correspond to actual things. These things, however, are unknown to us in themselves, and are only cognisable through certain underlying notions which we call substances. "We have no clear idea of substance in general." It is that unknown something in

which we combine a particular aggregate of qualities and predicates. If we inquire what is the subject in which this weight or that colour resides, we are referred to a solid and extended something which we cannot immediately know. In a word, all our ideas of substance are but "collections of simple ideas with a supposition of something to which they belong and in which they subsist." Have we not here a suggestion of Kant's "thing in itself"?

The last kind of complex ideas is that of *Relation*. Relations are ideas which are so united that the one calls up the other. Such are the ideas of cause and effect, identity and diversity.

(4) *Relation of Mind to Real World*. In proclaiming the impossibility of forming any clear idea of substance and in insisting that all ideas of time, space, causality, identity, etc., are but ideas of the mind to be traced back to sensation and reflection, Locke establishes the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge and makes man himself, the individual consciousness, the source and criterion of all truth. He joins hands here with the individualism of Descartes as against the universalism of Spinoza. It is the self which thinks, over against which is the manifold world of things, only known to the thinking subject by its own ideas received through its own faculties of sensation and reflection.

The distinction which Locke makes *between primary and secondary qualities*, most interesting in itself, suggests a similar conclusion. Certain qualities are inseparable from a body whatever its state; these are called original or primary qualities, and include solidity, extension, figure, motion, number. "Secondly, such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, *i.e.* by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, etc., these I call secondary qualities." Now, while "the ideas of

primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us; and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves which we call so." But if these secondary qualities are only ideas in our mind and represent nothing in the bodies themselves, how are we to bridge the gulf which exists between the thinking subject and the real world? Elsewhere, he says (bk. II. ch. iv.): "It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge is real only so far as there is a *conformity* between our ideas and the reality of things." What then shall be the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with the things themselves? Here Locke states the problem with which philosophy has ever been confronted,—a problem which has been variously solved by idealism and realism. What is the relation of the subject and object? Locke, it may be said, is scarcely alive to the full significance of this question, and he overcomes the difficulty by a mere *petitio principii*. We have a conviction that such a reality exists to which our ideas correspond. Our ideas are the product of things "operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing those perceptions which, by the *will and wisdom of our Maker*, they are ordained for and adapted to. Whence it follows that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us; and so carry all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires; for they represent things to us under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us." The truth is that Locke fails to make the transition from



...ar to the world, or from the world to the individual, and he resorts, like Descartes and Malebranche, to a *Deus ex machina*, by whom the conformity is brought about. All our knowledge is really subjective, according to Locke, and human certainty is only relative certainty. Ideas may be true for us without having absolute validity.

(5) *Nature and Limits of Knowledge*. Having so far examined the source and range of our ideas, Locke proceeds in the fourth book to consider the kinds of knowledge which those ideas afford, and to treat of the various judgments, intuitive, demonstrative, probable, and erroneous, into which ideas enter. He defines knowledge as "the perception of the connection, and agreement or disagreement, and repugnancy, of any of our ideas"; holding that "the mind hath no other immediate objects in all its thoughts and reasonings but its own ideas." Where this perception exists there is knowledge, and where it is not, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.

If the mind knows nothing but its own ideas, how, it may be asked, have we any real knowledge of things and persons outside ourselves? How, in other words, do we attain to a knowledge of God and the material world? What bridge is there between the faculty of knowing within us and the objects of knowledge without us? Only on the supposition that the mind contains images or archetypes of God, of the soul, and the external world. Thus, though Locke starts his essay by strenuously contending against innate ideas; at the close, by affirming that the mind possesses archetypes or intuitive ideas of certain things, he seems to give his case away, and to bring back what he formerly expelled.

According to the completeness or incompleteness with which an idea corresponds to its archetype is the clearness of our knowledge. There are, therefore, three degrees of certainty of knowledge. First, "when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately

by themselves, without the intervention of any other ideas. We may call intuitive knowledge, which leaves no room for hesitation. The second, is when it perceives the agreement or the disagreement of any of the ideas, but not immediately; this is demonstrative knowledge. The third degree is the problematic, such as the knowledge the mind has of the material world."

Now there are three objects of which the mind may be said to have a real knowledge. We have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence. That truth needs no proof. We have also a real, though, in this case, a demonstrative knowledge, of God, whose existence is assured for us both by the design in the outer world and still more by our own existence and our powers, which demand a supremely powerful and intelligent being as their creator. Lastly, we have a knowledge of material things through our sensations, which, if it falls short of being as sure as the knowledge of ourselves and of God, is still highly probable and practically certain. Of this we have various evidence. Our senses imply a cause, which the organs of our mind have not produced. Also, we have the assurance which comes from the general agreement of our senses and the consensus of mankind. Of these things we may be said to have a real and certain knowledge. But all else upon which the human understanding can be exercised is referable to the sphere of probability, presumption, or even of ignorance. All judgments, about absent things of sense, about the relations of the qualities of nature, about the attributes of Spiritual beings, can only at best have a vague uncertain presumption. Hence probability is the guide of life, and the weighing of reasons for and against a proposition is the chief exercise of the human understanding. With regard to the nature of God, and of the spiritual world, we have no knowledge as such, and can only rely upon revelation and faith.

Locke does not work out a separate ethical theory, but

many of his remarks bear directly upon practical conduct.

Personal identity consists of continuity of consciousness. Personality is the foundation of all responsibility. Locke rejects the doctrine of the freedom of the will in the common acceptance. What he calls will is the power of self-determination towards motion or rest, thought or no thought. Freedom has to do with action, not with will. A man is not free to will and not to will. So far as a man's power of acting in accordance with his own thought extends, so far is he free. "The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive for change is always some uneasiness." Our will is, in the first instance, determined by the desire to avoid pain, or to put it positively, by our desire for happiness. Locke makes an important distinction between desire and will. "We are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will and engaging us in action." We can compare our desires and calculate their consequences. "In this lies the liberty a man has." In other words, the will is determined by "the last judgment of good or evil." Good and evil are, however, with him nothing but that which procures pleasure and pain. And he defines "moral good and evil as only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good and evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the lawmaker." He holds that ethical rules are obligatory on us independently of political society, though he does not regard those principles as implanted in the human mind at birth. The aggregate of such rules he conceives to be the law of God.

Locke's significance consists in his being the first thinker of modern times who turned men's minds to the question, whence do we get our ideas, how do we know? and he has suggested the chief problems which in different forms have occupied philosophy since. In opposition to the mere "mode" of Spinoza he has emphasized the reality of the individual and has pointed to the individual thinking

man as the true subject of all knowledge. "Locke," says Schopenhauer, "was the first to proclaim the great doctrine that a philosopher who wishes to prove or derive anything from ideas must first investigate the origin of these ideas." His hesitation, however, between pure individualism, which can only conceive things as given by sense and reflection, and can, therefore, never go beyond its own subjective standpoint, and the assumption of an objective world existing without, which it yet presumes in some way to know,—is the flaw in his system which his followers were not slow to detect. Locke is not, in fact, consistent with himself. Sometimes he speaks as if the external objects of the world themselves made impressions on the mind; at other times he seems to imply that all that the mind can know are its own ideas.

The defect of Locke's philosophy, therefore, is that these two theories cannot be reconciled, and neither gives an adequate explanation of our knowledge. On the one hand, if we begin with the individual mind we are forced to conceive its knowledge as limited to its own sensations, with the result that the objective world must be totally beyond the possibility of knowledge. If, on the other hand, we begin with the outer world, which only acts on the individual through the senses, we assume a knowledge of things in themselves independent of the sensations of the individual.



## CHAPTER II

### DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICISM: BERKELEY

THE position at which Locke had arrived in his doctrine of knowledge was, as we have seen, untenable, involving as it did an impassable gulf between the external world and the mind. It was inevitable, therefore, that the consequences which his theory suggested, but did not state, should be developed by his successors.

Although Locke had assumed a real world outside our minds, he maintained that we could not know that world. Our knowledge could reach no further than our sensations, and consisted not in the agreement of our ideas with things, but simply of our ideas with one another. If this be so, it is an obvious inconsistency to attribute to the external world a substantial objective reality. If the mind is simply a piece of blank paper on which our sensations are written, and we can know nothing beyond these sensations, then the notion of an external substance must be declared to be a merely subjective conception. This was the conclusion which Berkeley drew, and which Hume carried out to its rigid consequences.

*George Berkeley*, the immediate disciple of Locke, was born in Kilcrin, in Ireland, in 1684. He was a man of extraordinary intellectual ability, and of exquisite purity and generosity of character. In his twenty-fourth year he published his *New Theory of Vision*, and the year after, his *Principles of Human Knowledge*, which, by their novelty of conception and lucidity of style, made a pro-

found impression. In 1713 he went to London, where he became acquainted with the brilliant literary circle of the age—Addison, Swift, Steele, Pope, and others. His paradoxes with regard to the non-existence of matter, as popularly understood, exposed him to the ridicule of the wits of the time. But though, as Pope wrote, “coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin,” the loveliness and charm of his personality disarmed hostility.

After some time spent in travel, during which he met Malebranche, he returned to England and set about carrying out the great project of his life—the conversion of the North American savages. On this expedition he actually set out, but the promise which Parliament made was not fulfilled, and he had eventually to relinquish an enterprise in which he had embarked his whole worldly means. He was ultimately made Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland, and he spent the remainder of his days in the duties of his diocese and the pursuits of study.

Of his numerous writings, we may mention, besides those we have already named, the *Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous*, a philosophical converse in which Hylas represents the views of the materialists, while Philonous gives expression to his own opinions.

The aim of Berkeley's writings was practical rather than theoretic. He wrote as the champion of orthodox Christianity against the “mathematical atheism” of his age. He found practical immorality excusing itself by a theory of materialism which made the whole conscious experience of man dependent upon “unperceiving matter.” He thought, therefore, that the doctrine of Locke had only to be made consistent with itself in order to dispel the cloud which hid the spiritual world. Hence, in the interests of religion, he sought to get rid of that “unknown something” which philosophers had assumed as the cause of our sensations. His first task, therefore, was to expose the self-contradictory supposition that ideas are either copies of matter or its effects.

The philosophy of Berkeley takes thus a twofold form—a negative and a positive. First, he seeks to prove that the material world does not exist independently of the mind that perceives it; and then he proceeds to show that only ideas and the percipient spirits to whom they belong have reality, and that, finally, God, the supreme Spirit, is at once the cause and guarantee of our ideas and their association with one another.

(1) *Unreality of Material things.* The opening words of his *Principles of Human Knowledge* state the problem and sum up his whole position. "It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination. . . . But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises diverse operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul, or Myself. . . . That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations, or ideas, imprinted on the senses, however blended or combined together, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them."

Let us not blindly accept the current notions about existence. Let us ask what we mean when we speak of something being "real," and when we apply such words as "exist," "external," "substantial," to what we see and touch. It must not be assumed that Berkeley doubted the reality of the outward world, and it was no refutation of his argument to challenge him to run his head against a stone wall. What he did deny was the existence of that unknown substratum, that abstract substance, which philosophers assume to underlie all phenomena and in which

all accidents were supposed to adhere. He would have said, "I, not less than you, believe in what I see and feel, but what I deny is, that there is anything else than what I see and feel. This unknown something is a mere abstraction which has no reality." Let us find out what matter really is. When we reflect on what is given in experience, we can discover no independent substance or originating power. All we know is our own sensations—certain sights, sounds, tastes, etc. I am also conscious of my own identity. I know that it is I who have these sensations. Beyond that we are not conscious of anything. When we say we see or touch a material object, all we can mean is that we perceive ideas which have for us a practical meaning in so far as pleasure or pain depends on them. The table I write upon exists, while I see and feel it. If I were out of my study I should still say it existed, meaning that if I were in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. A sound is heard, a colour or figure is perceived that is all I can assert. As to what is said as to the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived—that is, Berkeley affirms, perfectly unintelligible. To be is to be perceived,—‘their *esse* is their *percipi*’; nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds of thinking things which perceive them.

"All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all these bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind—their being is to be perceived and known." The immaterialism of the external world is the thesis of Berkeley.

The assumption that there is an actual world underlying our sensations is based, Berkeley tells us, on the universal but equally false supposition that we have such things as universal abstract ideas. We deceive ourselves by taking words for ideas and assuming that general notions separate from actual concrete facts exist. Abstract ideas



do not exist. They do not exist even in the mind, still less do they exist in the nature of things.

But if it be suggested that though the ideas themselves do not exist without a mind to think them, yet may there not be things like them, of which they are copies or resemblances? But, answers Berkeley, an idea can only be like an idea. A colour or figure is like nothing but another colour or another figure. Outward material objects, if we could fancy such, could not create or shape inner spiritual ideas, for that would be to imply that the mind was not only passive, but material.

Again, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities which Locke established, does not alter the case, for what is true of colour and taste is also true of the secondary or inferred qualities of extension and impenetrability. The one kind of quality is not more real than the other; both exist solely in the mind which perceives them.

But, once more, it may be said, the essence of matter is not the qualities but a substratum which lies behind them and supports them. The qualities may, indeed, be only subjective ideas, but surely there is a substantial existence which these qualities imply. But, says Berkeley, if we abstract from a cherry all the qualities which can be perceived through any of the senses, what is left? Nothing. Locke had already admitted that "substance" was "a something, we know not what." This unknown something neither acts nor thinks, neither perceives nor is perceived. What, then, is that which is entirely made up of negatives? Surely a nonentity, a thing unthinkable, utterly useless, and incapable of being known.

(2) *Spiritual Beings alone real.* But, now, it may be asked, do we know nothing beyond our fleeting ideas? Yes, in addition to our ideas we know ourselves. These ideas belong to Me. They are in my mind. I have a sense of distinction between me and my ideas. They are fleeting, various; the mind possesses a sense of order,

constancy, and coherence, which at once gives to my mind an independent existence, and to my ideas, connection and orderliness. "Besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them." This substance which supports and perceives ideas cannot itself be an idea; for while ideas are passive, this is active. "All the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in their being perceived, whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking." So then we know nothing but spirits and their ideas, and their distinction is that the former are active, thinking substances, while the latter are inert, fleeting, and dependent things, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by the mind or spiritual substance which thinks them.

(3) *God the Author of Ideas.* But now the further question arises, whence come those ideas? We have seen that they are not caused by outward material things. They are not copies or effects of some unknown material substance. Nor are they the creations of our own mind. They are not the product of our will. They are not the creations of our phantasy, nor are they objects of caprice or illusion. They follow in an orderly train and succession. They are vivid, lively, and clear. If, then, we do not produce these ideas ourselves, they must have a cause outside of us. That cause must be a willing and thinking being, for without will it could not be active and operative upon men, and without having ideas of its own it would be incapable of communicating any to my mind. On account of the variety and order of our sensations, this being must also possess infinite power and intelligence, it must be able to control all spirits at the same time and suggest the same ideas simultaneously to different and endless varieties of minds. This being, then, must be

God. The connected whole of these God-created ideas we call nature, and the constant sequence of their succession, the laws of nature. In the immutability of the Divine working and in the uniform harmony and plan of creation we detect the wisdom and goodness of the Almighty more surely than in sudden and exceptional acts. When we hear a man speak we may infer his existence. How much less should we doubt the being of God, who is speaking to us through the manifold works of nature. Those ideas which God imprints upon our spirits are the archetypes of His own eternal ideas.

In Berkeley's system it will be seen that everything is reduced to ideas and their relations. But these relations are not necessary relations, they do not flow from the nature of things. Berkeley eliminates all causality from the external world, and only admits relation of co-existence, or of constant succession, between phenomena, *i.e.* ideas. The laws of nature are merely rules in accordance with which God excites ideas in us. The changes in the material world form a kind of language which expresses the thoughts of the Divine Mind. The relation of ideas is only learned by experience, which gives to us "a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life."

The ultimate function of philosophy is the study of divine wisdom as revealed in the laws of nature. Will is the sole form of activity. As motion is determined by outward impulse, so will is determined by ends. In spite of his empiricism and individualism Berkeley sees a teleological purpose in the world.

A large part of his two chief works is occupied with showing the simplicity of his system and its fundamental agreement with religion, as well as with common sense. As the "doctrine of matter has been the main pillar of scepticism," so his theory of pure idealism is, he holds, the best safeguard against atheism.

It is true we can never know God as He is, for our

ideas, which are non-active, or, at best, but imperfectly active, can never fully represent Him, who is pure activity. At the same time, we may know God as we know our own and other spirits. We have no ideas of these, for we only know an object through its manifestations. We have, however, what Berkeley calls a "notion" of them. The existence of God may likewise be deduced from His effects. He produces the ideas He creates in us.

It will be seen that in his anxiety to be rid of the world of matter, Berkeley ends by practically denying the world of spirits as well. For if all we know is our isolated feelings or ideas, which are inactive, we naturally ask how we can discover among them that permanent order and sequence which, according to Berkeley, is the revelation of God? If we deny all constructive power to our ideas, how can we bind our sensations together and refer them, as he does, to a thinking subject? Wherein consists the connection between the Self and its ideas? How, in other words, can we ever reach any reality by such a theory, except the existence of our fleeting sensations?

Still further, if the connection between the thinking subject and its ideas is denied, or at least not provided for, how can we attain to the knowledge of any other spirits or realities outside our own personality? In order to meet this difficulty, Berkeley finds it necessary to state that though in a strict sense the mind can possess nothing but ideas, "we may be said to have some knowledge or notion of spirits and active beings." In other words, Berkeley has to resort to an accommodation in order to supplement his theory—an external reference or "notion" to bridge over the difference between self and other spirits. The idea of substance, from which Berkeley has freed himself on the material side, still binds him on the other, the immaterial side, and forces him into illogical conclusions. If true being consist only on being perceived, how can my consciousness assume the existence of beings distinct from myself, but able like me to think, imagine,



and will? How can I ascribe reality to them, or even to the Deity, since I have no assurance of their existence save from my own thought? Like his predecessors, Malebranche and others, Berkeley is obliged to bring in the thought of the Deity as the true author of all our mental processes.

At the same time, we must recognise in Berkeley a keen opponent of materialism, and his merit consists in being one of the earliest to give a clear utterance to the fundamental truth of idealism, and to show that the world is, after all, ours only as we can think it.

## CHAPTER III

### SCEPTICAL CONCLUSION: HUME

SCEPTICISM is the third and last phase of Empiricism, a phase which we find presented to us in the writings of David Hume. Berkeley desired to avoid scepticism, and his idealism was a valiant attempt to save the truths of the soul and of God from the destroying hands of materialism. But he did not realize that in denying the existence of matter he had prepared the way for the denial of the spiritual world as well. If we can know nothing but what the senses reveal, there is no room for a knowledge of mind. With a philosophic consistency which neither Locke nor Berkeley could claim, Hume drew the sceptical inferences which are logically implied in empiricism. Adopting Berkeley's analytic method, he founded modern scepticism. Like Berkeley, he accepts only what is immediately revealed to us by our senses. Berkeley had shown that we have no experience of an external world apart from perception, and had, therefore, pronounced matter to be a figment. But, said Hume, must not mind be also a figment? We know nothing from experience of a substance of any kind, either spiritual or material. We are only conscious of a collection of sensations. Our internal like our external experience gives us nothing but perceptions. The idea of an *ego* or self is, therefore, reducible to a series of sensations. Certainty has only one source—our immediate experience. "Since nothing is

ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions."

*David Hume* was born in Edinburgh in 1711. Of his early years we know nothing except that he studied at the university of his native town. In his youth he spent three years in France, and at the age of twenty-four he produced his first and most notable work—*A Treatise of Human Nature*. The neglect of this early work induced him years after to recast it in a more popular form, under the title of—*Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*, which appeared as the second volume of a series of essays. He expected to astonish the world with the novelty of his views, but, as he said, his work "fell dead-born from the press." His other writings are *Political Essays*, constituting the third volume of *Essays, Political and Moral*; his *Dialogues on Natural Religion*; and his *History of England*. His outward life was uneventful. Good health, easy circumstances, literary labours, in which he found never-failing enjoyment, brightened with social relaxation and combined, as he tells us in his autobiography, with evenness of temperament and absence of morbidness, made the current of his life smooth and tranquil. His only occupation beyond his literary work was the performance of the not very arduous duties of Librarian to the Advocates' Library—a post he held for many years. In 1763 he was appointed Secretary to the French Embassy, which necessitated his residence in Paris, where his philosophical fame procured him admission to the highest literary circles. His last years were spent in Edinburgh among the cultivated society which at that time distinguished the Scotch capital. The philosophy of Hume is an attempt to carry out to their logical consequences the findings of Locke and Berkeley. He largely accepts not only the starting-point, but the mental data of his predecessors. We know

nothing but our sensations, nothing except what experience supplies us with. His problem, therefore, is how thought remains possible on that hypothesis, how we are to account for the contents of our consciousness as we find it without reference to any material world which our senses do not supply.

(1) *Impressions and Ideas.* Hume agrees with Locke in maintaining that the first elements of all knowledge are simple perceptions, which are received passively by us. These perceptions, however, Hume divides into two kinds, which he calls Impressions and Ideas. The difference between them consists in the degree of force or liveliness with which they strike the mind. Those perceptions which enter the mind with more force he terms Impressions. Ideas, on the other hand, are "but the faint images of impressions in thinking and reasoning." In a note Hume tells us that by the term "Impression" he does not mean "to express the manner in which our perceptions are produced in the soul." Of this outside world experience teaches us nothing, and we must be silent. The real background of ideas is ignored by Hume. At the same time, we may say in passing that he invariably uses language which implies some cause for our sensations. Indeed, the very metaphor contained in the word "impression" assumes a particular theory as to the existence in some form of an external world which gives rise to them, and this theory, tacitly assumed all through, is the basis of his whole system. It follows from the definition of impressions and ideas that we can only have ideas when we have had previous impressions. "It must be some impression which gives rise to every real idea." Impressions, then, are the ultimate standard of reality by which we may test every thought we have. "When we entertain any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without meaning, we need but inquire from what impression is that supposed idea derived." Everything in our thoughts which cannot be traced back to some distinct impression



must be regarded as mere illusion or irrational assumption. At the same time, Hume agrees with Locke in holding that we have complex ideas which do not always resemble our impressions, but are rather formed by the help of the understanding or the imagination out of a number of simple ideas. "Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas." But as the first ideas are derived from impressions, we may hold that all our simple ideas proceed mediately or immediately from their corresponding impressions. By proving the priority of impressions to ideas, Hume professes to have answered the much-disputed question as to whether the mind has innate ideas.

Hume also agrees with Locke in dividing impressions into two kinds, those of Sensation and those of Reflection. The first arises in the soul originally from unknown causes. The second is derived from our ideas. But since all reflective activity is really called forth by impressions of the external world, and is but a copy of them, the ideas as well as the impressions of sensation must precede those of reflection. We must have feelings or sensations before we can reflect upon them.

The only other distinction which Hume makes, at the outset, is that between the ideas of memory and those of imagination. The former, being more directly copies or repetitions of our perceptions, are more lively and strong; the latter, those of imagination, are less so. Memory preserves the original form in which the objects were presented, whereas the imagination takes the liberty of transposing and changing its ideas. In other words, imagination goes beyond experience and produces errors or makes assumptions which cannot be proved.

(2) *Relation of Ideas.* When, then, Hume examines the contents of his mind, he finds there nothing but feelings with their copies. At the same time, he finds also that all these ideas are being constantly separated and united again by the imagination. It is inconceivable that those loose and unconnected ideas are only joined together by

chance. There must, therefore, be some connecting principle or associating quality by which one idea introduces another. These, he affirms, are three, viz.—Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect. As all objects of human reason or inquiry are either relations of ideas or matters of fact, they must fall under one or other of these three principles of connection. Mathematics, Algebra, and Arithmetic, in short, every affirmation which is intuitively or demonstrably certain, belong to the first. Upon the second are founded the sciences of nature and the mind. On the third,—that of causality,—are founded all reasonings concerning matters of fact. Mathematical propositions “are discernible by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never was a square or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.” Of these three relations, that of causation is the most extensive, and that which we have most to do with in common life. It bears upon everything which is not a mere abstraction. Therefore, Hume subjects this idea to a searching examination, with the object of showing that we know nothing of the nature of this alleged necessary association. Experience tells us of the conjunction of what is called a cause and what is called an effect, but it reveals to us nothing of their actual connection.

Before, however, proceeding to this question, which he deals with in Part III. under the head of Knowledge and Probability, he disposes of several prior matters under Part I., viz., Relations, Modes, and Substances, into which complex ideas may be divided.

With regard to Substances, Hume follows Berkeley in affirming that we have no idea of an external substance apart from its qualities, but he goes further and maintains that we have also no notion of the substance of the mind distinct from particular perceptions. Substance can be derived neither from sensation nor reflection. If it were

derived from the senses, it must needs be a colour, sound, or taste. If it be derived from reflection, it must be a passion or an emotion. But it is none of these. We have, therefore, no idea of substance, which is nothing else than a collection of particular qualities united by the imagination and having a particular name assigned to it.

Modes, Hume examines in connection with the doctrine of Abstract or general ideas. A mode is also a number of united qualities, and has no real existence. It is just a form of general idea which is nothing but an abstract name given to a particular thing.

At this point he enters upon an elaborate examination of the origin of our ideas of time and space, which is interesting from the fact that it gave a starting-point to Kant's subsequent doctrine that space and time are mere forms of the mind which have no corresponding reality. "It is from the disposition," says Hume, "of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, and from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time." He further says, "the ideas of time and space are, therefore, no separate or distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order in which objects exist." These passages are interesting as showing that Hume is obliged to call to his aid something more than unrelated particulars—to assume, in short, that the mind contributes certain ideas which are not to be found in any impression.

(3) Having disposed of these preliminary matters, Hume has now to face the subject of *Knowledge and Probability*, and has first to enumerate the philosophical relations of the mind, which are evidently an expansion of the natural relations he has already named. These are seven in number—Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, Cause and Effect. These relations he divides into two classes: "Such as depend on the ideas which we compare together, and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas." The first four belong to the first class as having to do with ideas

alone. The last three seem to carry us beyond to outward things, but as by means of two of these—viz., Identity and Succession—we can never go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, these relations can tell us nothing as to the real existence of objects. It is, therefore, only causation which produces such a connection as to give us assurance, from the existence or action of one object that it is followed or decided by any other existence or action. The *Idea of Causality*, therefore, demands his attention, and his object is to show that it is a purely delusive notion arising from no given impression, and that it acquires its apparent validity solely from custom. The question which he has to answer is, assuming that all things are merely isolated particulars, how has the illusion of a causal connection between mutually indifferent units arisen? We must bring this idea, like every other, to the test of all reality. What, then, is the impression from which the idea of Cause is derived?

It cannot be an intuitive idea, for there are no innate ideas. Moreover, knowledge *à priori* could only extend to things which are identical, but an effect is totally different from its cause, and can never be discovered in it. No amount of scrutiny or analysis of the one can ever yield the other. A billiard ball moves and knocks against another, which then begins to move also. But there is nothing in the motion of the first to suggest the motion of the second. Nor can experience afford this idea of necessary connection. All that our senses give us is one sensation and then another, simply a sequence of the isolated events with no intervening or connecting link between them. All that we really perceive is first a spark and then an explosion of gunpowder; at one moment I see a flame and at the next feel heat. All that I am aware of are the two relations of contiguity and succession. But these do not explain what I mean by causation. A thing may be beside or prior in time to another without being regarded as its cause. There is, therefore, another element



which I add, and that is the idea of necessity. Whence then this notion of *necessary* connection which is invariably associated with the idea of cause and effect? What is my warrant for transforming a perceived succession into a causal connection? Now, it will be noticed that we do not attribute necessity to every pair of successive events, but only to those which have been repeatedly observed together. So long as I regard only one instance, I can observe nothing beyond the relations of contiguity or succession. But if I enlarge my view to embrace instances where I find like objects always existing in like relations, I discover that every fresh repetition produces a new impression or determination of the mind, which gradually affords the idea of necessity. It is, therefore, by an association of ideas that we are led to connect one thing with another. It is custom or habit which leads us to conclude that because certain objects have always been connected in the past, they must in the future be similarly connected. The essence of necessity is, as Hume puts it, "the propensity which custom produces to pass from one object to the idea of its usual attendant." The principle of causality is wholly based on feeling, it is a subjective habit or trick of the imagination which leads us to suppose a nexus, which has no existence except in the mind conceiving it. "Necessity is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another." I can never demonstrate the connection between two facts, but I have an instinctive belief in the connection. I expect by an involuntary feeling that when one fact occurs the other will not be wanting. Thus for Hume there can be neither necessary truths nor true principles since he reduces everything to habit and experience. It is, therefore, an arbitrary distinction, and one not permissible to Hume's theory, to attribute to mathematical truths as being discernible by the simple operation of thought, a validity which does not apply to matters of fact. If all operations of thought

are to be traced simply to particular impressions, then there is no room in his system for necessary truths.

What holds good of causality obtains, according to Hume, in respect to all other relations of necessity, to ideas of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, and all productive qualities. Destroy the link of necessity and the whole structure of our knowledge of the world crumbles away into nonentity. He extends his analysis to the material world, to our belief in the uniformity of nature, to our belief in a first cause, and to the action of the spirit and will. "So far from perceiving the connection betwixt an act of volition and a motion of the body, 'tis allowed that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essences of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over the mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and could not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction." Here again it is custom which produces the transition of the imagination; and this again is identical with belief.

(4) *Illusion of External World.* This same principle of custom and association is applied to explain the illusion also of a permanent world. And here Hume asks two questions: "Why do we attribute a continued existence to objects, even when they are not present; and why do we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception"? As to the first, he shows that the senses give us nothing but a present perception. I see my table. I go out of the room and come back in an hour. How do I know that it is the same table I see? It is only custom and association that convinces me of the continuance of the table. All that I am legitimately aware of are two isolated particulars, two separate impressions of tables. As to the second question, Hume answers, that our perceptions being of ourselves, they can never give us the least intimation of anything beyond. What have been called secondary qualities of objects do not exist

outside the mind that thinks them. We cannot immediately perceive our bodily frames, for we only know impressions. We can never get beyond the facts of our consciousness. The world is simply a complex of sensations. How then do we come to think of it otherwise? How do we attribute constancy and coherence to certain of our impressions? The answer is to be found in a peculiar tendency of the imagination "to go on in the line in which it has been put." Thought slides from one impression to others with which it has been joined, and reckons them the same, mistaking the succession of things for the identity of objects. Moreover, impressions are distinguished from ideas only by their superior liveliness; and by close association with an impression, an idea acquires so much of this liveliness, that it also appears to be real. Reason corrects the illusions of the imagination. Hence arises "the hypothesis of a double existence of perceptions and objects which pleases our reason in allowing that our dependent perceptions are different, and, at the same time, is agreeable to the imagination in attributing a continued existence to something else which we call objects." This philosophical system is the monstrous offspring of two principles which are contrary to each other. Not being able to reconcile these opposed theories, we successively grant both, and thus feign a double existence.

We have thus reached the result that "all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences."

Hume proceeds to demolish also the notion of a *permanent self* by subjecting it to the usual test as to whether it represents any real impression. If all our knowledge consists of sense impressions, to what impression is the idea of personal identity due? We have no impressions which continue invariable and constant through the whole course of our lives. Pain and pleasure and all the feelings and passions of our mind succeed each other in constant

flux, and never even exist together at the same time. There is really no such idea. All we are aware of is a bundle of fleeting sensations without any connecting bond, and what we call mind or self is nothing but a fiction of the imagination.

It might be fairly objected that while Hume only discards the mind or self at the end of the *Treatise*, he takes advantage of a connecting mind all through his discussion; indeed, it might be urged that those connecting qualities, or "natural relations," which he discovers in the mind, imply its unity and identity,—indeed, whether he calls the principle memory, imagination, or self, matters little,—there is an *ego* assumed as the basis of Hume's whole reasoning.

It is clear if the mind be only a heap of isolated impressions, then the immateriality and the immortality of the soul are destroyed. To speak of the soul as either material or spiritual has no meaning for Hume, for he knows nothing of either matter or spirit. His theory also undermines the argument for the existence of a Divine Being. In his *Dialogues on Natural Religion* he deals with this question. We can know nothing of cause except as the observed antecedent of its effect. But we can form no inference unless we have seen the two events together. We can infer a watchmaker from a watch, for we have observed them together. But as we have no experience of the making of a world, we cannot argue that the existence of a world implies a creator. Reid met Hume here by urging that the traces of design in nature imply an intelligent cause. But Hume rejoined that if we are compelled to seek a cause for everything, then we must seek a cause for the Divine Being Himself. He also argues, as Kant did after him, that the order of the universe implies only a finite and not an infinite or perfect cause.

In his essay on *Miracles*, he assails the supernatural revelation,—not its possibility—he was precluded from that by his denial of necessary sequence—but the evidence of it.



He shows that there has been an invariable experience in favour of the uniformity of nature, and that a miracle, being a violation of the laws of nature, cannot be established by as strong a proof as that which can be advanced against it. He disparages the evidence usually brought forward for miraculous occurrences, by showing how apt mankind is to be swayed in such matters by fear, wonder, and fancy. It might be urged that Hume reveals a very superficial knowledge of the evidences of Christianity, but it is more to the point to question his right to regard a miracle as a violation of nature. According to his theory, a break, or unusual occurrence, ought only to be regarded as a new perception, another fact of experience. One would rather expect that the whole tendency of his argument would be to favour the possibility of the miraculous, or at least the unusual, in nature. If there is no conception of objective order, no necessary uniformity, then there can be no absolute expectation that no break or variety will take place. Moreover, if the alleged miracle had been believed in by any (for that is his test), it would be on a par with other occurrences. A miracle, according to Hume, might be an unusual event, but could not strictly speaking be regarded as a violation of the laws of nature.

The *ethical* views of Hume were first expounded in the second volume of the *Treatise*, but the final statement of them is to be found in his *Inquiry into the Principles of Morals*, and his *Dissertation on the Passions*, as well as in the *Essays* generally.

He regards the inquiry into moral action as more important than mere theoretic research. The laws of conduct are subject to a mechanism, he holds, not less regular than the laws of motion and optics. None the less, his treatment of man's moral nature is somewhat discursive, and nowhere does he enter upon a methodical analysis of the springs of action. In general he assumes that the actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure and pain, to which we owe our notions of good and evil. Hume is a thorough-

going determinist. He applies the doctrine of causality to the problem of freedom. The same causes are always followed by the same effects. So it is in character. Given a man's nature, you can predict how he will act. All history, politics, ethics, are based on the inference that certain actions flow from certain motives. If, then, human action may thus be foreseen, the motives being given, it follows that what we call freedom is an illusion.

But though we cannot speak of the freedom of the will in determining action, it does not follow that virtue and vice, even though they are involuntary and necessary, call for no praise or blame. We give our admiration to beauty and talent, though they are independent of our will.

Nor does the determining ground of moral action lie in the reason. Reason is a purely theoretic faculty. "It is no motive to action," except so far as it "directs the impulse received from appetite or inclination." It shows us what is true, but it cannot really influence our conduct.

The only motives of action are the feelings or passions, and these Hume subjects to a somewhat searching examination. He first divides all passions into calm and violent. The calm include beauty and deformity; the violent, love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. He draws a distinction between the cause of a passion and the object of it. While love has for its object some other person, the cause of that passion is the relation of that person to oneself. This leads Hume to make a further division of the passions into *direct* and *indirect*. By direct, he understands those which arise immediately from good or evil, that is from pleasure or pain. Under this head he includes desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear. These direct passions are the basis of the more complex indirect, where, beside the cause that produces the satisfaction, there comes into play another object to which that cause belongs. If this object is one's self, joy and sorrow assume the form of

pride and humiliation ; if some other, they become love and hate. By a law of association these several passions may pass into one another.

In the third book of the *Treatise*, Hume treats of moral questions, and examines the criterion or standard of moral judgment. Here again he differs from those who make reason the judge of actions. Morals, he holds, rest on feeling, and he agrees with Hutcheson in deducing the perception and approval of good from a moral sense or instinct. All moral distinctions rest ultimately on a feeling of pleasure or displeasure which an action excites in him who beholds it. Virtue is accordingly a quality of spirit which calls forth in a beholder the feeling of pleasure or the sense of approval.

The reason why the actions of others please us depends on a peculiar capacity in human beings of entering into the feelings of others. By the help of the imagination we transfer ourselves into the position of another, and praise or blame that in him which would occasion pride or humiliation if it belonged to ourselves. This feeling of "sympathy" lies at the root of all moral approbation. It is a mistake, Hume holds, to say that we are actuated chiefly or always by self-love. "We frequently bestow praise on virtuous action performed in distant times and remote countries, and a brave deed performed by an adversary commands our approbation though its consequences may be acknowledged prejudicial to our peculiar interest." In short, sympathy with the happiness or misery of others must be regarded as a principle of human nature beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general.

If we now ask what is the ultimate end of all action, Hume answers, agreeableness or utility, and he accordingly proceeds to a survey of those qualities or virtues which he finds are always either useful or agreeable (1) to ourselves, and (2) to others. There are some qualities, such as cheerfulness, courtesy, modesty, which, "without

any utility or tendency to further good," charm the beholder and excite his approbation; but, for the most part, utility is the foundation of our chief virtues, including fidelity, veracity, and integrity, and even such virtues as go beyond ourselves, justice and generosity. Thus while in general Hume recognises that the good is equivalent to the useful, it is not always the private utility of the agents, but general utility which he commends. If the benevolent affections have a higher value than the selfish inclinations, it is not because of their intrinsic nature, but in virtue of their greater utility. The former tend to the good of all men; the latter only to the good of the individual. While private virtues have their worth, such as skill and prudence, benevolence and justice should be preferred, so that the lesser utility may not prevail over the greater. Hume does not, indeed, recognise any obligation to virtue except that of the agent's interest, but he attempts to show that all duties to others are the true interest, in the end, of the individual.

The moral theory of Hume is open to the objections which are to be brought against all forms of Utilitarianism, viz.—first, that utility and pleasure do not account for our highest virtues, and that such an explanation of conduct does not reach to the roots of moral action. They do not answer the question, why I should pursue the useful? nor do they succeed in reconciling private interest with the desire for the general good. The fundamental error of Hume's position is that he bases conduct on mere feeling and makes the passions the only motives of action. You cannot divide the Self into reason and passions, and treat the passions as wholly irrational. Reason not only enters into and transforms all the desires of a rational being, but also gives significance and worth to every object he seeks. The end of moral action is not the satisfaction of any particular desire isolated from the others, but the realization of the self as a whole, and when we begin to reflect on the meaning of self, we find that it involves relations to other



selves, without which it has no meaning, or, indeed, existence.

In the realm of pure philosophy our country has probably produced no profounder intellect than that of Hume. He and Locke represent the high-water mark of English thought. In general the philosophy of Hume is the last word of Empiricism. It shows that a theory of knowledge based on mere sensationalism leads inevitably to Scepticism. Reason is employed to show the weakness of reason. Knowledge is turned against itself. Hume's attitude in theoretic as well as practical matters is one of despair. He thus closes his *Inquiry*: "When we trace up the Human Understanding to its first principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments as seem to turn to ridicule all our past pains and industry and to discourage us from further inquiries." No one, he expects, will accept the results he comes to. Reason furnishes no assured test of thought or action. Our beliefs are due simply to custom and instinct. We can never guard ourselves against the assaults of scepticism. It is impossible, he says, on any system to defend either our understanding or our senses. "Reason entirely subverts itself and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence on any proposition either in philosophy or common life." Beyond experience there is no knowledge. We have not final certainty with regard to anything. Custom is our only guarantee, and probability our only guide in life.

## CHAPTER IV

### PRACTICAL QUESTIONS

THE Empiricism of Locke, which was developed on its theoretic side, by Berkeley and Hume, to its natural conclusion, gave rise to various movements of thought, scientific, theological, and ethical, which now demand our attention. The influence of Locke's mind may be traced in the general view of the world which Newton took as well as in the physiological researches of Hartley and Priestley, while the Deism of Toland and the Moral theory of Shaftesbury were largely affected, on the one hand by his work on the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, and on the other by his *Denial of the Doctrine of Innate Ideas*.

1. *Natural Philosophy*. Though the discoveries of *Sir Isaac Newton*, the greatest of natural philosophers, do not strictly belong to the history of mental philosophy, a name so illustrious and epoch-making cannot be passed over without mention. Newton was born in 1642, a year memorable in English history for the breaking out of the Civil War, and doubly notable in the history of science for the birth of Newton and the death of Galileo. He was educated at Cambridge, where he ultimately became Professor of Mathematics. Newton represents the culmination of a long series of scientific efforts which, from the time of Aristotle, had been made to explain the mechanical forces of nature and to reduce the movements of the heavenly bodies to a single principle. It is the glory of Newton to

have crowned the labours of a Kepler and a Galileo with success, and though in science more perhaps than in any other department of human effort, each new worker builds on the results of his predecessors, Newton's name is for ever distinguished as that of the discoverer of the great law of gravitation, as the principle by which bodies, terrestrial and celestial, are governed, first casually suggested by the fall of an apple, but ultimately mathematically proved.

While Newton for the most part confined his attention to purely physical subjects, and did not inquire into the inner meaning of the world whose forces he computed, it is noteworthy that he combined with his strictly scientific reasoning a deep and reverent piety, seeing in the wonderful order and arrangement of the universe the surest proof of an intelligent creator. His theory of knowledge was accepted from Locke, but he recognised that God contained all things in Himself, and that He is the ultimate source of all being.

Newton's *Principia* profoundly influenced not science only, but every realm of knowledge. It is difficult for us to-day to realize how largely this new conception of the physical world bulked in the thought of the eighteenth century. What the idea of evolution has been to our own generation the law of gravitation was to the age of Newton. It directed and coloured the whole theological outlook of the times, and became a kind of standing illustration of man's relation to God.

Locke's theory of the association of ideas gave rise to the associational psychology of which *David Hartley* (1705-1757) and *Joseph Priestley* (1733-1804) are the chief representatives. If the mind is passive and dependent on outward things for its sensations, may thought not be explained on physiological and semi-material principles? The connection of the mental processes with certain states of the body, and the mutual relation of psychical functions and nerve-vibrations, suggested a materialistic theory in which the mechanism of the nervous system was

regarded as the primary cause of thought and will. At the same time, these writers did not press their theory to its logical conclusion. They strove to reconcile their psychology with a belief in the immortality of the soul and the divine origin of the world. Priestley especially strongly opposed the atheism of Holbach, and is associated with the Deists in his advocacy of natural religion.

2. *Theological Controversy.* The movement known as English Deism arose as a protest against the Calvinistic and Arminian discussions of the Continent. It was an attempt to free religion from the mysteries of church dogma and the traditional elements of Christianity, and to found it solely on rational grounds. This group of thinkers, though critical rather than openly hostile in their attitude to Scripture, sought to establish natural religion upon the basis of reason without any reference to supernatural Revelation. While there is no general unanimity amongst them, they are united in rejecting everything miraculous in Christianity and regarding the understanding without any help of Revelation as alone competent to discover God and account for the world. This rationalistic tendency had several co-operative influences, among which were the effect of the Copernican discovery upon the views taken of Scripture, as well as the new scientific outlook generally upon the culture of the times.

*Lord Herbert of Cherbury* (1581-1648) has usually been regarded as the "father of Deism." He was, as Leland says, the first to put Deism into a system. He was a soldier as well as a thinker. While he spent his youth in study, he devoted his later life to travel and activity. He fought in the Dutch wars and became eventually French Ambassador. It was the claim of opposing parties to exclusive possession of the truth that drove him to the task of thinking out the problem of religion for himself. His views are most fully set forth in two Latin works, *De Veritate*, published in 1624, and *De Religione*, published after his death in 1663. The former work sets forth the



philosophical principles which lie at the foundation of religious inquiry. His second work adduces the five truths, or *notitiæ communes*, which form the essence of all religion. These are: The existence of God, the duty of worship, the obligations of virtue and piety, the need of repentance, the fact of punishment and reward here and hereafter. He does not directly attack Christianity, but he obviously considers that all religious doctrines are the offspring of superstition and priestly corruption. Religion is an inborn possession of the human mind. God is a postulate of reason not given by revelation, but common to all men.

*John Toland* (1679-1722) in his work, *Christianity not Mysteriorious*, goes a step further, and contends that not only is there nothing contrary to reason in Christianity, but that there is in it nothing above reason. Everything is plain to the understanding, and what cannot be understood is profitless. We have no other faculty by which truth is assured to us. Toland was the first to express the determination which was a characteristic of Deism, to be satisfied with nothing less than a simple and clear explanation of things. Everything that smacked of mystery is to be rejected. The only ground we have for believing anything is not that it was revealed or given by authority, but that it is conformable with the human intelligence. In primitive Christianity there were no mysteries, and those which we now find there were introduced from Judaism and Paganism. His conception of revelation is similar to that of Locke. It was added to the light of reason not because it was actually required by the rational and thinking part of mankind, but as a kind of help to ordinary mortals.

But if revelation be merely "a means of information," it was almost inevitable that the further step should be taken that there is nothing to hinder us from thinking freely about it. This was practically the position of *Anthony Collins* (1676-1729), the ablest of the Deists. In his *Discourse on Free-thinking* he maintains that thought

cannot be restricted. Without freedom no one could ever be convicted of error. No one is saved by right doctrine. The only crime of a man with regard to belief is not to think freely. The clergy alone have sought to check thought, and it is their whole aim to maintain a certain system of divinity on which their salaries depend. All the greatest men have been free-thinkers. It is an absurdity to imagine that error can be useful and truth hurtful. But, as Bentley replied, free-thinking itself may have its prejudices, and rationalism is as often ready as faith to base its conclusions on rash and unverified assumptions.

Collins' work on *Liberty and Necessity* is an acute argument in favour of determinism, which, however, drew forth the criticism of Samuel Clarke that there undoubtedly exists in man a principle of self-motion, of voluntary self-determination. If man were not self-moving, he would be simply like a clock, and not a free agent. The argument for necessity from the the prescience of God Clarke met by saying that there might be a previous certainty even of free acts, and that God's foreknowledge is only a power carried to perfection which man partially possesses.

The only other names of this movement worthy of note are *Woolston*, who contended in his *Discourse on the Miracles of our Saviour* for an allegorical interpretation of the New Testament; *Chubb*, *Morgan*, *Bolingbroke*, and *Tindal*. Tindal's treatise, *Christianity as Old as Creation*, or *The Gospel: A Republication of the Religion of Nature*, which appeared in 1730, is one of the most characteristic writings of this period. He endeavours to prove the sufficiency of natural religion and to show that Christianity, in so far as it is true, simply republishes it. He lays it down as a self-evident proposition that as God is perfect, He must have given to man the perfect means of knowing and serving Him. From the very beginning, therefore, He must have made religion known to every man. It must on that account be perfectly discoverable by reason, "for

the use of reason is the only thing for which all men are responsible."

While it is doubtful whether to reckon Bolingbroke among the Deists or their opponents, the interest of Shaftesbury, though perhaps the most powerful writer of this period, lies in his ethical rather than his purely theological views.

Acuteness rather than profundity of thought characterizes the majority of the Deistic writers. For the most part they lack religious feeling and historical sense. They have no idea of the unfolding of truth or the development of revelation. They conceive of God as standing outside the world, giving to man an initial knowledge once and for all perfect. In their demand for an easy and intelligible scheme of things, they discard everything that conflicts with a narrow rationalism. The general temper of the period was a shallow optimism. God they regard as an easy, tolerant Being who cannot be injured, and, therefore, does not demand reconciliation. Miracles are an excrescence, and the work of Christ is superfluous. There is really no room and no need for revelation in the Deistic scheme of the universe. The world is a vast machine governed by the law of gravitation—a gigantic clock fabricated and set in motion by God, but guaranteed to go without further interference.

Deism was brought to a termination partly by its reduction to scepticism by Hume, and partly by its positive refutation at the hands of *Conybeare* (1732), and especially *Joseph Butler*. Butler insists not less than his opponents on the use and validity of reason. "I express myself with caution," he says, "lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which, indeed, is the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself." But reverence and a sense of our ignorance and insignificance are indispensable to a right understanding of God and our relation to Him. Let us by all means use reason, but "let not such poor creatures as we are, go on

objecting against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity of or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning." In his famous work, *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, published in 1736, he shows that the Christian religion embodies natural religion, the latter being at once the basis and type of the former. While Christianity has a higher authority, it corroborates and completes the laws of reason and virtue by adding the sanctions and obligations which Christ revealed.

3. *Ethical Theories.* The practical result of the Deistic movement was to reduce religion pretty much to an affair of moral conduct. The consequence of this separation of religion and morality was that attention came to be concentrated upon ethical questions, and an attempt was made to propound a theory of conduct on a natural basis apart from religion.

We have already seen that the first systematic effort to formulate a theory of morals was made by Hobbes. Man is naturally a selfish being, and selfish interest induces him to form a contract with his fellows and to place supreme power in the hands of the sovereign. Right is what the state ordains, and wrong what it forbids. Morality is merely negative, and duty and justice are simply an arbitrary arrangement for the promotion of the general weal of the community. Hobbes' theory of egoism,—“the selfish system,” as it was called,—roused vigorous opposition amongst his countrymen, and, indeed, determined ethical speculation for more than a hundred years.

The polemic against Hobbes was first started by the Platonist school of Cambridge, a little group of thinkers of the seventeenth century, who, while embracing Platonist principles, were also influenced by the philosophy of Descartes. Of this school Cudworth, Henry More, and Cumberland, were the chief representatives. They insisted, in opposition to Hobbes, on the positive character of morality, regarding it as a body of good and evil, and



not merely as a code of rules. While *Cudworth* (1617-1688), in his treatise on the *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, upholds the essential and eternal distinction of good and evil as independent of mere arbitrary will, he does not offer a systematic exposition of the ethical principles, which, he says, are intuitively apprehended. *Henry More* (1614-1687), on the other hand, in his work *Enchirideon Ethicum*, gives a list of axioms, or self-evident truths, among which he places not only the principle of Justice, but also the virtue of Benevolence. Absolute Good, which includes doing good to others, is discovered by the intellect, or at least by a particular form of it, which he calls "the boniform faculty," which, by revealing "the sweetness and flavour" of goodness, supplies a motive to virtuous conduct. *Cumberland* (1632-1718) proceeded against Hobbes in a similar fashion. He regards man's social nature to be as original as his egoism. While egoism is directed towards one's own private welfare, the social instincts are directed to the universal weal, without which, indeed, personal good is not possible. Cumberland is noteworthy as being the first to lay down the principle that "the common good of all" is the supreme end and standard to which all other virtues must be subordinated. The connection between the welfare of the individual and that of the public is regarded by Cumberland as a provision of God, whose commandments in this as in all other respects are authoritative.

Two other writers, Clarke and Wollaston, may here be named, who, while recognising the intuitive character of goodness, seek to explain it, not so much as dependent on a separate faculty as resulting from a general sense of conformity with the fitness of things. *Sam. Clarke* (1675-1729) made an attempt to place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration from self-evident propositions as incontestable as those of Mathematics. His great work—*A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God*—though dealing more particularly with the existence of

God, is interesting on account of its treatment of moral questions. God, he holds, has so created the world that all things subsist in certain relations and agreements. These relations are inseparable from the nature of things, and are, therefore, eternal. The moral life consists in conformity with the fitness of things. This fitness, though recognised by all, is not by all obeyed. He who follows his passions acts contrary to the elementary nature of things; he not only contradicts the order of the world, but denies the law of his own reason.

*William Wollaston* (1659-1724) was in practical agreement with Clarke. The special point, however, which he emphasizes is that every action contains a principle, and is a practical declaration. If this principle is untrue, as when I take something that is not my own and use it as if it belonged to me—the action is morally bad—an action of the opposite character is morally good. Between those two kinds of actions, there are those which are morally indifferent. According to Wollaston, the moral law is thus summed up: "Let us follow nature, and treat everything as that which it is." It is a duty to act as things prescribe, which we can only do when the mind is in possession of accurate knowledge of the world. The reward of such action is happiness, the balance of pleasure and pain.

The most important writer of this period is the *Earl of Shaftesbury* (1671-1713), the grandson of the nobleman who befriended Locke. His artistic sense was fostered by his classical studies, and he saw in the Greek ideas of beauty the highest types of manhood. He published from time to time several works—the principal of which was *Characteristics, or Men, Manners, Opinions, and Uses*.

The doctrine of Rational Morality preached by Clarke and Wollaston showed the difficulty of establishing ethics on any philosophical basis until the egoism of Hobbes had been definitely met. The significance of Shaftesbury is that he initiates a new departure in his attempt to show that man has originally social tendencies. Instead of pre-

senting the principle of social duty as abstract reason, Shaftesbury seeks to exhibit the naturalness of the social affection. In his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit* (1711), he begins by refuting Hobbes' theory, and seeks to show that the egoistic interpretation of human nature does not account for all man's feelings. Such an explanation might be sufficient if man were a wholly unrelated individual. But, as a matter of fact, he forms a part of a larger system, and his impulses and actions can only be called good when they are so graduated and balanced as to produce the larger good of the whole.

Man, says Shaftesbury, is really a social being. The individual is not a whole in himself. Every man's nature has a certain reference to others. Hence man is only good when he himself aims at the good of the system to which he belongs. So long as he seeks his own good and not merely his own pleasure, he does not come into collision with his system. In other words, man is so constituted that he cannot seek his own good without seeking the good of the system to which he belongs.

Shaftesbury is not faithful to his own theory, but relapses into the view that man has certain selfish tendencies towards his own good as well as certain tendencies towards the good of others. To strike a balance between the selfish and the social impulses is the aim of the moral life. Moral beauty, like all beauty, consists in a harmony or just proportion between two opposite elements. In morality, as in everything else, we decide what is beautiful by the aid of an innate instinct.

Hence arises the idea of a "moral sense," which decides how much is to be given to self and how much to others. This moral sense he conceives to be an immediate judgment not arising from education, as Locke held, though by culture and training it may be improved, just as a natural ear for music may be developed into a musical taste, by cultivation and practice.

Only when one set or other of our affections becomes

unduly prominent can strife arise. Except in such a case, the good of the whole implies the good of the individual, and the good of the individual the good of the whole.

Shaftesbury was the first writer who suggested the idea of a moral sense, a doctrine which became a most important element in subsequent systems of ethics. He was also the first to bring into prominence psychological experience as the basis of ethics, which gave rise to the elaborate moral system of Hutcheson.

In the meantime the ethical optimism of Shaftesbury called forth the criticism of *Mandeville*, the author of the *Fable of the Bees*, or *Private Vices, Public Benefits* (1724), in which he seeks to show that while, indeed, the wellbeing of society rests on the activity of the individual—that activity really depends upon his selfish instincts, and, indeed, on his passions and vices. Greed, prodigality, jealousy, envy, ambition, are the real roots of all achievements, and contribute more to the weal of society than does suppression of one's desires. Virtue, Mandeville holds, is purely artificial, where it is not merely a pretence. The world is really not served by virtues, but by vices. Mandeville's idea of virtue was wholly negative and ascetic. It is easy to see that if virtue consists in self-denial only, then it is but a negative good.

*Francis Hutcheson* (1694-1746) developed and systemized Shaftesbury's doctrine. He became Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. His principal works are: *Inquiry into our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1720); *Essay on the Nature of the Passions and Affections* (1728); *A System of Moral Philosophy*, published after his death in 1755. Hutcheson makes a distinction (1) between violent passions and calm affections, and (2) between selfish and benevolent affections.

If we examine our desires we find within us something which makes us choose the calm affections, and also leads us to approve of the benevolent rather than the selfish affections. This approval arises from a reflective sense—or



moral sense. A certain taste or relish comes from the benevolent affections like an ear for music, which makes us prefer them to all merely selfish desires. The theory of Hutcheson, in so far as it makes a distinction between the passions and the calm desires, marks an advance on Shaftesbury; but, on the one hand, he confuses the desires of man with the merely animal appetite, and, on the other, he fails to show how the rational nature of man produces those calm affections. The moral sense or taste simply comes in as a reinforcement of our benevolent tendencies. If it be merely a relish or taste with no rational basis, it is scarcely reasonable to promote it to the position of authority among all man's other desires, as Hutcheson does in his theory.

*Joseph Butler*, born 1692, one of the most eminent and influential divines of England, differs from Hutcheson, in ascribing to conscience, an authoritative principle somewhat akin to Kant's *Categorical Imperative*. Butler's main works were his *Analogy* and his famous fifteen sermons. The leading aim of the *Analogy* is to show that all the objections to revealed religion are equally applicable to the whole constitution of nature, and that the general analogy between the principles of divine government, as revealed in Scripture, and those manifested in Nature, warrants the conclusion that they have one author. The argument is valid against the deists, but it lacks completeness as a defence of Christianity.

Butler's greatness, however, lies in the sphere of Morals. The centre of his teaching is the deification of the conscience. Duty is his first and last word. According to his view, we have a number of tendencies, some of which are selfish and others beneficent. Those tendencies are at first purely disinterested. By and by we find that an object gives us pleasure, and desire springs up. At this point Conscience comes in, as a reflective faculty, bringing with it the idea of command. But what is the origin of this power, or why we feel bound to obey it, Butler does not

inform us. He never gets beyond the circle—what is right is what conscience approves of, and what conscience approves of is right.

Among the most illustrious of Hutcheson's students was *Adam Smith*, whose fame rests on his work as a political economist rather than as a metaphysician. As the author of the *Wealth of Nations* his reputation is world-wide, though his treatise—*A Theory of the Moral Sentiments*—gives him a high place among the thinkers of the times. He may be regarded as the connecting link between the English moralists and the Scottish philosophy. He was born in Kirkcaldy in 1723, and studied at Glasgow, where he afterwards became professor.

According to him, the primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of other men. We put ourselves in their position and partake with them in their affections by virtue of a power or faculty he calls "sympathy." This sympathy is the fundamental principle of his system. We proceed to judge of others' conduct, and apply our decisions to our own actions. It is only by seeing our conduct reflected in another that we can rightly judge it. Moral excellence or sense of propriety, being thus obtained by this power of sympathy, the author proceeds to show that the sense of duty is found by an application to ourselves of the judgments we previously passed on others. It will thus be seen that Adam Smith is closely allied with Hume in his analysis of moral actions. He agrees with him also in holding that anything approved by the mind is useful and agreeable, but the mere utility is not the principal cause of moral approbation.

Ingenuous as is the theory of Adam Smith, it is too artificial and intricate to be the true account of our moral nature. Virtue, which has no other foundation than the sympathy or approbation of men, must be felt to rest upon a most arbitrary and precarious basis.

Before passing to the Scottish school, the name of *Henry Home* (Lord Kames) (1696-1782) deserves mention in this

connection. He was an intimate friend of David Hume, although he opposed many of his views.

In 1751 he published a work on the *Principles of Morality and Natural Religion* which roused considerable interest. His view is that man is influenced by a great variety of principles,—self-love, benevolence, sympathy, utility, amongst others. But, at the same time, he possesses a separate principle,—a moral feeling or conscience, which at once judges his motives and directs his conduct to a beautiful end—the supreme happiness of his nature. He also expounded a doctrine of necessity, according to which he held that while our actions may be said to be determined by the will, the will is really determined by desire, and desire is always conditioned by the agreeable or disagreeable. Hence man's conduct is really dependent upon a chain of causes and effects, which is as irresistible and necessary as the laws of nature.

In consequence of these views, which seemed to many to undermine man's responsibility, Lord Kames was regarded as a Sceptic, and put in the same class as David Hume.

4. *Scottish Philosophy.* The English moralists lead naturally to the Scottish school, many of whom were much interested in ethical questions. While the name is applied chiefly to the group of thinkers who protested against the sceptical conclusions of David Hume, Scottish philosophy has a wider range and embraces many names which are famous in the annals of European culture.

Though Hutcheson is generally regarded as the founder of the Scottish school, he and his successors were under deep obligations to Shaftesbury, in whose *Characteristics* we first find the phrase "Common Sense," which is the watchword of the movement. "Some moral and philosophical truths," says Shaftesbury, "are withal so evident in themselves that it would be easier to imagine half mankind to have run mad, and joined precisely in one and the same species of folly, than to admit anything as truth

which should be advanced against such natural knowledge, fundamental reason, and common sense."

Hutcheson, as we know, elaborated the views of Shaftesbury. He made a thorough classification of the various mental and moral faculties of man, and among others he discovered what he calls a "public sense," *i.e.* a determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery. This faculty, which is to be found in some degree in all men, he styles *Sensus Communis*, which is really another name for the moral sense. This sense became the distinguishing feature of the Scottish school, and was adopted by Reid, Stewart, and others as the test, not of moral truths alone, but also of metaphysical. By "common sense" they meant simply the common feeling or consensus of mankind, which is constituted by certain fundamental judgments intuitively recognised by the mind as true.

The most representative, as, indeed, the most able, writer of the school of Common Sense is *Thomas Reid* (1710-1796). He was Professor first at Aberdeen and afterwards at Glasgow. Though he did not neglect moral subjects, his attention was chiefly directed to psychological questions. He was a man of truly philosophical spirit, with much Scotch shrewdness and caution—the embodiment of that "common sense" which he so often commends. His principal works are: *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, published in 1785, and *Essays on the Active Powers*, 1788.

Alarmed by the consequences which had been drawn by Hume from Locke's Empiricism, he was induced to study anew the origin of our perceptive faculties with the object of proving that the mind is cognisant of a real objective world. There are, therefore, two points around which his philosophy revolves;—the one is the criterion of the correct theory of sense-perception, and the other is the doctrine of a common sense, a criterion of truth.

The theory that we do not perceive objects immediately,



but only through ideas, Reid holds to be a fiction, and the source of much mischievous error. He denies that we perceive by means of intermediate or representative ideas, or obtain knowledge of the external world by means of any reasoning whatever.

His own theory is that of immediate perception. We do not start with ideas, but with judgments. As soon as we have a sensation we have at the same time the knowledge of it as objective and the knowledge of it as our own. He holds, indeed, that there is first a sensation, and that the sensation "suggests" a perception. The word "suggestion" is an important one in Reid's philosophy. It was borrowed from Berkeley; but is implied by Reid to denote those "natural suggestions" or "judgments" of nature which are implied in the existence of all phenomena,—relations, in other words, which are necessary to the very constitution of experience.

These suggestions or judgments are the first great principles of the knowledge of self and the reality of the natural world. "If we attend," says Reid in a suggestive passage, "to that act of our mind, which we call the perception of an external object, we shall find in it these three things: First, some conception or notion of the object perceived; secondly, a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence; thirdly, that this conviction and belief are immediate and not the result of reasoning" (*Works*, p. 258).

Connected with this theory of perception is his doctrine of natural language or signs. "Our sensations are signs of external objects." There are, he holds, natural signs which suggest or conjure up a thing and create a belief that it exists. These suggestions are not images, he tells us,—only signs which irresistibly suggest the reality of objects. But, it may be asked, does not Reid in thus bringing in "signs" give away his whole theory of immediate perception? There is, after all, little difference between his theory of signs and that of "representative ideas" which

he combats. He, too, virtually admits the necessity of some kind of medium.

Without pursuing further his theory of external perception, let us ask what is his criterion of knowledge or ultimate appeal—for this is really the distinctive feature of the school. "Common sense" is the acknowledged criterion. The phrase is ambiguous. It may mean "good sense," or wisdom, a gift by no means common. It may also mean a power or principle implanted in all minds by which we can judge and decide upon the truth or falsity of any proposition that is presented to us. As employed by Reid, both meanings are tacitly implied, though in general he means by it a certain principle in our constitution, which all men are obliged to admit and act upon. But while nothing sounds so plausible as an appeal to common sense, there is nothing so illusive or uncertain. My common sense may not be yours, and your answer to me may quite legitimately be, "I do not perceive it so"; and, in any case, to solve a problem by an appeal to common sense is virtually to acknowledge that the problem is insolvable.

In general, Reid falls back upon the existence in the human mind of certain necessary truths which belong to our very constitution, and which every sound mind must agree to. "By what principles of logic we make these inferences it is impossible to show." They do not fall within the province of reasoning, but of common sense. "They are judgments of nature immediately inspired by our constitution." They cannot be proved. They are the basis of all proof. He divides the principles of common sense into two classes,—those relating to "contingent truths" and those relating to "necessary truths." Among the first, he places the existence of everything of which I am conscious—self-identity; that things are what we perceive them to be; the freedom of the will; the life and intelligence of our fellowman; and the uniformity of nature. Among the second, he places all mathematical truths and logical axioms; all principles of moral and metaphysical

truths, as, for example, what begins to exist must have a cause, and that design may be inferred in the cause from marks in the effect. The main point on which Reid insists is that every perception is, or involves a judgment. This judgment is the unit of knowledge, and carries with it at once a belief in the perceiving subject as well as the object perceived.

Of the disciples of Reid it will not be necessary to speak in detail. Jas. Oswald (d. 1793) applied common sense to a consideration of religion. Jas. Beattie (1735-1803) wrote on the *Nature and Immutability of Truth*. Adam Ferguson (1724-1816) and Thomas Brown (1778-1820) sought to bring the teaching of Hume and Reid into closer union.

The chief representative of the school after Reid was *Dugald Stewart* (1753-1828), Professor in Edinburgh, whose chief work is *The Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*.

Stewart follows his master in his attempt to classify the intellectual powers of man, but his list is somewhat defective and redundant. While he makes self-consciousness a separate attribute, he does not give to reason a distinct place. He speaks of "the fundamental laws of belief" rather than of the somewhat ambiguous principle of "common sense."

He is specially happy in treating of Memory and the Association of Ideas, though in dealing with "Causation" he seems to yield too much to the theory of Hume.

Though usually a fair critic of the writings of others, he does less than justice to Kant, whom he evidently knew only at second hand. But his reflections on Kant are not more misleading than are Kant's own observations on the school of Common Sense, which he caricatured in the preface to *The Critique*.

Whatever may be said of the shortcomings of the philosophy of Reid and Stewart, it must be admitted that it is a plea for necessary truth, and that it formed a timely and necessary check to the growing tide of scepticism which

had begun to appear in this country and on the Continent towards the middle of the eighteenth century. The great work which the Scottish school achieved consists in its careful investigation of the faculties of the mind, and particularly of man's primary convictions.

In one sense, what Kant did, they too sought to do—to subject the mind to a critical analysis in order to discover its necessary and universal truths. That this analysis was not complete or thorough they themselves would be the first to admit. While their merit is, as against the scepticism of Hume, to have shown that there are intuitive or ultimate principles of the mind, their weakness is that they do not tell us what are the tests by which the presence of these truths may be detected. Too often these necessary truths are arbitrarily chosen, nor is any attempt made to bring the isolated intuitions to a rational unity. The opposition between subject and object is not solved, by the mere assertion that common sense assures us of the existence of both.

The position of the object as given along with the subject, which is the standpoint of the Scottish school, too often degenerates into a crude dualism of mind and matter as two heterogeneous substances.

The last thinker of this school is Sir Wm. Hamilton, who was one of the strongest philosophical minds which Britain has produced. Uniting the positions of Kant and Reid, his philosophy may be generally characterized as a vindication of the relativity of all knowledge, and therefore of the impossibility of attaining to a coherent view of the world.

*Sir Wm. Hamilton* was born at Glasgow in 1788. He studied in Scotland and Oxford, arts and medicine and law, and was admitted to the Scottish bar. In 1821 he was appointed Professor of Civil History in Edinburgh, and in 1837 was called to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics, which he held till his death in 1856. Besides his works on Philosophy, Literature, and Education, he wrote lectures



on Logic and Metaphysics, which were published after his death.

The primary problem of philosophy, according to Hamilton, is the investigation of the conditions of knowledge, hence mind is the first and chief object of consideration. Without dwelling upon his important contribution to Logic—*The Quantification of the Predicate*—we may note that in the department of psychology Hamilton divides the phenomena of the mind into cognitions, feelings and conative phenomena—which include volitions and desires.

The standpoint of Hamilton is what may be called *Relativism*. That is to say, he believes all that we perceive is the phenomenon, and that our knowledge of matter as well as of mind is confined to phenomenal states. Of existence absolutely and in itself we know nothing. Hamilton therefore is the advocate of natural realism. Since we know only the relations of things, and since relativity in this sense is a quality of all human knowledge, it follows that we cannot know the unconditioned. "To know is to condition." Conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. But though the unconditioned is unknowable by reason, Hamilton strangely affirms that it is not a contradiction in itself. Revelation, he holds, supplements the knowledge which our faculties are too weak to wholly apprehend.

With regard to the *self* and the *not-self*, while maintaining that the doctrine of relativity applies to the pure objects of thought, *i.e.* that they are unknowable in themselves, he allows that our mental experience reveals itself as a unity amid change, and that our experience of the external world warrants us in representing it as a permanent reality.

The doctrine of relativity, of which Hamilton is the most noted champion, became later the basis of modern agnosticism as represented by Huxley and Tyndal. Dean Mansel, in his famous Bampton lectures on the *Limits of*

*Religious Thought* in 1858, as well as in his *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, applied this theory in the defence of religion. He seeks to refute rationalism by showing that as the only knowledge of the unconditioned which the human mind can acquire is negative, in matters of religion our reason is inadequate and must be supplemented by faith.

The last name we may mention here is that of *James Ferrier* (1808-1864), author of the *Institutes of Metaphysics*, who, though a Scotsman, was opposed to the doctrines of the Scottish philosophy. He had learned much from the German idealists, and was one of the earliest students of Hegel in this country, and thus prepared the way for a more adequate view of human consciousness.

## *SECT. 2. FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT*

### CHAPTER I

#### EARLIER RATIONALISM

THE philosophy of Locke disclosed a dualism which parted his followers into two streams. While his English successors carried out his sensationalism to its logical results in the sceptical severance of thought and being, his French disciples seized the other side of his philosophy—the theory of the mechanical action of matter on mind—and developed it into a bare materialism. Though the French enlightenment was directly due to English influences, it found in the land of its adoption a congenial soil, and it bore there its richest fruits. The condition of France at this time was eminently favourable to the spirit of Rationalism, which Voltaire learned from his English teachers, and the political and social corruptions which characterized the reign of Louis XIV. made scepticism only too easy and almost justifiable.

The Monarchy had degenerated into a relentless despotism, the Church was honeycombed with unbelief and immorality, and Society was tainted to its core with every vice. It was not surprising, therefore, that philosophy should direct its polemics against all time-honoured institutions and attempt the overthrow of every tradition and belief which reason could not justify. In this sense the

philosophy of the eighteenth century has been styled the philosophy of the illumination or enlightenment. The word might be more accurately translated—Emancipation. It was a claim for liberty of thought and freedom from all ecclesiastical and social restraint. The movement, as we have seen, was general on the Continent at this time. While in England and Germany it was largely a matter of scholastic discussion, in France it took an intenser form, and became a fierce battle between the allied forces of Church and State and the champions of liberty. Against the abuses of a corrupt clergy and the intolerance of Jesuitical priestcraft, Voltaire and the Encyclopedists,—as the brilliant circle of free-thinkers were called,—raised their voices of bitter protest, employing scientific knowledge, scathing wit, and scoffing ribaldry to discredit and undermine the position of their enemies. The leaders of this movement were: Montesquieu, Condillac, Helvetius, Voltaire, Diderot, La Mettrie, D'Alembert, Turgot, Holbach, and others—writers whose merit it was, with all their faults, to give utterance to their countrymen's hatred of the baseness and hypocrisy of the privileged classes, and to awaken the people to a sense of their rights as men.

Thus while in England the deistic controversy was mainly academic, in France it became a popular movement, and while at the outset it was a protest against narrowness and superstition, it gradually became more and more negative until in the hands of the Encyclopedists, it passed from deism to atheism, and from empiricism to materialism and coarse naturalism.

Though Voltaire brought the results of English deism to France, and is regarded as the apostle of reason of the new era, the seeds of this spirit of rationalism were sown in the previous century, and Voltaire had his predecessors.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are sometimes contrasted to the disadvantage of the former. But it is a great mistake to fancy that the seventeenth century was devoid of all taste for speculative inquiry. In some



respects that age was more a philosophic period than the succeeding one. The difference of the two centuries in France is, that while the eighteenth was destructive and negative, the seventeenth was constructive and positive. Already the conflict between tradition and freedom had begun, but the spirits which contended for liberty had not broken with authority. Pascal, the Prometheus of modern Catholicism, stands quite alone in the magnificence of his despair, the suspect of the Church, the emancipator of his age. But it is to *Bossuet* (1627-1704) we must look as the representative of his times. In him is summed up the spirit of the seventeenth century. He was one of the greatest masters of style as well as one of the clearest intellects that has ever lived, and if we would know what the eighteenth century superseded, we must go to him.

"If," says Sir James Stephen, "it were the order of nature that God should be represented upon earth by infallible priests and irresponsible beings, it would be impossible to imagine a nobler system of education for a great king than that which Bossuet conceived, or a teacher better suited to carry it out than Bossuet himself."

The education of the ill-fated Dauphin presented him with the occasion of the expression of his theory of human life. His three great works: *Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-meme*; the *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*; and the *Politique Tirée de l'Ecriture Sainte*, represent the three great divisions of his teaching, and these works remain among the finest examples of the constructive power of human genius, as they are among the most important landmarks of human thought. But the point to be noticed is that, with all his faith, Bossuet was essentially a Rationalist. He accepted the facts of Revelation as the ultimate results of a process of reasoning which started from the grounds of all truth. Voltaire himself is not more determined in his expression of the principle of Rationalism than Bossuet is. "The understanding is the

light which God has given us for our guidance." It has different names,—Spirit, Judgment, Conscience,—but its work is to save and deliver man from sin and error and guide him to truth. "Reason, when not seduced by passions, is infallible." "In spite of his mysticism," says Renan, "Bossuet was a Rationalist."

But Bossuet was a positive teacher, and withal a firm believer in the Christian faith, and his work of enlightenment and emancipation was unconsciously wrought and imperceptibly effected.

Already, when the glory of Louis the Great was at its height, and when Bossuet was in the zenith of his fame, there appeared a man who represented in his life and work more completely than any of his contemporaries the coming spirit of negation, which was to sap the foundations of the spiritual edifice. This man was *Fontenelle*, who was born in Rouen in 1657, and who as a centenarian lived well into the eighteenth century. He represents the transition from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, yet in spirit and sentiment he belongs to the latter rather than to the former. He stands for the emancipation of the individual judgment from the control of authority, and may be regarded as the prophet of French Rationalism.

He was not a thinker in the strict sense of the word. He had no great passion for truth—a mild curiosity with a love of ease characterized his life. He was a bit of a poet, a witty essayist, and a dabbler in science,—a man of letters, a clever dilettante, a type of writer, of which France has produced an abundance, skilled in portraying the spirit of the age. He had, however, one enthusiasm—a love of science, and he foresaw the part it was to play in the future.

He was a friend of Bayle and Voltaire and many other of the leading spirits of the times. His writings secretly undermined the positive truths of Christianity, not so much by his direct opposition as by his insinuation and spirit of scepticism. He became the suspect of the clergy,

and was charged with impiety. He had much of the character of Voltaire himself. If Bayle provided in his *Dictionnaire* the philosophic arguments against the Church, it was Fontenelle and the kindred spirits, who used to meet in a little house in the Faubourg St. Jacques, that sowed broadcast the seeds of unbelief and licence, which too quickly brought forth fruit.

That little room has been called the cradle of eighteenth century Rationalism in France.

Along with Fontenelle there remains to be mentioned *Pierre Bayle*, who, born in 1647, was one of the earliest forces of Rationalism, and whose *Dictionnaire* was the arsenal from which many of the philosophical arguments were drawn for use against Christianity. Though son of a Calvinist pastor, like so many of his co-workers, he was trained in a Jesuit college, and by and by renounced his father's creed and adopted Catholicism. His advanced views, however, brought him under suspicion, and he again reverted to the Protestant side. He was called to a Chair of Philosophy in Sedan, and busied himself with philosophical and scientific subjects. A litterateur, like Fontenelle, rather than a systematic thinker, his scepticism was directed not so much against the doctrines of Christianity as against the bigotry of the clergy and the suppression of freedom. He held that moral character can flourish independently of religious belief. His *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* ran to sixteen volumes, and its views were widely diffused through France and Holland.

Before referring to the more distinctively religious and practical aspects of the *Illuminism*, there are one or two thinkers who must be mentioned, whose writings, if less popular and more theoretical and philosophical, were not less influential.

The first of these was *Montesquieu*, who was born at Bordeaux in 1689. His earliest literary success was his *Lettres Persanes*, in which he gives a satirical description

of contemporary life, inveighing against the profligacy of the reign of Louis XIV.

After spending several years in England, where he studied the political writings of Locke and the working of the English Parliament, he returned to France and set himself to embody his views in the great works of history and law which have made his name famous. The first result of these studies was his *Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur et de la Décadence des Romains* (1734). In that work, which traces the growth of Rome from its earliest beginnings till the fall of Constantinople (in which he was indebted to Machiavelli and Bodin), we have the earliest application of the modern idea of historical development. But his great work, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, completed after twenty years of labour in 1748, vindicated its claim to be the most original treatise in the philosophy of law. By the spirit of laws, Montesquieu understands their inner essence or reason,—the causes and conditions in the character of the people, and the climate and soil of the country, which determine their form and expression. Laws which are good for one nation are unsuitable for another. In opposition to Spinoza and Hobbes, he controverts the opinion that laws do not arise until after the State has been formed. The great fundamental principles of justice and equity, he holds, are prior to the formation of all states, and have their origin in those natural instincts which compel men to unite. He analyses the English constitution and holds it up to the admiration of all Europe. Next to natural conditions nothing is more important for the life of a people than religion, and of all religions Christianity is best suited to develop and crown the work of the State. The influence of the *Esprit des Lois* has been very great upon the legal and political thought of Europe. But though it met with immediate favour in France, it was too late to counteract the spirit of unrest and revolution which had already begun to ferment in the minds of the people.



Maine, in his *Ancient Law*, while praising its general drift, points out what he considers its weakness. "The inference," he says, "constantly suggested is, that the laws are the creatures of climate, local situations, accident or imposture—the fruit of any causes except those which appear to operate with tolerable constancy. Montesquieu seems, in fact, to have looked upon the nature of man as entirely plastic, as passively reproducing the impressions and submitting implicitly to the impulses which it receives from without. He greatly underrates the stability of human nature. He pays little or no regard to the inherited qualities of the race, those qualities which each generation receives from its predecessors and transmits, but slightly altered, to the generation which follows it. . . . The truth is that the stable part of our mental, moral, and physical constitution is the largest part of it" (*Anct. Law*, ch. v.).

While Montesquieu developed the political views of Locke, Condillac and Helvetius carried his doctrine of Empiricism to pure sensationalism.

*Etienne de Condillac* (1715-80), the Abbé of Mureaux, and tutor of the Duke of Parma, was a native of Grenoble. He began as a disciple of Locke, whose writings he had got to know during a sojourn in England.

His chief writings were: *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines* (1746), and his *Traité de Système*, in which he argues against Spinoza, and finds fault with Leibnitz because he does not derive all knowledge from experience. Finally, in his *Traité des Sensations* and *Traité des Animaux*, he discloses his point of divergence from Locke.

While Locke assumed two sources of our knowledge,—Sensation and Reflection,—Condillac contended that these were but two forms of one source, viz.—Sensations. All our mental processes, our volitions as well as our most complex ideas, are reducible to simple sensations. "Locke," says Condillac, "distinguishes two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, but it would be more correct to

recognise only one : first, because reflection is in principle nothing but sensation ; secondly, because it is less a source of ideas than a canal through which they flow from sense."

In order to prove that there is nothing in the soul except the ideas which it receives through impressions from the senses, Condillac imagines a statue, which is wholly devoid of any ideas, and is gradually endowed with one sense after another. He begins with the single sense of smell, and shows how much knowledge of the outward world is gained by that sense alone. Man is on a par with the lower animals to begin with, and is only distinguished from them by the sense of touch and by the power of associating one idea with another. Our ideas of good and evil are wholly derived from our sensation. Every sensation is connected with a blessing or a pain. Hence we seek what is desirable as good, and avoid what is disagreeable as evil.

Condillac does not go the length of denying the existence of God, nor does he assert the materiality of the soul. But if all that exists can only be perceived by the senses, it is but a step, and a step which his more consistent followers were not slow to take, to assert that there can be no being but material being.

The famous dictum of Condillac—*Penser est Sentir*, to think is to feel—has become the keynote of the Sensational school. While the aphorism has often been ridiculed, it was meant by Condillac to emphasize the idea that it is impossible to say where sensation ends and thought begins. The field of thought, it is held, is the nervous system connecting with the brain, and the idea which Condillac and others have sought to express is, that as muscle and nerve are nowhere absolutely separate, so feeling and thought are always interdependent. It will be seen that in these considerations Condillac foreshadows the position of later sensational psychology.

The chief merit of Condillac is his theory of the interdependence of thought and language. He contends that

the development of our mental faculties is due to the use of verbal or written signs. In other words, he maintains that the evolution of thought is coincident with that of speech. It is the gift of language, by which man is able to associate and combine ideas, that distinguishes him from the brute. While the lower animal lives in the momentary sensation, man is able to unite his sensations into complex ideas, and in the form of words or signs, to receive them from the past and hand them on to succeeding generations.

While Condillac confined his philosophy to the theoretic side of knowledge, the principles of sensationalism were carried into the practical sphere of morals by Helvetius. If all our knowledge is derived from external sensation, then all our internal feelings, desires, and volitions must also be determined by our senses.

*Claude Adrian Helvetius* (1715-71), born at Paris, was a man of honourable character and kindly nature. His character was better than his creed, and he scarcely realized all that his teaching involved. On account of his work, *De l'Esprit*, he was subjected to severe persecution at the hands of the French clergy, especially on account of his criticism of the Jesuits. After his death appeared *De l'Homme, de ses Facultés et de son Education* (1771), in which he applies his ideas to education.

Since all our ideas, which are just copies of impressions, come to us from without, the difference among men must depend wholly upon circumstances, which is just another name for chance. The most important factor, therefore, in determining life and character is education, which cannot be begun too early. As the end of life is really self-satisfaction, the purpose of all education ought to be happiness. By happiness Helvetius understands the greatest amount of physical pleasure.

Self-interest or self-love, by means of which men strive after pleasure or seek to avoid pain, is the motive of all our conduct, the rule of all our actions. All intellectual

pursuit as well as all practical effort rests on self-interest, and in every undertaking to promote the good of others, we are really actuated by considerations of our own advantage. To bring self-love and the common good, therefore, into harmony ought to be the object of all education and every form of legislation. It is unreasonable to expect men to do good for the sake of good alone. He who follows his own interests without injuring the interests of others is the good man. Complete suppression of the passions would only lead to brutalization. The passions enrich the soul, but they require to be regulated. It ought to be the task of the State to make it possible for each individual to attain to a moderate independence, and to prevent the few becoming rich at the expense and the toil of the many. Government should restrict work to eight hours a day, and should make provision for the general spread of knowledge. The State must take account of the selfish interests of its members, and, if it is to obtain the advantage of the many, its legislation must be so framed as to appeal to the desires of the individual, and, by a system of rewards and penalties, secure obedience to its laws. In Helvetius' mechanical scheme of the world there is no need for God and no place for Him. As the spring of all our actions is self-love, and the gratification of the senses the highest happiness of man, there can be no talk of virtue or goodness, and political expediency is the only sanction and restraint of the moral life.

It is easy to see that Helvetius is an eclectic, and is indebted to such writers as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Montesquieu for his conclusions.



## CHAPTER II

### MATERIALISTIC TENDENCIES

WHILE these writers were not without their influence, and helped to lay the basis for a materialistic view of life, it was not as materialists that the philosophers of the Illumination, at first at least, appeared. The common character of the period is rather a practical protest against the tyranny and corruption of the age, which were prevalent in Church and State. While the writers we have just mentioned confined their thoughts to the regions of law, psychology, and ethics, the movement which we have now to consider was directed by a group of brilliant litterateurs, who employed their gifts of wit and sarcasm against the established opinions of the times.

The chief representative and spokesman of this tendency was *Voltaire* (1694-1778). He was born in Paris, and sojourned in London from 1726-29. In 1750 he lived at the Court of Frederick the Great. His writing secured for him a fortune, which enabled him to live during the last years of his life in retirement on his estate at Ferney, near Geneva. It is difficult to estimate his life, or even to account for his influence. He was, indeed, a voluminous writer; scientific works, historical novels, poems and pamphlets poured from his pen, yet it was by his personality, rather than his works, that he impressed his age. He stands forth as the embodiment of the eighteenth century. With the single exception of Luther, there is

probably no other individual in modern times whose influence and reputation have been so great and widespread as those of Voltaire. In his own day he was indeed highly honoured, and especially at the close of his career he was worshipped almost as a god, and received a triumph in Paris such as has been accorded to few sovereigns. Yet his name has grown rather than diminished in importance as we recede from him, and now he is regarded by his admirers and detractors alike as the most powerful factor of his age. He was not in the strict sense of the word a philosopher, but he was a man of wide knowledge and subtle mind, a master of expression, and of clear orderly arrangement and rapid generalization. But, as Carlyle says, he was not a great man. He had no great love of truth, except when it paid and was triumphant. He was essentially a mocker, and ridicule was to him the test of truth and the weapon of controversy. The glory of knowing and believing is almost a stranger to him. Though he inveighed against the Jesuits, he was a thorough master of their wiles, and nobody knew better than he how to make the end justify the means. He did not object to falsehood, if it was necessary to extricate him from a tight corner, and while he could praise the loftiest virtues, he did not consider it necessary to practise even the lowliest. Self was the measure of the world, and life had nothing glorious or divine in it. "He reads history not with the eye of a devout son, or even of a critic, but through a pair of mere anti-Catholic spectacles. It is not a mighty drama enacted in the theatre of Infinity, with Laws for lamps and Eternity as a background; whose author is God."

He was a man of large learning, but of shallow attainment. In England he had learned to admire Newton, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Bolingbroke, and he returned to France an enthusiast for Newton's *Principia* and Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*. He understood Newton better than any other man in his country, and he knew how to forge

English Deism into a weapon with which to smite French superstition. Carlyle calls him the "great Persifleur," a man for whom life had but a despicable meaning, and who met its difficulties with gay agility. No man so well understood the sense of self-preservation, and none so habitually employed the arts of derision. His view of the world is cool, calculating, and prosaic. He has no sense of sublimity or reverence. A light, careless, courteous man of the world, he was largely the outcome of his times, and while in a sense he helped to create, he also wholly embodied, the spirit of his age. He was essentially a critic, and the only thing which gives dignity to his figure is his daring advocacy of freedom and his unceasing protest against injustice and bigotry. It is his merit to have given the death-blow to superstition. He is chiefly conspicuous as a vehement opponent of the Christian faith, but his argument took the shallow and profitless form of controverting the "Plenary Inspiration of Scripture." Of the inward essence of Christianity he seems to have but the meagrest intuition. He was, however, no atheist. He held the belief in a God of rewards and punishments to be a needful support of moral order. "If God did not exist it would be necessary to invent one." In this respect he did not go so far as his successors; on the other hand, he was the inveterate hater of all positive religion and the indefatigable opponent of every ecclesiastical form and observance. That this world is under the guidance of a wise God, he doubted. In his novel *Candide*, as in other of his writings, he deals with the difficulty of reconciling the sins of the world with the power and goodness of the Deity. "People are engulfed at Lisbon, while they dance at Paris."

The impulse started by Voltaire was taken up by the *Encyclopedists* and carried by them to greatest extremes. Of this group of writers *Diderot* (1713-84) is the chief representative. The *Philosophical Encyclopedia* was the literary organ of these writers, and was a notable monu-

ment of the spirit of the age, Diderot was its joint-editor with D'Alembert, and it counted among its contributors the most distinguished men of the day. It professed to be a treatise on Science and Theology, Art and Manners, and, indeed, every theme, every question, political and social, every opinion and grievance found expression in its pages. It was the literary focus of French Enlightenment—the chastiser of abuses, the champion of liberties. For twenty years Diderot stood at his post of editor in spite of danger. The book more than once was threatened with prosecution, and after a time D'Alembert forsook him to bear the brunt of attack alone. Diderot was a most prolific writer. He worked in almost every department of literature, as novelist, dramatist, satirist. As a literary critic he was in advance of his contemporaries, and anticipated the Romanticists in advocating a return to nature and in seeking to free the drama from the trammels of the Classical school. If he was inferior to Voltaire and Rousseau as a literary craftsman, he was a more philosophic thinker than either. His writings abound in racy sayings and pregnant thoughts, but are often marred by mannerisms and defects of taste. Unlike Voltaire, there was a strong vein of earnest passion in him. It is not easy, however, to determine his position in philosophy. He has been frequently described as an Atheist. He certainly gives expression to deistic views in his earlier writings, while in his later he seems to favour a pantheistic, or even materialistic, conception of the world. All matter, he holds, is instinct with feeling. In the animal organism sensation comes to consciousness, and in the highest types produces reason.

Diderot's atheism appears openly in his *Interprétation de la Nature* and in his conversations with D'Alembert. Here he reduces all mental activity to physiology. Here, too, he argues against freedom and immortality, and mocks at those who believe in a personal God. Deity is attested by the order of nature, and wherever truth, beauty, and



goodness exist, there also God is. The individual vanishes, but the race remains. The immortality of the soul is nothing but the memory of man cherished in the hearts of his successors.

Diderot was a man of encyclopedic knowledge, yet his outlook on life was of the narrowest. Nothing escaped his eye, but his view of the world was mechanical and essentially atheistical. In his system there was no room for Divinity. The world is simply a vast machine, a musical instrument, which played of itself. Like all the men of his age, he was limited by the seen. The Sanctuary of man's soul remained closed, and "where his hand ceased to grope the world for him ended." In practical matters his views were loose and his morals dissolute. His theory of life was synonymous with pleasure, and self-denial entered not into his scheme of things.

Next to Voltaire he was the greatest Frenchman of his day—a hard worker, a brilliant talker, a keen lover of the good things of life. He, too, was the creature even more than the creator of his age. His role was that of polemic and denial, and his ambition, to be a philosopher. Yet for all he wrote, and in spite of all his agitation and controversy, his books are now hardly ever read, and he stands for little more than a name.

Still more pronounced and thorough-going was the Scepticism of the physician *La Mettrie* (1709-1751), the friend of Diderot. His *Histoire Naturelle de l'Ame* brought about his expulsion from France, as his *L'Homme Machine* did from Holland. He was thereafter summoned to the Court of Frederick the Great, in the capacity, as Voltaire said, of Court Atheist, where he wrote a number of works. In all his writings he teaches the most crass Atheism. Pleasure is the chief end of man, and the world will never be happy till the idea of God is banished from it. What is called the mind is really a part of the body. Man is a machine, enjoyment the only thing worth living for. The titles of his works indicate their character.

Everything spiritual is a delusion. The Soul is only a function of the brain, which grows with the body, and with the body disappears. Immortality is an absurdity. *Après la Mort la farce est jouée.* Let us take pleasure while we can. Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die.

In much the same spirit of negation, though with more of scientific method, were the writers *Maupertuis* (1698-1759), *D'Alembert* (1717-83), *Buffon* (1708-1788), and *Robinet* (1735-1820). *Robinet*, in his work *De la Nature*, asks the question, "Who is God?" and his answer is—"We know not." Over the temple of Being let us inscribe, "To the Unknown God." Our only possible knowledge is the knowledge of nature, in which all things have their origin and being. The Seed is the Life. Good and evil are equally balanced, and their equipoise constitutes the reality of the world.

*Baron Holbach* sums up the movement, and the treatise now attributed to him utters the last word of French materialism. The *Système de la Nature* may be regarded as the representative work of the period. It seeks to establish scientifically the doctrine that nothing exists but matter. It combines the materialism of *La Mettrie*, the sensationalism of *Condillac*, and the self-interest of *Helvetius*, and preaches the gospel of freedom from superstition and oppression. *Holbach* (1728-89), though born in Germany, lived mostly in Paris. His salon was the rendezvous of the leading spirits of the time.

The Universe discloses nothing but a combination of matter and movement, an unbroken chain of causes and effects, of which causes some affect our senses, and some do not, and are, therefore, unknown to us. The essence of things consists for us in innumerable combinations which are constantly altering. The totality of things is *le grand Tous*, which we call nature. In nature is neither purpose nor order—nothing but necessity. Everything is an activity. Nothing continues in one stay. There is an

everlasting appearing and vanishing—a constant attraction and repulsion of elements. These are called by moralists sympathy and antipathy, love and hate, friendship and sincerity. But these two sets are really identical; the difference between the moral and the physical arises only from the different kinds of molecules. Man is not a duality of body and soul. What we call soul is only part of the body, and it is the molecular motions of the brain which produce thought and will.

The belief in God has its origin in a false distinction of mind and matter. Nothing in nature points to the existence of a God. Theology ascribes to him conflicting moral properties, and can only distinguish him by negative attributes. Many are of opinion that religion is necessary in order to restrain and direct the actions of men. It would be as reasonable to argue that you must give a man poison lest he abuse his powers. The idea of immortality is mischievous in so far as it withdraws human interest from the present world. Man, in short, is a tool in the hands of an inexorable necessity. He has neither freedom nor immortality. The superstitions of theologians only engender unrest. Materialism has the virtue of consistency, and accords with nature and life as we know them. It frees man from torturing impatience and delivers him from the fear of God and the reproach of conscience. It teaches him to enjoy personal happiness and to endure his lot with equanimity. Morality, which is founded on self-interest, is to be promoted by mutual forbearance.

The gospel of the *System of Nature* was one which appealed to the spirit of the age, and the work was hailed with approbation. It was a fierce and fanatical polemic against everything spiritual and moral. The notion of God as the source of all falsehood and hypocrisy was to be completely banished, and nature, with her unalterable laws, was to take its place. Truth and religion are sworn enemies,—reason and superstition irreconcilable opposites. “Nature says to man, ‘Thou art free, and no power on

earth can lawfully strip thee of thy right.' Religion cries to him that he is a slave condemned by God to groan under the rod of God's representatives. Let us recognise the plain truth, that it is these supernatural ideas that have obscured morality, corrupted politics, hindered the advance of the sciences, and extinguished happiness and peace in the heart of man " (Morley, *Diderot*).

Realism could reach no further than this, the *System of Nature* was the extreme of materialism, and the works which sought to outbid it are utterly unworthy of consideration. Grimm said of them that they were an exposition of Atheism fit for chambermaids and hairdressers. Men were no longer content to repeat what Diderot uttered on his death-bed—"The first step to philosophy is unbelief." It had come to be for the multitude, philosophy itself. (Erdmann, *Geschichte*, vol. ii.)

French Illuminism ended in scepticism and negation. Freedom became its watchword and reason its weapon: but it was a freedom which meant licence and caprice: a reason of destruction and self-interest. The individual is to be the sole measure of truth and right; Self, the standard of duty. Let us exalt the intellect, and before the advancing light of reason, tyranny and priestcraft, social injustice and oppression, must vanish. Let men study science and submit to that inexorable necessity which prevails everywhere, in the moral not less than the physical world.

At this juncture there came forward a remarkable man, who gave utterance to the thoughts which were seething in many minds, and who, while he opposed, also completed the one-sided and negative rationalism of the Enlightenment.

*Jean Jacques Rousseau*, a Swiss of French descent, was born at Geneva in 1712. He was at once the offspring of the Illumination and the parent of a new movement which ultimately found its expression in the Revolution. At first an adherent of the Encyclopedists and the friend



of Voltaire and Diderot, he soon passed beyond their position and became their bitter opponent. He lived a strange and checkered life, full of vicissitudes and inconsistencies, now in the depths of poverty and now on the crest of fame. Of a keenly sensitive temperament and suspicious nature, after a career of adventure and misfortune, vexed with deepening melancholy and hallucinations verging on madness, he died at Paris in 1778. He has given a frank and faithful account of his life in his *Confessions*, in which he has not attempted to minimize his vices and weaknesses. He was a man of rare genius, yet a mass of inconsistencies. He combined the most exalted ideals with an almost unparalleled weakness of will and instability of moral character. Sentiment and action, feeling and purpose, were strangely fused in him. Yet few men have left the impress of their personality more forcibly on their generation than he has done. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the influence of the genius of Rousseau. "No one," says Mr. Lecky, "plunged more recklessly into paradox, or supported his paradoxes with more consummate skill." The firmness with which he grasped great principles, the wonderful union of passion and clearness of his arguments, above all, the beauty and eloquence of his style, have given to his writings a power unequalled in his age. His revolt against the conventionalities of his day penetrated all classes of French society, revolutionizing social distinctions and overturning time-honoured traditions and customs.

He has been styled the conscience of France—the voice of protest against the crass negations and empty atheism of his time. His merit lies in opposing spiritualism to materialism, in advocating the social instincts of humanity as against a narrow egoism, and in exalting feeling in the place of cold analytic reason as the essence and inner power of man.

His first work was a prize essay on the *Influence of the Arts and Sciences*, in 1750, which was followed in 1753

by another on the *Inequality of Man*. His other writings were the *Contrat Social* (1762); his two novels, *La Nouvelle Héloïse* and *Emile*. One thought runs through all his books—Civilization is the great evil, the parent of all vices. Man, as he comes from the hands of Nature, is good, but society has spoiled him. "Back to Nature" is the cry with which Rousseau startled Europe, and the gospel which he preached was the simplicity and unspoiled innocence of primitive man.

He, not less than the leaders of the Enlightenment, is the champion of individual freedom, but the emancipation which he sought was not to come by the exercise of the intellect in the cultivation of science, but by a return to the original instincts of humanity.

Let us do away with all artificial conventions and all unnatural restrictions. Let us get back to primitive life. Civilization, with its burdens and inequalities, has enslaved man. All knowledge and refinement, all science and culture, have but made man untrue to his vocation and false to his nature. Society, with its creation of property and division of labour and separation of classes, has awakened selfish passions and created every crime. We must undo history. We must begin at the beginning again and let man develop his freedom naturally. "Do away with pernicious progress, with all our errors and vices, do away with all the works of man, and all will go well" (*Emile*, iv.).

In *Emile* Rousseau develops his ideas of education, which are largely borrowed from Locke. Let us isolate the individual, put him under a private tutor, so that, withdrawn from the influence of society, his true nature may unfold. Let the stress be chiefly laid on physical rather than intellectual training. Exercise his bodily functions and preserve in their naturalness and innocence all his primitive instincts. "All our first inclinations are legitimate." Let us guard against all teaching of science, and all the products of intellect in which the apostles of

the Enlightenment place our superiority. The intuitions of feeling afford a light more brilliant and more pure than all the light of reason. Let us, therefore, always listen to the holy voice of Nature, our only guide to truth and happiness.

But, while Rousseau would lead us back to a state of nature, he does not advocate isolation. He sees the necessity of the social life for the development and mutual protection of man. What he really inveighs against is the artificiality of modern society. He would have history begin afresh, and would have men form a new social constitution according to which the individual might enjoy his full freedom, and, at the same time, the advantage and protection of State provisions.

Like Hobbes and Locke, therefore, Rousseau would base society on a contract by which men agree, for the sake of certain advantages, to restrict their individual liberties. The individual is not to exist for the State; on the contrary, the State is to exist for the individual. Man as man can only come to his highest through society. Government is, therefore, to be a democracy; it is to be based on the will of the people, and everywhere the rights of the individual are to be the first consideration. In the sphere of religion also Rousseau sought to oppose the prevailing Atheism of his age and to lead men back to nature, basing his ideas of God, virtue, and immortality upon the religion of the heart. If his politics, says Falchenberg, was the utterance of the Swiss Republican, his theory of religion revealed the Genevan Calvinist. In the confession of faith, put into the mouth of the Savoyard vicar in *Emile*, he exalts Deism as the true religion of feeling. The book, however, pleased neither the Church nor the Rationalist party. It was burned by order of the Government, and repudiated by the Encyclopedists. In Rousseau's religion of the heart we may detect the first germs of that emotional theology which afterwards became dominant, especially in Germany, in the form of Pietism.

We cannot prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, but we have an inner feeling with regard to both which is irresistible. In opposition to those who would deify reason, Rousseau is never weary of proclaiming that the heart is greater than the intellect, and that our own subjective feelings are, in spiritual matters, a surer guide than the reasonings of the mind.

"The more I strive to prove the infinite Being of God the less do I understand it. But I feel that He is. That is enough for me. The less I comprehend the more devoutly do I pray."

In the second part of the *Profession de foi* Rousseau endeavours to vindicate the reasonableness of a Divine Revelation. God requires no other service from man than the devotion of the heart. Reason is incompetent to decide the truth of Revelation. But the majesty and simplicity of Scriptures are its best evidence. That Christ was no mere man, that He was no fanatic or vulgar sectary, the meekness and purity of His life, the wisdom and grace of His words, the majesty of His person, and the elevation of His teaching, bear witness. Socrates lived and died as a philosopher. Jesus as a God. Whence did the writers of the Gospel obtain so noble a character as that of Jesus? From what sources did they derive so peerless a code of ethics? To have created such a life and to have invented such a system of truth would be a greater miracle than the life of Jesus itself. So everywhere the assurance of the heart vanquishes the doubt of the head.

These utterances sound strangely on the lips of the author of the *Confessions*, and his exalted sentiments of religion but ill accord with his life of indulgence and sense. But Rousseau was a living paradox, and in his profession of faith, not less than in the confession of his life, he was a sentimentalist. He is the apostle of subjective feeling. He worshipped self and revelled in the ecstasy of emotion. He lived in a world of inner contemplation, brooding over his own thoughts and finding



supreme satisfaction in lonely self-analysis. He was an egoist not less than Helvetius or Voltaire. It is the last word of individualism—at once the completion and dissolution of Illuminism.

The enlightenment was a necessary moment in the evolution of thought. These men were the champions of individual freedom—the assertors of the liberty of thought. They accomplished a work, says Hegel, though in another form, similar to that of Luther. Rousseau, not less than his contemporaries, asserted the rights of the individual. "For a man to renounce his freedom," he says, "is to renounce the quality of manhood." What he called feeling they called reason; but both claimed for man the same thing—the right of individual thought—the liberty of the subject, a liberty which had yet to be wrought out in the practical sphere by the bloodshed of the revolution, and in the more quiet speculative domain, by the philosophy of Kant.

### SECT. 3. *GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT*

#### CHAPTER I

##### INDIVIDUAL IDEALISM. LEIBNITZ

GERMANY also participated in the spirit of emancipation and rationalism which spread throughout Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century. While the same individualism was there prominent, the movement was at first metaphysical rather than practical as in England and France, though later, under the influence of the literary gifts of Lessing and Herder, the dry intellectualism of Leibnitz and Wolff was transformed into the broader culture of the so-called "Popular Philosophy." Thus, through its connection with a rich national literature which sprang up, German thought of the eighteenth century, while maintaining its speculative character, did not degenerate into scepticism as in England, nor become dissipated by political controversy as in France. It is not without significance that while Realism should flourish in Britain, the land of practical movements, Idealism should find a congenial soil in Germany, the high place of intellectual effort. The Frenchman, it has been remarked, tends chiefly to acuteness; the Englishman to clearness; the German to profundity. France is the land of mathematical, England of practical, Germany of speculative

thinkers. The first is the home of Scepticism, the second of Realism, the third of Idealism.

Leibnitz may be regarded as the originator of German Enlightenment, as, indeed, he was the father of modern philosophy in Germany. He stands at the head of a fresh development of thought. While he gathers up the past, he prepares the way for the higher synthesis of the mind and the external world, which was attempted by Kant. In Leibnitz two great lines of speculation meet—that which goes out from Descartes and Spinoza, and that which proceeds from Bacon and Locke,—Pantheism and Individualism, Idealism and Sensationalism. His philosophy, while retaining something of each, is an attempt to reconcile both. As Idealist he stands on the side of Descartes against Locke; as Individualist he agrees rather with Locke than Spinoza. The extreme individualism to which he was at first inclined was corrected by his study of Spinoza, while the universalism of Spinoza was again modified by his examination of Locke's philosophy.

We have seen that the Empiricism of Locke was vitiated by a dualism which, on the one hand, led his English followers into sensationalism, and, on the other, drove his French disciples into sheer materialism. Leibnitz recognised the necessity of combining the two sides which Locke had left unreconciled—thought and matter, the thinking subject and the external world. He saw that to account for knowledge the individual mind must be capable of going beyond itself and coming into communion with the universe of which it forms a part. Possessed of the ideas at once of the individuality and universality of existence, he sought to unite the two by declaring that the individual substances or monads, as he calls the primal elements of the world, while really distinct, yet ideally imply each other and include the whole universe in themselves. It is only when we remember the two opposite influences to which Leibnitz was subject that we are enabled to understand the peculiar character of his philo-

sophy. It is a system of mediation, an effort to reconcile the individual mind with the external world, to combine the principles of Cartesianism with those of Locke.

Leibnitz has been called an eclectic. As he himself said, he desired "to reconcile Plato with Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes, the Scholastics with the moderns, theology and morals with the dictates of reason." But his philosophy is no mere patchwork of previous systems. His aim is rather to discover a new principle which will be deep and comprehensive enough to explain all the facts of consciousness and to embrace in a higher unity the best thoughts of his predecessors.

*Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz* (1646-1716) was born at Leipzig, where his father was Professor of Moral Philosophy. He studied there and at Jena, and received his doctor's degree at the age of twenty. He was destined for the legal profession, and entered on the diplomatic service of the Elector of Mayence. In this capacity he travelled as member of an embassy to Paris and London. He paid a visit to Spinoza at the Hague, and afterwards became court-librarian at Hanover, which became his headquarters, though his manifold activities led him to make frequent excursions to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and even into Italy. He lived on terms of intimate friendship with the Prussian Queen, Sophie Charlotte, a princess of great culture, and at her instigation he wrote his *Theodicée*. He instituted the Academy of Science of Berlin, and became its first president, while the similar academies of Vienna and St. Petersburg were also due to his influence. The Pope offered him the headship of the Vatican library, a position which, however, he declined, as its acceptance would have required him to become a Roman Catholic.

Leibnitz was not only one of the most learned men of his day, or indeed of any time, but he was also one of the most many-sided and energetic of men. He was not merely a great philosopher, but was equally at home in mathematics, law, and theology. He ranks as one of the



greatest mathematical geniuses of the world, sharing with Newton the honour of inventing the Differential Calculus. He was not simply a thinker, like Spinoza, but a courtier and man of affairs, who took a leading part in the political life of the times. He was the friend and correspondent of many of the distinguished men of his day, and his name is connected with most of the important events and controversies of the age.

The mediating tendency of his philosophy is reflected in the spirit of conciliation which he evinced in practical life. He took a prominent part in the endeavour to reconcile the Protestant and Catholic churches, and he was also one of the leading spirits in attempting to effect a union between the Lutheran and Reformed Confession. Of untiring energy, he carried his projects into every sphere of thought and activity, and has enriched almost every department of learning with his original contributions. In the union of productive genius and universal knowledge Aristotle alone can be compared with him.

From the multiplicity of his engagements he was prevented from setting forth his philosophical views in any systematic way, and they are to be gathered chiefly from his voluminous correspondence and his isolated essays. His principal works are : *Essais de Theodicée*, published in 1710; his *Monadologie*, 1714; and his *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain*, which, though written in 1704, was not published till fifty years after his death, in 1765. His works have been collected in six volumes and edited by Erdmann.

There are two ideas with which the name of Leibnitz is inseparably associated, which are, indeed, the foci of his entire system. These are his doctrine of monads and his theory of pre-established harmony. While the latter has been discarded as an artificial evasion rather than a real solution of the difficulty it dealt with, the former, though fanciful and often contradictory, has been a fruitful factor in modern scientific progress. Only subordinate to these

two ideas is his theory of cognition, which, in its attempted reconciliation of the innate ideas of Descartes with the impressions of Locke, foreshadowed the doctrine of Kant.

1. *Monadology*. The starting-point with Leibnitz is the question how are we to regard the manifold world as it is presented to us? What is the ultimate essence of things? Two answers suggested themselves from the past history of philosophy—the answer of Democritus and Hobbes and that of Descartes and Spinoza—individual atoms and one universal substance. But neither of these answers was satisfactory to him. While he agrees with Spinoza that a correct idea of substance is the key to philosophy, he agrees also with the atomists in their desire to reduce being to its most simple elements. But while the substance of Spinoza yields only an abstract idea of unity in which all individuality and reality are lost, the small bodies of the atomists being material must be, in thought at least, infinitely divisible, and, therefore, can never afford the ultimate essence of things. *Il faut réunir Democrite et Spinoza*. Two ideas must be preserved; indivisibility and reality. A mere unit or mathematical point is not sufficient, for while that indeed is indivisible, it has no reality. Nor is the idea of extension satisfactory, for while it has reality, it is infinitely divisible. That which alone can fulfil these conditions, according to Leibnitz, is “force,” which is immaterial, yet real; indivisible, yet active; without parts, yet all-inclusive; intangible and unseen, yet the ground and essence of everything. These primal essences, or forces, which he calls “monads,” constitute the whole of reality; they are the fundamental elements of the entire material and spiritual world. They are distinguished, on the one hand, from the substance of Spinoza in that they are individual, and, therefore, infinite in number; and, on the other hand, they are contrasted with mere atoms in that they are not dead, inert particles, but instinct with vitality and movement. They are not

mere repetitions of one another, but are infinitely diverse in quality and action.

These active substances have two peculiarities; they are at once exclusive and inclusive. As simple units they exclude all influence from without. As Leibnitz says, "they have no windows through which anything might come into them or go out of them." They can neither be produced nor destroyed except by God. They are self-contained and absolutely self-determined. Each is a little world developing under its own laws as if there was nothing in existence but God and itself. But in another sense they are all-inclusive. While each monad is self-contained and self-determined, it has the power of reflecting or representing all the other monads. Each reflects the whole universe, and is, indeed, a little microcosm in itself, so that if we could understand it fully we should understand the whole universe. Thus the many are in the one, and every individual carries in its bosom all the past and the future of the world. The monad is a mirror which reflects the whole universe. But it is a living mirror (*miroir vivant*), by which Leibnitz means that the world is brought forth from a germ within by its own inner activity. Leibnitz expresses this feature of the monads by the word "perception," indicating that each monad has a perception of the world peculiar to itself and more or less distinct. By the use of this word we are not, however, to understand a conscious activity of the soul. He distinguishes between "perception and apperception"; apperception being the higher conscious knowledge belonging to thinking beings, perception being the lower subconscious feeling or state possessed by those monads which have not reached the stage of consciousness. Thus there are infinite degrees of perception. While in one sense Leibnitz vitalizes matter, on the other hand he enlarges the idea of mind. Mere lifeless matter does not exist. Down to the lowest stages of being there is everywhere not merely activity, but life and implicit thought. Below the threshold of clear con-

sciousness there are throughout the world dim confused states which he calls "petites perceptions." He illustrates the existence of these lesser perceptions by the noise of the waves which we hear when near the shore. The general roar of the sea is made up of a number of separate smaller sounds, which of themselves would be too slight to affect our hearing. Yet each must make some impression, though unperceived, upon us. Each must add something to the general sound. Each, in other words, is perceived though not apperceived.

Each monad reflects the whole, but each in its own degree and after its own fashion. Some are clearer, some more confused. The clearer the perception of a monad the more active it is. It is the property of God alone to have perfectly clear perceptions. He alone is pure activity. All others, from man downwards in varying degree, are partly active and partly passive. That which constitutes the passivity of a monad is what may be called the material element in it. Leibnitz distinguishes between two kinds of matter; *materia prima*, which is a kind of abstract quality everywhere diffused, and which is wholly passive; and *materia secunda*, which is actual or concrete, and endowed with activity. It is the presence of the passive matter in a monad which acts as an impediment to its clearness of perception. In other words, the more the spiritual vital element predominates over the inert material element the less confused is the perception and the nearer does the individual approach to conscious active life.

The whole world is filled and penetrated with these perceptive immaterial substances. But while each is independent and self-contained, there is no break or gap in the universe. By what Leibnitz calls the "law of continuity," the one shades into the other. From matter up to mind the world is one. There is a continuous series from the lowest to the highest. Nowhere in nature or life is there interruption or repetition. There are no abrupt contrasts or violent contradictions. Rest and motion, action and



reaction, good and evil, plant, animal, human being,—all pass by imperceptible gradations into one another. There is no overlapping or superfluity. There are no two things alike in the universe. Every single leaf or blade of grass is distinct. Everything has its separate place and purpose in the world.

At the same time, Leibnitz indicates three outstanding stages of development. The monads of the lowest rank, minerals and plants, just perceive and no more. They are like beings in a slumber or swoon, whose perceptions have not attained to consciousness. Higher are the monads of the animal world, which possess feeling and memory, but have not attained to reason. These he calls souls. They live, as it were, in a world of confused dreams. Higher still are human beings, endowed with reason and self-consciousness. These he names spirits. God may be regarded as the highest of all, and is distinguished from others in that while their perceptions are more or less confused His are perfectly clear. Thus from the lowest to the highest we have a series of reflections of the whole world, each individual reflecting and being reflected in turn.

One other feature of the monads remains to be mentioned. As each is more or less active force, it is endowed with the property of *effort* or *striving* to rise to a higher stage of perception. The law which governs this *appetition* to pass from one state to another is the law of final causes, the law according to which everything in the world seeks to fulfil its highest being. As the will in human beings is always directed towards the good, so the *appetition* of the lower monad is always an effort towards a more perfect state. Everything in the universe is consciously or unconsciously striving to fulfil its highest end and ever seeking to realize the best that is possible for it.

We live in a thought-world which is instinct with soul and permeated throughout with life. "There is," says Leibnitz, "a world of creation, of living things, animals,

entelechies, souls, in the minutest particles of matter. Every part of matter may be considered as a garden full of plants, or a tank full of fishes. But every branch of the plant, every member of the animal, every drop of its juices, is again a similar garden and a similar tank. There is nothing uncultivated, nothing unfruitful, nothing dead in the universe; no chaos, no disorder. Every living body has a central monad or ruling entelechy, but the members of the living body are full of living things, each of which again has its own soul."

2. *Pre-established Harmony*. But, now, it may be asked, if the monads which make up the whole universe are little worlds apart, neither influenced by, nor exerting influence upon others, how are they related? How are we to account for the harmony and order which exist? The answer of Leibnitz is by pre-established harmony. The monads have been so constituted from the beginning that the life of each runs parallel with the life of all the other monads. While each exists apart and develops wholly according to the laws of his own being, they all act in such strict agreement as to be apparently dependent on one another. They are, indeed, absolutely isolated and independent, yet by means of their separate obedience to a higher common law in the mind of God they act in unison and fulfil the order of the universe. "This combination of independence and harmony may be compared," says Leibnitz, "to different choirs of musicians playing their parts separately, and so situated that they do not see or even hear one another. Nevertheless they keep perfectly together, by each following their own notes, in such a way that one who hears them all finds in them a harmony that is wonderful and much more perfect than if there had been any connection between them."

According to Leibnitz the mutual relation of *mind and matter*, or soul and body, is satisfactorily explained by this theory. The soul obeys its own laws, and so does the body, and yet without the one acting on the other they

agree in virtue of the harmony which has been established between all substances. The correspondence between the two is so unfailingly exact that every thought or act of will is attended by a modification of material substance answering to it, as if the relation were actually that of cause and effect. There are three alternative explanations of this agreement which Leibnitz illustrates by his well-known figure of the two clocks which keep the same time. The same mechanism might regulate the motion of both. Or some one might from time to time readjust their works so as to bring them into agreement. Or, lastly, both clocks might be so perfectly constructed as to make divergence impossible. The first is inadmissible, since it is inconceivable that mind should act on matter or matter on mind. The second explanation corresponds to the occasional causes of Malebranche and Geulinx, and presupposes continuous divine intervention. The third hypothesis, Leibnitz thinks, is alone worthy of the deity—the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. It will thus be seen that Leibnitz simply substitutes an all-embracing miracle in place of a continuous miracle, and thus resorts, like so many of his predecessors, to a *Deus ex machina*.

If the question be asked, what is the relation of God to the monads? the answer is that He is the supreme perfect monad, the ground or reason of all, from whom all proceed, as radiations or emanations, and in whom all things are united. God, in a word, is the harmony of the world. *Dieu seul fait la liaison et communication des substans.*

But when Leibnitz endeavours to explain how the soul becomes conscious of God he is not quite consistent with himself. If each monad is confined to itself we can only know our relations with others through the knowledge of God. Yet how can a being who is simply an individual substance obtain a knowledge of the world or of God unless he transcend the limits of his own individuality? Hence we find that Leibnitz, when speaking of the relation of

spirits to God and to each other, departs from the idea of mere harmony and brings in the idea of communion. Spirits differ from ordinary souls in that, while souls are simply images of the universe, spirits are also conscious images of the deity, and are, therefore, capable of knowing and imitating Him, and through him of knowing the whole world. It is this higher knowledge "which enables spirits to enter into a kind of fellowship with God and brings it about that, in relation to them, He is not only what an inventor is to his machine, but also what a prince is to his subjects, or indeed, what a father is to his children. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality of all spirits must compose the city of God, that is to say, the most perfect state possible under the most perfect of all monarchs" (*Monad.* par. 83). In other words, in dealing with the nature of God and His relation to men, the idea of the self-contained monad is lost and God alone becomes, as with Spinoza, the one supreme substance, of which the individual spirits are but modes or expressions. The truth is, Leibnitz' idea of monads and his theory of harmony hang badly together. If he had been faithful to his notion of perception with which he endows the individual, there would have been no need for his hypothesis of a superimposed agreement among the souls of the world. But if, on the other hand, he had consistently followed up all that is implied in the idea of each soul being a representation of the whole world and of God, he would have been carried far beyond his doctrine of monads and would have had to find refuge either in pure Spinozism or in some such theory as Fichte later propounded.

3. *Theory of Knowledge.* Closely connected with Leibnitz' doctrine of monads is his theory of knowledge, which he develops in his *Nouveaux Essais*. This work, which was not published till fifty years after his death, contains a thorough examination of Locke's empiricism, and opposes that writer's contention that all our knowledge comes from



without and that the mind is merely a passive recipient of impressions.

"The question between us," says Leibnitz, "is whether the soul in itself is entirely empty like tablets on which nothing has been written, according to Aristotle and the writer of this essay; and whether all that is traced there comes wholly from the senses and experience, or whether the soul originally contains the principles of several notions and doctrines which the external objects only awaken on occasion, as I believe with Plato." From this passage it will be seen that Leibnitz attributes to the mind innate ideas, but, at the same time, he seeks to rectify the imperfect statement of it as it appears in the writings of Descartes. Here, as so often elsewhere, Leibnitz exhibits his spirit of mediation, and endeavours to reconcile the positions of Locke and Descartes. As against Locke, he maintains that the mind has a groundwork of knowledge, without which cognition would be altogether impossible. This knowledge, it is true, lies only potentially in the mind, and not till sensation awakes it does it attain to consciousness. We come into the world with a faculty for truth which is prior to all experience. Locke's doctrine, therefore, that there is nothing in the intellect but what the senses give, must be supplemented by the clause—"except the intellect itself." On the other hand, Descartes' theory of Innate ideas is also inadequate, for while we have certain ground principles in the mind, they are not at first clear and distinct as he held, but lie there only in a dim unconscious way awaiting experience to call them forth. Leibnitz' theory is based on his notion of "petites perceptions." The mind has many ideas which exist in a confused undeveloped way of which we are not conscious. Only by the contact of the mind with the world of sense do its virtual possessions become actual possessions. The life of the mind is, therefore, a continuous process from confused to more distinct perceptions. It is not a *tabula rasa*, as Locke held it to be; it resembles rather a block of

marble, the veins of which prefigure the statue which experience will ultimately carve out. So far from our having no innate ideas, there is a sense in which it may be said that all our ideas are innate, for all our knowledge lies virtually and potentially in the mind awaiting the occasion that will call it forth. The soul is the ultimate and exclusive source of our perceptions, and experience is only the channel or expression of their development.

At the same time, while Leibnitz traces back all our knowledge to the mind itself, he distinguishes two kinds of conclusions or judgments, one drawn from reason and the other deduced from experience, corresponding to which he indicates two classes of truths—necessary truths and contingent truths. Necessary truths are such as are not derived from particular instances or evidences of the senses, but directly from the innate principles of the mind itself. They prevail in mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and morals, and all such departments of knowledge which carry their proofs within themselves. The laws which these subjects express are, in other words, self-evident and necessary, as their denial would involve a contradiction. Contingent truths, on the other hand, are those which are true as matters of fact, but whose contrary would involve no contradiction. They are actually so, but there is no necessity in the reason of things why they should be thus and not otherwise. To these two kinds of truths correspond two great laws of the human mind: the law of Contradiction and the law of Sufficient Reason.

The law of contradiction governs what may be called rational knowledge and applies to the possible. The law of sufficient reason relates to contingent truths or actual events which become intelligible and reasonable as soon as we are conscious of the reasons or causes why and how the real exists. In God's mind we may imagine there is an infinite number of possible things, all of which, however, do not attain to actuality. God only chooses the best or most suitable. Each individual thing may not be abso-

lutely the best, but relatively to the whole it is the best, and in the general result the maximum of perfection is attained. The law of the best possible is thus a particular application of the principle of sufficient reason. This law rules throughout all the actual world, and is the explanation of all created things. The law of sufficient reason, however, ultimately rests on the law of final causes. The world as it actually exists is and must be the best possible, for it is the expression of the mind and purpose of God.

4. *Relation of God to the World.* We are thus led to a consideration of Leibnitz' theological views, which he has most fully expressed in his *Essais de Theodicée*, a work written to accommodate his philosophy with the accepted dogmas of the church. Here Leibnitz seeks to demonstrate the purposefulness of God in creation, and to vindicate His permission of evil in the world. And here he elaborates his famous theory of the "best of all possible worlds." When we examine the constitution of the world, we are led to ask why it should assume exactly the form it does. There seems no apparent reason why it should just be as it is. Yet when we consider the nature and character of God, the proofs of whose existence Leibnitz first reviews, we are led to the conclusion that this world is the best possible. For if a better had been possible the wisdom of God had discerned it and His power and goodness created it. This has been called the doctrine of Optimism, of which Leibnitz is the chief representative. "God is the first reason or cause of things." He must be "absolutely perfect in power, in wisdom, and in goodness." The supreme wisdom joined to infinite goodness could not fail to choose the best. For if this were not the best of all possible worlds God would not have chosen any world, since He never acts but in accordance with supreme reason. This theory of optimism is based on the principle of Sufficient reason, which, as we have seen, plays an important part in Leibnitz' system. God cannot act without some reason, and since He is perfection, this reason can

only be the choice of the best; "for if He had chosen one less good there would be something which might be improved in His work." Voltaire becomes merry over Leibnitz' reasoning, and declares that as far as his experience goes it is the worst possible world. Hegel remarks that Leibnitz has made a statement, but has by no means proved it. I send to the market for an article; what is offered me, I am told, is not perfect, but it is the best that there is. It is perhaps a sufficient ground for being pleased with what I have got, but it is no reason why it is the best. I am just where I was. Nothing more is told me than that the world is good, but there is evil in it too. It is simply a matter of arbitrary choice. How and why the finite is evolved from the absolute Leibnitz does not attempt to show. Leibnitz acknowledges that the presence of evil in the world would seem at first sight to contradict his theory. But he says that if sin and pain were abolished this would not be the best possible world. All things are really connected. An evil is frequently the cause of a good. "A little bitter is often more pleasing than sugar." He proceeds, therefore, to examine the origin of evil in the world. *Si Deus est, unde malum?* The primary cause of evil is to be found in the essential limits of the creature. It is a condition of man's material existence, to overcome the passivity of which is the aim of the *appetition* or striving which is inherent in every monad. Evil, therefore, is merely a privation, a deficiency, or limitation. It has no efficient reason, and is only permitted for the sake of a higher good. Leibnitz distinguishes three kinds of evil,—metaphysical, physical, and moral.

Metaphysical evil is inseparable from finite existence, and is conditioned by the very nature of the world. Physical evil is either punitive or disciplinary, and is, therefore, a means of healing and educating man. Moral evil or sin is permitted by God, but not willed by Him; for without its possibility there could be no freedom, and without freedom no goodness or virtue.



Evil is, in short, simply a *conditio sine qua non*. It is not, indeed, anything real or positive. It exists as a foil to the good. It plays the part of the shading of a picture or of discord in music, which, by contrast, enhances and heightens the general effect. A world without variety would be a less perfect world than one in which contradiction and difference are harmonized. While God is the cause of all that is positive in His creatures, He cannot be regarded as the cause of their limitations. In his treatment of the problem of evil Leibnitz never gets beyond statement and metaphor. That the laws of nature are the best according to the wisdom of God we must accept. But no reason is offered why they are so. To affirm that God has once and for all made them so may seem the utterance, says Hegel, of pious feeling, but it is not a sufficient answer for philosophy.

5. *Views of Freedom and Morality.* The ethical system of Leibnitz is based on his metaphysical optimism. Because this is the best of all worlds, life itself must be good. Everywhere we find harmony, and everything is making for supreme happiness, which in the end is one with supreme goodness. All things are fulfilling God's will, but at the same time working out their own ends. Leibnitz, like Spinoza, regards perfection as the end of morality, and reason as the principle of perfection. But Leibnitz refuses to be classed with Spinoza in his view of determinism. For while Spinoza places the determining cause of action outside of the individual, Leibnitz represents the will as determined only by its own perceptions. It is true we are often unconscious of the inward impulse that actuates us, but even in our dim confused sensations we are seeking our good. The will is never neutral. We are always influenced by the strongest motives. To act without motives is impossible. In virtue of the quality of striving which is inherent in all monads man always chooses that which he regards as the best, and the action of the will is nothing else than the natural outcome of his individuality, the result of his own inner nature.

In the lowest exercise of will we are actuated by instinct, which consists in a dim feeling of uneasiness. In the higher stage of will we are influenced by objects which we set before us productive of pleasure or pain. Above these two stages there arises the rational exercise of will, which is determined by distinct perceptions. Here we are guided by the eternal truths, which have their seat in the mind. Where the will is thus determined by reason it may be said to be free, and the more rational it is the more freedom it has. Moral good, therefore, is the striving after knowledge, the cultivation of reason, progress from confused to distinct perceptions. Happiness and blessedness are really identical. To seek perfection, the end of our being, is to find ultimate happiness. Our instincts even point to our moral good, and the progress of life consists in rising from instinct to reason, from nature to conscious action. But reason not only deepens our nature, it also broadens it. As we obey it, it teaches us not only to find joy in our own satisfaction, but to seek the happiness of others. The more we become conscious of our own good the more do we realize our mutual relations. Hence, according as we advance towards the perfection of our being, the more shall we rejoice in the perfection of others. The whole moral law is fulfilled in the virtue of philanthropy, which, in its three stages of justice, equity, piety, constitute the moral harmony of the world. Finally, to love God is to rise to a conception of His goodness and to an understanding that the world is governed by Him for wise and good ends. Freedom consists in the attainment of divine wisdom. To see all things as they are in the mind of God and to fulfil the law of our inner life is the highest aim of a spiritual being.

One cannot but admire the high tone of moral earnestness which pervades the writings of Leibnitz, but it must be admitted that he has failed in solving the dualism which he set out to reconcile. He never succeeds in getting beyond the individualism, which he opposed to the uni-

versalism of Spinoza. If Spinoza represents the world as if there were no individuals, Leibnitz regards it as if there were no universals. If Spinoza's doctrine may be described as an extreme universalism, that of Leibnitz may be regarded as a no less extreme individualism. Spinoza merges the many in the one; Leibnitz exalts the many but misses the one. His theory of a Pre-established Harmony is but an artificial expedient to account for the co-existence and interaction of the independent existences which he had assumed. He delights in bringing together opposite views, but he never succeeds in reconciling them. He abounds in ingenious distinctions, but never attains to a higher unity in which the differences disappear. "The unity of reality and ideality, of the finite and the infinite, of efficient and final causes, of the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason, is never completely achieved."

At the same time, his philosophy contains many hints and suggestions which have not been without their influence on later thought. In his theory of knowledge, for example, Leibnitz dimly foreshadows the Kantian doctrine of *à priori* elements in cognition. We cannot but feel that in his contention that mere experience cannot reveal necessary truths and that to all our knowledge the mind itself must contribute, Leibnitz is the forerunner of Kant. Again, in his conception of nature as instinct with life, and in his emphasis of the idea of force as the abiding principle in matter and motion, Leibnitz prepared the way for the enunciation of the law of the conservation and indestructibility of energy which has become the leading idea of modern physics. And, once more, in his statement of the law of Continuity, according to which there are no breaks in nature but everywhere a continuous gradual transition and imperceptible development from lower to higher forms of life, Leibnitz approaches a formulation of the Darwinian theory and almost anticipates the doctrine of the Descent of man.

## CHAPTER II

### FOLLOWERS OF LEIBNITZ

LEIBNITZ may be regarded as the father of the German Enlightenment. In his demand for the scientific treatment of the problems of philosophy, in his exaltation of the intellect as at once the instrument and goal of all progress, not less than in his faith in the Divine order and harmony of the world, he inaugurated a movement which dominated the thought of Germany till Kant's time.

Though his ideas gradually permeated intellectual society and gave rise ultimately to a kind of "popular philosophy," he was immediately followed by three men who sought to elaborate and systematize his views, and who, though far inferior to their master in philosophic grasp and acumen, exerted a powerful influence upon their times. These were Thomasius, Tschirnhausen, and Wolff.

*Thomasius* (1655-1728) was one of the most influential teachers of his day. He was Professor first at Halle and afterwards at Leipzig, where, on account of the boldness of his utterances, he roused the suspicion and resentment of the authorities. He was distinguished as being the first academic teacher who gave his lectures in the German language, a practice followed by Wolff. In his freedom from Scholastic forms of expression and methods of reasoning, in his constant attempt to bring science into touch with common life, as well as in his demand for religious toleration, he exhibited the characteristic features of the Enlightenment. Educated as a lawyer, he was greatly



influenced by his study of Grotius and Pufendorf, who directed his attention to political and social questions. Philosophy with him resolves itself into worldly wisdom, the object of which is to further the general happiness of man. Peace belongs to those who free themselves from ambitious desires and unruly passions and devote themselves to the cultivation of virtue—"rational love." He is more of an enlightener than a philosopher, a champion of liberty rather than a promoter of science. The goal of philosophy is not so much wisdom as well-being, and the means by which it is to be attained is common sense. Reason is the test of all truth. He divides his practical philosophy into three parts—*natural right*, or justice; *politics*, which has to do with decorum; and *ethics*, which treats of honesty. In his natural right he treats of the world and of man. The world consists partly of visible and invisible things. The visible, he names bodies; the invisible, powers. All bodies have some kind of powers, and the higher we rise in nature the higher are the powers. Man consists of both body and powers. Through his higher powers he comes into relation with his fellowmen. The principle of justice lies in the requirement, to act towards no one as we would not have him act towards us. The principle of politics or "decorum" is so to act towards another as we should wish him to act towards us. And the principle of ethics or "honesty" is, to do that ourselves which we should commend as praiseworthy in others. All positive right is a human ordinance, a need of our nature taught us by experience. Whether it has its ultimate ground in God is a matter for theologians to discuss.

With the name of Thomasius that of *Tschirnhausen* is closely allied (1651-1708). More scientific in his method, he is not less of an eclectic in his attempt to reconcile rationalism with empiricism. He was born in Lausitz. He studied at Leyden, where he came under the personal influence of Spinoza. He also became the friend of Leibnitz, and corresponded with him on matters of philo-

sophy. His principal work, *Medicina Mentis*, professes to be a general introduction to scientific knowledge. While convinced of the necessity of applying the method of mathematics to all departments of knowledge, he believes, at the same time, that all knowledge is derived from experience, and that deduction must be preceded by the observation and collection of facts. When we proceed in this way we become possessed of four fundamental facts: 1. That we are conscious of a variety of things; 2. that of these some please and some displease; 3. that some things are comprehensible and others are not; 4. that we receive pictures of external things through our senses, imagination, and feelings. From the first of these facts we derive our notion of mind; from the second the will; from the third the understanding; from the fourth the imagination and the body. Corresponding to these, there are four kinds of knowledge—knowledge in general, morals, logic or the science of the understanding, and physics or the science of experience. From the facts of experience we advance to notions, and then proceed by the way of deduction from the general to the particular. Perception and conception, therefore, sensations and ideas, are necessary to the formation of all knowledge. Truth is what can be comprehended by the understanding, which of itself cannot err, though it may be misled by the false notions of the imagination. The only true method of reasoning is the mathematical, the method of Descartes and Spinoza. The most important of all sciences, on which, indeed, all the others rest, is Natural Philosophy or Physics. All other departments of knowledge are more or less obscured by the phantasies of the imagination. Let us only attain to clear notions of the laws of nature, and right ideas of our relations to God and man must follow.

Tschirnhausen was an acute and suggestive thinker, but, unfortunately, he did not live to complete his *Physics*, which was to have been the second part of his *Medicina Mentis*.

But much greater in philosophic importance and exercising a far wider and more lasting influence than either of the two men just mentioned is a name which is invariably associated with that of Leibnitz, and was regarded with unusual respect for nearly a century—Christian Wolff.

Wolff (1679-1754), the disciple and systematizer of the philosophy of Leibnitz, was born at Breslau towards the end of the seventeenth century. He was destined for the church, but showed an early aptitude for mathematics and speculative science. In his student days he was much impressed by Tschirnhausen's *Medicina Mentis*, and while a college tutor at Leipzig he attracted the notice of Leibnitz, by whose influence he was appointed successor to Thomasius in Halle. The eloquence of his lectures delivered in German, the clearness and order with which he marshalled his thoughts, the moral tone and practical character of his teaching, as well as the general novelty of his views, soon won for him a wide popularity, and his class-room was filled to overflowing. But his alleged negative attitude to Revealed Religion roused the suspicion of his theological colleagues, Frank and Lange, who belonged to the pietistic circle which largely prevailed in Germany at this time. The feeling rose so high that Fried. Wilhelm I. was induced to depose him from his chair and banish him from Halle. After teaching for a time in Marburg, he was recalled to Halle in 1740 by Frederick the Great, a warm admirer of his philosophy. Here he continued to teach with growing influence and honour till his death in 1754.

The school of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy became the centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century, though it is somewhat difficult for us now to discover the secret of its power. Wolff's system is essentially that of Leibnitz, and his merit chiefly lies in the methodical development of his master's ideas, in the rounded completion and encyclopedic character of his philosophy, as well as in the popular expression of it in the current language of

the people. But the originality and subtlety of thought, the bold imaginative power and inventive faculty which characterized Leibnitz are totally wanting in Wolff. He was not the man to open a new path for speculation, but he possessed the gift of popularizing the thoughts of another and making them accessible to his contemporaries. It must be admitted, however, that while he formulated the system of Leibnitz with clearness and consistency, he eliminated from it all its higher truths and richer suggestions, and reduced it largely to a common-place collection of definitions. It has been frequently pointed out that Wolff's philosophy degenerated into a dry and empty formalism. It is a system of analysis and enumeration. While Wolff proceeds from the simplest notions to the more general, and from the abstract to the concrete, there is no real evolution of thought. He deals, indeed, with the entire compass of philosophy, but the subjects are simply placed in a continuous succession without any attempt to show their inner connection or rational development. It is the philosophy of the enlightenment, reason is the highest type of judgment concerning truth, and dissection and analysis are its methods. Intellectual clearness is the test of truth; confusion and mystery the enemies of all progress.

Philosophy, according to Wolff, is the science of the possible, and the possible is that which involves no contradiction. The whole realm of the knowable is, therefore, the field of philosophy. Nothing is too insignificant for Wolff to consider. Everything that exists claims a place and calls for an explanation in his system. He deals with the minutest details of building and sanitation not less than with the attributes of God.

He accepts Leibnitz' distinction between necessary and actual truths, and he accordingly divides all philosophy into two parts—Theoretic and Practical. Before dealing, however, with these two divisions, he treats of Logic, in which he considers the laws of evidence, the criterion of



truth, the degrees of certainty, opinion, belief, and knowledge, the nature of conceptions and syllogisms, and the distinction between *à posteriori* and *à priori* knowledge.

The speculative or theoretic part of philosophy, Metaphysics, is subdivided into Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, and Theology. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, branches into Ethics, Economics, and Politics.

1. *Ontology* deals with the grounds of Being, the categories or radical notions of all thought, as Aristotle called them. But he makes no attempt to show their inner connection. He simply offers a bare enumeration of some of our primal ideas. He begins with the idea of contradiction, according to which the same thing cannot at once be and not be. From this law he deduces that of the Sufficient reason. There is an absolute distinction between *Nihilum* and *aliquid*, nothing and something. The intermediate state of becoming, which formed an important element in Greek as well as in later thought, has no place in Leibnitz' system. The notion of Possibility comes next. That is possible which involves no contradiction. Distinguished from the merely possible is the Necessary, the opposite of which is self-contradictory. By the help of the conceptions of the impossible and the possible he reaches the proposition that only what is completely determined is real, and that only what is real is individual. Wolff proceeds in the second part of his Ontology to deal with the various kinds of individuals or existences. These are either simple or complex. To the latter must be attributed extension, time, space, motion, etc. But none of these can be applied to simple existences. They are really units or monads. While Wolff ascribes to them power, he denies that they have the attribute of perception. Thus what Leibnitz called souls become in the hands of Wolff simply atoms.

2. *Cosmology*, which is the basis of physics, deals with the world as a whole—the totality of things in time and space. Since all changes in things are effected by motion,

the world is a machine, and may be likened to a clock, all the works of which are necessary. The ingredients of the world can neither be increased nor diminished. While the world exists in time, and God is above time, the world cannot be eternal in the same sense that God is eternal. The component parts of the world are called bodies, small substances, which possess inherent motive-force. Wolff treats in this department also of the teleological reason of the world. Everything must be considered according to the causes that produce it, on the one hand, and according to the end it serves on the other. It is not enough, therefore, to give a mechanical explanation of the world. We must examine it from the point of view of end or purpose. This must be the best of all worlds, not merely because God has made it, but because it best serves the highest conceivable purposes. And the perfection of the world consists in this, that all things in it, good and bad alike, combine in bringing about one end, the good of the whole.

3. *Psychology* treats of the soul of man as simple substance. The fact of consciousness is the distinguishing mark of the soul through which it knows itself and other things. The thinking being is simple and incorporeal. It has the power of continually altering itself, from which arise all the faculties of knowledge. These Wolff divides into two classes,—inferior and superior. The inferior embrace sensation, imagination, fancy, and memory. While the superior include attention, understanding, reason. Under the head of sensation he discusses the relation between body and soul, and asserts that the only tenable explanation is that of a Pre-established Harmony. The freedom of the will consists in power to choose what seems preferable, but that we may know what is truly preferable, knowledge is required.

4. *Theology* deals with the being and attributes of God, whose existence he proves by the cosmological argument. In his theology Wolff is but a slavish commentator of

Leibnitz' *Theodicée*. God has all knowledge, and might have made any kind of world. Since He has made this world, it must be the best. It owes its being to the will of God, and continues to exist in order to show forth His perfection.

In his practical philosophy Wolff shows more independence than in his theoretical. Reason affords the principle of direction for the will. Good is good of itself, and would be so even if there were no God. Perfection and not happiness is the aim of life.

His *Ethics* has to do with man in his individual capacity, his virtues, duties to himself, and his aims in life. In developing his moral theory he distinguishes between a man's duties to himself, his duties to others, and his duties to God. His duties to others rest on the apostolic rule that we can only attain to perfection by mutual and reciprocal activity, and that in the furtherance of this end it is the duty of each to help his neighbour. Under the duties to God he designates "those acts whose motives are divine perfections." He does not thereby mean that we can actually contribute to the perfection of God. But by honouring His laws, as revealed in nature and life, by our actions, we do in a sense fulfil His perfection.

In the *Economics* he discourses in a genial and practical way of family life, the relations between husband and wife, parents and children, masters and servants; while in his *Politics* he treats of man as a member of the State, dealing with property, contract, etc. Through the contract which individuals make for mutual support and security there arises the State, the well-being and peace of which are the highest ends which those who live in it can pursue. It is not necessary to follow Wolff here into the minute details of the constitution and government of the ideal State. As we have said, the merit of Wolff is his completeness. Nothing is overlooked. If his ethical and political philosophy is full of much homely sagacity,

it is also, it is to be feared, somewhat prolix and commonplace.

It will thus be seen that the system of Wolff is but a faint imitation of that of Leibnitz, leaving out all that was distinctive and suggestive of further development. He accepts Leibnitz' doctrine of monads, but rejects the idea of their perceptive or representative character, by which alone they were capable of relation with the complexity of things, with the result that the individual essences of Wolff sink into mere atoms and the unity of the world is simply a mechanical composition of unrelated particles. Again, in his treatment of the relation of God to the world, he sometimes regards God as an individual similar but greater than man, and sometimes as a substance wholly distinct. Thus he oscillates between a purely atomistic material view of the world and a universal or pantheistic. Finally, while he adopts Leibnitz' theory of Pre-established Harmony, it becomes in his treatment merely an external combination of soul and body, and has no relation with the rest of his system.

It was not perhaps wonderful that a philosophy whose chief commendation was its clearness and method should attract many adherents, and that a system of thought so practical and homely, dealing with every variety of subject, should at length permeate the various classes of the community and give rise to what has been called "a people's philosophy." We thus find that under the influence of Wolff there sprang up in Germany during the second half of the eighteenth century a series of writers who gave to philosophy a popular turn. It is almost impossible to group them into a school, though the period has been called more especially "the German Enlightenment."



## CHAPTER III

### THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY

THIS movement was literary rather than strictly scientific, and the writings of the period were of an eclectic rather than an original nature. General culture, enlightened thought, freedom from tradition and convention, the right of individual judgment in matters of religion and morals—were the general features of the age. English Deism and French Illuminism were not without their effect in Germany. The writings of Locke and Shaftesbury, Voltaire and Rousseau penetrated the north and affected the literary circles of Frederick the Great's court, who himself was a patron of learning and an enthusiast for the Enlightenment. But while the Illumination of France took the form of a revolt against social and ecclesiastical traditions, in Germany it assumed the milder appearance of a thoughtful rationalism. Superstition quietly dissolved under the higher light. It was an age not so much of unbelief as of emancipation from accepted dogma. Questions relating to the individual soul,—its nature, its duties and duration,—took the place of the more technical problems of philosophy. The model is no longer Leibnitz or Wolff, but Shaftesbury and the English essayists. All the writers of this period are agreed that philosophy in its last resort has to do with man and his well-being. He is to become master over all things. "Blessedness," says Steinbart, "is the aim of all thought, as it is the goal of life." Or,

as Wieland puts it, "the last desire of all creatures, and especially of man, is joy." The surest means of attaining it is the illumination of the spirit, the culture of piety and friendship, and sympathy with all that is beautiful and noble; while the best safeguard of the virtuous life is faith in God. Among the other forces which helped to shape the spirit of the age, the Pietistic tendency which had for some time prevailed in a certain section of the Reformed Church exerted no little influence. The religious subjectivity of such men as Spener, Schultz, and Arnold, who sought to emancipate faith from all creed subscription and ecclesiastical form, contributed to the general desire for a freer and higher expression of spiritual life. The German Enlightenment placed a high value on religion, and in this respect it forms a contrast to the atheism of the French Illumination.

Of the many writers of this period we may select as representative, Mendelssohn, Nicolai, and Lessing—Mendelssohn, the religious metaphysician; Nicolai, the literary exponent; Lessing, the cultured critic of "the Popular Philosophy."

*Moses Mendelssohn*, or Moses, as he frequently called himself, the son of a Jewish schoolmaster, was born in Dessau in 1729. As a boy he studied the Old Testament, which he learned by heart. He went at the age of fourteen to Berlin, where for many years he had a hard struggle for a livelihood. Ultimately he received the post of book-keeper to a wealthy merchant, on whose death he became the head of the business. His life, however, was chiefly devoted to philosophical pursuits. All writers agree in ascribing to Mendelssohn a beautiful and attractive personality. In his simplicity and absence of care for the things of this life, in his philosophic calm and unselfish devotion to the good of man, as well as in his unquestioning trust in the Divine order of the world, he has been compared with Socrates and Spinoza. His writings bear the same character. His pen, says Zeller, was consecrated

to the enlightenment of humanity. While he was interested in the larger questions of religion, he remained true to the faith of his fathers, and it was his special mission to deliver his co-religionists from the narrow prejudices and cruel disabilities under which they laboured. His principal works are: *Letters on the Sensations* (1755); *Evidence in Metaphysics* (1763); *Phaedon* (1767), a dialogue on the Immortality of the soul after the manner of Plato; *Jerusalem* (1783), a defence of Judaism; *Morning Hours*, essays in refutation of Pantheism.

In his philosophy he professes adherence to Leibnitz and Wolff, and in the more speculative part of his teaching he adopts their standpoint. But he was also influenced by a study of Locke and Shaftesbury. Metaphysics he calls his queen, but he regards the supreme purpose of speculative thought to further the blessedness of man. Nobility of life is the motive of all study, and the dictates of common sense are the test of truth.

The first question for Mendelssohn is, what are the conditions of human blessedness? To answer this question it is necessary to investigate our human nature. Hence in his *Letters on the Sensations* he examines the sources of our knowledge. These he finds to be desire, feeling, and reason—feeling or sensation being the intermediate or connecting-link between the faculties of desire and thought. Pleasure or pain is the direct object of sensation. In harmony with Leibnitz' distinction between dim and clear perceptions, he distinguishes between three kinds of sensation—sensual pleasure, the feeling for natural beauty, and the delight in moral perfection. He discards the Leibnitz-Wolffian view of a pre-established harmony in the relation of body and soul, and contents himself with a confession of ignorance.

While he deals with all manner of subjects, and especially with the Fine Arts, he is most deeply interested in moral and religious questions. In seeking for a criterion and motive for conduct, he says that that which is the

ground instinct of our nature must be the highest law for our will; and as no rational being can dissociate himself from his fellowmen, virtue, justice, and love of our kind unite in forming the highest elements of blessedness. Every free being is bound by the inner laws of his nature to produce as much perfection, beauty, and order in the world as lie in his power. The highest maxim of the moral life, therefore, is—"Make thine own and thy neighbour's inner and outer state, in due proportions, as perfect as thou canst."

One of the most important questions which he feels impelled to discuss is the nature of our faith in the existence of God. He deals with the subject in his *Evidence in Metaphysics*. He is assured that certainty is as attainable in theology as in mathematics. He examines the various proofs for God's Being, and is an enthusiastic defender of the Ontological argument, and he clinches his position with a dilemma,—“Either God is impossible or He exists.”

Though many of his admirers, including Kant, consider that his *Jerusalem* is his finest work, none was so popular as his *Phaedon*, in which he discusses the immortality of the soul, a theme of special interest among the writers of this time. Socrates is conjured up as a citizen of Berlin of the eighteenth century, and is made the champion of religious enlightenment. Mendelssohn maintains that the lot of all men will be a happy one after death. The soul must be eternal. Even nature knows nothing of annihilation. Things change, but do not pass into nothingness. The spirit cannot be less enduring than the body. The inconceivability of God having pre-destined men to misery, the impossibility of a being like man, whose end is obviously perfection, being mocked and frustrated in his aspirations; and, finally, the necessity for a state after death for the adjustment of the inequalities of this life—these are the arguments with which Mendelssohn seeks to establish the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.



There are few more impressive figures in the history of philosophy than that of Mendelssohn. He is not, indeed, a deep or original thinker. He cannot compare with a Leibnitz or a Kant. He is essentially an eclectic, culling his flowers from many fields. But he adds a grace both of language and thought to everything he touches. His character is even finer than his writings. He is one of the noblest representatives of a class of writers who have done much to humanize and broaden the general culture of the world. Such men are, indeed, indebted to the severer thinkers for their inspiration, but mankind often learns more from the popular teacher than the profound philosopher.

*Frederick Nicolai* (1733-1811), like his friend Mendelssohn, was largely self-taught, and, like him also, was engaged in trade. Apprenticed to a bookseller, he employed his leisure in acquiring English and Greek. He went to Berlin, where he entered upon what became his life-work—that of editor and publisher, which he pursued in the interests of the enlightenment. His greatest undertaking was a *Universal German Library*, which he edited for twenty-one years. All the best writers of the times were contributors to this work. Nicolai did much in this way to extend a knowledge of high-class literature and to elevate the thought and taste of his countrymen. As might be expected, the philosophy which he taught never took a very definite or systematic shape. His views are contained in a number of essays, reviews, criticisms, and letters to his friends Mendelssohn and Lessing. What he desires chiefly to inculcate is a “sound philosophy.” He claims to be a man of business and not a scholar, who writes to help common people to take a practical and unprejudiced view of things. He avoids technical language, and aims at utility and general clearness of thought. His object is to enlighten men’s minds so that by clearness of intellectual vision they may attain to true happiness. He wages a constant warfare against prejudice and tradi-

tion. His hero is Frederick the Great, whom he admires on account of his tolerance and sympathy with culture. He believes in making men good citizens, hence his watchword is the "public good," after which every man ought to strive, for only in the weal of others will he find his own blessedness. If he lacked the spirituality and idealism of Mendelssohn, and was inferior to Lessing in literary talent, he did perhaps not less than either for the promotion of knowledge and the education of the people. He embodied the spirit of the age. In his conceit, self-confidence, and shallow optimism he was at once a product and type of the Enlightenment.

Nicolai is, however, chiefly interesting as marking a transition from Mendelssohn to Lessing. He is less of a dogmatist and more of a critic than the former. Gifted in a small degree with the historical sense and with a tendency to a rationalistic view of the world, he may be regarded as preparing the way for those characteristics which made Lessing at once the last of the Illuminati and the first to expose their insufficiency.

The name of *Lessing* belongs to the history of Literature rather than to that of Philosophy. But he is one of those many-sided men whose influence has been exerted in nearly every realm of thought and life. In the literature of Germany he may be said to have created a new epoch and to have given an inspiration to those deeper feelings and aspirations which found expression in the *Sturm und Drang* period. If he is to be regarded as an apostle of the enlightenment, it is only in the sense that he gave to that tendency a broader and larger outlook. Just as Rousseau was the emancipator of French Illuminism, so Lessing was the liberator of those ideas of his countrymen which were yearning for expression. A new sense of the possibilities of life is awakened by him. He is the creator of new ideals, and by his return to classical sources as well as by his realization of historical development, he has given to the enlightenment a fuller and richer signifi-

cance. He was at once a man of learning and a man of the world, and in him the various elements of the time unite. Religion and rationalism, literature and life, morality and aestheticism, toleration and intensity, individualism and universality, are strangely combined in this restless, strenuous spirit.

Lessing makes no pretence of being a systematic philosopher. By disposition and by the force of circumstances he was before all else a critic. Speculation interests him more for its excitement than its achievement. His divergence from those who sought knowledge simply as a means to felicity is revealed in his famous saying, that if God held all truth in the one hand and in the other the search of it, he would still take the hand which gave the search even though it bestowed also error and endless struggle.

Lessing was a man of extraordinary ability and untiring energy. He was engaged in continual controversy. Freedom was his watchword, says one of his biographers, and his life was a series of battles for truth. We cannot enter here upon an account of his literary activities. Fables, essays, poems, dramas, art-criticisms, and theological treatises came forth in rapid succession from his restless brain.

His *Dramaturgy*, in which he dissociates himself from the artificial French tradition of the "three unities" and points to Shakespeare as his model, marks a turning-point in the history of the drama; while his *Laokoon*, which contains his philosophy of art, breaks fresh ground in the interpretation and relations of Sculpture, Painting, and Poetry. Of *Minna von Barnhelm* Goethe says, it opened up a new world in literature—a world of living men, while his *Amelia Galotti* awakens men to the deep tragic element in life. His *Nathan der Weise* embodies one of the leading aims of his life—his demand for tolerance and freedom of thought in religious matters. A Jew, a Mohammedan, and a Christian are brought together in

the time of the crusades. The lesson of the spirit of Nathan the Jew is that a man's creed is of little moment provided there be the temper of charity and the spirit of true humanity. The principal thing is not whether we are Jews or Christians, but men.

It was perhaps the same desire for toleration and fairness which actuated him to publish the *Wolfenbützel Fragments*, purporting to be a MS. of an unknown author found in the library of Hamburg, in which the credibility of the Gospels was attacked. The work was really by Reimarus, a friend of Lessing, but Lessing was regarded as the author, and was involved through its statements in bitter controversy. Probably he only endorsed its views in a modified degree. Christianity had roots in his life too deep to be shaken by such shallow criticism. But he was pleased with any attempt which demonstrated that the truth of the Gospel was independent of the Scriptures or any outward channels through which it happened to be conveyed to mankind.

Next to his demand for freedom of thought and truth for its own sake, and not for the happiness and peace it might bring, the most striking feature of his character was his Individualism. He held with his friends, that the real subject of philosophy is man; but it must be man in his ideal and perfect totality. The perfection of mankind is only possible through the perfection of individuals. States exist for men. Governments and churches, all political and ecclesiastical institutions are but necessary evils—moral safeguards and aids of order and religion. He will not allow that men should be influenced by patriotism, but that each should be a citizen of the world. It should be our ambition to free ourselves from all limitations of nationality, religion, and rank and be known simply as men.

His individualism is based upon the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy which he espoused in his early college days. His metaphysical views rest upon the Leibnitzian theory



of Monads. Each individual is a separate entity, and each soul must work out its own inner life. At the same time, he perceives that the world is composed of infinite gradations of existences which together form a whole. Each soul is ever striving after perfection, and there is no reason, he thinks, why an individual may not be born into the world several times, and with each new life attain to a higher stage of existence. He follows Leibnitz also in his conception of Divine Purpose and Determination. All things are not merely related, but are progressing towards a higher end. He will not, however, yield to the easy optimism of the Enlightenment, which cannot believe that a good God would cause pain and misery. As against Mendelssohn, he defends the doctrine of eternal punishment. Heaven and Hell are not two states in time and place. They are not merely future localities, but the possible conditions of every life which our own actions create.

But Lessing is not a blind follower of Leibnitz, and in his later writings, especially in his work on the *Reality of Things Outside of God*, he approaches the pantheism of Spinoza. This tendency to combine different elements of thought reveals another characteristic of the man. His inclination is ever towards paradox and contrast. No sooner does he see one side clearly than the other side obtrudes itself and demands recognition. "The more anyone tries to prove to me the truth of Christianity, the more do I see its objections." It is this double movement of thought which accounts for his seeming contradictions, and rouses often the suspicion of his friends. Now he speaks with the voice of a Rationalist, and now of an orthodox Christian. "The Theologians," Nicolai writes to him, "believe that you have become a free-thinker, and the free-thinkers that you have become a Christian."

Lessing is not satisfied with an individualistic view of the world; he seeks, therefore, to combine Spinoza with Leibnitz. If the world presents a number of isolated

existences, it also reveals a comprehensive unity. Of God we can form no other idea than the Being in whom all things consist, and who includes in Himself all variety and change. Though He is outside of all things, nothing is outside of Him. That which enters not into the notion of God has no existence. Out of this idea of God he endeavours to develop the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The Father is revealed in the thought, the Son in the activity of God, while the Holy Spirit is the union of the revealing and the revealed, of the thinking and acting God.

Lessing was originally intended for the Church, and all his life he took a deep interest in theological questions. In his investigation of Christian truth he combines the rationalist with the man of faith. He is not satisfied with the formal orthodoxy of the Church, but he is as little pleased with the shallow rationalism of many of the Enlighteners, with their arid deism and utilitarian morals. The central point around which all his criticism of Christianity turns is the distinction between form and faith, the spirit and the letter. The proof of Christianity is not to be sought in manuscripts, dates, and Gospel harmonies. The religion in the Gospels is not the religion of Christ. No two men will be found to attach the same meaning to Christianity. Christ and not the Bible is the primary object of belief. Lessing believes in a religion of reason, which is older than the Scriptures. Religion is not true because the apostles taught it, but they taught it because it is true. Truth is not a thing once and for all given us through a book. It is a process, a development. God is revealing Himself in history, and is educating the race by the gradual unfolding of His thoughts through life. This is the theme which he sets forth in his work on the *Education of the Human Race*. He sees a gradual evolution going on in the world from lower to higher forms of faith. Christianity, as the religion of a more fully developed humanity, succeeds Judaism, just as Judaism

succeeded the natural religions of early times. Revelation is to the entire race what education is to the individual. God leads man on by earthly hopes and material promises to more spiritual things. The time will come when the Christian will be able to dispense with all notions of heavenly reward, and will do right because it is right. At present we are under the dispensation of the Son, just as a former age was under the dispensation of the Father. But Lessing believes there will be a third and higher dispensation,—the kingdom of the Spirit,—in which men shall no longer obey God through fear or for the sake of recompense, but because goodness is its own reward. This ideal state will be reached when the reign of reason is supreme.

In this view of the future, it will be seen, Lessing passes beyond the standpoint of the Enlightenment, and has given expression to an idea of historical development which has proved most fruitful in later philosophy. We can recognise the child of the Enlightenment in his demand for a freer and more reasonable faith, emancipated from forms and traditions. He is at one with the age in his desire to extricate morality from dogma, and life from belief. But this morality and life for which Lessing pled, involve sterner demands than the representatives of the Enlightenment dreamt of. He rigidly excludes all utilitarian motives and eudaemistic incentives. He will know nothing of happiness and felicity as ends. He has no doubt about the Immortality of the soul, but he will not say that virtue and goodness in this life should be based on our hopes for the next. The goal of humanity will be reached, the true Enlightenment attained, when the hearts of men are so purged and purified that virtue will be loved and sought for itself alone.

*PART VI*  
*GERMAN IDEALISM*

*SECT. 1*  
*THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. KANT*

INTRODUCTION

As the enlightenment received its latest and fullest expression in Germany, so too in Germany its effects were first manifested. This land now became the stage of European thought. While the country was at its lowest politically, it strangely attained to the zenith of its power in the realm of the intellect, and there came forth a series of thinkers and poets who gave to mankind a new outlook and a fresh impulse. The various lines of thought which were started in the eighteenth century now converged and were brought to a focus in a great intellectual movement, which, in its intensity and influence, can only be compared with the extraordinary development of Greek philosophy from Socrates to Aristotle. Poetry and philosophy united to produce this result. Literature opened up a new world for thought. Goethe, Schiller, Herder, and Lessing, created a world-literature which was developed by the writers of the Romantic school. A desire for general culture, an appreciation of antiquity, and an awakened



interest in art, combined to give a new worth and beauty to life. Man was no longer regarded as an isolated phenomenon. He was the product of the past, the outgrowth of innumerable forces which acted upon him. New problems as to his past history and his present environment were suggested, and new ideals of his advancement were conceived. The leading idea animating and directing the whole movement was the conception of historical development, which, already promoted by Lessing and taken up by Herder and Goethe, was consummated by Schelling and Hegel.

But this new conception of the world required for its elaboration a new and broader mental basis than that which the subjectivity of Rousseau and the individualism of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy offered. At this point there came forward the great thinker who revolutionized philosophy by gathering up the diverse tendencies of the past and combining them in a new synthesis. The importance of Kant lies in the new foundation which he laid for the comprehension of man's relation to the world.

*Immanuel Kant* was born in Königsberg in 1724, and he died in 1804. The outward course of his life was uneventful, and its main interest lies in the story of his philosophical development. He was the son of a humble tradesman of Scottish descent. His mother was a woman of piety and intelligence. The influence of his home and of his early training in a school presided over by a leader of the Pietists, did much to foster that combination of moral intensity and sobriety of understanding which formed the basis of his character. He entered the University of his native town at the age of sixteen as a student of philosophy and mathematics. In 1755, in his thirty-first year, he became a college tutor. His first work was an essay on *Thoughts on the True Estimate of Motive Force*. In the year 1770, at the age of forty-six, he became Professor of Logic and Metaphysics. He received calls from various other universities, which, however, he declined.

In 1797, in his seventy-fifth year, he ceased to lecture on account of the infirmities of age. He lived a simple, frugal life. Though unmarried, he enjoyed the society of congenial friends.

Though he never travelled beyond his native province, he was an extensive reader of travels, and had an accurate knowledge of geography. He was a man of upright character, of great modesty and kindness of disposition. He was most methodical in all his ways. He rose at 5 a.m., worked, lectured, and wrote till 1 p.m., when he dined. Exactly at half-past four he went for his walk, always the same, which was called after him the "Philosopher's Walk." Heine humorously remarked that the good people of Königsberg set their watches when he appeared. He was an interesting lecturer, and had much sympathy with the young life of the University. He died in his 80th year in 1804.

The most important of his early works was *A Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, in which he extends Newton's mechanical theory of the actual planetary system, to explain the genesis of that system, anticipating many of the ideas which were afterwards developed by Laplace. After 1762 his thoughts tended more to philosophy proper, and particularly to the criticism of the faculties of man with which his name is chiefly associated in the history of philosophy. He has, however, given an impulse to thought in almost every department, which has lasted for more than a century and is not yet spent. Not only idealists like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but realists like Herbart and Lotze owe to him their inspiration. As has been said, "whatever metal of speculation is anywhere turned now, the ore of it is Kant's."

The principal works of Kant, which form the constituent parts of his System, Metaphysical and Ethical, are :

*The Critique of Pure Reason*, published in 1781; the Second Edition, corrected, in 1787.

*Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics*—1785.

*Critique of Practical Reason*—1788.

*Critique of Judgment*—1790.

*Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason*—1794.

Before entering upon a detailed exposition of Kant's philosophy, it will be desirable to offer a brief indication of its aim and scope. There are, therefore, two preliminary points which claim our attention: the purpose and results of Kant's speculation.

1. *The Purpose.* Previous to Kant's time, two lines of speculation—those of Locke and Leibnitz—though so different in character and principles, led to the same results—the severance of thought and reality. The old question as to whether we receive our knowledge from without or bring it forth by the activity of our own minds from within, whether our cognition is the product of sensation or of pure thought, divided the philosophical world into two camps. On the one side the Empirical school maintained that all our knowledge comes from experience alone, and that the mind is passive; on the other hand, the Rationalist school held that the mind alone is the source of cognition, and that we know nothing but our own ideas. Each sought to solve the opposition between mind and matter by denying one of the factors. Both were equally one-sided. Both failed. The empiricism of Locke issued in the scepticism of Hume; the individualism of Leibnitz and Wolff, in the dogmatic assumption of an external harmony.

An attempt, therefore, is made by Kant to reconcile the two extremes of Realism and Idealism.

Kant had been educated in the Wolffian philosophy, and was for a time an adherent of it. But he could not long rest satisfied with its assumptions. Wolff assumed that by the employment of abstract principles he could reach an ultimate knowledge of all reality. But Kant found that the mere application of analytic propositions, such as are used in mathematics, furnished the mind with no contents. He turned, therefore, to empiricism. But

a study of Locke's sensationalism soon showed him that Hume's deductions were correct, and that unless the mind possessed some faculty of synthesis, some unifying principle, all we could know would be a series of unconnected sensations; and that, therefore, scepticism, despair of reaching all truth, was the conclusion to which we were shut up. Again he felt that this could not be the ultimate explanation of things.

—"It was the reflection on David Hume," he says in a famous passage, "that several years ago first broke my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely new direction to my enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy."

The question regarding causality according to which Hume maintained that all that we see is the mere succession of isolated sensations without any causal connection, suggested to Kant the more general question—how propositions which are based, not on experience but on pure thought, can, nevertheless, possess validity for the world of objects. The question suggests to him the propriety of reversing the order which was supposed to obtain between the mind and its objects—a revolution in mental procedure which Kant compares to that which was effected by Copernicus in astronomy. Hitherto it had been assumed that all our knowledge must adapt itself to the objects. "Suppose," he says, "we try now whether better success may not attend us in the problems of metaphysics, if we assume objects to be under the necessity of adapting themselves to the nature of our cognitions, a method which clearly would better agree with the avowed aim of metaphysics, to determine the nature of objects, *à priori*, or before they are actually presented" (*Krit. d. r. Vernunft*, Pref. 2nd Ed.).

This is really the fundamental thought of Kant's system. It is not in things that we are to look for the explanation of the laws of the mind. On the contrary, it is in the mind that we must seek the reason of things. It is here that we see the idealism of Kant, an idealism, however,



different from all former kinds. The mind legislates over things. We create the world: it is the product of the laws of our own understanding. The mind supplies the form of knowledge, but not its matter. This matter in itself we cannot attain to, for we can only know what has passed through the forms of sense.

The question, therefore, which Kant is led to ask is no longer whether the idealists were right or the empiricists were right, but what part does the mind play in the constitution of what we call knowledge? But it was not by a fusion of both views that Kant sought to reconcile their opposition. His significance lies in directing speculation to an entirely new problem—viz. the nature and origin of knowledge itself.

It is the task of Kant, therefore, to set aside all dogmatic presuppositions and to deal with the preliminary question—What and how does the mind know? He will subject reason itself to a searching investigation, that he may discover its constitution and its factors. He will examine the origin and scope of our knowledge, find out its sources, and fix its limits. Hence Kant designates his standpoint "criticism," and the work which undertakes this task is called the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is also called by him "Transcendental," because it has "to do not so much with the objects, as with our knowing of the objects, in so far as there is any possibility of an *à priori* knowledge of them."

2. *Results.* The object, then, which Kant proposes is a criticism of human knowledge with a view to determining its nature and its limits. There is a twofold necessity for such criticism. The first is the failure of philosophy hitherto to arrive at any definite conclusions in regard to those very questions which the mind cannot but ask, and which it seeks most of all to understand. Scepticism has not quenched the insatiable longings of reason to solve those problems as to the Being of God, human freedom, and the order of the world which constantly recur to the

mind. "It is vain," says Kant, "to strive after an artificial indifference towards enquiries whose object can never be indifferent to the nature of man." The necessity of this inquiry is felt, secondly, when we consider how naturally we are led by the extension of our empirical knowledge to speculate about that which is beyond experience and to make assumptions which experience cannot verify.

The conclusion to which Kant comes is, not that metaphysics in itself is impossible, "for some such disposition of the human mind must exist as soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its powers," but that the ideas with which metaphysics deals, being objects of a supersensible world unconditioned by the forms of the mind, cannot be proved by the speculative reason in the same way as the objects of other sciences can be proved. We can only know phenomena, that is, things as they are modified and transformed for us by the action of the mind itself. "The unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction." "These objects which reason thinks and necessarily thinks, but which are not given in experience, or at least as reason thinks them," cannot be cognised or proved in the same way as objects given in experience. A purely scientific knowledge of the soul, of God, and of the unity of the world is not available.

Yet these ideas are not to be regarded as false or illusory though speculative reason cannot verify them. They are there: they can be *thought*, and they press for recognition. It is true they have no phenomena corresponding to them which the forms of our understanding can seize upon. But they are in our consciousness. There must be another way of vindicating them. For, after all, reason is one, and the ideas of reason must have a purpose for man not less than the objects of experience. The interests of philosophy and of life Kant felt are not exhausted by the question, what or how can we know? We must also inquire, what shall we do and what may we hope? Hence Kant is convinced that by means of our faculty of willing

we can press into the supersensuous world, which is closed to speculative reason. "After we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make any progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains for our consideration whether data do not exist in *practical* cognition which may enable us to determine the conception of the unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience from a *practical* point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphysics" (*Krit. d. r. Vernunft*, Pref. 2nd Ed.).

On this account Kant follows up the *Critique of Pure Reason* with an examination of the ethical demands and moral faculties which constitute the basis of his moral theory—which he calls the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The ideas of freedom, the soul, and God, which the *Critique of Pure Reason* postulated, but could not prove, *Practical Reason* restores to their place of authority in the life of man. Finally, in a third treatise, the *Critique of Judgment*, he endeavours to indicate the point in which the theoretic and practical views of the world unite.

We may now proceed to a more particular exposition of the Kantian philosophy. And as Kant himself divides all the faculties of the soul into three—thinking, feeling, and willing—we may follow him in dividing his doctrine into a theoretic, a practical, and an aesthetic part. The theoretic part deals with the principles of cognition and reason proper. The practical deals with the principles of the will. The aesthetic,—in so far as it is a theory of the sensations of pleasure and pain, and of the feelings generally—as mediating between the reason and the will, is a faculty of judgment. Hence we have the three great critiques, of Pure Reason, of Practical Reason, and of Judgment.

## CHAPTER I

### KANT'S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY

#### *Critique of Pure Reason*

REASON is the faculty which contains the principle of knowledge—the basis of all of our mental possessions. Pure reason may be defined as reason independent of experience, and the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the examination of the part which the mind plays in relation to experience in constituting our knowledge. “There can be no doubt,” says Kant, “that all our knowledge begins with experience, or otherwise how could our mental powers be stirred into activity if they were not affected by outward things? But although all knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all springs *out of* experience. It may well be that experience itself is made up of two elements, one received through impressions of sense, and the other supplied from itself by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of those impressions.” May there not be *à priori* cognition, Knowledge that is independent of experience and even of any impressions of sense? Such knowledge is said to be *à priori*, to distinguish it from empirical knowledge, which has its sources *à posteriori*, or in experience.

Obviously, however, we need a criterion by which to distinguish with certainty between pure and empirical knowledge. Experience tells us only that a thing is so and so, but not that it is so by necessity. If we find,



then, a proposition which on being thought, is thought as necessary, it is an *à priori* judgment, and if it is not derived from any proposition except one which is itself necessary, it is absolutely *à priori*. But, again, experience never bestows on its judgments true or strict universality. It merely says that so far as observation has gone there is no exception to this rule. If, therefore, a judgment is thought with strict universality so that there can be no possible exception to it, it is not derived from experience, but is absolutely *à priori*. "Necessity and universality, therefore, are the sure criteria of *à priori* knowledge."

But, again, a further distinction must be made. All judgments are of two kinds—Analytic and Synthetic. Analytic are those in which the predicate is already contained in the subject, which, therefore, in being stated, does not add anything to our knowledge; as, for example, 'all bodies are extended.'

Synthetic Judgments, on the other hand, are those in which the predicate lies wholly outside the subject and is only added to it, and thereby contributes to our knowledge; as, for example, 'all bodies are heavy.' Now, of these two forms of judgment, Analytic are wholly *à priori*. Synthetic may be partly *à posteriori* and partly *à priori*, *i.e.* partly drawn from experience and partly from the mind itself.

The object, therefore, which Kant sets himself at the outset is to answer the question as to the possibility of an *à priori* knowledge, *i.e.* knowledge independent of experience: or, as he puts it, the question as to the possibility of a science of metaphysics. By metaphysics Kant understands in general the science of Pure Reason, the science which deals with the *à priori* forms of the mind. And, in particular, he distinguishes between metaphysics and two other *à priori* sciences—Mathematics and Physics. He, therefore, proceeds to ask the threefold question, as to the possibility of Pure Mathematics, of Natural Science, and of Metaphysics. His answer is that these sciences are

possible if in relation to the objects with which they deal, synthetic judgments, or universal and necessary judgments are possible, *i.e.* if we can form conclusions in them without the help of sense experience.

Pure mathematics is possible because we have pure or *à priori* intuitions—(space and time)—and natural science is possible because the mind possesses *à priori* notions, *viz.*, the categories and the principles of pure reason. Metaphysics, as the pretended science of the supersensible, can only be regarded as a futile effort, inasmuch as the ideas with which it is occupied reach out beyond experience and give an appearance of reality to the objects with which they deal. As a real science it is not possible, because the categories only permit of being applied within the domain of experience; whereas objects conceived by means of ideas, in so far as they are not received through the senses, involve the mind in indissoluble contradictions. On the other hand, the science, which teaches the proper use of the categories (as applicable only to phenomena), and of the ideas (as applicable to our knowledge of objects), and therefore determines the source as well as the limits of our cognition, is not only possible but necessary. Hence, with regard to metaphysics (knowledge springing from pure reason), the answer of Kant in effect is: It is *not* possible as a metaphysics of things in themselves; it *is* possible as a metaphysics of nature (within the domain of phenomena) and as a metaphysics of cognition. In other words, we must reject the science which professes to deal with things beyond experience while we recognise the science which confines itself to the province of possible experience.

The problem, then, which Kant has to discuss involves a theory of knowledge. The two factors of all knowledge are obviously—Sense and Understanding. What does each contribute? Sense is the receptive faculty in cognition; Understanding the active and spontaneous factor. By means of sense, objects are given; through the understanding they are thought. The former receives the raw

material; the latter transmutes it into knowledge. "Notions," so runs the famous dictum of Kant, "without intuitions are empty : intuitions without notions are blind." It is the union of these two—the perceptions of sensibility and the notions of the understanding—which constitutes knowledge.

In reference to sensibility or the faculty of receiving the manifold objects of sense, there must be certain forms of intuition supplied by the mind itself, which make perceptions possible. And in regard to the understanding, there must also be certain mental processes by which our perceptions are rationalized and clothed with intelligibility. When, therefore, we inquire as to the *à priori* conditions of experience a twofold question arises :

(1) What are the *à priori* intuitions, lying ready in the mind,—the principles of our sensuous faculty?

(2) What are the *à priori* notions,—the principles of our thinking faculty?

The first question is considered in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* (aesthetic being used in its literal acceptance, as the science of the *à priori* principles of Sense, and not to denote the doctrine of taste). The second question is treated in the *Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic*.

1. *Transcendental Aesthetic*. What, asks Kant, are the *à priori* principles of our sensuous faculty? What are those forms of the mind which, in the first instance, make our sensations possible to the intelligence? In every act of perception there are two elements—the matter and the form. The matter is what is perceived : the form is that which reduces the manifoldness of appearance to order. But that which gives order to our sensations cannot belong to the phenomena themselves, but must be the pure forms which, belonging to the mind, receive the matter and afford a basis of unity.

Kant assumes that the forms of sense-perceptions are *Space* and *Time*. *Space* is an intuition which, without doubt, belongs inherently to the mind, whose function is to

present to us objects outside of us. In the same way, *time* is also a pure *à priori* intuition. We can abstract all that belongs to the matter of sensation and yet there remain, Space and Time.

That space and time are *à priori* Kant proves, first, directly from the nature of the notions themselves in that they are presupposed in all experience; and, secondly, indirectly—because unless these forms were *à priori*, the science of mathematics, whose propositions are based on the universality and necessity of these notions, would be impossible.

But, says Kant, we must remember that space and time are only intuitions or sense perceptions; they are not to be identified with notions of the understanding, for general notions contain their particulars under them and not as parts in them. Whereas all particular spaces and particular times are but parts of space and time generally.

Space and time, therefore, are the indispensable conditions of all our perceptions. Things can only be known to us through these forms. They afford the possibility of unity. They form “the warp of experience across which the shuttle of thought continually throws its woof and constructs its web of knowledge.” The one is the form of all outer sense, the other of all inner experience. Every object in the world, every state of feeling, can only become a part of consciousness as it is either localized or timed.

Space and time being thus subjective forms in which all things are presented, it follows that we do not perceive things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us through the media of space and time. What the thing is in itself we can never know, for we can never get it apart from our sensuous perception of it. Kant does not, however, hold that the entire world is a mere semblance. Phenomena must have realities behind them; but we cannot get at the reality, for we cannot get outside of our own minds. Things as certainly exist as our own states within us, but we can never divest ourselves of those



necessary conditions through which they are presented to us.

2. *Transcendental Analytic.* To constitute our knowledge, as we have seen, the mind must not only be able by means of its two forms, space and time, to receive outward objects, it must have a power of co-ordinating them and giving them intelligibility. This is the work of the understanding. The action of the understanding must come in to unify the objects of sense. That action is synthesis or correlation. A pure sensation would be a mere isolated occurrence in consciousness. Sentient life, if we had no unifying faculty, would be a mere series of blind pulses. In Kant's words, "perceptions without conceptions are blind." The string which gathers the isolated beads into a necklace—the glass which collects the beams of sentient life into one focus—is what we call intellect. Synthetic unity is the one function of thought which is required to bind our sensations into knowledge.

It is, therefore, the business of the Transcendental Analytic or Logic to exhibit the special form in which this general intellectual synthesis is exercised, and to show how the work of unification is accomplished. It falls into two parts; the first, called the Analytic of Conceptions, which is a classification of the ultimate forms of the understanding; and the second, the Analytic of Principles, which exhibits these forms in their application to the elements of sense.

(a) *Analytic of Conceptions.* The *discovery and classification* of the notions of the understanding is the first task of the Analytic. Here Kant does not give himself much trouble. He simply takes the classification of judgments of traditional logic—Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, and from these, in a somewhat arbitrary manner, deduces twelve categories, which he sets forth in the following table:

Every judgment in reference to Quantity is, Universal, Particular or singular; as to Quality, Affirmative, Negative

or infinite; as to Relation, Categorical, Hypothetical or disjunctive; as to Modality, Problematic, Assertive, or apodictic.

Hence to these judgments there correspond an equal number of categories from which all the other pure principles may be derived. These are, under Quantity—Unity, Plurality, Totality; under Quality—Reality, Negation, Limitation; under Relation—Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect, Action and Reaction; under Modality—Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and Non-existence, Necessity and Contingency.

These categories act necessarily upon the objects of experience, as by means of these alone can an object be thought at all. But in themselves they are simply empty forms, and only receive their contents through the perceptions.

But, now, the question arises, how can the categories be applied to things and take them up into themselves? How can these forms, so plainly mental, come into relation with the sensuous world? How can two such dissimilar powers as sensibility and understanding operate in conjunction? This is what Kant calls the "Deduction of the Categories," which means their justification or application, according to which we have the second condition (the condition of time and space being the first and the unity of consciousness, as we shall see, the third), by which experience becomes possible. This synthesis is the work of the imagination, whose function is to bring the sense perceptions and the notions of the understanding together, and the element in which they meet is the form of time. If we ask then, how can objects of sense be brought into connection with intelligible notions? the answer is, not directly, but by means of a third or intermediate factor, which, being at once sensuous and mental, shares the nature of both. Such a mediating principle is to be found in the formal element of all sense perceptions—viz., time. To this determination of time Kant gives the name "The

Transcendental Schema." Being *à priori*, it is homogeneous with the categories; being a form of sensibility, it partakes also of the character of sensible objects. Thus sense and intellect, though so dissimilar, meet by means of this product of the imagination, which has the peculiar power of bringing an object, which is not actually present, before the mind and enabling it to be an object of thought. In other words, the categories cannot act directly on objects. They work through their schematic or semi-sensuous forms. "These schemata," says Kant, "are the true and only conditions for securing to the categories a bearing upon objects—of giving them, in short, import and meaning."

Thus we have presented to us the three acts of synthesis by which intellectual knowledge takes place. First, the manifold representations are unified by the application of the *à priori* forms of time and space: next the intuitions resulting from this application are unified by the determining schema of the imagination. Finally, above all there is the "unity of self-consciousness." The dynamical unification of the imagination thus carries us back to a statical unity—"the standing and abiding ego"—the third and primary synthesis—"the original synthetic unity of apperception," as Kant calls it. It is the 'I think' which accompanies all our perceptions and makes them objects of knowledge for us.

The "Deduction of the categories" consists then in showing that experience presupposes a formal unity of consciousness, and that the categories express the special rules under which this primal unity presents itself for the guidance of the imagination.

Each category has a corresponding schema or time-element of its own, through which the matter of sensation is taken up and transformed into thought. The relation of time that constitutes the schema of *quantity* is series in time or number—the succession of units. That of *quality* is the contents of time. Real is what fills time; Negative

is empty time. That of *relation* is, order of time; a determinate relation suggests a determinate order of things. Substantiality is conceived as permanence in time. Causality, as sequence in time. Reciprocity, as co-existence in time. The categories of *Modality* take as their schema the relation of objects to time as a whole. Possibility is the agreement with the conditions of time generally; actuality, existence in a particular time; necessity, existence in all time.

(b) *Analytic of Principles*. But now, in order to show how experience results from these categories, Kant proceeds to enumerate the *principles* according to which all our perceptions are raised to cognitions. These are somewhat formally drawn from the categories. They are four in number: (1) Axioms of Intuition; (2) Anticipations of Perception; (3) Analogies of Experience; (4) Postulates of Experiential Thought.

(1) *The Axioms of Intuition* unite in the general principle that an object of perception is always recognisable as an extensive magnitude, and is known by its *quantity*.

(2) *The Anticipations of Perception* are based upon the view that every sensation, though it has no parts out of parts, is an intensive magnitude, or is known by its *quality*. These are called anticipations of sensation, because they precede all sensation and prescribe its character.

These two principles, which relate to quantity and quality, are based on mathematical elements, in the one case, elements which can be placed side by side, in the other, elements which appear as degrees of quality. They show that every object of perception, whether it be physical or mental, must be thought in terms of number or degree.

(3) The third class of principles—*Analogies of Experience*—relate not to mathematical but to physical science; not to the internal structure of objects, but to their order and relations in actual existence. They are termed analogies, because they represent the relation of things



after the analogy of the relation of thought. Just as in a judgment there is the antecedent and consequent, so in our experience of things there is the physical cause and the physical effect. But it is only an analogy, not an identity. Under this head Kant treats of substance, causality, and simultaneity. Hence we have these rules—(a) With regard to substance; in all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent. Unless thought supplied this persistent background it would be impossible for us to realize the relations of succession and simultaneity. (b) With regard to Causality, we reach this conclusion, that every event is connected with or follows after another event. In other words, all changes take place according to the law of cause and effect. The justification of this law depends on a fixity in the order of time. (c) What the second analogy does for succession in time the mind does for simultaneity. The objective co-existence of things is only conceivable on the assumption that as parts of a community they act and react on each other. The rule then here is, that all substances as perceived in space and time exist in complete reciprocity.

(4) *The Postulates of Experiential Thought*, which are the last class of synthetical principles, explain the use of the terms, possible, actual, and necessary, in the scientific world. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience is possible. That which coheres with the material conditions of things is actual, and, lastly, an existence is said to be necessary in the sense that everything which occurs is regarded as determined by a cause which preceded it, and on which it must follow.

Under these four heads Kant defines the limits of human experience. These principles of the understanding can be applied only to the objects of perception. Our notions cannot extend to a knowledge of *noumena*—to things in themselves as existing outside of time and space and all causal connection. The attempt to know *noumena* in the same way as phenomena has led to all manner of contra-

dictions. To prove this is the object of what Kant calls Transcendental Dialectic.

3. *Transcendental Dialectic.* We can only know how things appear to us; we can never know what they are in themselves. But it is just this unknown and unknowable with which all so-called metaphysics concerns itself. In so far, then, as Kant limits our knowledge to experience he declares the impossibility of metaphysics. But the strange thing is that the mind is not content to remain within the confines of the known. Thought, in other words, has two sides or functions, a real and an ideal. There is a higher form of the mind which Kant distinguishes from understanding by the name Reason. And as the understanding has its conceptions, so the Reason has its ideas. The object then of the Transcendental Dialectic is to examine and criticise the Ideas.

Reason is the faculty of drawing conclusions from certain given ideas—and its function is to gain the most general principles that the mind is capable of. While the understanding has experience assigned to it, reason has only to do with itself, and is exclusively occupied in perfecting our subjective consciousness. Reason, therefore, is only a purely formal logical faculty of reflection. Taken generally, it expresses the effort to find, in respect to the knowledge that is given through the understanding, those principles by which completion and unity may be reached. But just here lies the danger of reason. It is not content to rest in the finite, but is continually pressing onwards beyond its legitimate data. It can only operate with the notions of the understanding. It must not strain those notions beyond their legitimate bounds and exalt its conclusions into objects of knowledge. We must not, in other words, apply our ideas to the unconditioned, to that which is beyond the limits of experience. We must remember that the ideas of reason are mere ideas yielding no real knowledge. They are not constitutive principles through which objects of knowledge are produced, but only regula-

tive principles, whose real use is to enable us to arrange our knowledge and bring it under certain working conceptions.

But reason is ever seeking to follow up the chain of phenomena beyond all possible experience. It aspires to complete and absolute unity. It furnishes ideas to which no perceptions can correspond. These ideas are not, however, valueless. They exist as demands, as *à priori* needs of the mind. Their function is to lead on the understanding and sustain it in its efforts to reach a more complete synthesis of phenomena. It is when reason attempts to do more than this that it falls into error. Reason, in other words, is the faculty of the absolute. It represents a need, an ideal of the mind. "Transcendental illusion" consists in our converting this mere subjective need into an objective reality.

The object of the Transcendental Dialectic is to expose this illusion.

Kant proceeds to trace the various forms of self-deception by which *à priori* reasoning imagines that it has gained a hold on truths outside the sphere of experience. And here, according to his wont, the procedure is designated by names borrowed from logic. Just as there are three forms of logical reasoning, so the absolute has these three forms: the Categorical, the Hypothetical, and the Disjunctive. *Categorical* reasoning presupposes a subject that is not itself an attribute—the soul or *ego*. *Hypothetical* reasoning implies a supposition that presupposes nothing further, and consequently embraces the whole of the conditions of phenomena—the Universe. *Disjunctive* reasoning, which embraces totality, assumes the ultimate ground of totality—viz., the Supreme Being, God.

The attempt to establish these ideas as existing outside of the mind gives rise to a series of contradictions which have vitiated all past systems of psychology, cosmology, and theology.

These three ideas give rise to three forms of dialectic

reasoning, which Kant names: the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, the Antinomies of Pure Reason, and the Ideal of Pure Reason.

1. *Psychology*. With reference to the soul, with which he begins, Kant seeks to show that the Cartesian, "*Cogito, I think*," is made the basis for the assumption, without any support from experience, that the soul is a real object, immaterial, simple, personal, and immortal. The logical unity of consciousness is translated without any warrant into a real substance of mental life. The act of thought is falsely converted into a thing. What has never been given as a perception, but only as an idea, is treated as a real object. This Kant styles a *paralogism*.

2. *Cosmology*. In like manner when we attempt to form a conception of the world as a whole, we are involved in what he calls *antinomies* of cosmology, in which the thesis and the antithesis seem equally valid. With equal force we may say the world had a beginning in time and it had no beginning. We may assert that every compound consists of simple parts, and that there are no simple parts. Or, again, we may allege that there is such a thing as freedom, but we may also contend that nothing but necessity exists. Finally, we may allege that there exists an absolutely necessary Being and that there exists no such Being. The arguments on both sides are equally sound, and the fact that they contradict one another shows that we have entered a region where truth cannot be reached by the principles of mere logic.

3. *Theology*. And so finally with *the ideas of God*. In this section Kant attempts to destroy the cogency of the arguments hitherto adduced for the existence of the Deity. He combats the right of the ontological proof to infer existence from the conception alone. He shows that the cosmological argument involves a *petitio principii*, when it seeks the final cause of all contingent things in an absolutely necessary Being. Finally, he proves that the



teleological proof, even when we grant the beauty, harmony, and design of the universe—leads only to the conception of a wise and good architect of the world.

But while these proofs are unsatisfactory from a logical point of view, the denial of God's existence, Kant holds, is equally incapable of proof. On the great questions of metaphysics, — immortality, freedom, God, — scientific knowledge is hopeless. "Both parties to the dispute beat the air; they worry their own shadow, for they pass beyond nature to a region where their dogmatic grips find nothing to lay hold of."

Are these ideas then pure delusions? If so, how is it that the human mind ever harks back to them and finds in them a perennial fascination? Kant admits that these ideas have a relative value. They stand as an ideal towards which the mind aspires. The ideas of reason, though involving the mind in contradiction if pursued to their ultimate logical conclusions, have a regulative and practical validity. We may regard them as postulates. They do not add to our knowledge, but they help us to systematize our manifold experience, and while incapable of logical justification, they possess a moral certainty. The existence of God, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, are inexplicably bound up with our moral life. Metaphysics can no longer claim, indeed, to be the foundation-stone of religion and morality. "But if she cannot be the atlas who bears the moral heaven, she can furnish a magic defence. Around the ideas of religion she throws the bulwark of invisibility, and the sword of the sceptic and the battering ram of the materialist fall harmless on vacuity."

## CHAPTER II

### THE PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

THE *Critique of Pure Reason* is only the first stage in Kant's process of thought, and it was evidently regarded by its author as a basis for the superstructure of Practical philosophy, which is contained in the second part,—or the *Critique of Practical Reason*. If the knowledge of the objects of the ideas is denied, it is only to make room for faith. We only *know* the phenomenal, but we must still *believe* in the noumenal. The restriction of our knowledge, if in one aspect of it it means the limitation of our intelligence, in another it suggests the infinity of our being. Our consciousness of our limits points to the means of transcending them. Those very ideas which carry us into the supersensible world, though they cannot be logically proved, admit of a justification as the postulates or grounds on which, as spiritual beings, our whole moral life rests.

But it must not be supposed that Kant regards faith as something less than knowledge. It is, indeed, in his view a higher form of certainty guaranteed by the very consciousness of self. If Kant had been true to the suggestion which he himself makes, that the consciousness of self involves the knowledge of the whole world of things, he would have seen that the solution of the antinomies, which he set up at the close of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is to be found, not in emphasizing the distinction between

phenomena and things in themselves, but rather in the very perception of the unity of the self and the world of objects which self-consciousness involves. Kant has developed his practical philosophy partly in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, partly in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, and partly in the *Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Rights and Virtues*. The *Metaphysics of Ethics* treats of the laws of Morality; the *Practical Reason*, of the faculty for it; and the *Metaphysical Foundations*, of particular duties. In the first, Kant lays down the principle of the Categorical Imperative, the supreme law of the moral life. In the second, he inquires as to whether man has a faculty by which he is able to fulfil the commands of the moral law. After the analogy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason* is divided into two parts; an Analytic, which analyses the notion of duty as the dictate of a higher faculty which acts independently of sense in obedience to its own law; and a Dialectic, which deals with the antinomies which arise from the conflict between the authority of pure reason and the instigations of sense. Under this head he treats of the *Summum Bonum*, the supreme good or virtue which Practical Reason prescribes, and the difficulties and conditions of attaining it.

Again, just as the *Critique of Practical Reason* is divided into two parts, so *The Metaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Virtue* has two parts; the first of which has to do with Jurisprudence, or the laws and constitution of the State; and the second, with individual morals, or the duties of man to himself and to others.

In his treatise of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant develops a teleological conception of the Universe, and thereby seeks to unite in a higher unity, theoretic and practical reason, the ideas of nature and spirit, of necessity and freedom, in a realm of feeling which finds expression in the consciousness of the beautiful. Here, then, Kant treats of Art as embodied in the beautiful and the sublime,

as well as of the general idea of a teleological purpose in the universe.

Finally, Kant's religious views with regard to God's attributes and man's relation towards Him, with regard to Christianity and the Church's constitution and ordinances, are contained in his remarkable and somewhat neglected work, *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*. We may now proceed to a more detailed account of these various subjects.

*Kant's Doctrine of Morality.* Kant's theory of morals was an attempt to reconcile the two opposing ethical principles which were current in the eighteenth century. On the one side were the Realists, who treated man as a merely natural being, and, accordingly, demanded a pursuance of the natural impulses of his nature, some of whom, like Hutcheson, regarded them as benevolent, and others, like Helvetius, as selfish. Opposed to these, on the other side, were the Idealists, who conceived that man must be ruled only by his idea of goodness or perfection. Both theories, though opposed in their methods, united in regarding happiness as the end of life, the one the happiness of sensuous enjoyment, and the other that of self-sufficiency. Both set an end outside of the man himself as the basis of their ethical doctrine. Kant at once seeks to take a higher standpoint, above both, and to show that the law of our moral life must not rest upon ulterior ends at all, but must spring from an inherent rational principle. Morality must be disinterested, and the law which governs man's life must be self-originating and not subordinate to any imposed end.

Hence the distinctive feature of Kant's moral theory is his enunciation of what he calls the "Categorical Imperative," the supreme inner demand of reason. The originality of his doctrine lies in his derivation of the contents of the law from the form, and to him belongs the distinction of having first most clearly formulated the principle of morality as "Duty for duty's sake."



Kant opens his *Metaphysics of Morals* with the words, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, but a good will."

The will must be good of itself, not because of what it performs or effects. It must not depend upon the qualities of moderation, on self-control, or deliberation. For even a villain may do good actuated by such motives. Like a jewel, it must shine by its own light as a thing which has value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. Even though a virtuous act is pleasant to the agent, or any violation of duty painful, this moral pleasure or pain cannot strictly be the motive to the act, because it follows instead of preceding the recognition of an obligation to do it.

All theories of morals are to be rejected which are based on any lower motive than the absolute disinterestedness and independence of the will. The desire for happiness, all counsels of prudence and sagacity, and every eudaemistic system which places the principle of morality outside the man himself, are inadequate as a principle of moral action. The moral law is an absolute command, a categorical imperative. But now there are three questions which we must ask with reference to this moral law. What is its source, what are its contents, and what is its value?

(1) With regard to its *source*—it springs directly from the reason itself. We can get no further back than that. It is a law imposed not from without, but by the very constitution of man as an intelligible being. Man as a rational being has this prerogative above all other beings, that he forms his end for himself. Nature is governed by material laws which it fulfils unconsciously. The lower animal has its ends fixed for it by its instincts. But man is distinguished by the power of knowing and realizing his own ends. The "ought" comes from within.

(2) As to its *contents*—it cannot contain any empirical element. It must be wholly independent of all ends or

motives. The demand of the moral law has no reference to the *matter* of the act, but only to the *form*. Happiness cannot be the principle of morals. For happiness is often in conflict with our reason, and different men have very different ideas as to the nature of felicity. "If nature had desired to place our destiny in happiness it would have done better to equip us with infallible instincts rather than with the practical reason of Conscience, which is continually in conflict with our impulses." There are several kinds of imperatives. Those which demand a certain action for the sake of some result to be obtained through it are what Kant calls "hypothetical imperatives," *i.e.* they are subordinate to certain ends which may be good and useful, but in themselves cannot give a content to the moral law. The formula for this class of imperatives is, "Who wills the end wills the means." But the requirement of the moral command must be dictated and fulfilled solely for its own sake. It does not appeal to what a man may wish on other grounds. It holds good unconditionally and absolutely, and its formula is "Do your duty, come what will." Hypothetical Imperatives are merely maxims or counsels of prudence or skill suggesting the best means of procedure to obtain certain results. The categorical imperative, which is immediately evident so soon as the will perceives the law, and determines us to action without regard to result, alone deserves the name of a law or command. All material motives come under the principle of agreeableness or happiness, and, therefore, of self-love. The will, in so far as it follows such natural ends, is not autonomous. It makes practical reason depend on something outside of itself. All expectation of reward or punishment, the consideration of utility, and even the will of God, are rejected by Kant as imposing external constraint upon the will.

The categorical imperative being the expression of the pure Rational will is universally valid, and it may be expressed in the formula, "Act on a maxim which thou

canst will to be law universal." Universality is a sign by which we can infallibly recognise the law of duty in particular cases. "If we observe the state of mind at the time of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we really do not will that our maxim should be a universal law. We only assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour, or just for once in favour of a passing inclination."

It is thus the *form* and not the *matter* which Kant regards as the essential consideration in this law. Morality lies not in the particular things we will, but in the way in which we will them. It is a negative test at best. It does not tell us what to do, but what we must not do. It is a law of restriction, not of realization. Never act except you can generalize your action. But on this principle—that only that action is right the maxim of which can be universalized—all particular will as such is condemned, for no particular will can be universalized. There is some truth in the criticism of Jacobi, who said that Kant sets up "a will that wills nothing." In other words, you cannot carry out any particular duty absolutely and make it a universal law without making it conflict, and in the end negate some other particular duty. This maxim of Kant can accordingly only be affirmed as a law by abstracting from it all the contents of desire. Hence, like the Stoics, Kant treats desire as an intruder upon the determination of the will which must be excluded that the will may preserve its autonomy. "To be entirely free from such desires," says Kant, "must be the universal wish of every rational being." Coming into contact with the appetites or propensities of daily life, the moral law seeks to limit and restrain their operations. From this merely formal abstract principle it is impossible, without the help of other considerations, to descend to particulars. The moral law, as Kant thus expresses it, declares only the negative *sine qua non* of morality.

But it is only fair to say that Kant takes a more positive

and concrete view. This he does by adding two new formulae for the moral law.

(3) We may, therefore, now pass from the contents or absence of contents to the *worth* or significance of the law. That only has inherent worth or dignity which is absolutely valuable in itself and is the condition for the sake of which all other things are valuable. This worth belongs in the highest degree to the moral law, as the expression of man's rational nature, and, therefore, the motive which stimulates a man to obey it must be nothing else but reverence for the law itself. It would be dishonoured if it were fulfilled for the sake of any external advantage. The dignity of the law, however, passes over to the man himself. Hence reverence for the worth of man is for Kant the real principle of morality. Man must perform his duty out of reverence for his own rational nature. Every rational being thus becomes a supreme end in himself. We must never regard ourselves as means, but always as ends. But every time a man follows his inclinations rather than his reason, he treats himself as a means. We must draw a distinction between persons and things. The person is inviolable, and should be respected by every other will as well as our own. Thus Kant gets a new formula for the imperative of practical reason; "always treat humanity, both in your own person and in the persons of others, as an end and never merely as a means." This formula not only compels me to preserve my own life, but also to make no deceitful promise to another. It even requires me to develop my powers and faculties, and it may even demand that I should contribute to another's happiness, or at least do nothing to hinder it. In short, I have no right to dispose of humanity in my own person or in others as I please, no right to hurt or destroy it; and, indeed, in order to realize myself as an end, I am bound to seek the ends of others, as the completion of my own ends.

Thus Kant conceives a Kingdom of Ends which includes all rational wills, as ends in themselves who treat one



another as such. Each man in this way participates in the institutions of universal laws, which he obeys, because he recognises in their universality the law of his own being. Thus we are led to this final formula, "Act in conformity with the idea that the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will." This is the principle of the "autonomy of the will." For man in submitting to universal legislature is really submitting only to himself. This Kingdom of Ends, while involving a more positive view of the moral life, is still tainted with negativism. Because of the opposition between the rational will and the particular desires, the Kingdom of Ends can never be actually realized. It remains an ideal, an "ought to be." It is conceived by Kant as a kingdom of limitation rather than a kingdom of reciprocal expression and realization. Kant does not rise to the conception of an organic unity of society in and through which alone individuals can attain to their true life and expression.

The moral consciousness, as a consciousness of reason determining itself, is the guarantee of the three great truths or postulates, which metaphysics could not prove—the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.

First, the *Reality of Freedom* is guaranteed. The moral law can have no meaning for me unless I *can* do what I ought to do. If the moral law be universal, *i.e.* binding on every man, then each must be in a position to fulfil it. The will must be free. As Schiller has expressed it—"Thou canst, therefore thou oughtest."

And as freedom is thus safeguarded, so the whole intelligible world in which alone freedom has its ground is also guaranteed.

Kant goes on to show that the *immortality of the soul* is also vindicated. The law demands complete conformity with itself. But in a being, such as man is, at once sensuous and rational, this conformity can never be more than partially realized in this world. Hence the soul

demands an indefinitely prolonged life to work out its ideals. There must be room for infinite progress, and continual approximation to the idea of holiness. In other words, the soul to attain to its true moral worth must be immortal. And, finally, the postulate of the *idea of God* is confirmed. The imperative nature of the moral law implies that there exists somewhere a good which is not only supreme but complete, an embodiment of that perfect holiness which is the source of all the conditions implied in the moral order. With the dual nature of man Kant connects in a somewhat curious way the idea of the *Summum Bonum*, which he defines as the union of happiness and virtue. As finite creatures endowed with sensibility we crave happiness; but as rational beings we aim at virtue. How are these opposite notions to be combined? The one is not contained in the other, nor are they causally connected. In this world they do not go together. Striving after happiness does not make a man virtuous. And he who seeks virtue does not necessarily gain happiness. Since man belongs to a sensuous world as well as to an ethical, both sides of his nature must be vindicated. There must be a sense in which felicity and holiness can be united. May it not be that in the end virtue will be seen "to be worthy of happiness," and happiness will be the crown of virtue? Faith must reach beyond the sensuous life of man to a supersensuous life, where the conflict between these two ideas does not exist, where the reality of the highest good—the *Summum Bonum*—will be attainable—a world in which perfect virtue will be felicity—and true felicity will be virtue. But in order to realize this ideal condition, we must not only postulate a life of infinite duration, but the existence of a Being, who is the Creator at once of the natural and the spiritual world, the cause at once of the sensuous and the rational life of man. In other words, we must believe in a God whose action is regulated with a regard to the physical and moral natures of His creatures.

It will be impossible to do more than refer to Kant's application of his principle of morals to *Jurisprudence and particular Duties*. As a self-conscious being and yet a particular object in the world, man's problem of life is to determine himself in relation to other subjects, who, like himself, are also particular objects. Law becomes, therefore, a corrective determination of rights and duties, and the problem of *Jurisprudence* is "to keep self-conscious beings in their acts from coming into collision with each other"; and such a collision is avoidable only in so far as their acts are in agreement with rules that can be universalized. The idea of right, therefore, has to do only with the external relations of one person to another. Legal right is defined by Kant as the "whole compass of the conditions under which the will of individuals is harmonized according to a universal law of freedom." He divides all rights into *private* and *public right*. To the first belong rights in things, persons, relations of contract, and of marriage. Public right is subdivided into the right of States, Nations, and of Citizens of the world.

The social contract is at once necessary and inviolable. The State protects the individual against the possibility of enslavement to others; while it limits, it also helps each to realize his freedom. The true or ideal form of State he holds to be Republican, and while he denies to the individual the right of resistance, he maintains that governments should base their authority upon justice and not on expediency.

As in his theory of Rights, so in his conception of *Particular and applied Ethics*, the idea of constraint or compulsion is prominent. But here it is a constraint exercised not upon others, but upon one's self. Such a compulsion of one's own desires involves an effort which is expressed in the word *Virtue*, or *Duty*. My freedom lies in my power of self-compulsion—in my ability to make myself an end in conformity with my own reason. What then are the ends which as rational beings it is our duty to

set ourselves? These, Kant answers, are our own perfection and the happiness of others. One's own happiness must never be the goal of action, for what natural impulse requires cannot be duty. Nor is it my duty to further the perfection of another. That is each man's own business. We are to seek, however, the happiness of others, not, indeed, directly, but in a negative way in so far as we are to do nothing that would put a stumbling block in the way of their physical and moral well-being. Hence arises the twofold division of moral duties—*duties to ourselves* and *duties to other men*. Duties to God are excluded, for all duties are, in a sense, duties to God as the Legislator whose will is one with the moral law. (1) *Duties towards one's self* are treated of first negatively and then positively. The *negative duties*, relative to man's *physical* being are those which lead to self-preservation, and the maintenance of the species. The negative duties of man to himself as a *moral being*, are the opposite of the three vices of lying, avarice, and false humility. Under this division Kant remarks that all duties rest on his being "born judge of himself," and, therefore, the fundamental duty is expressed in the Socratic maxim, "Know thyself." The *positive duties* of man are simply the duties of developing his bodily and mental powers and, above all, seeking to attain to holiness. (2) *Our duties to others* are divided into duties which create obligation on the part of others and those which do not. The former involves the feeling of love, the latter that of respect. Love and respect as mere feelings are not duties. But the maxim of benevolence, of which well-doing is the consequence, is obligatory as a maxim of the will, being based on the moral principle of universality, which permits us to wish our own well-being only on the condition that we wish well to every other. It will thus be seen that in this doctrine of virtue there is no place for, and no justification of the natural passions as vehicles of reason. Moreover, the individual is made at once the basis and standard of all moral action. Morality is pure self-deter-



mination. The egoistic motive is the ultimate one, and the happiness of others is only to be aimed at as the condition of realizing the end of one's own being.

## CHAPTER III

### CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

WE have seen that the three great ideas which speculative reason could not prove practical reason vindicates. The man to whom the moral law is the supreme principle of the inner life cannot but believe in personal immortality and in the existence of a moral ruler of the universe as well as in his own freedom. The assurance of our freedom rests on the consciousness—"Thou canst, for thou oughtest." The conviction of the immortality of the soul derives its reality from the possibility of perfected virtue, and that of the existence of God from the necessity of the Supreme Good. Hence the three ideas, though insolvable problems to pure thought, are the practical postulates of moral action.

But it seemed to Kant that there must be a sphere in which these two elements of our consciousness—thought and action—can be united. The faculties of the human mind are three in number—knowing, feeling, willing. May it not be that the first and last are mediated through the second, and that we have a power of combining theoretic and practical reason by the faculty of judgment, or of reflective feeling? Kant was a man who was deeply impressed with the moral order of the universe as well as with the royal law of duty. Two objects, he says in a noble passage, awoke his supreme reverence,—the starry heavens above and the moral law within. What he really

wanted to find was a final cause or purpose of the world which would at once justify the reasonings of the mind and the activities of the will. The *Critique of Judgment* cannot be said to have been a part of his original plan. But when engaged on a treatise on Taste, the idea of a final cause which he discovered to be the key to the consciousness of the beautiful and the sublime, suggested the thought that the same teleological idea might be extended to the whole system of things, and thus the gulf which seemed to separate the *Critique of Pure Reason* from the *Critique of Practical Reason* might be bridged over by a third Critique, the object of which would be to unite in one systematic unity all the elements of our consciousness.

The *Critique of Judgment*, therefore, deals with two topics somewhat casually bound together (yet the one really a particular case of the other)—a theory of Taste, and an examination of the value of Teleology in Physical Science and in Moral Theology.

(1) The *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, as the first part of the work is entitled, deals with the notions of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Suggested to some extent by Burke's *Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful*, and influenced by Lessing and Mendelssohn, Kant's analysis laid the foundation for a philosophy of Art. What is the Beautiful? In defining it Kant distinguishes the Beautiful from the Agreeable and the Good. The Beautiful is that which pleases, not because of sensuous desire like the Agreeable, nor through conformity with reason like the Good, but solely of itself, by its very nature. It is, in one word, the object of disinterested Pleasure. It is quite distinct from all ideas of utility, and free from all admixture of social interest or personal desire. We pronounce an object to be beautiful when imagination freely groups its forms and outlines in such a way as to exhibit an unsought symmetry, as if some intelligence had guided the moulding hand of fantasy. Beauty may be said to be realized by the harmony

of Sensibility and Understanding, and it claims universal assent.

While the Beautiful signifies a rest in the play of the faculties, the *Sublime* is created through the medium of a painful feeling of inadequacy. An object is styled "Sublime" when the imagination fails to grasp in a whole the mass of details which it suggests, or when the feeling of its overwhelming power, as compared with our weakness, suggests the thought of our littleness or inability. The Sublime is the great, that which surpasses all else we know, and in the contemplation of which, by its very infinitude, we feel pain. This sense of the sublime is really a quality in ourselves rather than in the object, and it bespeaks the greatness of man that he can conceive it. The infinite alone is absolutely great, and that is properly only in ourselves. The sublime in nature is but a reflection of our own minds. By the very check given to the imagination we are reminded that we have a power of thought or an ideal nature which sensuous knowledge can never attain to, and which physical terror can never overpower. The sense of sublimity presupposes even more than the sense of beauty, a susceptibility to ideas, and implies some degree of moral culture. It can only be felt by noble minds. But, like the beautiful, it claims universal assent—not as a right which can be enforced by argument, but as an acknowledgment which all must yield whose judgment has not been perverted or dulled.

"Nature," says Kant, "was found beautiful when it looked at the same time as if it were Art; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious that it is Art and it yet appears to us as if it were Nature."

The love of Art is not a sign of moral goodness, but interest in the beauty of nature indicates the presence of beauty in the soul.

What produces beauty in nature is a mystery. But in Art, genius, whose characteristics are originality and inspiration, would seem to be the prime creative power.



Genius has the power of giving universality to the particular and producing in the realm of Art what aesthetic judgment must assent to. Genius exhibits aesthetic ideas, and it is the function and gift of the artist to give utterance to those thoughts or feelings of ordinary people which they see to be beautiful or sublime when so expressed. Everything short of what is nauseous may be made beautiful by artistic rendering.

But not only does genius invest common things with a beauty they did not seem to have; it has also the power of disentangling the ideal from the real, or, in other words, of giving a sense of infinity to the particular. Thus it is the peculiar touch of genius, by a line of poetry or a stroke of the brush, to expand the imagination and suggest deeper meanings than are actually formulated in the particular poem or picture. This power of prolonging and expanding images of beauty, Kant calls "the Exhibition of Aesthetic."

Thus in the beautiful as well as the sublime, in the beauty of Art not less than in the beauty of Nature, the act of judgment forces us to refer to "the undefined idea of the supersensible" in order to explain the mysterious sympathy between our powers of knowledge and the nature of their objects.

But to feel the influence of beauty and sublimity there are conditions of mind and heart necessary. To create or appreciate beauty a sense of peace and harmony must pervade us. Passion must be stilled. Hence the right training for the purification of taste is to develop ethical ideas and cultivate the moral feelings. "Taste is a faculty of judgment by which we discern moral ideas embodied in sensuous forms."

(2) The *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, the second part of the criticism, deals with the idea of Design, and, therefore, serves to connect the theoretic with the moral philosophy. The underlying idea is that of an intellect for which universal conceptions are not mere abstractions,

which are only formally connected with particulars, but are really a *comprehensive principle* by which the various parts of nature are related and unified.

Observation alone affords no evidence of design, because an end or purpose cannot be perceived in an object, and can only be thought into it.

The theory of Natural Science can only be mechanical. End (Zweck) is not a category of objective knowledge, and all explanations of nature consist in pointing out the causal necessity with which one phenomenon produces another. But, on the other hand, there are some products of the world which cannot be accounted for by mechanical laws, and which demand for their explanation the theory of final causes.

Final Cause is that quality in an object in virtue of which it is the cause of itself. Life is inexplicable by merely mechanical causes. The adaptation which we find, therefore, in the higher organisms of nature we are obliged to assume to be everywhere, although we cannot immediately discern it.

Adaptation may be said to be of two kinds, external and internal.

*External Adaptation* is always relative, designating merely the utility of one thing for another. For example, the sand of the sea shore is favourable to the growth of pine trees, or the earth affords the necessary nourishment for animal life. These are examples of external adaptation. Such results are, as far as we can see, merely arbitrary or accidental. They do not express the inner nature of the thing.

*Internal Adaptation*, on the other hand, is intelligible *per se*—quite apart from any notion of use. The organic products of nature (life, growth, etc.) are so constituted that their several parts act and react upon each other. All are necessary to the whole, and necessary to one another. Each part of the organism is at once cause and effect. Living bodies are not like machines. They have

creative or formative power. They are not explicable on mechanical principles. They are what Kant calls teleological or purposeful.

It is true we cannot prove this principle of adaptation in nature generally, for the mind always proceeds from particulars, but we are driven to assume it as the only true explanation of the world. For, in the first place, this seemingly contingent world can only be determined in relation to a self which imposes on it its own idea of unity; and, in the second place, in virtue of the moral law we are obliged to regard ourselves not merely as ends to ourselves, but also as ends to all nature. In other words, the moral law, which imposes an ideal upon us and assures us of a self-determinative power, makes us regard all nature as a means to the realization of our moral nature. The moral law must, therefore, be the nature of God, the absolute Being, and must reveal itself without as well as within us. Man is forced to regard himself as the end of all things. And if it seems that on account of his sensuous nature, nature does not always treat him as an end, but simply as a natural thing, still the idea of the *Summum Bonum* to which his moral life points leads him to conceive a mind in which the opposition between spirit and nature is harmonized, and all things have their necessary purpose, and adaptation to all others and to the world as a whole.

Kant's teleological views lead naturally to his *views of religion*. In his theory of method Kant states the task of philosophy to be the answering of three questions: what can I know? what ought I to do? and what may I hope? The first is theoretical, the second practical, and the third the union of both. All three Critiques, the three great divisions of Kant's philosophy, lead to the same conclusion, viz.—that God is at once the final cause and ultimate ground of all being. But, now, if God is, there is a final question—What may I hope, if I do as I ought? This question leads Kant to present his philosophy of

religion, which he does in his work, *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*.

Religion, according to Kant, can only come after Morality. It must not determine Morality, but be determined by it, for the idea of God arises only in connection with the idea of the chief good.

The treatise is divided into four parts. The first deals with the Radical Evil in Human Nature. The second treats of the Conflict of Good and Evil for Mastery in Man. The third considers the Victory of the Good Principle over the Evil, and the Founding of the Kingdom of God on Earth—the idea of the Church. And the fourth treats of True and False Service in Religion and the Priesthood.

The basis of all religion is the freedom of the Will, and the sum of religion is Morality. There is no place for love, nor must we be actuated by fear or hope. Law must be supreme.

Good and Evil contend in the human heart. Evil lies in something which is before any action, yet it cannot operate without our choice. The real hindrance to good is the deceitfulness of the heart, which is another name for original Sin (Urböse).

This self-deceit is the foul blot in our race disturbing the moral judgment. Man is not created good, but to be good. The New-birth is the reversal of the original propensity of our nature. Man's whole worth rests on his power to obey the moral law. To awaken enthusiasm for the law is the truly moral means of confirming men in Good.

In his scheme there is no room for the supernatural in the usual sense. We may admit the possibility of miracles, but must and do act as if everything depended on ourselves. Prayer should do no more than ask submission and conformity to God's will.

*Christianity* is the only religion that can effect the moral reformation of man. As the Founder of it, Jesus is to



be honoured, both in His life and teaching. The Gospels are the highest embodiment of this pure religion. Revelation is possible, but only of things which men are capable of knowing by their own reason. Scriptural truths must rest not on historical but upon moral evidence alone. The purpose of the Scriptures is to teach the religion of reason.

The Son of God is simply **Humanity**—the ideal Humanity, which is the only worthy divine goal of Creation—the Image of God's Glory. Only by our acceptance of this idea, and our endeavour to be incorporated in this Humanity, can we be the Sons of God. Saving faith is the belief in the perfect ideal, not in the historical fact of Christ's Life.

From these principles Kant deduces the idea of the *Church*—the Community of believers—a Society which exists for the mutual help of men in the practice of virtue. The bond of the moral commonwealth must not be outward, but ethical; the basis of it is the moral order, and the goal, the Kingdom of God. Ordinances and observances, though not really a service of God, have their educative use. "Dogma has value only as it has moral core." The Doctrine of the Trinity contains no significance for the practical life. It matters not whether there be three or ten persons in the Godhead. Thus what in Hegel was the very rationale of God's Being and the essential basis of religion is in Kant a matter of no moment. The object of every creed is to prepare the way for the faith of reason. Moral conduct and not belief is the essential thing in religion.

The history of the Church has been the conflict between superstition and reason. The preponderance of ritual over reason leads to priestcraft and idolatry. The aim of the treatise is to reconcile his moral theory with the fundamental conceptions of Christianity. The effort is not very successful. Religion is a merely external thing in his system, and God stands outside his theory of life. Indeed,

it may be said that just as Kant's individualism limited his conception of the social and political life, so it has limited and impaired his view of religion. He never really gets over the duality of Good and Evil, which is the counterpart of the duality of the intelligible and sensible world, the world of reason and of things.

In two respects Kant stands pre-eminent among the thinkers of all time. He has given the most thorough analysis of the human mind that has ever been offered, and he has propounded the idea of duty with an earnestness that has seldom been equalled. The *Critique of Pure Reason* represents the greatest revolution that has ever taken place in the realm of speculation, while the *Critique of Practical Reason* marks a new epoch in moral philosophy. In Kant, as one has said, "Reason has come to herself."

The object of Kant, in the theoretic realm, was to abolish the distinction which previous philosophy had assumed between subject and object, not by suppressing one of the factors, but by showing that thought and things are really related in all our thinking. But though Kant, as against Hume, vindicates a certain reality for knowledge, it is still not a knowledge of realities. In place of the old dualism he creates a new dualism, between the phenomenon and the noumenon. There is a world of things in themselves to which the mind cannot penetrate.

But it must at least be said that Kant has given to the problem a wholly new form, so that the old bald individualism of Locke or Leibnitz is no longer possible. He has shown that thought by its very action establishes a synthesis in which both subject and object are inseparably related. Kant has for ever vindicated for the mind the chief function in creating our world, and his permanent achievement is the revolution he has effected in our notion of what constitutes reality and his pointing out the direction in which the solution of the problem is to be sought.

In the practical sphere also Kant's influence is scarcely

less marked. Against utilitarianism in all its forms he raises a powerful protest.

His moral theory is grand, if somewhat stern. He proclaims the universality of reason as the distinctive element in man as opposed to the transient phases of appetite, which he shares with the lower animals. In laying emphasis on duty as opposed to inclination, Kant has exposed himself to the reproach of asceticism and negativism which some of his critics have cast upon his theory. There is ground for the charge. At the same time, it must be remembered that asceticism and self-denial are a necessary stage in the moral life both of the individual and of the race. All spiritual progress consists in subordinating the lower to the higher. But the defect of the ascetic theory is,—a defect from which Kant's doctrine is not wholly free,—that it treats this aspect of the moral life as final. Self-realization cannot consist in mere resistance to desire alone. For that would be to set up one part of human nature against another. It would be to assume that the natural impulses have no justification, and only exist to be crushed out. Such a theory would make virtue depend for its very existence on continued resistance. The victory of virtue would involve its own destruction.

It is impossible to estimate the enormous impulse which Kant has given to philosophy. The world is his debtor for the infinitely fruitful seeds in which his works abound, and his influence has been exerted in all departments of science, and especially on theology, ethics, and art. Pericles said that "the whole world is the tomb of the great," and in no small degree may it be said of Kant.

## SECT. 2

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM

A SYSTEM of philosophy so searching and comprehensive was not likely to remain long unnoticed, and it soon acquired general recognition. It created an interest in philosophical subjects, which extended throughout all classes and excited an influence on all departments of science and literature, and particularly on theology and ethics.

The reception of the various parts of Kant's philosophy was, however, very different. The *Critique of Pure Reason* was at first scarcely understood, and by its seeming negations and revolutionary principles excited the suspicion and even the opposition of the orthodox clergy and the traditional dogmatists. But, on the other hand, the practical part was received by many with enthusiasm. Jean Paul Richter exclaimed, "Kant is not a light of the world merely; he is a whole solar system at once." Schiller became an ardent follower, and was especially delighted with his works on the Beautiful and the Sublime, which he made the basis of his own reflections on artistic feeling. Humboldt was also deeply interested in Kant's teleological views, while Goethe, who took note of every phenomenon of his time, was particularly pleased with the *Critique of Judgment*, though he looked with less favour upon the notion of a Categorical Imperative.

A variety of circumstances led, however, to a more particular examination of Kant's philosophy as a whole. It



was first taken up by a coterie of brilliant spirits at the University of Jena, to which Fichte, at first an ardent adherent of Kant, had just been called as Professor.

In close proximity to Jena lay Weimar, the home of Goethe, and the chief literary centre of Germany. Poetry and philosophy thus mutually stimulated each other, and in the person and work of Schiller, then Professor of History at Jena, were actually united.

Another factor which helped to mould the thought of this time was the revival of interest in the philosophy of Spinoza, brought about by a correspondence between Jacobi and Mendelssohn on the nature of God, and also by the studies of the youthful Fichte. Thus, in spite of the deep opposition between the two, Kant and Spinoza became the poles around which the speculation of the next generation revolved. Idealism is the common character of all the systems which arose after Kant. But it was from Kant that the new movement sprang. The conception of the "Thing-in-itself," the relation of the unknown object to the phenomenon of Experience, which seemed to be a fundamental element in the *Critique*, became the starting-point of a new series of speculations which led ultimately to the efforts of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to explain the world as a System of Reason.

## CHAPTER I

### PHILOSOPHY OF FEELING

BEFORE presenting the more imposing systems of idealism which owe their origin to Kant's speculative views, we must notice a tendency which took its rise specially in opposition to Kant's ethical and religious conclusions. It was not wonderful that a system which made religion a function of the will and exalted the behest of conscience in such a way as practically to dispense with the need of religion, should evoke dissent and reaction. According to Kant, the three ideas of God, immortality, and freedom could not be demonstrated, and were to be regarded as postulates, without theoretic certainty. To combat this uncertainty and doubt there arose a "philosophy of feeling" or faith which sought to vindicate these truths by a higher faculty than reason—by a kind of intuitive belief. The deepest truths do not admit of logical demonstration. They are not to be proved by the human understanding, but to be apprehended by subjective feeling, by inner intuition. It is, moreover, only a select few, an aristocracy of spiritual beings, who possess this spiritual sense. The truth lies not on the surface, and can only be discovered by a withdrawal into the secret depths of consciousness.

The chief representatives of this tendency are *Hamann*, *Herder*, and *Jacobi*, who stood in close personal union with each other.

*Johann Georg Hamann* (1730-1788) was born at Königs-

berg. He was a man of striking personality; egotistical, yet not without deep spiritual feeling. He was, on account of his originality and mysticism, called "The Wizard of the North." His writings, which consist of his autobiography, miscellaneous essays and letters, though now largely forgotten, had a considerable influence on contemporary thought, and especially on such writers as Goethe, Jacobi, Herder, and Richter.

He was a confirmed foe of the Enlightenment, that "*aurora borealis* of the eighteenth century," as he calls it, which separated the Divine from the Human. Like Kant he is satisfied neither with the materialism of France nor the Rationalism of Germany. But he is also dissatisfied with Kant's "two stems" of the faculty of knowledge by which he makes a cleavage between the Divine and the Human. Language itself, that Divine Gift to man, unites Idealism and Realism. But this union, which Hamann perceives and contends for, he never works out. The union is wholly subjective. He exalts feeling, and contends that the truth cannot be demonstrated to the understanding. It may, none the less, be held with a deep irrefragable certainty when it appeals to that which is most spiritual in man. Reason is not given to make us wise, but to show us our error. The Revelation of God given to us in Scripture is of equal validity with that of nature, but truth being wholly subjective cannot be taught: it must be immediately perceived by each individual for himself. Without its mysteries Christianity is not credible. Christ, the God-Man, in becoming flesh, solves all contradictions. So, too, he regards the Triune God as the basis and reconciliation of all divine truth. These tenets are of the very essence of the Christian faith, but to try to prove them, instead of inwardly experiencing and living them, is just as foolish as an attempt to deny them.

Erdmann calls Hamann "the theosophist or mystic among the faith philosophers." Jean Paul says of him, "the great Hamann is a deep heaven full of mighty stars,

but also of many dark clouds which no eye can penetrate."

"His style is a stream which a storm has driven back to its source, so that the German trading vessels know not how to get up." His works collected by Roth, are in eight vols. (1821); but a most interesting life, with extracts from his writings, has been written by G. Poel in 1874.

*Johann Gottfried Herder* (1744-1803) was one of the most thoughtful and influential writers of Germany. If not an exact thinker, he was fertile in suggestion, full of genial enthusiasm, a poet and preacher as well as a philosopher. His book on the *Spirit of Hebrew Poetry* impresses its readers with the sublimity and attractiveness of the Scriptures. His principal work—*Ideas Towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, in which he regards nature as a progressive development of which man is the goal—is an application to the life of man generally of the ideas which Lessing applied to the History of Religion. The conception of development,—the idea that everything grows and expands from type to type,—pervades the book, which is remarkable for its anticipation of modern evolutionary theories. Reason, Herder holds, directly recognises God as the Supreme Reason—the primary cause and bond of all things. As man's development is incomplete in this world, we are warranted in assuming his immortality. Religion is the highest expression of the spirit of humanity, and religious feeling, the condition of man's deepest life. To comprehend man, Herder begins with the universe and attempts to show how the central position of the planet on which man dwells conditions the whole character of human thought and life—(an idea which has recently been revived and advocated with vigour by Wallace in his book, *Man's Place in the Universe*). The history of man is a natural process: in his life we see the same laws of development which we see in nature. Herder was influenced by Kant, but probably more by Hamann, with whom he agrees that there is no pure thought, and that all certainty must rest upon faith or



inner experience. In his work on *God*, containing his philosophy of religion, which is a modified Spinozism, he assigns to the deity the position of the world-spirit. Christ, through His complete consciousness of the Divine and Human, is the Ideal Man. Man is not only the crowning work of the universe to whom all lower forms of life point, he is also the first link in a higher order of existences. Hence the life-work of man is to cultivate those elements of his humanity which unite him with the highest.

These views, which are opposed to the Kantian standpoint, are interesting as giving us the first impulse to the philosophical treatment of history, which becomes a marked feature in the thought of the nineteenth century. Herder was not only a philosopher, but even more, a poet and literary writer. He was an enthusiast for nature and all natural things, and in this respect again finds himself in opposition to Kant's views as to the elements of beauty and of aesthetic feeling generally. He interested himself in antiquity, folklore, and all primitive forms of poetry and life, and, along with Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, was one of the writers who exercised a broadening and enriching influence on the general culture and thought of Germany.

While with Herder philosophy proper had only a secondary place, with *Fried. Heinrich Jacobi* (1743-1819) it is the central interest. He was an acute, if not, indeed, a systematic, thinker, and he deals more directly with philosophical problems. His protest against Kant's philosophy of religion is more definite and pronounced than that of Herder. He occupied an important position in his day. He was born at Düsseldorf, but studied in Geneva. He had a country seat near his native town, where he gathered around him a circle of literary friends. In 1807 he was made President of the Academy of Munich.

He has been called the "Pantheist in Head and the

Mystic in Heart," in that he united, as he himself professed, the mysticism of Hamann with the pantheism of Herder.

Jacobi does not profess to be a philosopher of the schools. His writings are occasional and desultory, often taking the form of letters, dialogues, and even novels.

He was one of the earliest to realize the importance of the revolution wrought by Kant's philosophy. He had been in England, and had been attracted by the Scottish philosophy. The French Encyclopedists, especially Rousseau and Bonnet, interested him, while to him is due the fresh attention which the works of Spinoza began to receive.

Jacobi is the greatest of the faith-philosophers, and may be said to sum up and define their general position. He holds that the fundamental truths of natural religion are indemonstrable. They are, however, the objects of an immediate belief, a spontaneous intuition, inspired by a necessity of feeling. This instinctive faith is an act of reason. But reason is not, as according to Kant, merely regulative, it is intuitive. God, immortality, freedom, though lying beyond the apprehension of sense, are guaranteed to us by this higher faculty of reason.

Taking this idea for his guidance, he successively examines Spinozism, Hume's and Kant's teaching, and Schelling's philosophy. His principal works are:

1785. *Of the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mendelssohn.*

1787. *David Hume, upon Belief, or Idealism and Realism.*

1790. *Letters to Fichte.*

1802. *On the Attempt of Criticism to Bring Reason to the Understanding.*

1811. *Of Divine Things and Their Revelation* (in which he charges Schelling with employing Christian terms in a pantheistic sense, and accuses him of infidelity).

The central point around which the entire philosophy

of Jacobi turns is the distinction he draws between mediate and immediate knowledge.

1. *Mediate knowledge* by means of demonstration and proof is only applicable to finite things. When we extend it to embrace the highest truths, it leads to materialism. "The way of demonstration," says Jacobi, "leads to fatalism." When we make the attempt to explain everything, we simply reduce the universe to a machine and leave no room for the freedom of the individual or the existence of God. The most logical and consequent of all systems is Spinozism, but on that very account it is a system of atheism and fatalism. It cannot be otherwise. When you attempt to explain the ultimate grounds of things, you can never get beyond the conditioned and the finite. Demonstration and proof must cease when you exhaust the chain of causes. By means of thinking we can only reach a world of mechanical necessity; we cannot attain to the origination of the world. "A God who could be proved would be no God."

2. But while this is the necessary result of all speculative thinking, of all mediate knowledge, man has another and higher faculty of knowledge, *immediate and intuitive*. Jacobi employs various terms to express this higher power. He calls it faith, sense, intuition, feeling, and sometimes reason.

Jacobi controverts Kant's position, that we only know phenomena, and not things in themselves. We know directly every object which affects us. It is absurd to say that the phenomena disclose nothing of the truth that is concealed behind them. In denying a knowledge of the thing-in-itself, Kant's philosophy is practically idealism, and idealism is nihilism. It is only by an awkward round-about method that Kant restores the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, in the practical critique, which he dissolves in his theoretic. How is it possible to take these ideas seriously once reason has found them unthinkable? How is morality possible if freedom is denied? Kant's

practical philosophy is not less a system of nihilism than his theoretic. "An impossible hypothesis, a chimera," he calls it. Immediate knowledge—the knowledge of faith and feeling, on the other hand, is our only guarantee of these ideas. Jacobi applies it to the three great objects of thought, nature, God, and the soul in its threefold relationship, freedom, immortality, and moral responsibility.

(1) With regard to *nature*, Jacobi maintains, in opposition to Kant, that our sensations give us real knowledge. The thing-in-itself is the only thing we do know. Space and time are not mere ghostly forms—"a twofold enchanter's smoke,"—but actual objects of perception. "Nature conceals God and the supernatural in man reveals Him."

(2) Faith, however, assures us of *God*. God is a necessity to human nature. "A rational human being is conditioned by a twofold externality—a nature below him and a God above him." "Man finds God because he can only find himself in and through God." The existence of God cannot, however, be proved, for you can only prove a thing from its causes and conditions, but God is the uncaused and unconditioned. Belief in God is a personal necessity—"I am not and cannot be, if He is not." And as He cannot be proved, so He cannot be comprehended. "A God whom we could understand were no God." We can say nothing about Him except that He is personal. That which is highest in us must be in Him. Reason can only belong to a personal being. The true revelation of God is a revelation within the soul of man. An external revelation is a contradiction. "God must be born into man himself if man is to have a living God and not merely an image or idol." The essential element in Christianity is the inner feeling it creates. The external evidences of the Christian religion are of little significance. The main thing is the witness of our own heart. Christ is not so much the originator of Christianity as the witness of faith



within each. Whether Christ existed historically or not is unimportant. "Does He exist in thee?" "In thee He may be a truly divine being, through whom thou mayest perceive the God."

(3) With faith in God, faith in *man's higher nature* stands in closest relationship. God reveals Himself to the inner spirit of man, and that inner revelation guarantees man's higher faculties,—his freedom, his moral obligation, and his immortality. Virtue is not so much a law without, as with Kant, as a natural instinct, an impulse of nature; and freedom consists in obeying the original qualities with which God has endowed us. Jacobi's peculiar principle of Subjectivity makes him an opponent of Kant's Categorical Imperative. "It is the prerogative of man that the law exists for him and not he for the law." In his works of fiction, especially in his *Woldemar*, he claims for the heart the immunities of poetry. "The grammar of virtue has no rules." "We can exalt ourselves above the sphere of the understanding by faith in divine things. There lives in us the spirit which comes directly from God, which is at once the guide and warrant of our actions." This same subjectivity lies at the basis of his religious views. In his work on *Divine Things and Their Revelation*, he condemns Schelling's system of Identity because of its pantheism. But he himself will not attempt a theory of God's nature. All definitions are anthropomorphisms. "We only know *that* God is, but not *what* He is." While Jacobi applied the term "reason" to this feeling of consciousness of God, he regarded reason as being only an organ for that which is supersensuous, and did not consider it a faculty which was independently active and productive of ideas. It is merely a receptivity—an inward sense of revelation—which he placed side by side with the outward senses. Both furnish us with truth, each after its kind, the one guarantees to us the existence of the spiritual world, and the other of the real world. The fact that all knowledge has some truth which really

exists, corresponding to it, and every subject some object which belongs to it and is bound up with its personality, is the kernel of Jacobi's philosophy,—an idea which he is continually groping after, but never succeeds in explaining. The distinctive feature of his position is the separation of understanding and feeling. These he could never unite. "In my heart there is light," he says, "but the moment I would bring it into the understanding it vanishes." He makes the mistake of fancying that the measure of his own consciousness is the measure of the intellect of mankind. Wishing to present the personality both of God and man, he places that which he conceives as constituting the essence of man—his self-consciousness—between the two, as something merely passive and purely receptive, both of things divine and things natural—a selfless medium.

"Feeling" is the first and last word of Jacobi's philosophy, and though he designates it reason, it remains nothing more than subjective intuition or faith.

Kant had made God, freedom, and immortality postulates which practical reason proved. Jacobi felt the insufficiency of his proof, but instead of attempting any rational justification of them, he simply accepted them as subjective intuitions, of which he could give no further account than that they were there. This is not philosophy, says Hegel, it is rather the despair of all philosophy. "Jacobi," he says, "is like a solitary thinker who, in the morning of his day, has a very ancient riddle hewn out upon an eternal rock. He believes in this riddle, but endeavours in vain to interpret it. He carries it about with him the whole day—he elicits from it meanings full of importance, which he moulds into images that delight the hearer and inspire him with noble wishes and presentiments; but the interpretation fails, and he lays them down at even with the hope that some divine dream, or the next waking, will pronounce to him the word for which he longs, and in which he has so firmly believed."

A somewhat different aspect of Kant's ethical philosophy was dealt with by *Schiller* and *Humboldt*; and although these writers were not adherents of the philosophy of feeling, still on their literary side they were closely related to some of its representatives, particularly to Herder and Hamann.

Just as Kant had assigned to different sources the two factors of our knowledge, sensation and thought, and had failed to assimilate them, so on the ethical side he had left a gap between the moral law and practical life, between duty and desire. It was the endeavour of *Schiller*, therefore, to remove the sharpness of this distinction in Kant's moral theory and to claim a place in life for the natural impulses of man. So far from its being the case that we only do our duty when we do it with aversion, virtue is nothing else than an inclination to duty. Man should obey the voice of reason with joy. We must not separate what is united in our nature, reason and sensibility. We must not suppress the sensuous part of our being, but bring it into harmony with our whole life.

Our freedom stands towards our nature in a double relation—it can liberate our nature or it may wholly command it. The spiritually free and the spiritually-ruled nature are both aesthetic manifestations. The one is Grace, the other Dignity. In dignity there is manifested the sublime will: in Grace, the beautiful Soul. In both the Spirit rules the sensuous nature—in Dignity, it rules as conqueror: in Grace, it rules without coercion. Dignity is imposing, but grace is winning.

There is a beauty in which Grace and Dignity unite. It is the perfect beauty of humanity such as the gods of Greece realized. Were Dignity the only possible ideal of man, his life would be grand, majestic, but stern and ascetic. Grace is the quality in which reason is reconciled with sense, and duty is performed with delight. Moral grace is spontaneous virtue, the virtue which flows from love of duty. It is a fine and noble thing to act from duty

alone. It is a more beautiful thing to do our duty for the love of it. The one fulfils the moral law; the other realizes our own nature. Our actions are indeed good when we do our duty because we ought, but they are beautiful when we do it because we cannot do otherwise; because they have become our second nature. The highest state, the state of the beautiful soul, is attained when the whole character so acts with freedom and spontaneity that it does not require first to still the voice of inclination, but fulfils, even its most painful duties, with the ease of instinct.

The purpose of all culture is to harmonize reason and sense and thus to fulfil the idea of a perfect manhood. As it is the aim of art to present life in its fulness, so it must be the aim of man himself to develop his whole nature and reach a stage in which the strife between duty and impulse ceases and his entire activity springs, by the harmonious working of both principles of his nature, from one noble idea (Schiller, *Über Anmuth u. Würde*).

Thus Schiller sought to harmonize the moral with the aesthetic standpoint. Here is revealed to us the difference between the philosopher and the poet. At the opposite extreme from Kant, the stern moralist, stood Goethe, the apostle of self-culture and geniality of life. Between the two, Schiller appeared as the reconciler. But he pleased neither. Dignity and Grace would not unite. Thus while Schiller began as a disciple of Kant, in his later writings, especially in his *Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man*, he approached more nearly to the views of Goethe.

A somewhat similar position was occupied by *Humboldt* (1767-1835), who sought also to soften the rigour of Kant's moral theory. Influenced by Goethe and Schiller and incited by his studies of Greek Antiquity, he developed the idea of an Aesthetic Humanity. The harmonious development of all man's powers and impulses was his ideal; the agreement of the spirit with nature, the general basis of his conception of the world. In his political



activities he carried the same idea into his conception of the State. Also in his researches into the origin of language, he sought to show that just as all sciences are connected, as the manifestation of one spirit, so all the different languages spring from a common source, have certain simple grand-forms and express one universal human need.

He also attempted to prove that all history is but the revelation of certain powers lying latent in man which are gradually developed through the union of the two principles of necessity and freedom.

## CHAPTER II

### SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM: FICHTE

WHILE these writers occupied themselves with particular aspects of Kant's philosophy—his moral and aesthetic ideas,—a series of disciples came forward,—Reinhold, Beck, Krug, Fries, and Maimon—who sought to reshape and elaborate the principles of the critical philosophy.

The point which was fixed upon was naturally the antithesis of phenomena and noumena, which Kant had left unexplained. It was felt that the thing-in-itself, that unknowable something, lying beyond human experience, which remained like a rudimentary organ, was something external to a complete theory of knowledge. The untenability of his conception, recognised even by Jacobi, was emphasized by Reinhold, who attempted to present the critical philosophy in a systematic unity from which he sought to eliminate the "unknowable." But he only succeeded in making the duality of subject and object more pronounced. The first attempt to transform the thing-in-itself proceeded from Maimon, who saw that the assumption of a reality outside of consciousness involved a contradiction. The "thing-in-itself" was an impossible conception, and hence he reduced it to what Leibnitz would have called a "petite perception." It is something given in consciousness, but only in an incomplete way.

It thus became clear that if the duality was to be overcome

a new conception of the entire relation of consciousness and being must be attempted.

The man who was destined to reshape the Kantian philosophy and to give a starting-point to the great systems of Idealism which follow was *Johann Gottlieb Fichte*. Fichte was born in 1762 at Ramenau in Lusatia. He studied theology at the Universities of Jena and Leipzig, and was licensed to preach, but never actually held a pastorate. He was early attracted to the study of Spinozism, which was not without its influence on his later philosophy. His acquaintance with Kant's philosophy was the turning point of his life. He went to Königsberg to visit the great philosopher, and while there wrote his first book, *Critique of all Revelation*, which won for him fame, and marked him out as the true successor of Kant. In this work he develops the idea that the moral law, which is sovereign in us, is changed for us by a demand of our higher nature, into a law-giver, and hence loyalty to duty becomes religion, and theology completes morality. He was called in 1794 to Jena, to succeed Reinhold, where his lectures aroused great interest. After a time of brilliant activity, he was dismissed on a charge of Atheism. Withdrawing to Berlin, he was afterwards appointed Professor at Erlangen, and, finally, at the newly founded University of Berlin, of which he became the rector in 1810. He died in 1814 of fever, which he contracted from his wife, who attended the wounded soldiers in the hospital. While he was in Jena he wrote his principal philosophical works—*The Basis of the Entire Science of Knowledge* (1794) (*Wissenschaftslehre*), and his more extended works on *Natural Right and the Theory of Morals*. The writings which he published in Berlin are of a more popular nature, among which may be mentioned, *The Destination of Man* (*Die Bestimmung des Menschen*) (1800); *Characteristics of the Present Age*; *On the Nature of the Scholar* (1806); *Way to the Blessed Life* (1806); *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808). These last were

delivered as lectures to the general public while the French were in command of the city, and did much to rekindle the patriotism of his countrymen.

His name, indeed, is remembered by many chiefly on account of his patriotic endeavour, and the author of the *Wissenschaftslehre* is overshadowed by the orator of the *Addresses*. He was a man of upright and resolute character, gifted with rare natural eloquence, and his lectures, both to his students and the public, were full of fire and inspiration.

"There are few characters," says Thomas Carlyle, "which inspire more admiration than that of Fichte. His opinions may be true or false, but his character as a thinker can be slightly valued only by those who know it ill, and as a man approved by action and suffering, in his life and in his death, he ranks with a class of men who were common only in better ages than ours."

Fichte's philosophy has been usually regarded as falling into two periods, that of Jena and that of Berlin, and it has been maintained by some that the views of the later phase are entirely opposed to those of the earlier. It is true, indeed, that his later writings are of a more popular nature and more positive in their tone and spirit, but there is nothing in the earlier period inconsistent with the later. Fichte himself was conscious of no change; he never regarded his *Wissenschaftslehre* as containing his whole system. His practical views as to man's vocation and higher life have their roots in his whole conception of human consciousness and activity laid down in *The Science of Knowledge*. It is true that in his later writings he seems to give a more definite place to the idea of God, but, as has been shown, there is evidence that from the very first he regarded the absolute *ego* as being prior to and underlying all the manifestations of the particular *ego*.

A more natural division might be made into theoretical and practical philosophy, for to Fichte all conscious life



consisted of thought and action; indeed, thought with him is action. The world can only be comprehended from the standpoint of consciousness, and that again can only be explained through the will. The *ego* is pure activity, and all reality is its product. The theoretic only exists for the practical. His doctrine is wholly life and action.

The philosophy of Fichte is a system of pure and subjective idealism. "All that *is* is the *ego*," all that we know belongs to and takes place within our consciousness. Reality is experience, and it is nothing more. Hence the philosophy of Fichte starts with the demand that the facts of experience shall be examined as facts of self-consciousness. They exist only for a thinking being, and their significance and interpretation for the thinking subject is the business of philosophy. Philosophy, in other words, is the rethinking of experience, the endeavour to reconstruct in a systematic way what ordinary consciousness accepts.

Fichte, therefore, calls his work *Wissenschaftslehre*, or *The Science of Knowledge*, for, unlike every particular science which has to do with special objects, the business of this doctrine is to develop from its first principle the plan or complete frame-work of human knowledge generally.

Before showing how Fichte works out this principle, it will be desirable to form a clear idea of the origin and aim of Fichte's theory.

Fichte starts from Kant. He believed that the *Critique* furnished the material of a consistent view of the world, and that all that was needed was a rearrangement of its principles. Kant had, indeed, traced back everything to the internal constitution of our own thinking faculty. But in so doing he had left in opposition two distinct sources of our knowledge, one of which was to be sought within our intelligent being, and the other without. In other words, Kant seemed to refer the matter of knowledge to the action upon us of a *non-ego* or "thing-in-itself" absolutely beyond consciousness. Now Fichte felt that

here was a duality which must be overcome. How was it to be done? There are only two ways possible. Experience is an activity of consciousness directed towards objects. It can, therefore, be derived only from things or pure thoughts. It must have its source in objects outside of the mind or in the thinking subject itself. The one is the explanation of Dogmatism; the other of Idealism. Dogmatism regards consciousness as a product of things, tracing all the activities of the mind back to mechanical necessity and ending in materialism and fatalism. Idealism, on the contrary, sees in things a product of consciousness in which all the activities of the subject are determined only in and by itself. Between these two explanations a great gulf is fixed. Dogmatism or realism, as it may be called, is shown to be untenable as assuming an absolutely unknown and unknowable thing outside of self-consciousness. Idealism is the only satisfactory standpoint, in that it selects as ground of explanation what is actually in consciousness. But it must not be an imperfect idealism—which takes the *ego* as the alone real and denies the existence of the *non-ego*, or multiplicity of experience. Self-consciousness always implies consciousness of something else than self, and could not exist without it. Consciousness, in order to know itself, must be conscious of a limit, but it must be a limit within itself and set by itself. The world which ordinary intelligence regards as outside is really a world within,—a world which, indeed, must be accounted for, and can, therefore, be accounted for only as the product of the *ego*. The central fact then for Fichte was what Kant called “the unity of consciousness.” To reduce, therefore, Kant to consistency and to complete his work, all that is necessary is to drop the “thing-in-itself,” which is really an excrescence, and does not belong to the system. To explain knowledge by what is not known is a contradiction. All we know are the determinations of our own self. You may call them, he says, images or representations, but they are the

images of nothing external, for we possess nothing else but those images. There can be no thing-in-itself. The wish to represent to ourselves objects as they are is unthinkable; it really amounts to the desire to represent objects without representing them.

Having thus seen Fichte's general standpoint, and having traced the genesis of his doctrine, we may now proceed to give shortly an outline of the development of his system.

We must start with a principle of unity, and show that all things are necessarily related in one complete system of reason. That is the task which Fichte undertakes in *The Science of Knowledge*. And here it is Fichte's aim to show that theoretic and practical reason coincide. For while the whole system of pure thought can be deduced from one principle, the ground of this principle is explicable only in the region of practical life. The ultimate basis for the activity of thought is to be found in the will. It is only in the practical sphere, in the world of action, that the *ego* becomes conscious of itself.

What then is this single principle from which Fichte starts, and how does it act? To answer this question we must remember what is the problem of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. It is to give a complete systematic exposition of the principles which lie at the basis of all reason and knowledge—it is to trace the necessary acts by which consciousness comes to be what it is. This can only be done by the mind reflecting on its own action. "Think thyself." The whole business of philosophy consists in making clear what takes place in that act.

Now, if we examine that act we find that there are three momenta in the process of analysis. These are, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. These three axioms are related. The second is the opposite of the first, and the third is the result of both.

Of these, the first must be fundamental.

(1) The primitive condition of all knowledge is the principle of identity—an intuitive axiom impossible of

proof.  $A$  equals  $A$ , or, we may say, "I am I." I affirm the consciousness of my existence, which is the basis of all reality—I posit myself. This is what Fichte calls a deed-act (*Thathandlung*). The *ego* posits itself as real. How it does so we cannot tell, but until it does so there is no consciousness.

(2) But in consciousness there is given an equally primitive act of positing a not-self, which is the negation of that which has been first affirmed. The *non-ego* is opposed in consciousness to the *ego*. This is the antithesis of the original thesis. This act is also intuitive. I cannot tell how it occurs. I only know that as soon as I think myself, I think also my non-self. This is the axiom of contradiction.

(3) But, now, there is a third act, which is the union of the two—the synthesis. We have seen that in so far as the *non-ego* is affirmed, the *ego* is negated, and yet the *non-ego* can only be affirmed within the consciousness or mind, and is, therefore, not really negated. How is this contradiction to be solved? How can we think together reality and non-reality without the one destroying the other? Only by each limiting itself. The contradiction is solved in a higher synthesis, which takes up the two opposites into the identity of the one sole consciousness. The *ego* and the *non-ego* limit or determine each other. The *ego* posits itself as limited and determined by the *non-ego*. And the *non-ego* is limited and determined by the *ego*.

From these somewhat abstract principles the entire science of knowledge is developed.

One word of caution must here be given. It must be clearly understood that the *ego* spoken of by Fichte in these principles is not the individual *ego*, not any particular self, but the pure *ego* in general (*Ichheit*), which is to be presupposed as the *prius* of the manifold representations of the individual consciousness. It is the pure eternal reason which is common to all and is the source of all thinking, and which is present in all particular manifestations.



In the synthesis of the third act, two principles may be distinguished: (1) The *non-ego* determines the *ego*; (2) the *ego* determines the *non-ego*. As determined or limited, the *ego* is theoretic; as determining it is practical. Hence we have the two parts of the *Science of Knowledge*—the theoretic and the practical. The first has to solve the question: How does Reason or the *Ego* come to assume anything objective? And the second has to answer the question: How does the *Ego* come to ascribe to itself causality?

1. *Theoretic Science of Knowledge.* In the theoretic part of his system Fichte asks the question: What is implied in the proposition, the *ego* posits itself as determined by the *non-ego*? In so far as the *ego* is determined it is passive. That is, it is acted upon by the *non-ego*. Now, if we stop there, and assert only that the *ego* is determined and passive, we are involved in the view which asserts that the *ego* gets its presentations or images in a passive manner, as effects of outward things. This is the view of realism, which explains all experience by the category of causality and leads, if consistently carried out, to attributing to the "Thing" sole activity and existence, and denying the same to the *ego*. On the other hand, if we say that the *ego* simply posits itself as substance or sum of all reality, all presentations may be regarded as nothing but its own creations, accidents of its nature, like mere dreams. This is the view of Idealism, which as little as Realism can satisfy the conditions of consciousness. Fichte attempts to unite these two extreme positions. Neither the mere action of the *ego* is ground of the reality of the *non-ego*, nor is the action of the *non-ego* the cause of the passivity of the *ego*. There is a higher category, viz. reciprocity, in which the opposites, causality and substantiality, are united. Fichte calls his system sometimes "critical idealism," or "ideal-realism." This reciprocal determination of passivity in the *ego* and activity in the *non-ego*—this mutual limitation presupposes an "independ-

dent activity " in the *ego*, whose function it is to oppose to the infinite activity of the *ego* an outer break or plane (*Anstoss*), against which the *ego* strikes and rebounds. This plane bends back the action of the *ego* into itself, and thus causes it to be conscious of a limitation. This independent creative activity Fichte calls the "Productive Imagination." It is the power by which objects are given and realized as objects in consciousness. By his famous theory of the "*Anstoss*," or shock of opposition, Fichte explains or explains away Kant's "given" element. What Kant found it necessary to call "a thing-in-itself," Fichte transforms into a necessity of consciousness. Without opposition, the *ego* would have no object on which to exercise its activity. We have here, as we shall see, the whole rationale of the moral life. If there were no effort and no arrestment, if there were nothing to oppose and nothing to overcome, there could be no self-realization in the moral world.

In conceiving the *ego* as positing and determining itself, Fichte regards its activity as composed of two opposite elements, a centrifugal and a centripetal. The one is ever seeking to fly off into infinitude: the other to turn back upon itself. "So far as the *ego* reflects," says Fichte, "the direction of its activity, it is centripetal: so far as it is that which is reflected upon, the direction of its activity is centrifugal, and that to infinity." It is this turning back of the *ego*'s out-going activity by means of the opposition or *Anstoss* that causes the arresting objects to appear to us as real. As a matter of fact, they are only the creations of our own productive imagination. They are the representations or images which arise through the self-positing and self-limiting of the *ego*. Fichte now proceeds to develop the functions of theoretic reason—to show, in other words, the stages by which the whole indefinite, unconscious *ego* rises to a consciousness of definite objects, and, therefore, to a complete consciousness of itself. The entire evolution is the necessary consequence of the determination of

the *ego* by the *non-ego*. But it must be remembered that there is no reality beyond the *ego*, and the whole development is a process which takes place within the consciousness.

All objects are given us through and by the action of the productive imagination. By every repetition of its double action, of production and reflection, a special class of representations arises. The development begins with the very lowest stage of unconsciousness, in which there is no distinction as yet between external and internal feeling. This is the stage of mere sensation. In the next, that of perception, the *ego* distinguishes between itself and its feeling. Here sensations are converted into observed points in space and time. Next, just as sensation becomes perception through limitation, so is the undetermined, indefinite, fluctuating perception fixed into a concept of the understanding. The transition from perception to understanding is made by the reproductive imagination. The intelligence, when it passes beyond the limits fixed for it by the understanding, becomes reflection. Here judgment appears as the power of giving to consciousness a definite content, which points to the last and highest stage of intelligence, that of reason, by means of which we are able to abstract from all objects and attain to complete self-consciousness.

The Theoretic Science of Knowledge has now accomplished its task, which was, to show the process by which consciousness takes place. But now another question arises, what is the cause of the *ego* arresting its activity? But this question brings us to

2. *Practical Science of Knowledge*. As yet we have been able to assign no reason why the out-going activity of the *ego* should meet with opposition, and that of its own making. We have seen that if the infinite activity of the *ego* were not limited, there could be neither thought nor objective world at all. But why should there be consciousness or world? Why is that "Anstoss" or opposition

necessary? The explanation which the theoretic part cannot yield is afforded by the practical. Fichte follows Kant in declaring that the reason limits itself, and is theoretic in order to be practical. The whole apparatus of our consciousness and of the world presented to it exists that we may fulfil our duty. We are intelligence that we may become will. The objective world is necessary for the realization of the *ego's* activity. The *ego* creates the world, not for the sake of the world, but for the sake of realizing itself through the conquest of the world. To act, to realize ourselves, and by striving, to overcome the limits of the *non-ego*—or objective world—that is the reason of our existence. The world is nothing else than the material of our duty. It is there in order that we may act upon it and overcome it. The *ego*, therefore, asserts itself as will, and the goal of the *ego* is freedom, the realization of its ideal. If we ask now,—what are Kant's "things-in-themselves"? the answer is,—they are nothing in themselves. They are only things for us; they are, in short, "what we shall make out of them."

Thus when we ask, how can the *ego* become conscious of itself? the answer is, only in so far as it is practical, only in so far as it is a striving force, a will. "Will is, in a special sense, the essence of reason." Hence the system of reason culminates in the Categorical Imperative—"fulfil thyself, realize the end of thy being"—that is the vocation of man.

Fichte applies the principles which he has developed in the *Science of Knowledge* to practical life, and particularly to his *theory of rights and duties*.

It is quite in harmony with Fichte's idealism that he has no philosophy of nature. He acknowledges nothing really objective, and nature with him is identified with the *non-ego*, which it is the aim of the *ego* to overcome. He sees in things not ends in themselves, but means only for the realization of man's moral nature. Both his theory of morals and his theory of rights are connected directly with



his *Science of Knowledge*. Between morals and law there is no relation, the object of law being to supply the means by which its enactments are to be obeyed without the support of moral justice or honesty. If morality were supreme, there would be no need of law.

In his *Natur-recht*, or *Jurisprudence*, he deduces the idea of a multiplicity of individuals or rational beings. Man knows himself to be free. But he cannot know himself as a free, active being without assuming the existence of other free, active beings. Individuality is a condition of consciousness, and is, therefore, only conceivable if there be a multiplicity of persons. To each *ego* is allotted a part of the world as the sphere of its own exclusive freedom, and the limits of these spheres constitute the rights and obligations of the individual. That portion of my sphere of freedom, which is the starting-point of all the changes to be wrought by me in the world of sense, is my body. The world of sense becomes the common ground or means of communication between free individuals. The co-existence of free individuals is, further, impossible without a relation of law, by which each reciprocally limits his freedom. The duty of each is to treat others as beings who have the same aims as himself. Fichte regards the State simply as a relation of compact. It exists for the protection of the individual. It is merely an arrangement of convenience, whose highest aim is to make itself superfluous.

Fichte's special theory of Jurisprudence falls into three parts :

(1) *Primitive Rights*, or those which belong to persons as such. This yields the rights (a) of personal freedom, (b) of property.

(2) *Coercive Rights*, or penal laws, which are ordained to deal with the violation of individual rights or freedom. For the establishment of such rights, individuals must enter into a mutual contract. Hence we have :

(3) *Political Rights*, which exist for the purpose of (a)

guaranteeing personal rights, (b) enacting laws for the good of the community.

It is interesting to note that these thoughts culminate in the socialistic view that the State ought to make provision that everyone may be able to live by his work—the doctrine of the so-called “right to work”; and from this principle, again, Fichte projects his ideal of the “Socialistic State” as the complete industrial commonwealth, which is to undertake all home manufactures and all trade with foreign countries, in order to assign to each citizen his work and his wages. He foresees the time when by organization and the division of labour property will be universalized. “Workmen will associate themselves for the production of the greatest amount of wealth with the least possible amount of labour.”

His *Theory of Ethics* is also derived directly from his Science of Knowledge. Here he deals with the individual, not in his external relationships, but as a moral being. The *ego* is essentially an activity, a striving after independence and freedom. But it would lose itself in infinity and remain without consciousness did it not encounter some resistance. In its effort to overcome this resistance it exercises its will. But resistance limits freedom. Hence it is irresistibly impelled to assert itself and enjoy perfect freedom. As a sensuous being in a world of material things and bodily desires, the resistance which the rational being meets is his own lower impulses or natural tendencies, which impel him not to freedom, but to enjoyment and self-satisfaction. Hence there are in man two sets of impulses, the pure and the natural: the one tends to the realization of his being, the other to the fulfilment of his enjoyment. These seem to be mutually antagonistic, but from a higher point of view they are the same. The lower or sensuous desires must be subservient to the higher, and only be gratified in so far as they further the ends of our being. The moral life is a progressive life, and it consists in gradually rising to independence of nature and freedom

from the lower desires. "The *ego* can never be independent so long as it remains an *ego*: the finite end of a rational being lies necessarily in infinity, and is, therefore, one never to be attained, but continually to be approached."

"Continually fulfil thy vocation" is, therefore, the practical expression of the moral law. We must do our duty only for the sake of duty. Let no man blindly follow his impulses, but act at every moment with clear consciousness according to duty. "Be free." "Act according to thy conscience." "Fulfil thy vocation as a man."

To be virtuous is not to obey some external law, but to fulfil the internal law of one's being.

Such a view of the moral life would seem to make *religion* superfluous, and in his system there is legitimately no place for a personal God. *His views of Religion* are contained in his work on *The Ground for our Belief in a Divine Government of the World*. The moral order of the world is the only divinity in which we can believe. The idea of a God as a being separate from us and from the outer world, as a distinct and self-determining personality, is a contradiction. The moral order is truly a spiritual order, and in it only our life has reality. All life is its life, and the manifestation of this life is the development of humanity. God exists only in our consciousness of Him. By our effort to fulfil our duty and to realize the good, the beautiful, and the true, we are tending towards God, and already, in a measure, live the life of God. True religion is the realization of universal reason.

In his later philosophy Fichte tends more towards a Christian view of life, particularly in his work, *Guidance to a Blessed Life*. In this new form he attempts to transform his Subjective Idealism into an Objective Pantheism, in which the *ego* of his earlier speculation becomes the notion of God.

As early as 1797 Fichte began to see that the ultimate basis of his system must be the absolute *ego* in which the difference between subject and object is annulled. In 1800,

in *The Vocation of Man*, he defined his absolute *ego* as the infinite moral will of the universe, in whom all individual *egos* exist, and from whom all have sprung. God is in them the absolute life, who becomes conscious of Himself by expressing Himself in and through individuals. The idea of God, which he had formerly seemed to place at the end of his system, now becomes more expressly the basis and beginning of his philosophy. Religious gentleness now assumes the place of moral severity, and instead of abstract duty he now speaks of life and love. Christianity, the ideal of which is presented in Jesus Christ, is now the supreme form of truth, and the aim of man is to lose himself in God by the spirit of self-abnegation and devotion.



## CHAPTER III

### OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: SCHELLING

THE philosophy of Fichte roused considerable interest, and drew multitudes of hearers to his lectures both in Jena and Berlin, yet his system as a whole obtained few adherents. The Idealism which he proclaimed was too subjective, too one-sided to satisfy the philosophic demand for a complete unity of experience. Even his moral theory, grand and exalted as it was in its aims and ideals, was obviously based on a contradiction. The world for Fichte only existed as a kind of moral gymnasium for the exercise of virtue, and life resolved itself into a series of impediments which man set up for himself in order to prove his prowess in knocking them down again. But this ethical anomaly had its root in a deeper contradiction, which adhered to his theoretic philosophy. It is true that Fichte got quit of Kant's thing-in-itself, but he did so at the expense of all reality. If, as according to Fichte, the *ego* can only come to know itself through the *non-ego*, which indeed is only a product of its own activity, then obviously the *ego* is dependent for existence on the *non-ego*, and if you affirm the one you must affirm the other. If you deny the one you must deny the other. If the *non-ego* disappears the *ego* must also cease to be. The one as well as the other can only be retained in consciousness with its opposite.

Thus Fichte was committed to a position which involved a dualism between Idealism and Realism—an alternating,

or at least a reciprocity of the two sides which could only be overcome by affirming the reality of the *ego*. If Fichte was convinced that the *non-ego* was a nonentity, then he was bound, as Hegel called him to do, "to admit that the *ego* was in the same way, a nonentity, for as finite *ego* it is only capable of existing in that it is conditioned by the *non-ego*." Thus, as Jacobi said, Fichte's Idealism really terminated in Nihilism.

In his attempt to reduce nature to a mere negative condition, a self-created object of thought, and to make spirit all in all, Fichte "turned the life of the spirit itself into something shadowy and spectral—a conflict with a ghost that could not be laid."

It is here that the need for Schelling's work arises to supplement the one-sided Idealism of Fichte. Contend as he might that what he meant was the absolute totality of consciousness, and strive as he would to enforce the doctrine that self-consciousness, which is the ultimate ground of reality, was not to be regarded as merely individual, he never succeeded in divesting his theory of a certain air of subjectivity. His absolute has no contents, and remains a mere barren form. He has nothing to say about the external world. His interest in it is only ethical, and Nature but serves as the sphere in which individuals realize themselves and fulfil their duty. But Nature refuses to be regarded simply as part of the *non-ego*. It demands a justification not less than thought as an element of the system of Reason. It was the indifference of Fichte to this side of the problem that compelled Schelling to undertake what he called his *Durchbruch zur Realität*, and to assert that the intelligence could find itself in Nature as well as in itself. According to Fichte, only knowledge by itself alone had existence, all that we are conscious of is our own thinking. Schelling maintained that if there be knowledge, there must also be something that is to be known: that, in short, if there be knowledge there must be existence. Schelling, therefore, sought to substitute for Fichte's

formula, "the *ego* is everything" (Ich is Alles), the wider principle—"everything is the *ego*" (Alles ist Ich), by which he meant that one principle manifests itself in the natural and the spiritual world alike. "Nature is to be visible intelligence, and intelligence invisible nature."

In opposing an objective Idealism to Fichte's subjective Idealism, Schelling himself was led to reject Idealism altogether and to propound a philosophy of identity, in which the difference of nature and spirit was so completely merged that the reality of both was lost and the absolute became a pure point of indifference to be apprehended only by mystic contemplation or intuitive feeling.

*Friederich Wilhelm Schelling* was born at Leonberg in Württemberg in 1775. Endowed with remarkable precocity, he entered Tübingen University in his fifteenth year, where he was a fellow-student of Hegel. At the age of seventeen he wrote an essay on the *Mosaic Account of the Fall*. Towards the close of his college career, his first two philosophical works appeared, written from the Fichtian standpoint, *On the possibility of a form of Philosophy in general* and *Of the Ego as a Principle of Philosophy*. In 1798 he became tutor in Jena, and in the following year succeeded Fichte in the Chair of Philosophy. While in Jena he edited, afterwards in conjunction with Hegel, the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. In 1803 he was called to Würzburg, and a few years later he became a member of the New Academy of Munich, and after the death of Jacobi, its president. In 1841 he removed to Berlin, where he delivered several courses of lectures, particularly on the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation. For many years he published nothing of importance. His works are comprised in fourteen vols., only ten of which were published in his lifetime. He died at Rogatz in Switzerland in 1854. Besides the works mentioned, the most important of his writings are his *System of Natural Philosophy* (1799) and his *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800).

It is not an easy matter to present a clear outline of the philosophy of Schelling. It does not present a finished whole, but is rather a series of views which reflect the author's own mental development. It has been usual to group the productions of Schelling, as we have done, under three or four successive heads or periods. In the first, he was under the influence of Fichte. In the second and third, the influence of Spinoza and Jacob Boehme is evident, while the fourth group is tinged with mysticism.

1st Period. *Schelling, a disciple of Fichte*. Schelling began as an adherent of Fichte, holding that the *ego* is the supreme principle of philosophy. The *ego* posits itself, and is conditioned only by itself. But in his work on the *Ego*, Schelling makes the transition to the absolute *ego* as the ground of the opposition between the *ego* and the *non-ego*. The existence of the objective world is as firmly believed in as the existence of the subjective; they are, indeed, both given in the same act. We cannot be conscious of ourselves without being aware also of something outside ourselves. Likewise we cannot know of the existence of any external object without at the same moment connecting it with a consciousness of ourselves. Hence we conclude that both exist, not separately, but identified in some higher power. The true principle of philosophy and the ultimate ground of all our knowledge is, therefore, The Absolute *Ego*. But this absolute being can only be comprehended by an intellectual intuition.

In his letters on *Dogmatics and Criticism*, Schelling controverts Kant's position that all knowledge is limited to phenomena, and affirms "a secret wonderful faculty which dwells in us all" of beholding the transcendental ground of all reality, which he calls "Intellectual Intuition," a faculty which corresponds to the Reason of Plato, Kant, and Spinoza, and has also some affinity with the "faith" of Jacobi.

2nd Period. *Philosophy of Nature and Transcendental Idealism*, 1796-1800. Here we find Schelling supplement-



ing the Fichtian doctrine of the *ego* by showing that the whole of nature may be regarded as a process by which the spirit rises to a consciousness of itself—by which, indeed, Subjective Idealism may be supplemented by Objective Idealism.

It is in this period that Schelling first diverges from Fichte and creates a new departure in German philosophy. The new thought which Schelling now introduces is that Nature, not less than Mind, is a form of the revelation of the Absolute *Ego*. Both matter and mind are the two sides of a higher unity. Nature is visible spirit: spirit, invisible nature. The one is the counterpart of the other, and in nature the soul contemplates itself. In other words, nature comes to self-consciousness in spirit. There is something symbolic in everything material. Every plant and lower product of life may be regarded as an externalized beat of the heart. The entire system of the universe is an organism formed from the centre outwards, and rising from lower to higher stages of being. Nature, whose end is to reflect itself, or to reveal the spirit, attains its climax in man. The absolute Ideal and the absolute Real are the same. Nature and spirit are, indeed, but the two poles of the same knowledge. Hence in his system of Transcendental Idealism (1800) we find Schelling speaking of the two fundamental and complementary sciences—Transcendental Philosophy and Speculative Physics—which together constitute the whole of knowledge. The one starts with nature and seeks to rise to God; the other starts with thought and endeavours to deduce from it nature.

*a. The Philosophy of Nature* presents a picture of the Intellectual world in the forms and laws of the world of phenomena, and its object is to construct intelligence from nature.

Nature is always in a state of activity, and its central conception is life. The system of nature is, therefore, ruled by the thought that in it the objective reason struggles upwards from its material modes of manifestation

through the multitude of forms to the organism in which it comes to consciousness. Nature pursues its goal by a process of duality, by the opposition of forces which negate each other in a higher unity. The two factors thus in constant antagonism are Productivity and the Product. Productivity is the active force which develops itself in all things. The Product is this activity arrested and solidified in a fact, which, however, is always ready to pass again into activity. Thus the world is a balancing of contending forces within the sphere of the Absolute.

Schelling divides the philosophy of nature into three parts: (1) Organic Nature, (2) Inorganic Nature, and (3) The Reciprocity of the two.

(1) *Organic Nature* is infinite activity, infinite productivity, which is, however, constantly checked by a retarding activity, with the result that a series of finite products is brought about. Nature is concerned not so much with the individual as with the genus, and is, therefore, in its productive activity always striving after higher forms.

The three ground-functions of organic nature are: (1) Reproduction. (2) Irritability. (3) Sensibility. Those forms of life stand highest in which sensibility or feeling prevails.

(2) *Inorganic Nature* is opposed to Organic, and while the elements of the latter are productive, those of the former are unproductive. While organic nature is concerned with production, the inorganic is occupied with individual products. Inorganic nature is mere mass, held together by outward causes. But like organic nature it too has its grades, which are: chemistry, electricity, magnetism.

(3) *The Reciprocity of the Organic and Inorganic Worlds.* These are related to and act on each other. As neither can exist apart, both must have a common origin. In nature as a whole there is an inner principle of life; a world-soul must dwell within which unites all the differences in one universal organism.

*b. Transcendental Philosophy* is the counterpart of the philosophy of nature. It begins at the other end and reconstructs the universe from the standpoint of intelligence. Here Schelling endeavours to develop a History of the *Ego*—in other words, to unfold the various stages of self-consciousness. The Transcendental Philosophy has three departments.

(1) *Theoretic Philosophy*, the object of which is to account for the inner world of self. It seeks to do this by showing the progress of intelligence in re-creating the life of the *ego* through sensation, perception, and reflection.

(2) *Practical Philosophy*. The principle of practical philosophy is the will or the free determination of self. The will seeks to realize itself in the world of moral action, in the individual, in the State, and in history.

(3) *Aesthetic Philosophy or Art*. In neither theoretic nor practical philosophy does reason, according to Schelling, reach its highest realization. This is only possible through the activity of the artistic genius. Schelling declares the aesthetic reason to be the keystone of the Idealistic system. What the mind was unconsciously striving after, and what the will was consciously seeking, but never fully realizing, art achieves. Here at last intelligence reaches a perfect perception of its own self. Art is the true organon of philosophy. It is in art that the "spectator thought" has to learn what reason is. Art is a higher attainment than philosophy. God is the direct object of aesthetic intuition. The absolute identity of subject and object which Schelling found embodied in poetry and art led him naturally to the next stage of his development.

3rd Period. *System of Identity*. The writings of this period are: *System of Philosophy*, *Bruno*, and *Method of Academic Study*.

At the head of this system he places the notion of the Absolute and defines it as absolute reason—the total "indifference" of subject and object. The absolute is

represented by the symbol of the magnet. As it is the same principle which divides itself in the magnet into north and south poles, the centre of which is the Indifference-point, so in like manner does the Absolute divide itself into the real and ideal, and holds itself in this separation as absolute Indifference. Hence, Schelling's philosophy is frequently called the "Indifference Philosophy." Reason is the indifference-point. He who rises to it, attains to the true point of view. The highest reason, while it includes both subject and object, in another sense abstracts itself from both. It is the nature of philosophy to eliminate wholly space and time, all differences generally, and to see all things in the light of absolute reason. Knowledge, in other words, is a knowledge of things as they are. The highest law of reason is the law of absolute identity,— $A$  equals  $A$ —which is the principle of the universe itself.

Subject and object being thus identical, the absolute Identity is the absolute Totality. There can be no difference except a quantitative difference between subject and object. In all things both are mixed in different degrees. A preponderance on the one side or other Schelling calls a "Potence," and the Absolute is the Identity of all Potences. If we could behold all that is in its totality, we should see a perfect equality. On the side of nature, weight is the first potency. Light is the second, and the third is the common product of both light and weight, viz.—the organism. As in the material world, so in the ideal sphere; the Potences here are: Knowledge, action, and reason; reason being the union of knowledge and action. These three potences represent the true, the good, the beautiful.

It is in this period, and especially in his lectures on academic study, that Schelling first brings Christianity into the realm of his philosophy.

Corresponding to the antithesis of real and ideal, of Nature and History, there is a similar antithesis in history itself. The ancient world with its naturalistic religions



represents the preponderance of Nature, while in Christianity the ideal is revealed. In the progress of history we may detect three stages: the period of Nature, which reached its bloom in Greek poetry and religion; the period of Fate, at the end of the ancient world; and the period of Providence, which began with Christianity. God became objective for the first time in Christ. The Incarnation is not, however, to be regarded as a mere fact in time: it is an eternal act. Christ sacrifices in his Person the finite, in order to admit of the advent of the Spirit as the light of a new world. The fundamental dogma of Christianity is the Trinity.

At the same time, the Bible must be regarded as the principal hindrance of Christendom. As the repository of superstition and legend it perpetuates ignorance and obscures the light of reason. The regeneration of Christianity is to be brought about by Speculative Knowledge alone, in which religion and poetry will be united in a higher form of truth.

4th Period. In the final phase of his philosophy, Schelling tends to mysticism under the influence of Neoplatonism and Jacob Boehme. The writings which represent this period are *Philosophy and Religion*, *Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom*, and his posthumous lectures on *The Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation*.

In his work on Freedom he deals with the relation of man's will to the Divine will. He now conceives of God as the basis or *Urgrund*, in which all beings, including man, have their cause. We cannot really know what God is—He is a dark, blind will or eternal yearning, which is ever seeking to reproduce itself. God only attains to a consciousness of Himself by the yearning taking the form of thought. Thus yearning and thought are one in God, the Almighty Will which creates all things.

In man also these two principles are united as the principle of Nature and the principle of Light. According to the principle of Nature man is to be regarded as possessing

a will or impulse of his own : as gifted with understanding he is the organ of the Universal Will.

In these two impulses or tendencies lies the distinction between Good and Evil—the presupposition of human freedom. The preponderance of man's particular will is Evil. Only through God can the particular and the universal will be reunited. This takes place by God assuming man's nature. On the stage of the world's history we have enacted the conflict between the particular and the universal will. Christ is the middle-point of history. Christ becomes man, suffers and dies to secure human freedom and reunite humanity with God.

In his lectures on *Mythology and Revelation* Schelling would appear to give up the attempt to reach the unity after which all the earlier stages of his speculation were striving. Here he develops the difference between a positive and negative philosophy. Reason, he says, can only yield the form of Reality, and a speculative system is at best but an outward order or arrangement of truth. After all, it is in the sphere of actuality, by the activity of the will that we attain to knowledge.

Thought has no power to create reality. The will alone postulates an actual God. This longing for the actual God is religion. Philosophy, therefore, leads to faith, and is completed by it. Hence the true progress of philosophy is revealed first in mythology and afterwards in revelation. Schelling proceeds to trace the evolution of the idea of God in history, showing that it passes from Pantheism or Monotheism to Polytheism, and thence to the Trinitarian God of Revelation. The history of the world may be regarded as God coming to Himself.

In closing the lectures on this subject, Schelling glances at the history of the Church. He distinguishes three great periods, and names them after the three chief apostles—Peter, Paul, and John. The first two periods—the Petrine and the Pauline—represent Catholicism and Protestantism. These have already had their day. The third—the Chris-

tianity of John, which is to rise on the ruins of the two former—belongs to the future.

Schelling's system as a whole can scarcely be regarded as an advance upon that of Fichte, though there are certain departments neglected by Fichte to which Schelling has given prominence, in particular we may mention that of Nature and of Art. With regard to the latter, though his treatment is in general artificial and formal, there is much that is suggestive of which later writers, and especially Hegel and Schopenhauer, have availed themselves. If Fichte set out from Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, it may be said that Schelling made the *Critique of Judgment* his starting point. Many of Kant's ideas as to the Sublime and Beautiful are developed by Schelling. The idea of the distinction between Nature and Art as a distinction between conscious and unconscious production is common to both. Nature has the appearance of design without being the conscious product of design. In Art, which is the product of inspiration, we have the embodied ideal which the moral life is ever striving to reach, but only approximately attains to. The aesthetic faculty may be said to take the place in Schelling's system which the moral impulse occupies in Fichte's. In his practical philosophy Schelling holds generally the same ground as Fichte. Fichte's idea of "Anstoss" or opposition is for Schelling also the starting point; and even in his later philosophy, when treating of the will, he is still in substantial agreement with the notion that freedom is obtained by the conquest of man over the limitations of his lower self.

Both philosophers deal with religion, and it is significant that each in his own way seeks to find a justification and rationale of the Christian faith. But while with Fichte Christianity comes in as a kind of addendum, and is not an integral part of his system, with Schelling it is a necessary factor and stage in the evolution of the world's life.

In general, while both Fichte and Schelling occupy the

same fundamental position and regard experience as the total of reality, the philosophy of Fichte may be said to be static, while that of Schelling is dynamic. The one views the universe as stationary, the other as a movement. Fichte starts with an eternal fact, Schelling with an endless becoming. The one system is an involution, the other an evolution. While Fichte analyses the elements of consciousness, Schelling elaborates the history of its contents. Schelling felt that the eternal fact in which Fichte summed up the universe must be unfolded on its objective as well as its subjective side. Philosophy must proceed from the abstract fact to reveal the riches of intelligence both in nature and history. To show the inner connection and development of the whole world was the task which Schelling essayed, and which Hegel took up. Schelling speaks of the "dynamic process of nature," and while he treats of nature in the form of an emanation, he regards intelligence, on the other side, as an evolution, beginning with intellectual perception and closing with aesthetic reason.

Fichte's system is clear, exact, cold; Schelling's hazy and mystical, yet full of colour and warmth. Fichte delights in subtle distinctions and minute differences: Schelling is ever seeking after analogies and identities: Fichte is the stern moralist: Schelling the genial romanticist. Fichte's style is vigorous, but hard and dry: Schelling's is poetical and flowing.

When all is said, the absolute identity of Schelling does not materially differ from the universal *ego* of Fichte. His absolute reason consists in an equilibrium or "indifference" of subject and object. There is no real distinction between the two. It is a unity akin to that of Spinoza in which all life and variety are quenched in blank identity. It is to little purpose that Schelling calls the absolute "reason," so long as he proceeds to treat it as a predicateless identity—an identity in which subject and object are regarded as two elements that completely coincide, or as two forces which annihilate one another. To say that reason equally mani-



feels itself in both is equivalent to saying that it does not manifest itself at all. If the absolute unity becomes a pure "indifference point" it is in effect reduced to an empty form, a mere name.

In conclusion, Schelling's philosophy may be divided into three main divisions—the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of identity, and the antithesis of Positive and Negative philosophy.

With regard to the first, Schelling's chief contribution is, that in opposition to Fichte he is led to emphasize the position of nature as well as of spirit in the total development of self-consciousness. Nature is not merely a limitation by which the activity of the spirit realizes itself. Nature is to be conceived as the manifestation of thought. But it is something concrete and positive, having its own structure and features. Nature and Spirit are distinct, but in both the principle of development is essentially thought. In the one case—the case of Nature—it is thought struggling towards consciousness; in the other—that of Spirit—it is thought advancing from mere sensation to reflection. The philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind are, therefore, at once parallel and complementary. But now the question to which Schelling's view of nature and spirit naturally led was, what is the one principle which expresses itself in both? Both point to a common basis. The attempt to find this common substratum gave rise to Schelling's *Philosophy of Identity*. His speculations at this point drew forth the adverse criticism of Hegel, who compared his neutral ground to the night-time, in which all cows are black. Schelling's method of explaining particularity—as a more or less, a preponderance on one side or the other, resembles, says Hegel, the effort of a painter who possesses only two colours, green and red, and applies to his picture now more of the one, and now more of the other.

In his search for a more adequate expression of the absolute, Schelling has recourse to mysticism, using at one

time the ideas of Neoplatonism, and at another the language of Jacob Boehme. He is constrained to distinguish in the absolute two factors—one a dark, indeterminate element, the other a form of activity by means of which the world, as we know it, comes forth into being.

It will thus be seen that the philosophy of Schelling ends in a dualism. While subjective idealism only attained a unity at the expense of one of the factors, Schelling only escapes the one-sidedness of Fichte by establishing a formal abstract identity in which the differences are affirmed, but not finally harmonized.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL

It was only natural that a writer of such versatility as Schelling should create a widespread interest, and that the "philosophy of Identity" should call forth numerous adherents and antagonists, not only in the strictly philosophical world, but also among purely literary men. Before passing on to consider the philosophy of Hegel, who attempted to unite the antithesis of Fichte and Schelling in a higher unity, we shall glance at the influence which Schelling exerted upon contemporary thought.

The Romantic school, which was at the height of its fame at this time, in so far as it may be regarded as not merely a literary-aesthetic movement, received no little impulse on its philosophical side from the mystical views of Schelling. The Romantic movement was a reaction against the hard, prosaic method of measuring everything by the understanding. Two new ideas—the idea of development and that of individuality—mark the beginning of the nineteenth century and contrast it with the eighteenth. Implicitly the germs of these ideas were contained in the philosophy of Kant, in as much as he recalled thought to a consideration of all knowledge as a creation of the mind, and in so far as he regarded the realization of the Kingdom of God as the ultimate end of humanity.

With Fichte and Schelling Idealism became more pro-

nounced, and the thinking of God's thought within man himself became the note of philosophy. The other conception—that of development, which was to become the predominating scientific idea of the century, received a powerful impulse from the later writings of Schelling.

With this conception of the world as a growing organism, as a great work of art in process of creation, the past became full of interest, and every form of research tended to become historical. History was no longer the story of warfare and the record of kings, but took all past movements of thought and life within its province. Dead languages were interpreted and remote centuries illuminated. Philosophy became an evolution; the study of religion, historical.

The spirit of the new age revealed itself first in literature and art, and Romanticism was its expression. In contrast to the hard rationalism of the eighteenth century, the Romantic movement concerned itself with the whole development of man. The high priest of this school was Goethe, and his *Wilhelm Meister* is the work which gave expression to the artistic view of life. His aim is summed up in the word "culture." "In the cultured society the world is harmonized. The ideal and real are reconciled, nature and art are united." Under Goethe's influence the world came to be regarded as a great work of art. Though not a philosopher in the strict sense of the word, Goethe became an enthusiast for Spinoza, and his Pantheism took the form of a world-spirit unfolding itself into all the variety of life and being. This idea of harmonious development received its scientific expression in Schelling's philosophy of Identity. Schelling's conception of man as at once the creature and interpreter of the world, also became a thought congenial to the younger literary spirits of Germany, for whom the prevailing note was individuality. Each man was a separate idea of God, and each had a special end to work out. The writers of this school start with the *ego* as the source and standard of all things.



But it is an empirical *ego*, an individual self of feelings and personal experiences which seeks to lose itself in nature and God. Individuality becomes with many a matter of whims and moods, and too often feeling degenerates into sentimentality.

While Romanticism connects itself in its literary efforts with the men of the Weimar circle—with Herder, Schiller, and especially with Goethe, in its philosophical views it takes up an intermediate position between Fichte, Jacobi, and Schelling. On the one side the egoism of this school falls far short of the moral earnestness and manly vigour of Fichte, and allies itself more with the subjective intuition and personal feeling of Jacobi. On the other hand, the individuality of Romanticism differs from that of Jacobi in so far as it is not exclusive and self-contained, but carries within itself a sense of infinitude and universality by which it seeks to transcend the immediate limits of personality and lose itself in the larger consciousness of God. It is at this point specially that the influence of Schelling may be detected.

The two chief representatives of this position, Novalis and Schlegel, were strongly impressed with the later mysticism of Schelling.

Friedrich Leopold v. Hardenberg, better known by his assumed name of *Novalis* (1772-1801), was a man of deep spirituality and fine poetic temperament. While a student at Jena he came under the influence of Schiller, and became the friend of Fichte and Schelling, of Tieck and Schleiermacher. Though at first a disciple of Kant, he eventually became impressed with the philosophy of Spinoza and Schelling. He wrote two philosophical romances, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* and the *Lehrlinge zur Sais*. His complete works are published in two volumes. His writings, though full of beautiful thoughts, lack method, and are often vague and elusive. He is essentially a mystic. He seeks the root of all science, as well as of the spiritual life, in freedom. The world is to be deduced from the moral

life. "Without philosophy there can be no morality, but without morality no philosophy." The fear of God is the beginning of morals. Our true will is to do God's will. The world cannot be explained by logic or cold reason; a mystery envelops all things. Everything is in God, and God is in everything, and we can only apprehend the purpose of life by a higher faith. Novalis is imbued with the poetic interpretation of the world. "The poet," he says, "understands Nature better than the man of science." Life is poetry. It is easy to understand how all things tend to poetry. "Is not the whole universe full of soul?" Even ordinary work can be treated poetically. "Poetry heals the wounds of reason." Its elements are of a totally opposite character, and may be described as elevated truth and agreeable illusion. He says again, "poetry is absolute truth." "This is the gist of my philosophy." "The more poetic, the more truthful." There is nothing else than practical philosophy. Life is an art. The seat of art is intellect. Intellect creates in accordance with its characteristic perception. Fancy, wit, and judgment are all called into play. The true artist can make of himself anything that he likes. I can do what I will. Nothing is impossible to man. Thought is action. "We are united by closer bonds with the unseen than with the seen. Philosophy is a home-sickness—a longing to be at home. Life is a yearning—action is suffering; rest—the element of the soul. Man is the messiah of nature. One touches heaven when one touches a human being. Self-sacrifice is a genuinely philosophic act. Death is life. Eternity lies in the heart of each, and immortality is reached through sickness and death" (*Werke*, ii. 271, etc.).

*Friedrich Schlegel* (1772-1829) gave to the fugitive poetic thoughts of Novalis a more systematic expression. He was an emotional and richly gifted man, but the unrest and impetuosity of his nature are reflected in the immaturity and fragmentariness of his writings. Along with his older brother, August, he was one of the most promi-

nent leaders of the Romantic school. Together they edited *The Athanaeum*, the literary organ which advocated the principles of Romanticism. The best known of Schlegel's works are his *Philosophy of History* and his *History of Literature*, both of which were the result of lectures delivered in Vienna to the public. His *Language and Wisdom of the Indians* (1808) was highly esteemed, and may be regarded as a pioneer to the study of Sanskrit in Europe. In early life he wrote a notorious romance, *Lucinde* (1799), in which he advocated the relation of free love. In later years he found peace in the Roman Catholic Church. At first he made subjective feeling the test of morality, but after joining Rome his philosophical standpoint changed. While Idealism was still the true philosophy, he took exception to the fatalism of Spinoza. At the same time, he declared there was nothing outside the *ego*, and the world took its rise from our own inner consciousness.

What we really find in Schlegel is a vague combination of subjective Idealism and Pantheism, a union of Theism and Theosophical Mysticism, which he himself styles "Speculation" or "the Philosophy of Life." The sense of the higher life is in us: it is an innate idea of the infinite, which comprises at once unity and multiplicity. The idea of God is given to us neither by reason nor the senses, but through revelation alone. Schlegel attempts to show that both the world and God are to be conceived by us as in a process of "becoming." The Son of God he identifies with the Spirit of the Universe. History is the movement of the Divine Spirit, the unfolding of God's thought. Like a good Catholic he denounces the Reformation, which he calls "the second fall of man."

Schlegel's philosophy is full of strange vagaries, and with the exception of his philosophy of History, which, indeed, contains many thoughts which have been adopted by the later historical school, had little influence upon

modern reflection. His place in German literature is that of a critic rather than a creator.

Passing over *Solger* (1780-1819), a friend of Tieck, and *Berger* (1772-1833), who sought to find a middle course between the Subjective Idealism of Fichte and the Spinozism of Schelling by the adaptation of the Platonic ideas, and the naturalist, *Oken*, who applied Schelling's nature-philosophy to Science, we shall proceed to mention two distinguished followers of Schelling who took up a somewhat independent position,—*Baader* and *Krause*,—and finally we shall refer to *Schleiermacher*, who may be regarded as the mouthpiece and completer of Romanticism.

*Franz Baader* (1765-1841), of Munich, was a spiritually minded man and deep thinker. It was his ambition to be known not merely as a philosopher, but as a Christian philosopher. Like Schlegel he too was a Roman Catholic, and the dogmas of the Church form the starting-point and goal of all his speculation. His standpoint is largely that of the Schoolmen, and he regards Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart, Paracelsus, and, before all others, Jacob Boehme, as his models. To separate religion from philosophy he considers an error. He loathes the Reformation and all forms of rationalism with his whole heart, but he is drawn to Schelling on account of his Theosophic tendencies.

The central point of Baader's speculation is his conception of God. The finite spirit cannot be conscious of itself, and only comes to self-consciousness as it is animated with the absolute spirit. God, as the eternal life, is at once Being and Becoming—an everlasting process. In the Divine Being there is a threefold element—the ground will, wisdom and nature. From the Ur-ground is begotten the Son. The Holy Spirit flows from the Wisdom, while Creation takes its rise from Nature. Sin and atonement are the two outstanding facts of history. Deliverance is wrought out for man by the magic or magnetic power of the blood of Christ. In general Baader endeavours to



reconcile his philosophical ideas with the orthodox faith of the Roman Church. At the same time, his sound democratic nature rebels against all political despotism, while his strong sense of independence causes him to regard with disfavour the coercive policy of Rome. He advocates an intelligent participation by the people in the Government, a co-operative organization of the Church and a reconciliation between theology and speculation. In the dispute between the old and the new Catholicism, Baader inclined to take the side of the latter, and this incurred the suspicion of the Ultra-montane party.

With Baader we must associate *Karl Krause* (1781-1832), who also received an impulse from Schelling, and sought to unite Pantheism with Theism in the interests of religion. Krause calls his philosophy "the Wisdom of God," or Theosophy. He, too, starts with the Divine Essence (*Wesen*), but while his system is more methodical than Baader's, his language is uncouth and his terminology peculiar and often wholly unintelligible.

He begins with the idea of self-consciousness, and seeks to evolve thence all our knowledge. The *ego* knows itself to be living, and it finds within itself manifold instincts, powers, activities, which are all derived from three root faculties—thought, feeling, will. In the exercise of these powers we at once become conscious of the existence of other creatures different from ourselves, and gradually we are led onwards from self-consciousness to a knowledge of the infinite principle of life, from which we and all other finite things are derivable—God, or, as Krause calls him,—"Wesen" or Essence. God, according to Krause, is not merely *an* essence, but *the* essence—Being—the absolute Identity, the Totality of all that is.

In deriving the world from absolute Being, Krause endeavours to guard himself against thoroughgoing Pantheism by ascribing personality to God. He regards the world as the development of the Divine Essence, a development which takes place according to the ideas

which lie in the mind of the Supreme Personality. The "Essence" is not to be thought of as mere abstract reason, but as the personal, living ground of the world. In the development of his system, which he has called "Panentheism," Krause repels his readers by his terminology. Like Schelling he regards the universe as a divine organism (*Wesen-gliedbau*), and the structure of society as a continuation of the organic vital movement beyond the individual man. Every union of men is a *Gliedbau*, and the course of history is the process of the production of successive and more comprehensive unions.

Everywhere in the world we find a combination of two forces, Nature and Reason. These are combined in some degree in the animal world, but first in man are they completely united. Only one part of humanity, earthly humanity, do we now know. The highest destiny of man is not to remain in self-union, but to rise into union with others and finally with God. Hence the philosophy of religion forms the highest point not of Anthropology alone, but of all theories of essence, because it shows how man comes to manifest God in his life, and how God comes to resign Himself to man.

From the consideration of the primal essence of God there arise the various disciplines or sciences. The first is what Krause calls "Mathesis," or the science of Magnitude in its relation to time, space, motion, force, etc. Next in the series is "logic," which has to do with the forms and laws of thought. The third formal science is Aesthetics, which deals with beauty, whose realization in art is a true expression of Godlikeness. As the category of beauty forms the foundation of Aesthetics, so does life for ethics, the next science in the series. The sum of Ethics is the reproduction in life of that part of the highest good which can be actualized by man. "Do thou will and do the good as good" is the ethical formula laid down by Krause. Evil, embracing sin and misfortune, is conceived of as a pure limitation, and as, indeed, transitory. The

theory of morals treats man not only as an individual, but as a member of society; and to fulfil one's destiny according to the prototype of humanity is to realize one's place of duty and influence in the larger organism of society. The series of sciences is completed by the philosophy of history, which is the culminating point of his system. As in individual life, so in the history of humanity generally, there are three periods—the stage of germination, youth, and maturity. The first stage was a primitive condition lived with the original essence, the only memory of which continues in traditions of the golden age. The age of growth closed its first period—that of Polytheism—with Jesus. Its second period, that of Monotheistic union with God, was the age of contempt of the world and the will of priests. The next stage, the age of maturity, will be the age of human endeavour, the age of right, virtue, and truth. But after maturity is completed there will begin another higher life, the goal of humanity, the consummation of good towards which mankind is ever approaching. Attractive as is the picture which Krause presents of the Ideal state towards which humanity is progressing, one cannot but feel, especially when he enlarges upon the future life of the inhabitants of heaven, that the author has passed beyond the limits of exact thought into the realm of phantasy.

Greater than any of the names just mentioned is that of *Friedrich Schleiermacher* (1768-1834), who was born at Breslau, and was a contemporary of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and who stands along with them as one of the greatest thinkers of Germany. As the reformer of German Protestant Theology, his influence on theological thought has been as creative as that of Kant on philosophy. After finishing his studies at Halle he was ordained as pastor in Landesberg. In 1796 he was called to be chaplain to the hospital of the Charite in Berlin. Here he made the acquaintance of Schlegel, by whom he was introduced into the circle of the Romanticists, and at whose instigation he

completed the translation of Plato's works. In 1799 he published his *Discourse on Religion*, which was followed in 1800 by his *Monologues*. After acting for a time as pastor at Stolpe, in 1804 he was called to the Chair of Theology in Halle. Five years later he was transferred to the newly founded University of Berlin, where also he became preacher in the Church of the Trinity. He died in 1834. He was a man of upright character, an inspiring teacher, the champion of humanitarianism, and the herald of a new era in theology. As a preacher Schleiermacher exercised a remarkable influence. His sermons, which he published from time to time, drew forth the admiration of all classes. In Berlin he divided his time between university work and the care of the poor. He also took a keen interest in political matters and Church affairs.

Among his principal writings we may mention, besides those already named, his *System of Ethics* and his *Christian Faith*. The work which roused most controversy was his *Addresses on Religion to its Cultured Despisers*.

Schleiermacher is closely related to the Romanticists. If Schelling is the philosopher of the movement, Schleiermacher is its theologian. This school or tendency, as we have seen, owed its origin to Goethe, and was a protest in every department of thought against the tyranny of abstract ideas and prosaic rationalism. It sought to return to life, to reality, and especially to the individual standpoint. Accordingly, the misconceptions of religion with which Schleiermacher deals are mainly two: that which views it as consisting essentially in knowledge, and that which makes it simply a means to morality. In his addresses on religion he seeks to prove that the system of reason can become complete only in and through religion, which he says is a life and not a theory, an experience to be enjoyed rather than a phenomenon to be explained. Individuality is the dominant note of Romanticism; to find a place, in the conception of the world as a reasoned whole, for the individual life, is the aim of all the members



of this movement. And it is because of the part assigned to individuality that Schleiermacher's speeches on religion have been called the religious programme of Romanticism. The full title, *Addresses to its Cultured Despisers*, expresses its object and spirit. It speaks directly to man, and is addressed to those men of worldly culture with whom he was so closely associated at this time. He desires to show his literary friends that to despise an element in man, so radical and distinctive as religion, is a defect even of culture. Religion was not a thing of doctrine or of morals merely, but an essential part of all right thinking and acting. Religion has to do with that which is universal in man. Yet each man can only be an expression of the universal, as he is first of all true to his individuality. The duty of each is, first of all, to himself, and only as he is himself, as he realizes the thought of God for him, does he help to embody the rich and manifold idea of God in the world. It is as a theological writer rather than as a philosopher that Schleiermacher must be regarded. His philosophy, indeed, bears the character of ecclesiasticism. He styles himself a dilettante in philosophy.

His standpoint in regard to the origin of our knowledge is largely that of Kant. Yet his whole method is that of the critic rather than the metaphysician. His chief interest lies in practical questions, and the purpose of all his speculation is to affirm and vindicate the absolute need and supreme value of religion. The religious consciousness with which he starts, he regards, without further derivation, as an absolute innate possession of man.

While Schleiermacher affirms with Schelling that absolute knowledge—the supreme identity of thought and being—in which all contradictions are solved, is the highest, it is, he holds, an ideal which is never reached by man. As finite beings we are beset with contradictions, and the deepest contradiction which belongs to our very nature is that which exists between our senses and our

understanding, or, as Schleiermacher expresses it, between the organic and intellectual parts of man. In all thinking there are these two functions: the organic yields the material, the intellectual, the form. But though Schleiermacher is in agreement with Kant as to the two functions in the formation of all knowledge, he alleges that we can never attain to the highest knowledge of all in this way. There is an intuitive union of thought and being, of the ideal and the real. Yet by the way of logical or scientific thought alone we can never reach this unity; nor can the difficulty be got over by Kant's method of Practical reason. We cannot really know God as He is. We can ascribe to Him no properties. He is the great first cause, the absolute identity of thought and being to which we can only ascribe personality when we bring it down into the region of earthly contradictions. Schleiermacher seems to agree with Spinoza in his notion of the relation of God to the world. God is mirrored in the universe and is present in the souls of men, so that if we would find Him we must go into ourselves. His Being is involved in the very idea of our personality. The individual spirit is the first and only reality, and the whole world is its mirror. In self-contemplation all contradictions vanish, and the soul through meditation enters the realm of the eternal. In this self-contemplation consists true piety. He who attains to this state is above all limits. The changes of outward life, time, age, death, can neither detract from nor add to his blessedness. This highest union is to be sought neither by the exercise of the intellect nor the will; it is to be reached through feeling only. By intuition we have intercourse with reality. In feeling, the soul and the universe, man and God commingle and become one.

Religion is the consciousness of the infinite. The seat of piety is, therefore, feeling. But if we inquire what special kind of feeling it is which constitutes piety, we are told by Schleiermacher it is the feeling of *absolute depen-*

dence upon God. It is something more than the feeling of relative dependence which we have towards the world or finite things about us. The feeling of absolute dependence co-exists with the feeling of relative dependence. It is in the proper relation of these two feelings, in the dominating and determining powers of the former, that piety consists. To feel that the finite only exists in and through the infinite, that the temporal and changing world is but the expression of the eternal, that life is only life as it is lived in and through God—that is religion.

“The usual conception of God,” says Schleiermacher, “as one single being outside of the world and behind the world is not the beginning and end of religion. It is only one manner of expressing God, seldom entirely pure, and always inadequate. Such an idea may be formed from mixed motives, from the need of such a being to console and help, and such a God may be believed in without piety, at least in my sense, and, I think, in the true and right sense. Yet the true nature of religion is neither this idea nor any other, but immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world. Similarly, the goal and the character of the religious life is not the immortality desired and believed in by many or—what their craving to be too wise about it would suggest—pretended to be believed by many. It is not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it, and which is still to come. It is the immortality which we can now have in this temporal life; it is the problem in the solution of which we are to be for ever engaged. In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite, and in every moment to be eternal, is the immortality of religion” (*Reden*, 2nd: On Immortality).

In his work on *Christian Faith* Schleiermacher deals more specifically with Christian piety and its relation to Christ as its Author. We can only refer very briefly to his views on Christianity. It is the function of Dogmatic Theology, he says, to deal with the contents of Christian

experience. It has three main topics: (1) Pious Experience (*Gottes-Bewusstsein*); (2) Development of the Sinful Experience; (3) Inward Experience of Redemption as related to Christ.

(1) The idea involved in our consciousness by God is not our creation, but our preservation, our sense of dependence. The world as a whole must, indeed, be referred to God, whom we regard as its Creator, but we cannot make any affirmation as to His being or attributes.

(2) Sin is the victory of the flesh over the spirit, and consists in the subordination of the religious feeling to our lower nature. It may be called original sin in so far as it is the condition of all men from the beginning.

(3) Christ is distinguished from other men by His absolute control of the religious feeling—by His habitual and perfect consciousness of God. But we must believe that His character developed in time, and that His nature was subject to human limitations. It is on His religious side that His perfection exists. He is the ideal of man, the type of mankind.

Christ is, therefore, the source of a new spiritual life of communion with God, and His redemptive agency consists in imparting to man His own inward consciousness of fellowship. By union with Christ the principle of sin is destroyed and a sense of forgiveness is experienced.

Christianity is the perfect religion, because it is the expression of the life of the perfect man who has lived in the fullest dependence on God, and whose consciousness is the norm and fountain of acceptable piety.

It is impossible to mistake the subjective character of religion in Schleiermacher's system. Sin is not so much a real thing, something abnormal, as simply a lower stage of human development; and the purpose of Christ's work is not to rescue from evil, but rather to elevate human nature. Next to his philosophy of religion it is in the sphere of ethics that Schleiermacher has exerted the greatest influence. His moral theory is considered under



three heads,—goods, virtue, and duty. The highest good is the supreme union of the ideal and the real, of reason and nature; virtue is the motive force of moral action. The cardinal virtues are Prudence, Constancy, Wisdom, and Love. Duty is moral action in relation to the moral law. The four departments of moral conduct are: Intercourse between man and man, property, thought, and feeling. To these correspond the four ethical relationships of right, society, faith, and revelation. And these again find expression in the four ethical organizations of the State, the Community, the School, and the Church.

In life there are two opposing tendencies. The one is the endeavour to be oneself—to realize one's individuality. The other is the effort to surrender oneself and lose oneself in the greater universe of God. Romanticism on its noblest side was an attempt to reconcile their opposition, and herein lies the significance of Schleiermacher that he has summed up these conflicting tendencies of the soul,—the tendency to self-realization and to self-surrender—in the idea of *freedom in God*. Only as a man finds himself in God does he truly realize himself. In thus expressing himself he gave utterance to the best side of Romanticism. If he regarded sin as a negative thing, and considered the spiritual life as based upon the natural to be realized by continuous progress, he contended with passionate earnestness that life is life only as it is realized in and through God. "The influence of Schleiermacher in religious philosophy rests on the fact that he was the first to undertake a critical analysis of religion, and the problem at which he wrought unceasingly, and which he has done more, perhaps, than any modern thinker to solve, is that of mediating between experience and history, between the conscience of the individual and the conscience of the religious society of which he forms a part."

## *SECT. 3. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM*

### CHAPTER I

#### *HEGEL*

#### GENERAL CONCEPTION AND METHOD

IN the philosophy of Hegel the line of thought pursued by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling culminates. The diverse elements of thought, subject and object, individualism and pantheism, which previous philosophers only succeeded in partially reconciling, and that by suppressing one of the sides, are now taken up and fused into one system. Hegel, indeed, claims for his system that all the opposing principles and previous names that have ever obtained in philosophy are taken up and transcended; and while imperfect and partial in themselves, they are shown to be necessary moments of a higher unity, stages in the unfolding of thought itself.

In particular Hegel was impressed with the necessity of avoiding the extremes which the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling presented. In correcting the one-sided idealism into which Fichte fell Schelling exaggerated the other side. Therefore, Hegel, though in agreement for a time with Schelling, found it necessary to reaffirm that which both Fichte and Schelling had lost sight of—the absolute unity of the subject, the unity of self-consciousness. The two

elements of knowledge which Kant had left unreconciled, and which Fichte and Schelling only succeeded in harmonizing by a suppression of one of the sides, Hegel seeks to bring into a higher synthesis. What had been regarded as opposites,—mind and matter, spirit and nature, the intelligible and phenomenal world,—must be grasped in a unity of thought, and that not in an external way, but by bringing into distinct consciousness the meaning of their differences as necessary elements of reason. The ultimate principle of all knowledge is the unity of consciousness. In other words, the absolute is not mere substance, but subject, the consciousness to which all beings are to be referred and in which all things are to find their justification and explanation.

Hegel brought to the solution of this problem a remarkable strength and vigour of thought, and he has become the creator of a system which must be regarded as the most perfect form of German idealism as well as the ripest fruit of the development of thought since Kant.

*George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel* was born at Stuttgart in Würtemberg on the 27th August, 1770, five years before Schelling, and seven after Schiller, both of whom, like himself, were Würtembergers. Swabia, as that part of Germany is called, has been likened to Scotland, and its inhabitants are distinguished not only by peculiarities of dialect, but also by simplicity and sturdiness of character. "The history of a philosopher," says Rosenkranz, Hegel's biographer, "is the history of his thought, the history of the development of his system." Though Hegel lived through a most stirring period of history, in his own life there is not much dramatic incident. Of his early days we know little. He studied at Tübingen University, but did not greatly distinguish himself as a student, and gave little promise of philosophic acumen. After leaving Tübingen he spent six years in Berne and Frankfort as tutor. During this time he laid the foundations of that extensive knowledge, especially of Greek history and

thought, which his after career evinced. His own mental life seemed to have passed through an evolution similar to that which ultimately found expression in his philosophy. He was the intimate friend of Schelling, whose career he watched "with admiration and joy"; and in 1801 he went to Jena to take his place beside his friend as champion of the "Philosophy of Identity." In his first published work, which appeared the same year, *On the Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, he is a defender of the latter against the former. In 1802 he united with Schelling in the publication of a *Critical Journal*, in which the points of view of the two contributors are identical. Both agree that subject and object must be united in a higher unity, and not merely externally harmonized like the two clocks of Leibnitz. But gradually a difference becomes visible; while Schelling clings to his "point of indifference"—the middle point of identity, Hegel asserts that the unity to which all things must be brought is not some middle term between nature and spirit, but that it is a unity of the Spirit with itself—a Unity which is at once higher than self and higher than Nature. In other words, Nature is to be regarded not as another existence side by side with mind, but as a part of its own life. A little later Hegel became *Privat-Dozent*, and, ultimately, in 1805, Professor in Jena. But the political catastrophe which at this time broke over Germany deprived him of his professorship. On the day of the battle of Jena Hegel finished his work on the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, which was not only his first great work, but that in which he embodied the distinctive principles of his philosophy. He himself has called it his "voyage of discovery." It has been named by others a philosophical Pilgrim's Progress. It cannot but have caused pain to Schelling, whom he mildly ridicules in his preface, and henceforth the friends of Jena days fall apart. The object of the *Phenomenology*, the most obscure yet in some respects the most brilliant of all Hegel's works,



is to prove that by a necessary process inherent in its very nature, thought undergoes successive transformations, passing from ordinary consciousness upwards till it reaches the position of absolute thought. On its way to this goal every possible phase of thought has its justification, not indeed as a condition in which the mind can rest, but as a necessary stage in the evolution.

After acting for a time as rector of the Nürnberg Gymnasium, in 1816 Hegel was appointed Professor in Heidelberg, and two years later was called to Berlin. He gradually gathered around him a large circle of students and admirers, and he exercised a profound and far-reaching influence on thought and life. Between the years 1812 and 1816 he wrote his *Logic*, and in 1817 his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophic Sciences*, in which he sets forth his philosophy as a whole.

In Berlin Hegel lectured on almost every branch of philosophy, the History of Philosophy, the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Right, of Art, and of Religion. His lectures were published after his death from the notes of his students, and his works are collected in eighteen volumes.

Hegel obtained a position in the realm of philosophy analogous to that of Goethe in the world of literature. His popularity was not due to any external advantage of address or manner such as distinguished Fichte and Schelling. His delivery was hesitating and embarrassed, and his expression heavy and involved, though it sometimes attained to commanding eloquence.

When he was at the height of his fame and influence he was suddenly cut off by an attack of cholera on the 14th November, 1831.

The philosophy of Hegel, in the first instance, as we have seen, connects itself immediately with that of Schelling. He also would start from the standpoint of the absolute and reach an absolute knowledge. But he declares in his preface to the *Phenomenology* that the

philosophy of Schelling is only the starting-point, not the completion, of the new science. On the one hand he pours contempt on the manner in which Schelling obtains his idea of the absolute. He has simply stated it without defining or proving it. It is as if it were "shot out of a pistol" instantaneously, abruptly, without any attempt to indicate the steps of its evolution. On the other hand, he criticises his formal abstract conception of the absolute as a motionless substance in which all differences are extinguished. "It is the night in which all cows are black." There is no movement, development, or productive energy. Hence Hegel contends that the absolute must not simply be stated, but rationally grounded and deduced. He would vindicate what he calls "the wonderful power of the understanding" as at once a stage and means of attaining to rational knowledge. "It is a ladder which has been let down" to common consciousness by which it may climb to the absolute standpoint. Hegel would, therefore, seek to show how consciousness develops from sense-perception to pure knowledge by a necessary and connected gradation; and in like manner he endeavours to prove that the absolute is not to be conceived as an abstract identity in which all differences are simply merged, but as a living spirit; not as a motionless substance, but as a productive subject from which all finite and particular things are brought forth and realized. "The absolute is spirit," says Hegel. That is its highest definition, to discover and grasp which is the aim of all culture and philosophy—the point to which all religion and knowledge converge.

While in one sense Hegel brings philosophy back to the standpoint of the intellect and demands that the world shall be grasped as a rational whole, his philosophy may also be said to be the justification of the common consciousness. It is to the consciousness of man as man that the world must be explained. Truth is not to be reached by way of the mysticism of Jacob Boehme, or the intuition

of Jacobi, but by the advance from the lower forms of the understanding to the higher stages of reason. For truth is not of two kinds. There must be no opposition between ordinary consciousness and higher knowledge. However sensuous, rude, and partial an ordinary man's consciousness of himself and the world may be, it is still, after all, a rational consciousness. It is the function of philosophy not to deny, but to correct and enlarge what is contained in the common man's thought of things. Philosophy, according to Hegel, "can only vindicate that highest synthesis which brings thought from the finite to the infinite, when it has fully recognised and done justice to the finite consciousness with which it starts." "That which is rational is real, and that which is real is rational." These words, which occur in the preface to his philosophy of Right, may be regarded as the keynote of his system. All reality is the expression of reason, and all being the realization of thought. The world itself is the evolution of the thinking Spirit.

The stages which the consciousness of the individual passes through have actually been passed through by the universal mind. The world-mind as exhibited on the plane of history is, equally with the individual mind, under the necessity of passing through the same stages. Knowledge consists in the re-reading of experience. It is for each of us the thinking of God's thoughts after Him. The Absolute exists first in the form of pure, pre-existent idea. It descends into the unconscious spheres of nature; if awakes to consciousness in man, realizes itself in the social institutions of the world, and finally in art, religion, and science, enriched and completed, it returns into itself again. Philosophy is a development, the highest product and goal of the world-process. Sensation, feeling, willing, are but lower forms of thought, each of which is necessary to and contained in that which is higher. Morality, art, and religion are stages in the progress of humanity towards the attainment of absolute knowledge.

Before entering upon a detailed exposition of Hegel's system, there are three main features of his philosophy which it will be well to keep in mind.

1. Perhaps the first most distinctive feature of his philosophy is his insistence on the *concrete historical character of mind*. This is specially the note of his first work, the *Phenomenology*, where, as we have seen, he sketches in broad outline the development of the mind from sense-perception to its return to itself in universal self-consciousness. His whole system is but an elaboration of the sketch which he gives us in this earlier work. The ultimate fact for Hegel, the principle of all reality, is always mind or spirit which only reaches complete consciousness of self by passing through and taking up into itself all the previous grades of its development. Thought constitutes the structure of reality—Hegel is an acknowledged idealist. Everything must be explained in terms of mind, and there is no higher criterion, no other test of truth than thought. Indeed, for Hegel as for Aristotle, truth and thought are but two different expressions of the same thing; and to say that thought is a system of reality is just to say truth is a whole in which are contained all lesser truths. The idea is the real, and all actuality is the unfolding of the idea.

2. From this there follows a second feature of Hegel's view, viz. that *thought is an organic unity*—a unity of distinguished and related parts. The whole is implied in every part, and every part is implied in the whole. It is, moreover, a graduated system in which the parts are not mechanically put together, but form an organism. All parts are justified, all are needed, and are there for the sake of and by reason of the whole. This interconnection is of the very essence of thought. Yet while all the parts are necessary, they stand in the relation of superiority and inferiority. The lower categories pass into the higher, but they do not cease to be. They live on, transmuted into higher forms of life. "The bud vanishes with the appear-



ance of the blossom, and we may say that the one is contradicted by the other; the fruit again proclaims the blossom a spurious form of the plant's existence, the truth of the one passes over into the other. These forms are not merely distinct, but crush each other out as being mutually incompatible. But their fluid nature constitutes them none the less momenta of that organic unity wherein they not alone cease to conflict, but in which one is as necessary as the other, which equal necessity makes the life of the whole." The categories of thought are thus co-existent parts of a system of reality. In the logic of Being thoughts cannot be prior or posterior. One thought implies the other, and all together—the earlier and the later, the lower and the higher—are reciprocally involved in each other. History is but the externalization of the absolute truth which is always there.

3. A third feature which follows from the former is that this system of unity of thought is to be conceived as a *unity of opposites*. In ordinary life the common understanding is constantly taking the part for the whole. Men are accustomed, says Hegel, to see only this or that, and to draw sharp distinctions between the true and the false. As a matter of fact, no part is complete in itself. It always implies something else. The partial is always the false, just because it is partial. Only in the system of truth as a whole can we escape contradiction; only when we allow for both sides do we attain to truth. Any isolated view pressed to its extreme at once displays its inadequacy. Thus in the advance of thought every notion passes into its opposite, and so there comes about an equal justification for the opposite as well as the original notion, and the truth is reached, not when we rest in any one of the sides and regard it as the whole, but when we take as complementary the two abstractions into which our thought has been sundered. The abstract notion, the notion which involves a contradiction when taken in its isolation, is not abolished, it is simply taken up into a larger whole, and

its true nature as part of a richer reality is established. Each part is necessary to the other, each supplies an element required for the complete notion. This supreme grasp of thought which unites what understanding severs Hegel calls "Speculation," and this movement from the simplest notion through negation and contradiction to higher, Hegel styles the "Dialectic of Thought."

If Hegel derived his conception of the absolute from Schelling, he borrowed his dialectic method from Fichte. But his employment of this method is much more thorough and insistent. While Fichte begins with the *ego* and derives the whole world from the subject, with Hegel the ground of development lies in the object, in the self-movement of the idea, and the subject is, as it were, the spectator who follows the evolution with his own thought. While Fichte, moreover, expressly declares that the original opposition of the *ego* and the *non-ego* cannot be derived from any other notion, and at each stage of his procedure refers back to the universal *ego* from which everything is produced, Hegel proceeds by a strictly immanent dialectic to develop each higher stage from the conflict and union of lower, till finally the absolute, which is the harmony of all opposites, is reached.

The dialectic is based on the recognition of the union of opposites. All affirmation implies negation, and all negation involves affirmation. This law of development, proceeding by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and thus advancing from contradictions to ever fuller and more complex reconciliations, while it is regarded by some students as a stumbling-block, is hailed by others as a veritable discovery. It is certainly the pulse of Hegel's system, and with fearless consistency it is applied to every subject. If it be accepted it revolutionizes our whole view of life. The law of contradiction of formal logic, according to which a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, must yield to the higher truth, that there is a sense in which everything is and is not, and that all reality is

a synthesis of opposites. The whole alone is the real. The partial fact is only an abstraction which needs to be brought into its relation with the whole in order to gain validity. Nothing can remain in hard isolation. Everything is a stage—a fleeting stage—false if taken alone. This law gives life and movement to the universe. This triple movement of thought runs through everything, from the simplest being right up to God. Thought always advances from simple abstract identity through differences to unity. The very world itself must follow this spontaneous evolution of thought. Nature, history, philosophy, everything illustrates the working of this law. The acorn holds within it the oak. The oak is at once the negation and fulfilment of the acorn. The child contains the possibility of the man, and the man at once negates and affirms the child. History presents the same law on a larger scale. Civilization develops by the action and reaction of opposing tendencies. The ages of authority are followed by ages of licence and lawlessness, and from their union there is evolved the higher stage of constitutional liberty.

The universe then for Hegel is a development, the process of the absolute, the manifestation of God. Behind the whole movement the absolute is eternally present, not as a fixed substance, but as a fluid, self-revealing spirit. The rhythmic advance of thought in the world is but the unfolding of what is already in existence, of what Aristotle would call "potential being." God reveals Himself in the logical idea, in nature and in mind. But while thought runs through every stage, it is not alike conscious of itself at every stage of development. It is only to the philosophical vision that God is seen revealing Himself, first, in the pre-existent stage of pure being; next, in the natural world, through its materialized forces and forms of life; and, finally, in the spiritual world through the individual soul, in the moral order of society, and in the creations of art, religion, and philosophy.

The philosophy of Hegel is an idealism, but it may be called a realism as well. Thought is, indeed, prior. Thought, in fact, is everything; but it is thought finding itself in a world of actualities which has no meaning but for, and apart from thought. Nature for Hegel is no fixed solid, as it was for Fichte, limiting and opposing thought. It is not even, as with Schelling, a mere parallel of mind, a twin offspring of the absolute. Nature and mind have, indeed, the same origin, but they are not co-equal branches of one stem. The natural world proceeds from the "idea"; the spiritual from the "idea" and nature. At the basis of all reality, whether natural or mental, there is thought. It is thought in its potentiality. In one sense the idea is first, in another it is last. It interpenetrates every part of being. But while in a sense it is only potential in the lower forms of existence, it comes to self-consciousness in the higher.

It is the province of philosophy to follow the eternal thought of God, to reproduce in our own consciousness the unfolding of reality, the evolution of the absolute. According to Hegel, philosophy must proceed dialectically and reproduce in the consciousness of the thinking subject the necessary stages in the development of thought. Everywhere the system falls into three parts, and every part of the system observes the triadic law. Every truth, every reality, has three aspects or stages. It is the unification of two partial aspects of truth, through affirmation, differentiation and harmony. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, is the perpetual law of thought.

As absolute reason, then, observes this triple movement; beginning first with the most abstract concept, the concept of pure being, and then externalizing itself in nature and finally returning into itself again in spirit, so philosophy has three broad divisions:

1. The Logic, which is the statement of the abstract conditions of self-consciousness, the exposition of the categories or terms of thought which we use in the thinking of the world.



2. The philosophy of nature, or the statement of the forms of the external world in and through which reason becomes concrete.

3. The philosophy of the mind or spirit, which deals with the stages through which consciousness passes from the simplest forms of physical activity to complete self-consciousness, to the unity of the subjective and objective mind in art, religion, and philosophy.

## CHAPTER II

### STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

WHILE the Logic, the purpose of which is to develop the universal notions of reason constituting all being and thought, is the first part of Hegel's system, the *Phenomenology* may be regarded as a general introduction to his philosophy. It contains, indeed, a comprehensive view of his whole theory of the world, tracing, as we have seen, the development of the Spirit from the lowest forms of sense up to the knowledge of the absolute.

It is impossible to characterize this work. It is neither a pure logic, a psychology, nor a history. It is, indeed, something of them all. It is his voyage of discovery, and may be said to give a picture of Hegelianism in the making. It is in some degree an autobiography of the author's own mind. It may be regarded, as Hegel says in his introduction, "as the pathway of the soul passing through the series of forms which its nature prescribes as so many stages of self-purification, until it attains, through a complete expression of itself, to a knowledge of that which it is in itself."

"The totality of knowledge is the unfolding of the idea. The idea discloses itself originally as thought identical with itself, and thence as an activity which places itself over against itself and which in this other self finds itself again. Therefore, the science of philosophy falls into three parts. (1) Logic, the science of the idea in and for

itself. (2) Nature-philosophy, the science of the idea in its other objectivated self. (3) The philosophy of the Spirit, the science of the idea which has returned to itself again" (*Encykl.* i. 26). With these words Hegel lays down the principal divisions of his philosophy.

1. *The logic* of Hegel is an enumeration of the forms or categories by which our experience exists. Kant had set forth the different forms of thought in an unconnected, arbitrary manner. Hegel seeks to show their connection with one another and their relation to the unity of self-consciousness.

Logic, it will at once be seen, is something different from what has been commonly accepted as such from the time of Aristotle. According to the usual acceptation, logic is simply the science of the laws of thought, and it is sharply distinguished from Metaphysics, which has rather to do with the actual contents of our thinking. Hegel regards this separation of form and material as unsatisfactory. A form without contents, he remarks, is unreal. You cannot distinguish a thought from its object. It is the thing which is the thought. Hegel demands, therefore, that logic and metaphysics shall be conceived as one. Logic must deal with the whole kingdom of thought. It must present the truth as it is in itself—the whole organism of being. It must, in short, reveal the very working of the mind of God.

Logic must, indeed, proceed methodically, but it is not bound by mere abstract consistency. The dialectic is the true law of thought as it is the law of all reality. Hence Hegel begins with the simplest notion of Being, and by means of its negation, which it at once involves, advances to a higher notion. Each notion has its opposite. Both are moments of a third,—components of a higher unity. Thus by an inherent necessity thought advances in ever-widening circles, by a triple movement, until the ultimate reality of being is grasped.

Hegel begins with the idea of *pure being*—the barest

possible assertion of reality, and the development of the idea falls into three parts—the doctrine of *Being*, the doctrine of *Essence*, and the doctrine of *Concept*. These categories taken by themselves are, indeed, pure abstractions. It may not be a very interesting study to follow their development, but into the “land of shades,” as Hegel calls it, it is necessary to explore in order to know what reason is and how it works.

(1) *Pure Being* is Being considered in itself without contents. As such it is equivalent to non-being, into which it passes through “becoming.” A thing passes out of itself into something not itself. But the not-self is really a higher realization of the thing. Thus Pure Being passes into determinate Being. That breaks up again into two elements—quality and quantity, which are united in magnitude.

(2) Again, Being, with its several particulars, leads to *Essence*, which is at once broken up into “ground” and “appearance,” which are again united in *actuality*. Actuality may be regarded in a threefold respect, as possible being, actual being, or necessary being. Actuality proper has two moments, *Substantiality*, or what is ground of itself, and *Causality*, in which the same thing may be either cause or effect. These two, substantiality and causality, are combined once more in the idea of *reciprocity*—which is the highest category of the real or the actual. The idea of reciprocity now carries us out of the region of *Essence* into that of “*Concept*,” which is the third division of the logic.

(3) The *Concept* is the union of Being and Essence. It is, as Hegel says, “the living spirit of the actual.” The concept breaks up into the subjective and the objective concept. The one embraces the forms of ordinary logic,—notion, judgment, syllogism; and the other includes the cosmical ideas of Mechanism, Chemistry, and Teleology. But now the *idea* unites the subjective and objective concepts. It may be viewed in the *immediate* form of *life*,



and in its *reflected* form as knowledge, which is the mind going out of itself and realizing itself in the object. The union of Life and Knowledge is the highest idea of all—the absolute truth. This absolute idea is the sum of all the elements of the logic which we have been considering.

The merit of Hegel here is that he has shown that the categories do not lie in the mind in an arbitrary, disordered mass, but form an organically connected whole in which each occupies its assigned place and is related to every other by gradations of filiation and subordination.

2. *The Philosophy of Nature* starts with the result of the logical development. Here pure thought loses its inwardness and is disclosed in its objectivity, in the relations of space and time. Whereas it formerly appeared as an abstract idea, now it appears as matter and movement. Instead of thought we have perception; instead of dialectic, gravitation; instead of causation, sequence in time. It may be asked, why does the idea externalize itself? The answer is, in order to become actual—Nature, in other words, is a necessary stage in self-knowledge. But the actuality realized in Nature is imperfect, and is only the forerunner of a better actuality of spirit, which is the aim of the idea from the beginning. Reason, therefore, becomes nature in order to become spirit. The idea goes forth out of itself in order that it may return enriched into itself again. The relation of natural objects to each other and their interaction are external and mechanical, and though, indeed, reason is visible everywhere, it is vague, dim, and blurred by material influences, and has often the aspect of caprice and unreason. In his treatment of nature Hegel follows Schelling closely, and for the most part does not reveal here his usual brilliancy and originality. He somewhat disparages the study of Natural Science, and is unjust in his criticism of Newton; and in so far as he admits a logical development or metamorphosis “only in the concept,” he is opposed to the general tendency of

modern scientific evolution. In agreement with Schelling, Hegel divides the philosophy of nature into *Mechanics*, *Physics*, and the union of these in *Organics*.

(1) *Mechanics* deals with matter in its pure objectivity. Here gravitation gives to matter its unity, and, in so far as the universe is reducible to mathematical laws, we may regard it as a system of rationality, as an expression of thought.

(2) *Physics* deals with the forms and relations of inorganic nature; and under this head we have the theory of the elements, of sound, heat, and cohesion, and, finally, of chemical affinity.

(3) *Organics* deals with life, which by a law of self-preservation resists the chemical process of destruction. As Life, nature comprises three stages, the primeval kingdom of the fossil world, which is the subject of geology; the vegetable kingdom of the world of plants, the subject of botany; and the animal kingdom, the subject of physiology, which possesses sensation and spontaneous movement and attains to self-consciousness and to mastery over nature in man.

3. *The Philosophy of the Mind* is the third part of Hegel's system, and it follows naturally from a consideration of nature. Here the idea is represented as returning from the outwardness of nature into itself. In order to know itself as Reason, the Spirit must pass through a series of grades until it reaches its highest form in God. The philosophy of the Spirit falls into three great divisions—Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Spirit.

A. The *Subjective Spirit* is the spirit considered in relation to itself. The essence and purpose of the subjective spirit is the realization of freedom, and Hegel shows here how it realizes itself and gradually becomes independent of nature. It has three principal stages: the soul, the consciousness, and the spirit as such. These Hegel deals with under the respective heads of (a) *Anthropology*, which has to do with the physical conditions of the soul, such as

climate, race, temperament, age, sex,—in short, everything which belongs to the spirit in union with the body; (b) *Phenomenology*, which treats of the soul in itself as pure *ego*, in contrast to the external world, tracing its development from consciousness to self-consciousness, and thence to reason; and (c) *Psychology*, which has three moments—a *theoretic*, dealing with the common psychological function of attention, representation, memory, imagination, and thought, in its forms of understanding, judgment, and reason; a *practical*, dealing with the appetites, desires, passions; and, finally, the *Free Spirit*, as the union of the theoretic and practical—the rational will which realizes itself in the actual outer world.

The will, according to Hegel, is a special form of the intelligence. It is thought translated into action, thinking become practical. Just as the spirit in virtue of its intelligence preserves its infinity and independence, so it exercises its freedom through the power of the will. The will is not a property of the spirit which merely exists along with others; it is the very substance of the spirit itself, the essence of thought.

B. *The Objective Spirit* is the outward realization of freedom, the will expressing itself in the institutions of the moral world. Here we have to do with the practical philosophy of Hegel, and here our author is at his best. The outline is given in his *Encyklopädie* and in his *Philosophy of Right*, but the lectures published after his death on History, Art, and Religion, not only elaborate and develop his views, but present a system of ethical, historical, and religious philosophy unsurpassed in fulness and wealth of thought by any age.

The doctrine of the objective spirit embraces ethics, the philosophy of right, the State, and history. It is divided into (1) *Rights*, which deals with property, contract, and punishment; (2) *Morality*, with that of purpose, intention, and well-being, in relation to good and evil; (3) *Social Ethics* as expressed in the family, the civil community,

and the State, and, finally, in international politics and world-history.

(a) *Law* or *Abstract Right* is the recognition of the freedom of the rational will. Though Hegel did not consider that the individual can be regarded apart from his concrete social life, still he deemed it convenient to treat of him, first of all, as a person having individual rights over against others. Abstract right, therefore, deals with three things, property, contract, and restitution. Law is, at first, necessarily negative. It is a sum of prohibitions. Private right contains two things—the warrant to be a person, and the injunction to respect others as persons. Property is at once the sign and domain of personality, the expression of the individual. As a part of the person, it is inviolable and sacred. It must, therefore, be recognised by my neighbour. It is mine to keep or part with. But, naturally, this right of keeping or disposing of property involves *Contract*, which is the union of two wills grounded on the right of disposition. When, however, a conflict of wills or disagreement arises, when one will asserts itself against the right of another, then we have the question of particular right as against wrong, which may take the form of delinquency, fraud, or crime. Wrong arising from the collision of wills demands reconciliation and restitution. This is the foundation of the right of compulsion, which appears as punishment. The wrong-doer, through punishment, is brought to see the self-contradiction of his act, and to recognise the principle of justice.

(b) Abstract or legal right leads naturally to the subject of *Moral Right*. Morality is the will regarded as determining its own acts and influenced not by legal considerations, but by purely ethical reasons. Here the question is not one of right merely, but of duty actuated by motive and intention. In the stage of morality, good exists in the form of a requirement which can never be perfectly fulfilled. It is a moral imperative. There is a perpetual opposition between the moral law and the individual will,



between intention and execution. Here the judge between good and evil is the conscience. But conscience, so long as it remains at the stage of mere subjective self-determination, is incomplete, and not, therefore, infallible. "I may will the good, but how am I to know what is the good? Conscience may bid me do simply what my particular desire or personal prejudice impels me." An action, which is the result of blind instinct, may be bad, however good my intentions may be. I need, therefore, not merely a personal motive, but also an outward standard. There must be a higher sphere in which morality and legality are united.

(c) That sphere, according to Hegel, is the sphere of *Social Ethics* (Sittlichkeit). Here morality is felt to be not merely a personal instinct, but a universal command given from without. Here I give up my purely individual, private judgment and recognise the authority of constituted society, whose institutions, customs, and requirements implanted in humanity give definiteness and stability to my moral life. Here in the ethical relations of the family, the society, and the State, the true life and freedom of the individual are realized. Only in society does a man come to himself and really exist. In the moral institutions good becomes established as a habit, a second nature.

(1) In the *family* the members are united by a living bond of love—it involves *marriage*, in which the physical union is transformed into a spiritual; *family property*, and the *education* of the children.

(2) The family widens out into the *community*, the members of which, though independent, are associated by common needs, and by the common recognition and support of civil regulations under which conflicting interests are adjusted and scope for activity is secured.

(3) *The State* is the union of the family and the community, and represents the completed realization of freedom—the consummation of the highest ethical idea to which all personal ends ought to be subservient. The

State is the true end of man. It does not seek to suppress, but rather to express the personality of each. But personality is not individualism. The true person is a social being who has rights and duties as a member of society. In giving the highest place to social obligation, Hegel would seem to be consciously controverting the ethics of Kant and Fichte, in whom mere subjective freedom was the goal of the moral life.

The best constitution, according to Hegel, is the limited monarchy as exemplified in Britain. The King is the dot on the i—the head which gives personal authority and completion to the decrees of State; the establishment of a constitutional monarchy is the goal of history.

From the consideration of the individual State, Hegel passes to the discussion of the relation of States or nations to one another, and to the problems involved in the conflict of peoples, the rise and fall of dynasties in the world's history.

In his *Philosophy of History*, which is one of Hegel's most interesting and most characteristic works, he unfolds the "grand argument of human existence," and traces the law of development which runs through the whole past life of the race, showing how each people, and one alone, holds the sceptre for a time as the unconscious instrument of the universal spirit till another arises to take its place with a larger idea of liberty and a higher sense of vocation.

"The only conception," says Hegel, "which philosophy brings to the contemplation of history is the simple conception of reason." Reason is the sovereign of the world, and the history of the world, therefore, is a rational process. The world-spirit is the guiding force of its development, and the instruments are the genius of nations and the efforts of their heroes. A particular people is the expression of one determinate moment of the universal spirit, and when it has fulfilled its purpose it yields up its power to another. "The world's history is the world's judgment," Schiller has said. All great historical characters are also

the instruments of a power the purpose of which they carry out while they imagine they are furthering their own ends. It is the art of reason that it makes the very passions of men minister to its progress. What Emerson has beautifully said of the architect of St. Peters may be said of all great men :

“Himself from God he could not free,  
He builded better than he knew :  
The conscious stone to beauty grew :”

Hegel held Napoleon in high admiration. But he saw in him but the incarnation of the spirit of his age—the fulfilment of a destiny greater than himself that had been committed to him.

The mighty drama of history discloses the growing consciousness of freedom. At first only one is free—the tyrant. Next some are free, and, lastly, all are free. The progress of civilization is like the progress of the sun from East to West. Here as everywhere historical evolution observes the triple movement of thought. The idea must have a fitting theatre on which to develop. The earth as the geographical basis of history has three great divisions—Mountains, Valleys, and Rivers. The first, the haunts of refuge, represent the primitive condition of man; the second, the scene of agriculture, a more advanced civilization; and the third, the highest stage of activity, commerce, and intercommunication.

In the development of humanity Hegel recognises three great epochs—the Oriental, the Græco-Roman, and the Germanic, and he traces the growth of freedom as the distinctive mark of the progress of the spirit.

In the far East, in the childhood of the race the Spirit is immersed in nature. China and India have not advanced beyond the primitive ideas of a State. In China the State is a large family, the monarch is patriarch. In India the family has passed into the society, but it is a society dominated by the stern insurmountable difference of caste. In Persia the idea of monarchy first appears, but it is in the

form of abstract unity—a unity of hostile elements held together by military force. The Sphinx of Egypt, half-brute, half-man—that strange riddle of antiquity—is the symbol of the transition from Oriental naturalism to European civilization. Egypt, with its sensuous imagery and spirit-worship, mediates between the East and West, and prepares the way for Greek humanism.

The Greek world represents the period of the world's youth, the age of the beauty and strength of fresh manhood. Here the Spirit is beginning to know itself and to realize its freedom. "By the Greeks," says Hegel, "we begin to feel ourselves at home, for we stand upon the soil of the spirit." Here the Spirit of freedom has its birth. Achilles is the symbol of Greek life—robust and vigorous youth rejoicing in nature and beauty. But it is delight in sensuous beauty. The spirit is not wholly free. The moral life is not yet universalized—it is the state of individuality. The few only are free; the many are slaves.

The culture of Greece passes over into Rome—while Rome conquers physically it is conquered spiritually. In Rome political universality and individual freedom are recognised, but not fused into one. It is the age of maturity, the age of power and utility. The geniality and joy of soul that existed in Athens have given place in Rome to stern duty and vigorous toil. With the decline of Rome, the German nations come upon the stage of history. Here for the first time the idea attains to full consciousness. Spiritual unity takes the place of secular power. With the appearance of Christianity all men become aware of their freedom. In the beginning the emancipation was religious, but gradually among the Germanic people it became a political enfranchisement as well. As the Christian faith pervaded the nations, man was recognised as man, and the brotherhood of humanity was acknowledged. The Germanic world presents three epochs. The first extends from the migration of the



Northern hordes till the reign of Charlemagne—an age of struggle and dissolution. The second, which reveals the antithesis between the Church and State and presents various features such as the Crusaders, feudalism, and the rise of free States—the dark ages in which superstition and faith conflict,—reaches to the Reformation, the epoch of emancipation and spiritual freedom. The third period extends from the Reformation to our own times. It is the age of civil liberty and growing rational life.

The *Philosophy of History* is one of Hegel's greatest works, and nowhere are his genius and originality more strikingly manifested than in his conception of historical evolution. He had, indeed, his predecessors in Bossuet, Montesquieu, Herder, Lessing, and Schelling, each of whom had glimpses of a progressive purpose, but Hegel is really the first writer who has attempted to grasp the whole movement of the ages as one all-embracing revelation of the spirit. Inaccuracy of detail in the arrangement of particular peoples and a certain arbitrary selection of facts have been pointed out as objections to his principle. It has also been observed that Hegel seems to suggest that the history of the world has attained its climax, and must reach its close with the present era. But Hegel nowhere indicates that the spirit has uttered its last word, or that the truth which this age has reached may not contain within it the germs of a great future. Philosophy is always in advance of fact, and the ideals and visions to which we have attained in the realm of knowledge to-day have still to be worked out in practical life and actual history. No difference is more marked than that between the methods of the eighteenth century and those of the nineteenth in contemplating historical development. In the eighteenth century no adequate representation was given of the real dependence of the later forms of human culture on the earlier. Evolution, applied not to nature only, but to thought, is entirely the product of the nineteenth century, and to Hegel must be accorded the honour

of laying down the principles which underlie and shape the unfolding of history.

c. *The Absolute Spirit*, which is the third stage of the philosophy of the mind, is the higher union of the subjective and objective spirit. It is the spirit which has returned into self. The break between subject and object, thought and being, infinite and finite, is annulled, and the infinite is recognised as the essence of the finite.

We have seen the spirit coming to consciousness in the outward facts of history; we are now to see it attaining to a knowledge of itself in the sphere of thought itself.

Hegel designates that sphere in general as Religion, but in particular he distinguishes three elements, those of perception, feeling, and thought, which correspond to the three forms in which the infinite is expressed, *Art, Religion, and Philosophy*.

1. *Art* is the perception by the absolute spirit of the ideal of beauty realized in concrete, sensuous form,—stone, colour, and sound. In Art we see the triumph of the idea over matter anticipated. But, still, the material which the idea employs is not perfectly plastic, and this lack of pliability, more or less existent in matter, creates the diversity of the arts. In general, it may be said, two inseparable factors belong to the constitution of the beautiful—the matter and the form or idea. Matter is the expression of the idea: the idea, the illumination of the matter.

Art has progressed from Symbolic, through Classical to Romantic Art, from the inartistic to the artistic, and, finally, to that which is more than artistic, as being unable to express all its meaning.

In *Symbolic Art* matter predominates, and the idea is merely suggested. In *Classical Art*, matter and thought are balanced and exist for each other. In *Romantic Art*, the spiritual idea wholly rules and moulds the material to its own ends.

The special arts have followed in a natural sequence—Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, and Poetry.

*Architecture* is characteristically symbolic. The idea and form are distinct. Whether in the form of the obelisk, the temple, or the cathedral, it is religious feeling or aspiration that is symbolized. The vast proportions suggest solemnity and grandeur, but the more delicate emotions are not expressed.

In *Sculpture* the contrast between the form and the matter is lessened, and the material is moulded more or less to express the thought of the artist. But while sculpture may attempt to represent the divine in human form, the higher aspects of the human soul, and still less of the divine nature, cannot be depicted in a material so gross and limited as stone.

The three specially Romantic Arts are Painting, Music, and Poetry. In *Painting* an advance is made upon sculpture; the material is less gross and the thought is represented in a more ideal form.

In *Music* the duality is overcome. Here Art passes out of space and beyond the limitations of matter and exists ideally in time. *Poetry* is the highest form of Art, combining music and painting. Poetry offers definite expression to the vague, inarticulate sounds of music, and gives ideal utterance to what painting can only suggest. Poetry combines all the other arts. Epic poetry corresponds to the plastic arts, lyric to music, while these are united in dramatic poetry, which is the most perfect embodiment of artistic expression.

While all the arts may be contemporaneous, and are still extant as the diverse expressions of feeling, there is a historical growth in their manifestation. Oriental Art, the art of India and Egypt, is distinctly symbolic. There the matter preponderates, and in its massiveness, grotesqueness, and grandeur, it is the feeling of sublimity rather than beauty that is expressed. In Classical Art—the art of Greece, symbolism passes into direct expression, and

beauty rather than grandeur is depicted. In Romantic Art sublimity and beauty are combined, and especially in Christian art the embodiment of spiritual ideas gives a new meaning to artistic expression. Under the influence of the Gospel the idea of the beautiful is spiritualized; the adoration of physical beauty yields to the worship of moral purity and holiness, and the worship of the Virgin succeeds the cult of Venus. But while Christianity enlarges the scope and enriches the content of classical art, it robs it at the same time of its beauty. The material form is felt to be inadequate to the moral ideal. The most finished masterpiece cannot satisfy the Christian artist. The eternal world which his inner eye perceives, the heavenly harmonies which enrapture his soul—the divine ideal, in short, which he longs to depict, neither brush nor lyre nor pen can express. With the realization of the inadequacy of material forms to embody the highest truth, Art as the expression of religious feeling degenerates, and prepares the way for a fuller and truer utterance of life, viz. religion proper.

2. *Religion.* The dualism between the finite and the infinite which Art reveals can only be reconciled by religion, in which the worshipper comes into direct contact with the object of his worship, no longer through the medium of material or symbolic forms. In Art the idea takes the form of concrete reality; in religion it is immediately realized in inward feeling. The essence of religion is the inward exaltation of the soul to the absolute—the desire for union of the subject with God.

In his lectures on the *Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel seeks to exhibit the vital connection of his system with Christianity. In an appendix, which consists of several lectures, he discusses the Being of God, and examines the various arguments which have been adduced for His existence. He characteristically recognises a development of the idea in the various proofs. He sees truth in them all. They are complements of one another. Yet all together



are inadequate. God cannot be demonstrated like a mathematical theorem. He leans mostly to the ontological proof. For, after all, God is just our idea of Him. He exists within, not without, our religious experience, and the more deep and comprehensive that experience is the more truly is God revealed to us.

Religion in its historical development has passed through various stages. The lowest phase is that which Hegel calls "nature-worships," in which God is conceived simply as substance or natural power, and in which the finite subject is completely merged. The stages of Oriental worship are,—the "religion of sorcery" in China; in India, that of phantasy,—the Brahmin worship; and that of inner contemplation,—the Buddhist. The Zoroastrianism of Persia he designates the "Religion of Light"; the Syrian, that of Pain; and the Egyptian, that of Mystery. These prepare the way for the religion of Freedom. The Greek solves the riddle of the Sphinx in so far as he knows himself as man, the master of nature.

The religions of spiritual individuality also pass through three phases—Judaism, the religion of sublimity; Hellenism, the religion of beauty; and the Roman religion, the religion of utility and purpose. The first is the religion of unity or Monotheism; the second, of necessity or fate, and Polytheism; the third, of the practical understanding or political power. Finally, Christianity or the revealed religion is the synthesis of nature-worship and humanism, the union of the one and the many, the harmony of sublimity, beauty and power, the reconciliation of necessity and freedom. The highest idea of God is attained in Christianity, which conceives God as going out of Himself, incarnating Himself in man and returning into Himself again. In Christianity the mystery of reconciliation between the finite and the infinite, between man and his Maker, is solved in Jesus Christ, the God-Man.

It is questionable if Hegel believed in the historical Christ. To him the idea of the mediator is more signifi-

cant than any question regarding the actual Jesus. It is, of course, essential to Hegel's view that the Trinity should be the distinguishing note of his idea of God. But the three persons are stages of evolution rather than co-ordinate personalities, of which the third is higher and more real than the other two. He sees in the history of the world three successive phases of revelation—the Kingdom of the Father, the Kingdom of the Son, and the Kingdom of the Spirit. But while the language of Hegel is ambiguous, we are not justified in assuming, as Mr. M'Taggart does, that he attributes personality to the third only of the triad. There are passages which seem to indicate that Hegel believed in a personal God who actually has revealed Himself in and through man.

In an important passage (*Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 282) Hegel says, "If man is to get a consciousness of the unity of divine and human nature, this unity must accordingly show itself in one particular man, in a definite individual who is, at the same time, known to be the Divine Idea, not merely a being of higher mind in general, but rather the highest, the absolute Idea, the Son of God."

But while the above passage (which has been curtailed) would seem to attribute a unique historical place to Christ, Hegel sees in the atonement an exhibition only of one great rhythm of thought—the oneness of God and man. God is conceived as self-estranged. Reconciliation must be conceived as proceeding from the side of the Divine. By the death of Christ, the Absolute Being is reconciled with Himself, and this act of death is Christ's resurrection as Spirit. The sensuous history in which Christianity first appeared is merely the point of departure for faith. We must detach the contents of religion from the first sensuous presentment of it. "It is expedient for you that I go away," said Christ. "The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified." The living Christ is to be found in the Church which He founded, and in the doc-

trines of the relation of God and man of which it is the visible symbol.

The reconciliation which Christ represents must be worked out on the stage of the individual life and of universal history. Faith without works is dead. Christianity exhibits the reconciliation of God with the world as an eternal truth, but this must be achieved in personal experience. The sense of failure in man to fulfil his vocation, with the consequent alienation from his true good, is what is called in religious language the consciousness of sin. The various religions which have appeared upon the earth have been the various expressions of man's attempt to overcome this sense of alienation. The Greek religion of self-assertion failed because it never realized the problem, it was never conscious of its separation. The lowest depths of suffering had to be fathomed before any cure could be effectual. Deeply dissatisfied with the world, Stoicism, with its gospel of renunciation and flight from the world, made an approach to the solution. But Stoicism and all kindred systems of denial are negative and barren. It is not by suppression but expression that man must come to himself. In Christianity for the first time the great principle and condition of life was enunciated—that man must die to live. And Christ at once expressed and exemplified the truth which must be fulfilled in every individual—that the only way to self-realization is through self-renunciation. Life is at once the beginning and the end, but the way is ever through sacrifice and death. This law is true for God as for man, and for man because it is true for God. God comes to Himself by going out of Himself and returning to Himself. Man too must "die to live" if he would realize the fulness and wealth of spiritual being of which his natural life contains the promise and potency. But dying is only a stage—life is the end, and death for man, as it was for Christ, is the "death of death." "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone."

3. *Philosophy* for Hegel is the keystone of his system.

What is only given in an intuitive and emotional form in religion is given in clearness and immediateness in thought. Philosophy is truth in its absoluteness, the thought of the self-thinking idea, of the self-comprehending reason.

Philosophy is, indeed, identical in its object with religion. The constant aim of both is to determine the nature of God and His purpose in the world. It is the need of a final synthesis which both religion and philosophy strive to satisfy, the one from the side of the heart and the other from the side of the intellect. But inasmuch as we cannot know truth till it is brought forth from the region of the emotions into the clearer light of thought, philosophy is higher than religion. The business of philosophy is to make plain the assumptions of ordinary consciousness—it is the “explication of God.”

In the historical development of philosophy we find the same dialectic movement which we find in thought itself. “The history of philosophy shows us in apparently diverse philosophies, philosophy itself at different stages of development, and the special principles, one of which underlies one system, and another, another, are only branches of one and the same whole. The last philosophy in the order of time is the result of all previous philosophies, and must contain the principles of them all.”

The triple rhythm of thought is the pulse of the universe. As in nature and spirit, so in history, in art, in religion, and in philosophy, as in the Absolute itself, this threefold movement of thesis, antithesis, synthesis prevails. The many in the one, unity in trinity, Being, Nature, Spirit—that is the secret of the world, the essence of God. Thought is everywhere, and must explain everything. “The real is the rational.”

It is impossible not to admire the grandeur and scope of Hegel's system. It is a great thought-poem—a new species of poetry, more dramatic, more masterly in construction, more rich in contents than any intellectual



conception of the universe that has yet been proposed by man.

It stands before our eyes, homogeneous, carefully articulated, severely symmetrical, like a gigantic Gothic cathedral, every little part of which repeats the whole, every triad revealing the great trinity—Being, Nature, Spirit.

## CHAPTER III

### REACTION AGAINST HEGELIANISM

It was inevitable that the two conflicting systems of idealism represented by Fichte and Schelling should awaken an effort in the heart of philosophy to overcome the opposition and attain a position in which their one-sided views should be refuted or reconciled. This counter movement assumed a double form, a negative and a positive. In Hegel, as we have seen, we have an acknowledgment of the truth, or half truth, of both Fichte and Schelling, and an attempt to reconcile their opposition in a higher unity. In Herbart, Beneke and Schopenhauer, on the other hand, we have a denial of both and an endeavour to controvert their errors by a return to the Kantian standpoint from which they both started.

It is true that beyond their equal reverence for Kant and their contempt for the "Fashionable Philosophy," as Fichte's science of knowledge and Schelling's system of identity were called, Herbart, Beneke and Schopenhauer have not much in common. Indeed, they themselves form an opposition almost as sharp as that between the systems combated by them.

While Herbart retains the individualism of Fichte but censures the pantheism of Schelling, Schopenhauer glories in pantheism and rejects individualism. Both seek to return to Kant, and to find in his Transcendental Aesthetic the basis of their explanation of reality. Kant had made

an absolute distinction between sensibility and understanding. Sense was the material principle, understanding the formative factor in the synthesis of knowledge. The "aesthetic" and the "analytic" are the two fundamental elements of the critical philosophy. Fichte took his departure from the analytic or the formative factor, and made consciousness the starting-point of his system. Schelling took a mediate position and imagined that in his point of "indifference" he had discovered the union or identity of subject and object. Herbart and Schopenhauer reject the position of self-consciousness or understanding and take their start from the aesthetic side of the critical philosophy. While Herbart finds the root of experience in pure feeling, Schopenhauer discovers it in the personal will.

That which unites these three thinkers is their antagonism to the philosophy which culminated in Hegel. Herbart represents a Realistic, Beneke a Psychological, and Schopenhauer a Voluntarist movement.

*Johann Frederick Herbart* was born at Oldenburg in 1776, where his father held an official position. In his eighteenth year he became a pupil of Fichte at Jena, but took an independent position, and from the time when he taught as *privat-docent* in Göttingen and during the period of his professorship in Königsberg, where he succeeded Kant, till his death at Göttingen in 1841, his philosophical activity was directed against the idealism of Fichte and the pantheism of Schelling.

Herbart professed to be a follower of Kant, but he rejects Kant's idealistic theories of time, space, and the categories, as well as his *Critique of Judgment*. He starts, indeed, from the Kantian position of analysing experience, but he rejects the idealistic conclusions which Kant's successors drew.

The most important contributions which Herbart has made to philosophy are in the spheres of metaphysics and psychology. His principal works are: *Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik*, 1806; *Logik*, 1808; *Psychologie*, 1806;

*Allgemeine Metaphysik*, 1829; and his *Text-book of Philosophy*, which gives a conspectus of his whole system, 1813. Herbart begins by rejecting Kant's distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. He holds, indeed, that we are only conscious of appearances, but these appearances must imply real existences behind them, and Herbart professes to be able to give an account of these real things as *noumena*, which he regards, in opposition to Schelling and in agreement with Wolff and Leibnitz, as individual, simple, and independent entities. He emphasizes the thought that all philosophy begins with a study of conceptions and proceeds by reflection to an elaboration of conceptions.

Philosophy consists of three principal departments, Logic, Metaphysics, and Aesthetics.

*Logic* deals with the formal elements of thought, and the chief object to be attained here is clearness of conception. Distinct notions lead to correct judgments. The unalterable result of Logic is that it supplies to all the departments of philosophy the principle of "identity, contradiction, and excluded middle," according to which conceptions which are contradictory must be rejected and their opposite accepted.

*Metaphysics* deals with the *contents* of thought. Here we pass from the merely formal aspect of conceptions to their matter. And here they fall into two classes—conceptions by which we comprehend the given world, to which we apply the term Metaphysics proper; and conceptions which have nothing to do with the reality of the thing conceived, inasmuch as they are capable of being applied to imaginary facts. It is the province of Aesthetics and Ethics to deal with this second class.

*Aesthetics* deals with such notions as it is impossible for thought to suppress or change, but which involve judgments of approval or disapproval. *Ethics* is a branch of Aesthetics, and its province is to investigate the agreement or disagreement which obtains between the relations of



volition and certain fundamental moral ideals, such as personal freedom, perfection, benevolence, justice, and equity. In his *Text-book to the Introduction of Philosophy*, Herbart makes a sharp distinction between metaphysics and practical philosophy, and he actually places the practical part before the theoretic part. It will be more convenient, however, to consider his metaphysics first.

By Metaphysics Herbart understands with Wolff, the whole theoretic side of philosophy. Kant, he says, has the merit of proving that all that is known, all we call nature, contains only phenomena, but at the same time distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and so recognises the principle that wherever appearance is, there reality must also be. All theoretic philosophy must start with "the given," but must not stop there, but go on to inquire after the being which is behind the appearance, and thus become metaphysics.

Herbart retains in the main the Wolffian division of metaphysics. The first part he terms "General Metaphysics," and the second "Applied Metaphysics."

Under General Metaphysics he deals first of all with the question of procedure—and he calls this *Methodology*. All our knowledge comes from experience, but the conceptions in which experience presents itself to us are full of contradictions. What are we to do with these contradictions which are involved in all our thinking? We cannot deny our perceptions, nor can we accept them as they are. A contradiction occurs when intelligibility and fact do not coincide—as when two terms are found together, which, however, are only conceivable in separation. An example of this is cause and effect, where the cause in preceding the effect cannot be considered as equivalent to it, and, on the other hand, in so far as it implicitly contains the effect, must be considered equivalent. How are we to proceed in such a case? Obviously we must endeavour to "transform the notions" of experience,—that is, we must so deal with them as to eliminate the

contradiction. This is what Herbart calls the *method of relations*, which he compares to the reduction of a composite force in mechanics into its component parts.

The fundamental form of contradiction is when a thing is thought of as being simple yet made up of a plurality of differences. The difficulty can only be got over by assuming a variety of simple things, through the relation of which to each other the illusion of the manifold is produced. The things in themselves must be as numerous as the appearances which we apprehend with our senses. For from a single substance the multiplicity of qualities could never be explained. Each of these things must be thought of as entirely simple and unchangeable—to these he gives the name of “reals.”

*Ontology*, which is the second part of the *Metaphysics*, deals with the nature of the real or actual. The actual is not given to us in experience. We must, however, assume reality as the basis of what appears. Every phenomenon points to a real. “So much appearance, so much being.” It is the contradictions which phenomena involve which compel us to assume a reality. There are in particular two contradictions which run through all our conceptions of things; these are the contradiction between a thing and its many qualities, and the contradiction involved in change and identity. The thing as we think it is not as it is in itself. We perceive it made up of a variety of qualities, or as passing through various changes in time and space. But behind each of these many qualities and these manifold variations we are driven to assume that there must exist a simple unalterable and independent essence or “qualitative atomism,” as Herbart calls it,—spaceless, timeless, and unconditioned. But now, it may be asked, if these atoms or essences are wholly independent in themselves, how are they related as appearances in our experience? How, in other words, are we to account for the ideas of causality, change, relation, which phenomena suggest?

To meet this difficulty Herbart propounds his theory of "Disturbances and Preservations of the Reals" (Störungen und Selbsterhaltungen). The real essences must be conceived as reciprocally "disturbing" each other and calling forth in a form of reaction against these disturbances inner states which have the character of self-preservation. The meeting of two or more atoms produces in each of them a disturbance, and in consequence of this, a resistance or self-conservation. This kind of action and reaction of the "reals" gives rise in the realm of phenomena to what Herbart calls "Contingent Aspects" (Zufällige Ansichten),—a conception borrowed from mathematics, which means, speaking generally, that the same thing without absolute alteration in itself may assume, in relation to others, another aspect or value. By these disturbances and self-conservations, all the phenomena given in experience of physics and psychology, may be explained. They may, therefore, be regarded as the groundwork of the philosophy of Nature and of psychology.

*Synechology* is the name which Herbart gives to the third part of his metaphysics, and here he treats generally of natural philosophy, and particularly of the relations of space and time and matter. Space is, indeed, appearance, but not as Kant imagined, subjective, but rather an objective appearance. Everything must assume the form of externality. But space is not to be conceived as a continuation as it appears to us. It is to be thought of as intensive rather than extensive. So with time, it consists in a sum of points of succession. It only appears as a continuation, because at the close of one series of changes another immediately begins. Space and time, in other words, are only accidents, not real properties of the essences—hence it follows that the essences are not subject to space-relation at all. Motion, therefore, is not a property of bodies. Without an observer there would be neither motion, time, nor space.

*Psychology*, the fourth part of the metaphysics, arises

directly from his ontology. What is the soul, the *ego*? The moment we think of it we are involved in the metaphysical contradiction of a thing and its qualities. Self-consciousness is one, yet its perceptions are many. It is a real with many states, powers, faculties, involving, therefore, innumerable contradictions. But the soul is also a psychological principle, and here those contradictions are to be considered which lie in the identity of subject and object. The *ego* affirms itself, and is consequently an object to itself. The object affirmed is, however, identical with the subject affirming. The appearance of such an identity is the constant problem which confronts us. The only explanation that is satisfactory, according to Herbart, is that the soul, like all other "reals," is a simple substance, eternal, indissoluble, unchangeable, spaceless. It cannot, therefore, be the substratum of a plurality of faculties. In itself it is unknowable, and is known only through its self-perservations, which are its ideas.

These ideas disturb and restrain each other, and the whole course of the psychical life is to be explained from the reciprocal tension of ideas.

Several similar ideas acting together coalesce and intensify consciousness. When, however, some are opposed to others, they counteract, modify or neutralize each other, and so reduce the consciousness. Consciousness is the sum of these relations, and is greater or less according to the degree of the intensity of the ideas.

Neutralized ideas do not, however, wholly disappear, but lie, as Herbart quaintly puts it, at the "threshold of consciousness." These ideas which thus lie just without, on the threshold, he calls "feelings." If, however, they are pressed still further back to a position even below the threshold, they become mere impulses.

Impulses, feelings, ideas, severally become stronger or weaker according as different powers coalesce with or oppose them. Ideas may thus be reduced to impulses or impulses may be raised to ideas.



Herbart lays particular stress upon the investigation of the process by which newly-entering ideas are assimilated and altered by the ideas already present in consciousness. The assimilating and assorting power of the soul he calls "apperception." The starting-point with Herbart is his definition of being. From his conception of being he is led to regard psychology as "the mechanics of the mind," and he seeks to explain all the modifications of the soul by mathematical formulae. "As in physiology the body is built up of fibres, so in psychology the mind is built up of representations." Our ideas react upon and balance one another in obedience to mechanical laws. This is the whole life of the mind. Herbart will hear nothing of special faculties. The soul is a primordial monad, and psychology is nothing else than the endeavour to discover the mathematical laws which govern the action and reaction of its ideas.

It is interesting to notice that in attempting to reduce the psychic life to a mechanism, Herbart forestalled in a measure the efforts of Fechner and Wundt to make psychology an exact science.

*Aesthetics* has to do with the practical side of philosophy. Its immediate object is the idea of the beautiful. But inasmuch as the beautiful, in contradistinction to the desirable and the pleasant, is that in an object which necessarily pleases, aesthetics has to do in general with everything which calls forth an approval or disapproval.

Herbart thus founds his practical philosophy wholly on aesthetic judgments. The morally beautiful gives rise to the consideration of *ethics*, which is regarded as a branch of aesthetics. The function of ethics is to investigate the agreement or disagreement which obtains between the relation of volition and certain fundamental ideals, five in number,—Freedom, Perfection, Benevolence, Justice, and Equity. Duties may be divided into those which concern oneself, those which relate to society, and those which have to do with the future.

The *State* springs from the needs of society. For its very preservation society requires an outward bond or power which will uphold and protect its institutions and relationships.

Herbart attaches much importance to education, and his views on this subject have not been without their influence on modern educational science. Its end is the moulding of moral character. Free-will and fatalist theories of character are alike to be rejected. Circumstances must be taken into account by the teacher; but the will can be strengthened, and individuality developed. Herbart rests the claim of religion upon the ethical needs of humanity. Its function is to comfort the sad, to guide the erring, and give peace to the guilty. All need its help on account of human weakness. The Church is necessary to the State, as the inner spiritual bond which holds men in peace when their material interests are liable to conflict.

With regard to the being of God, Herbart expresses no opinion. All he says is, there must be a supreme intelligence to account for the wonderful wisdom and purpose which are everywhere manifest in the world of nature and life.

The philosophy of Herbart as a whole may be regarded as a development of the *Monadology* of Leibnitz. It is a form of realism, and is a protest against the one-sided idealism of Kant's successors. It is founded on the idea of simple fundamental essences, which are supposed to be at the basis of all reality. As a system, it is grotesque and fanciful, full of ingenuity but devoid of influence. A certain reasonableness has been afforded it by its mathematical precision. It creates, however, more difficulties than it explains, and it is not easy to understand the attention which German writers have devoted to it.

*Friedrich Edward Beneke* (1798-1854) stands closely connected with Herbart, not only in his psychological studies, but also in his practical and educational theories. But while Herbart founds his psychology on metaphysics,

Beneke bases metaphysics on psychology. After serving in the army, he studied philosophy and theology first in Halle and afterwards in Berlin. In 1822 he became *privat-docent*, but his lectures were interdicted by the Minister of State because of their pronounced opposition to Hegel. Later, however, he was permitted to resume his teaching, and was actually called to succeed his opponent. He is the author of many important works, of which we may mention his *Text-book of Psychology*, his *Outlines of the Natural System of Practical Philosophy*, his *System of Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion*, and his *Pragmatic Psychology*, besides works on Education.

Beneke starts with Psychology, and endeavours to deduce the life of the soul from its prime elements. Philosophy can only proceed from what is immediately given, and that we can only discover from our own consciousness. Our starting-point must therefore be our own inner experience. The soul is the only thing we may be said to know, as it is in itself. Psychology therefore is the basis of all science, which must be pursued on the same inductive principles as the other sciences.

When we come to examine the soul we find within it four prime elements or 'ground-processes,' to which all the complex phenomena of our experience may be traced—the process of receiving impressions, of forming new faculties, of transferring impressions, and of reciprocal attraction and repulsion (association).

From these fundamental activities of the soul Beneke further derives two main classes, the products of the mind and those of the temperament—the intellectual and the moral powers.

While the mental activities fall within the province of logic and metaphysics, both of which are based on psychology, the constitutional or emotional powers belong to the realm of practical philosophy. In the matter of morals we estimate the worth of things by the heightening or lowering of the feelings which they excite in us. The

stronger the feeling roused, the higher the value we set upon a particular thing. A pleasure of the higher senses ought to be preferred to one of the lower. That which we perceive to be higher is morally good, and duty is that which we instinctively feel to be morally necessary.

Religion is the common product of theoretic and practical motives. On this subject, however, Beneke has little to say. He defends the immortality of the soul against the attacks of materialism, but he does not disguise the fact that our knowledge of God and the future is vague, and he maintains that our faith must rest more upon feeling than upon thought.

Beneke's significance pertains chiefly to the realm of psychology and paedagogy, and his strength rests on the keenness of his observations and the subtility with which he analyses the nature of our consciousness, thus preparing the way for the researches of Fechner and Wundt and the later psychological school.

*Arthur Schopenhauer* (1788-1860), the founder of modern Pessimism, was born at Dantzig, where his father was a banker. His mother, from whom he inherited his literary gift, was a writer of stories. On her husband's death she removed to Weimar, where she became friendly with Goethe. After relinquishing a mercantile pursuit, for which he was trained by travel and residence in France and England, Schopenhauer, in 1809, became a student first at Göttingen and afterwards at Berlin. He attended the lectures of Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher. He graduated at Jena with his first work, on the *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, a treatise in which he seeks to lay down the principles which determine respectively the provinces of Physics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics. He lectured as *privat-docent* in Berlin, but met with little success, attributing his failure to professorial spite and concerted opposition. Schopenhauer's philosophy can scarcely be understood apart from his personality. Inner discord was the keynote of his life. His



disposition was morose and gloomy, and he was habitually suspicious and distrustful of others. He was, moreover, possessed of an inordinate self-esteem and egotism, which led him to believe that he had produced a philosophy which made him the equal of Socrates. He maintained that there was a conspiracy in university circles against him which accounted for his neglect. He retired eventually to Frankfurt, where he remained in supreme isolation till his death in 1860. His principal works are: *The World as Will and Idea*, 1819; *On the Will in Nature*, 1836; and a series of occasional essays entitled, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, 1851.

Schopenhauer's philosophy forms an antithesis to the realism of Herbart, and may be characterized as a kind of subjective Idealism. Both start from Kant. But while Herbart opposes Kant's assumption that we cannot know the "thing-in-itself" by his theory of "Reals," Schopenhauer affirms that there is nothing real but the forms of our own mind. While, therefore, Herbart's realism logically leads to idealism, Schopenhauer's idealism naturally degenerates into a hard pantheistic materialism.

Kant's signal service to philosophy, Schopenhauer holds, was his distinction between appearance and *noumenon*. What previous thinkers, such as Plato, Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley only imperfectly saw, Kant clearly established, viz. that the world is nothing else but appearance and idea. The perceiving subject sustains the whole world. But Kant's position laboured under a twofold defect, which Schopenhauer proceeds to correct.

First, the manifold *à priori* sources of our ideas which Kant sought to establish must be reduced to one; and, second, the thing-in-itself must be wholly banished.

All our forms of thought, says Schopenhauer, may be referred to the principle of Causation, the "principle of the ground" (*Satz von Grunde*). This is the essential form of all objects. In particular, however, this principle assumes a fourfold form.

1. The ground of becoming (*ratio fiendi*) or the law of causality—which we call “cause” in relation to nature; impulse or excitement in regard to organic life; and motive in the sphere of conscious action.

2. The ground of being (*ratio essendi*), from which there spring our notions of the relation and sequence of things in time and space. The *ratio essendi* is nothing else than the time and space-form of the inner and outer sense—succession and co-existence.

3. The ground of knowing (the *ratio cognoscendi*), from which arises our power of thinking. The faculty by which thought works is Reason, whose principal function is to deal with the perceptions, to combine them into ideas, and thence to form judgments.

4. The ground of action (*ratio agendi*), which discloses the law of motives by which our moral actions are inspired and guided. It is the principle of the individual will.

The principle of cause in its four forms thus interpenetrates the world, but inasmuch as it is only a principle belonging to our faculty of presentation, it follows, that the world itself is nothing but our representation. The *ego* itself is only phenomenal, and only appears in an individual form in so far as it is an object in space and time.

Having thus led back all the forms of perception to one ground principle, Schopenhauer next proceeds to emancipate the mind from Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” in other words, to deny its existence as the cause of our sensations.

But if the world is all appearance and delusion, whence comes the appearance? How are we to account for the manifold phenomena around us?

The investigation into the nature of experience discloses a something which we call the “world” appearing under various forms, which, however, are all modes of causation. What is this thing considered apart from its appearance? That which appears is not consciousness, for however far back you go, consciousness is only the form assumed by

the thing itself. The matter of the world is not thought, but *will*. All previous philosophers have assumed the indissoluble unity, says Schopenhauer, of will and intellect. It is the merit of his doctrine that he distinguishes between these. It is not the soul that is the eternal and indestructible principle in life, but what may be called the root of the soul—the will. The soul is really a compound—it is made up of intellect and will. The intellect is secondary, a mere function of the brain; the will, on the contrary, is primary. Man is not primarily a thinking being. He is first of all active, willing. But how do we become conscious of the primacy of the will? Among the things which make up the world of which we are conscious is one which has a unique significance for us—our own body. It is perceived by us not like other objects, by the senses or through reflection, but in a direct immediate way, through our action and movement. Our bodies move in response to an act of will. Every act of will produces a movement of body. The whole organism is conditioned by the will. It is only by virtue of the forms of cognition, *i.e.* by virtue of the functions of the brain, that one's body is seen to be something extended and organic. But in its inner essence it is will. In all its organic functions just as in its external actions, the will is the agent. The body is just the will externalized, and its various parts are the visible expression of desires. "The brain is the will to know, the foot the will to go, the stomach the will to digest—it is only on the basis of their active self-expression that the thought-life arises." We think in order to do. The active impulse precedes every conscious motion and act. The will is the essence, not of man's life only, but *of the whole world*. Just as our bodies are the realizations of our wills, so all other bodies, and all that is acted upon by them, the whole natural world—are the embodiment of will—not, indeed, of my will or your will, but will in general, will as the idea. It is the same impulse which expresses itself in the growth of the plant, in the repro-

duction and development of the animal, and in the mind of man. Every power in nature must be thought of as will. Will, in short, is the principle of the world.

But the will which is the essence of the world must be distinguished from the particular empirical will of individuals. From the ground-will of the universe we must abstract all predicates which we attribute to things as they appear to us in time. We must think away all ideas of cause and effect, of purpose and end, all relations of space and time, and regard this principle of the universe as causeless, blind irrational impulse. In itself it is unconscious and purposeless striving. It is the stress pervading all phenomena. As gravitation impels all bodies to the centre, as the magnet attracts the iron to itself, as growth works in Nature, instinctively and unknowingly, so the eternal will works in all things without ground or reason. It is one amid all change, the unmoved ἐν καὶ πᾶν. Though Schopenhauer does not fear the name of pantheist, he will not use it, for he denies the existence of God altogether. The idea of God implies intelligence and purpose. But he sees nothing in the world but blind impulse and irrational instinct.

The eternal will as thing-in-itself—which opposed to the will as phenomena manifested in time and space,—expresses itself in the forms of stages of being which are equivalent to what Plato would call “ideas.” Things come and go, but these ideas or general types are unalterable.

These ideas which are the inner essences of things form a graduated series, which begins with the most general forces of inorganic matter and rises to the higher forms of life and thought. As each member of this series is a particular expression of will, it has its own special forces. The various forces act and react on each other in a state of constant conflict. In this perpetual strife there is a survival of the fittest. At the head of the evolution Schopenhauer places man with his consciousness and thought. But thought itself is only a form of mechanism,



by and through which the will expresses itself. Of freedom of the will we cannot speak. It is without knowledge. It is a mere will to live, a blind impulse to objectify itself. What the soul really is, is a problem which only the surgeon's knife will discover, for the intellect, after all, is merely a function of the brain. It will be seen that Schopenhauer ultimately arrives at a crass materialism. It is a pantheism, an apotheosis of the will, a blind irresistible energy which holds together all the processes in the universe, from the lowest to the highest.

From this view of the irrational nature of will there follows the *pessimism* of Schopenhauer. All willing arises from want, and, therefore, from suffering. For every wish gratified there remain ten unsatisfied. Every satisfaction is only illusory. The gratified wish at once gives place to a new one. Satisfaction is like the alms thrown to a beggar, which prolongs his life for a day only to postpone his misery till to-morrow. So long as we are given up to the stress of our desires with its perpetual hopes and fears, so long as we are the subjects of willing, we can never have lasting peace. "Whether we pursue or flee, fear injury or seek enjoyment, it is ever the same, the care for the constant demands of the will occupies and sways the consciousness." Without rest no true happiness is possible. "The subject of willing is thus perpetually bound to the revolving wheel of Ixion; thus does it ceaselessly pour water into the sieve of the Danaides; thus is it like the ever longing but never satisfied Tantalus."

Everywhere there is strife, pressure, war,—an endless medley of struggling and tumult. What is all trade and commerce, all politics and enterprise, but ceaseless intrigue and effort and self-seeking? All for what?—to sustain ephemeral and tormented individuals through a short span of life. If we consider the disproportion between the trouble and the reward, the will to live is a folly or a delusion—a senseless effort to gain something which, after all, is valueless. The common mind regards pleasure as

something positive, and pain as negative. The very opposite is the truth. Human existence is a condition of perpetual pain, and pleasure consists only in its removal. In short, as all will implies action, and all action want, and all want pain, it follows that pain is the essential condition of will.

Life is suffering. The world contains infinitely more pain than pleasure. Instead of being the best possible world, as some teachers of philosophy have affirmed, it is the worst possible. There is truth in the old saying, "it is better not to be than to be." Why the whole mockery of life goes on no one can tell. What purpose does it serve, what advantage does it yield? There is no proportion between the ceaseless care and the momentary rewards of life. Yet the strange thing is that everyone carefully guards his life as if it were a good. The instinct to live is universal. The will wills itself. This is what Schopenhauer calls "the will to live," which is an irrational tendency no one can justify. We pursue our life with the greatest interest and keenest solicitude as long as we can. "Life, in short, is a soap-bubble which we blow out as long and as large as possible, though each of us knows perfectly well it must sooner or later burst."

Is there then no *deliverance* from this condition of suffering, no palliation of the misery of life? Yes, according to Schopenhauer, there is; and in the third and fourth books of his work, *The World as Will and Idea*, which treat of Aesthetics and Ethics, he deals with the two means of attaining deliverance and peace from the bondage of the will. But in working out these ideas it will be observed that Schopenhauer is not consistent with himself. At the outset, he affirms that all our ideas are under the dominion of the law of causality, whereas he now declares that there is a higher kind of cognition which is not subject to the causal relationship, viz.—the aesthetic and philosophical contemplation. Formerly he asserted that the intellect was the creation and servant of the will; but now we are told

that in certain elect souls the yoke of bondage is thrown off, and that by means of pure thought the mind is enabled to slay the power of the will and attain to the region of blessedness. How this comes about, however, Schopenhauer nowhere informs us. It is true that in an earlier part of his work Schopenhauer draws a distinction between the pure ideas or images of things and the actual forms which the empirical will takes in the world of time and space. These ideas, though not subject to the principle of causality, may become the direct objects of contemplation. Man alone has the power of attaining to a knowledge of the ideas, and in doing so he severs himself from obedience to his particular will and reaches a position of universality.

Hence the third book deals with *Art* as the embodiment of pure ideas. Therefore, the first and partial means of deliverance is through art. The aim of art is the presentment of those ideas which are essential and permanent amid all the phenomena of the world. Art, in other words, has to do not with particular things, but rather with the ideas which are independent of all time and space relationships,—with the eternal types which are represented in the manifold objects of the world.

Schopenhauer's reflections on art, apart from the connection with his system, are full of valuable suggestion. He holds that there are various gradations rising from the sensuous to the more ideal. In architecture we have the lowest form of the manifestation of the idea. Sculpture and painting express the idea with more purity; while music, which stands by itself and is completely independent of the phenomenal will, manifests the idea in its highest perfection. Music could exist even though the world were not. It is not like the other arts, a copy of the idea, but is the immediate image of the eternal will itself.

The delight afforded by a contemplation of the beautiful depends on the fact that in art the striving of the will is temporarily stilled. In aesthetic contemplation we cease to strive. We rest in pure knowledge. The idea is every-

thing. Time and space have for the moment ceased to be. In the pure contemplation of these ideas, therefore, the soul finds momentary release from striving. Thought frees itself from the bondage of the will and loses itself in the object. Man forgets his individuality and rests in pure will-less, time-less contemplation. But it is only the few who can attain to this condition, and it is given to genius alone to lose itself entirely in the ideal world, and to abide there. The common mortal is not capable of this disinterested thought, and most of us sooner or later are involved again in the world of particular ends.

But even for the most gifted souls the alleviation of art is but passing and transitory. Though a quietude of the will, its deliverance is not permanent.

Is there then no other way—no way accessible to all? Yes, says Schopenhauer—entire deliverance may come about by the “complete suppression of the will to live.”

This final deliverance, which constitutes the ethical side of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, is treated of in the fourth book of *The World as Will*.

“The will to live,” which, as we have seen, involves ceaseless strife and never-ending suffering, may be either affirmed or denied by us. It is affirmed by us when we yield to our will and obey its impulses, when we seek to preserve our life and perpetuate the species. It is denied, when we seek to suppress all individual desires, and to renounce everything that leads to self-assertion and self-realization. True morality consists in denying the will to live, in suppressing in ourselves and others all selfish impulses; and our deliverance is finally accomplished when the will to live is wholly annihilated in us. This is not, of course, to be brought about by suicide, by the escape from life. The suicide, instead of denying the will, actually yields to his will. Deliverance does not come by rejecting life, but by quenching in the soul the desire of life, not by shunning sorrow, but by withdrawing from joy. The aim of the moral life will, therefore, be, to



remove as far as one can from his own life and from the lives of others all that causes suffering and woe. For, after all, there is no difference between my suffering and the suffering of another. It has one common root, the desire to live, the bondage to impulse. Let us seek to extinguish this desire everywhere. The basis of all practical morality is, therefore, *sympathy* with the suffering which is inseparable from life. Life is common to all—another’s weal and woe are just my own. In alleviating the misery of others by sympathy I am alleviating my own, for all suffering is the manifestation of the all-will, and the one mighty evil of the world is the will to live.

But the alleviation of the world’s misery through sympathy is only a palliation. It does not go to the root of the matter, it does not abolish the will, which is the source of all suffering.

The complete deliverance from the pain and delusion of the world is only possible through the complete negation of the will itself—the way to which is to be found in asceticism. True release only comes when we cease to strive, when we mortify the deeds of the body by the voluntary extinction of all desire and all activity.

The highest virtue of man lies in self-denial, in withdrawal into the realm of quiet, the Nirvana of the Buddhist, where, freed from all desire, he may pierce the veil of Maya, the curtain of illusion, and rest in the calm of unconsciousness. Is then nothingness the final goal of holiness? “We freely confess,” says Schopenhauer, “that after the complete extinction of the will, what remains for those who are still immersed in the things of this world is nothingness. But, on the other hand, for those in whom the will has already turned against and denied itself, this, our world which is so real, with all its suns and constellations, is also nothing.”

The system of Schopenhauer thus ends in a paradox. There could be no world at all if we were to universalize the virtue of ceasing to will. It is the acme of contradic-

tion, the last word of irrationalism. Suicide, although Schopenhauer refrains from drawing this conclusion, is the logical solution of life, the secret of final satisfaction.

In spite of the ridicule which Schopenhauer pours forth upon his predecessors, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, it is clear that he owes much to all of them. His chief merit lies in the consistency and determination with which he carries out certain of their ideas to their conclusion.

For a considerable time the views of Schopenhauer received little attention, but eventually the doctrines of pessimism found expression in the writings of Hartmann, Feuerbach, Ruge, Wagner, and Nietzsche.

## *PART VII*

### *PHILOSOPHY OF THE SECOND HALF OF NINETEENTH CENTURY*

THE history of philosophy may be said to close with the development of those systems which had their roots in Kant's theory of reason. Hegel is, properly speaking, the last of the great philosophers. The second half of the nineteenth century cannot be styled a philosophical age. Nothing essentially new has appeared. There has been no lack of writers, but speculation has assumed the aspect of the criticism of past attempts or the combination of previous theories rather than the origination of fresh views.

Two factors have largely moulded the intellectual activity of recent decades : (1) The awakened interest in natural science ; and (2) the idea of development, which has displaced the old mechanical view of the universe, and has been applied not merely to physical things, but to society and history and the whole mental and spiritual life of man.

On the one hand natural science has been gradually withdrawing interest from purely metaphysical questions and focussing attention upon a form of psychology which has for its aim the localizing of the seat of thought and the reference of all mental processes to the brain. As the result of these investigations, a material tendency in reaction against the idealism of German philosophy has been flowing steadily through the second part of the

nineteenth century. On the other hand, the historical view of the world inaugurated by Schelling and Hegel has not failed to exercise a powerful influence upon science, resulting in those theories of evolution according to which the whole connected system of material and mental existence is regarded as a single process of development of organic forms determined by the teleological idea of fitness for life.

We can only take a rapid survey of the intellectual movements of the century, and for the sake of clearness it will be most convenient to classify the various writers who have contributed to the progress of thought according to their nationality.



## CHAPTER I

### RECENT GERMAN THOUGHT

AT the time of Hegel's death his philosophy was dominant throughout Germany, and at most of the universities his tenets were espoused by admiring disciples. Among these we may mention Gabler, Henning, Michelet, Hotho, Marheineke, Vatke, Erdmann, Rosenkranz, Strauss, Baur, Schwegler, and Kuno Fischer. But the unity of the school was not destined to last long. Soon a division arose in regard to the application of the master's principles to religious and theological questions. The reconciliation of faith with knowledge which Hegel attempted was felt by some to be not merely vague and unsatisfactory in expression, but unjustifiable from a scientific point of view. Just as at the death of Socrates there arose a number of antagonistic sects, each of which grasped only a fragment of their teacher's doctrine, so within the Hegelian circle a breach appeared so wide that the principles which, on the one side, were interpreted as the defence of orthodoxy, were employed on the other in support of atheism and nihilism. Hegel's fate, as he himself foresaw, exemplified the principles of his own philosophy. The weapon which he forged was turned against himself, and the dialectic method achieved his own destruction. Yet the very opposition which took place was a proof of the vitality of his principles. The very differences into which the unity of his system was broken were its justification as a stage in the evolution of thought.

1. The first word of revolt against the assumed identity of Hegel's teaching with Christian dogma was uttered in 1831 in an anonymous pamphlet, which proved to be by Ludwig Feuerbach, directed against belief in a personal existence after death. This was soon followed by a more radical and destructive effort from the pen of Strauss, which, in the form of a life of Christ, subjected the Gospels and the Christian creed to the keenest criticism. The deductions of Strauss were avowedly drawn from the principles of Hegel's philosophy, and it was soon felt that if the master's premises led to such negative consequences, the whole Christian character of his system was discredited. The appearance of Strauss' *Life* became, therefore, the occasion of a sharp division in the camp, and there arose two parties—the *right wing*, consisting of those who defended the orthodoxy of Hegel and contended for a positive interpretation of his tenets; and the *left wing*, representing those who saw in his philosophy a denial of the positive truth of Christianity.

The *right wing* or old Hegelians, as they are sometimes called, who sought to remain faithful to their master's teaching and jealously guarded every tassel of the ark, have now very little interest for us: their books are forgotten and their very names have almost passed into oblivion. Of these it is sufficient to mention Schaller, Gabler, Ganz, Henning, and also Erdmann, distinguished for his valuable history of modern philosophy.

Between the right wing and the left, there were those who took an intermediate position. This *Centrum* or middle party did not profess to be thoroughgoing disciples of Hegel, but they were in sympathy with his main principles, which they applied to the various sciences, particularly to Christian dogma and to history. To this section must be reckoned the famous "Tübingen School," of which Baur, Zeller and Schweigler, who applied Hegelianism to the development of doctrine and ecclesiastical history, were the most distinguished representatives.

To the same section may be assigned Rosenkranz, the biographer of Hegel, Biedermann and Daub, the liberal theologians, and, lastly, Edward Zeller (1814-1908), the famous historian of Greek philosophy, Kuno Fischer, the brilliant writer who has done for modern philosophy what Zeller did for ancient, and Otto Pflieger, the well-known author of *Das Wesen der Religion* and other works on the philosophy of religion, which have exerted a far-reaching influence on modern theology both in Germany and Britain. Fischer, who for more than thirty years adorned the Chair of Hegel in Heidelberg, and contended manfully against the materialism of the age for a spiritualistic interpretation of the world, only died last year, 1907, while in the spring of this year, 1908, Berlin has lost in Zeller and Pflieger two of its most renowned teachers.

Connected with this party, yet maintaining an independent attitude, there appeared a small group of *theistic writers* who, adopting the teaching of Schelling rather than Hegel, contended for the personality of God and the immortality of man. They found their rallying-point in the *Journal for Philosophy and Speculative Theology* which was started in 1837 by the younger Fichte—a magazine which, under the editorship of Falckenberg, still continues to exercise a considerable influence on German thought. The chief representatives of this theistic school were J. H. Fichte, Hermann Weisse, Ulrici, Chalybäus and Harms. The best known of these is Weisse, whose *System der Aesthetik* is specially noteworthy. But it is the *left wing* or young Hegelianism which has exerted the largest influence on the evolution of thought and has most deeply touched the political and social life of Germany. It contended that the true kernel of the Hegelian doctrine lay not so much in the system itself as in its method, in the dialectic of development, which advances from the positive to the negative, and, by bringing into prominence the opposite elements of life and thought, discloses the one-sidedness and inadequacy of existing beliefs

and institutions. The left wing counted among its adherents not Strauss only, who deviated more and more from the Christian standpoint and eventually advocated a refined form of materialism in his *Old and New Faith*, but also Feuerbach, who, in his work—*The Essence of Christianity* (1841)—adopted a view of religion which was opposed not only to Hegel, but to all that is positive in the Christian faith. Religion, he maintains, is the offspring of human selfishness. It is a delusion which estranges man from the actual world, sacrifices love to faith, exhausts all morality of its best forces, destroys veracity, and is the fruitful source of superstition and fanaticism. Gradually Feuerbach departed wholly from the Hegelian standpoint, and ultimately reached a position of crass materialism. The physical life of man is the measure of all things. "Man is what he eats" (Man ist was er isst)—a coarse pun.

The principal organ of young Hegelian radicalism was the *Halle Year-Book*, of which Ruge and Echtermeyer were the editors, which soon expressed views which left those of Strauss and his friends far behind, until its publication was forbidden by the State of Saxony in 1843.

The ethical consequences of Feuerbach's philosophy were immediately drawn, on the one hand, by Max Stirner, the representative of egoism, and, on the other, by the founders of modern socialism, Lassalle and Marx.

*Max Stirner* (1806-1856), the pseudonym adopted by Kaspar Schmidt, agrees with Feuerbach in strenuously opposing all supernaturalism, but goes even further in declaring the individual to be the source and measure of life. His remarkable work, "The only one and his property" (*Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*), originally published in 1845, roused considerable attention in its day, which has recently been revived. "God and humanity," he declares, "have founded their affairs upon nothing, upon nothing but themselves. I must do likewise." "Of all men he whom I know and love best is myself." "The ego is my whole confession of faith. I do what I wish



and what pleases me." We are all egoists, and the sooner we face the fact the better. Each single individualism is the centre of the world, and everything exists for him and him alone. Towards others I have no responsibilities, and I bow to no authority. Every form of social life, the family, the community, the State, is to be regarded as an enemy of the ego. I am the measure of all things. Truth is what benefits me, and I know no law but that which conduces to my pleasure. Humanity and morality are words without meaning. The spirit is an illusion, a mirage of matter. There is nothing real upon the earth but myself. "Man, the ideal, is realized when the Christian view is transformed into the proposition—'I, the only one, am *the* man.' Every higher existence I set above me, be it God or be it man, weakens the sense of my individuality and only pales before the sun of my own consciousness." This remarkable book ends as it begins—"I have placed my concerns upon nothing." It is difficult to decide how far Stirner was in earnest in proclaiming these wild paradoxes. One can only recognise in this extreme form of individualism a protest against the mechanical uniformity and levelling spirit of Statecraft and social life which just before the revolution of '48 found expression in German politics.

This same reaction against all existing institutions and social traditions has found in recent times an utterance even more pronounced. *Friedrich Nietzsche* (1844-1900) is the modern representative of a form of individualism which strikes at all convention and public opinion, and seeks not only to overturn every accepted form of life and conduct, but to denounce every notion of submission to a higher will and every unselfish virtue as a sign of slavery and decadence. The task which Nietzsche undertakes is designated by him as the "Revaluation of all values." He would upset all previous estimates, deny whatever has been formerly affirmed and affirm all that has been denied. "Life is will for power." To exercise one's will is to add

to one's positive force. He subjects the moral sentiments of Christianity to a keen criticism, and finds in them a "descent from the will to persist in being." In place of the weak servility and altruism of Christian morality, he advocates "the restoration of Egotism." There have been in history two opposite ethical estimates—one he calls the "morality of the rulers," the other "the morality of the slaves." Slave morality—the morality of gentleness, patience, self-sacrifice—has unfortunately gained the ascendancy. The world will not be right and man will not come to his own till the sense of lordship and power, the instinct of conquest and mastery, has regained its rightful place in the esteem of mankind, and all such feelings as sympathy, pity, generosity, are abolished. This victory of slave morality which is everywhere visible to-day is a symptom of the decadence of humanity, a sign of declining vitality. The world for the strong, the great, the few—let that be our motto. To produce a new type of man, whom Nietzsche calls the over-man (*Übermensch*), is the task which lies before us in the future. The mission of this higher species is not to serve but to rule. A strong mighty race, self-assertive, full of will, vitality and force—that is the goal and ideal of humanity. Only as we individually live the master-life can life attain to true worth. Forget not, he cries to each, "that thou art here to live thine own life and to act for eternity."

Nietzsche has been called the Rousseau of the nineteenth century. He too demands a return to nature—but it is not to a nature of simplicity and lowliness, but to a high self-determined independence. Nietzsche's bitter attack upon the religion of pity and self-sacrifice offers a strange contrast to his own nature, which, as presented in his sister's biography of him, was gentle and considerate, with nothing in it suggestive of the character of the proud 'over-man.'

He is an artist rather than a philosopher—a poet and not a strictly scientific writer. With all his extravagances

his chief books —*Thus spake Zarathustra* and *The other side of good and evil*—are full of deep and fruitful suggestiveness. He has called the tendency which he represents “moral naturalism,” and he was much influenced in his earlier writings by Schopenhauer and Wagner; but it is difficult to place him. While some see in him the advocate of extreme individualism, others regard him as the real founder of the philosophy of value.

Naturalism, as represented by Feuerbach, Stirner and Nietzsche, is more a symptom of decadence than the Christianity which they oppose. Such wild paradoxes have little scientific value, and their practical tendency is to justify all animal instincts and base impulses. As a phase of thought it is interesting but unimportant. It has solved no problem, it has advanced no truth. It resembles a whirlwind which helps to clear the air and drive away superfluous leaves, but it does little to quicken or expand new seeds of life.

While Hegelianism has, on the one hand, developed an extreme form of individualism, it is a striking testimony to the many-sidedness of the master that his philosophy has also produced a no less extreme type of *socialism*. We cannot enter here upon the history of the socialistic movement, which extends practically throughout the whole of the nineteenth century. Taking its rise in the Utopian views of the eighteenth century French writers, St. Simon and Fourier, socialism received a more scientific treatment at the hands of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Friedrich Engels (1820-45), and Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-64). These men started on their literary careers as followers of Hegel, but gradually economic and industrial questions took the place of their earlier theoretic studies. Still the essentially social nature of the individual, the economic structure of society, the evolutionary character of personality and freedom—the gradual development through difference and conflict of the larger self-consciousness—the advance from status to contract, from individualism to co-operation, from rights to

duties, from selfishness to service—these principles which are implicitly contained in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* became the basis of the scientific socialism of Marx and Lassalle. The socialistic movement has indeed been disfigured by many extravagances, and while the theory of the extension to industry and economics of the free self-governing principle recognised in democracy—"industry of the people for the people"—is in the main sound, recent manifestations have degenerated into nihilism, anarchy and atheism, and wild schemes have been proposed which are subversive of all government and law.

On the literature of the so-called "Young Germany" Hegelianism acted as an emancipating power, destroying faith in religious dogma and freeing the individual from the somewhat cold and formal Christianity of the State-Church. Even such an entirely lyric nature as that of Heine was coloured with Hegelianism, and in the peculiar turn of his wit we may detect the influence of the "dialectic." But it was chiefly in the form of modern Hellenism that the Hegelian philosophy exercised its most powerful influence over the young minds. Even as a boy Hegel was a lover of classical literature, and in later life the *Antigone* of Sophocles was for him the typical Greek work of Art; and he, not less than Goethe, did much to foster the enthusiasm for the models of antiquity which marks German literature from the middle of the century onwards.

One other effect of Hegelianism may be mentioned—its influence on the *study of history*. Not only has the nineteenth century been distinguished by the great historical works of Ranke, Giesebrecht, and Mommsen, but the names of Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, Überweg, Zeller, and Lange in the department of philosophy, not to speak of Winkelmann and Burckhardt in the realm of antiquity and Art, show that the philosophical activity of Germany tends to historical research rather than constructive thought. Hegel has given a new worth to history, and it is felt



that every fresh departure in philosophy must henceforth not merely recognise the achievements of the past, but justify its appearance by proving itself to be a necessary stage in the evolution of thought.

As the century has worn on, the philosophy of Hegel has been somewhat neglected in his own country, and no system of equal importance has arisen to rival it.

2. In the main, two tendencies may be distinguished in Germany in recent times—the one a scientific materialism and the other a modified idealism. The *materialistic tendency* was partly a protest against the neglect of nature by the great idealists of Schelling's and Hegel's school, and partly a result of the new interest in natural science which recent discoveries have awakened. Of this materialism, of which Lange has written the history, we may simply mention, as examples, the names of Moleschott, Büchner, and Vogt, the latter of whom emphasizes the absolute sovereignty of the mechanical view of the world. The most popular exposition of this tendency is given by Ludwig Büchner in his book, *Kraft und Stoff*. Force and matter are the expressions of what we call mind and body, and are but the two different sides or manifestations of one and the same unknown essence or ground of all things. Matter has existed long before mind, and what we call the soul is dependent wholly on physical functions.

The distinguished naturalist, H. Helmholtz, has brought his scientific investigations to bear on philosophy, and has shown that a study of physiology can render to psychology important services.

In 1899, the year of Büchner's death, a remarkable book appeared which has done more than any other to spread and popularize a materialistic view of the world. The book is *The Riddle of the Universe*, by Ernest Haeckel. While Haeckel does not claim to have wholly solved the riddle, he does claim to have led back the problem to its source—to the one substance which lies at the root of everything. There are only two possible positions in

philosophy, according to Haeckel. The one sees in the world two opposed principles, a material and an immaterial. The other recognises only one substance, in which God and Nature, body and spirit, are inseparable. The latter view, the monistic, is the only truly rational one. The ground-idea of Haeckel's philosophy is, therefore, the notion of substance, in which matter and energy must be conceived as inseparably bound together. The ultimate that we know is motion, and all the laws of the mind as well as the actions of the body must be explained in terms of motion. From his knowledge of the functions and structures of the sensorium Haeckel proceeds to trace the development of the intellect of the higher animals and of man to its source in the simplest forms of life—an analysis which brings into view that centralization of sentient energy called the soul.

In the kingdom of the inorganic world we find two material elements, ponderable mass and imponderable ether. The physicist is unable to attribute any positive qualities to that extension called ether in which the cosmic masses revolve, except the energies of light, heat, electricity, and magnetism. According to Haeckel, ether is neither gaseous, fluid, nor solid,—it is structureless, but must be regarded as infinite and ever-active. The whole universe, he says, is divided into potential and actual energy, which terms are mutually convertible, just as all life springs from reciprocity of force, a correlating change of material.

Without following him further, we may notice that he declares the soul to be simply a natural product, and psychology to be a branch of physiology. "All the phenomena of the psychic life are, without exception, bound up with certain material changes in the living substratum of the body—the protoplasm." The soul is merely a psychological abstraction, like assimilation or generation. In man and the higher animals, the highest psychic function, conscious perception, is developed by the

mirroring of the sensations in a central part of the nervous system " (*Riddle of Universe*, chapter vii.).

While Haeckel undoubtedly reveals an extensive knowledge of the natural sciences, especially of biology and physiology, his acquaintance with mental philosophy and with theological and ethical science is by no means trustworthy. His use of terms, such as force, matter and spirit, is, to say the least, very loose and unscientific; and his whole theory is based upon the assumption that mind and matter are one and the same; that, therefore, the soul is nothing but a function of the body, and that thought has its seat in the brain. It is needless to follow Haeckel in his ill-concealed enmity to Christianity and his contempt for all forms of religious feeling. A well-known writer, the late Professor Paulsen of Berlin, has declared that he has read this book with shame—shame for the general intelligence and philosophical culture of our people. That such a book is possible, that it should be written, published, bought, read, admired, and believed by a nation which has possessed a Kant and a Goethe, is a painful reflection. "But," he adds, "each age just gets the literature it deserves."

3. But alongside of the materialistic interpretation of the world, an *idealistic* tendency, whose aim is to mediate between philosophy and science, has recently appeared. The new idealism differs from the old by its method. It relinquishes the purely deductive procedure of earlier writers, and insists upon a full recognition of the labours of natural science as a preliminary to metaphysical generalization. While recognising generally a spiritual interpretation of the world, it is convinced of the necessity of basing its metaphysical conclusions upon the assured results of an experimental psychology. Such a form of idealism is represented at present by a large number of thinkers. Quite recently Bergmann, in his work, *A System of Objective Idealism*, published in 1903, says that "the physical world is a totality, the properties of

which, while embraced as the contents of a single consciousness, must be ascertained by the strict methods of experimental science."

The first clear programme of this new standpoint of inductive metaphysics was given by Fechner in his work, *Zend-Avesta*, which appeared in 1851, in which he laid down the principle that the only way to reach sure results is to proceed from the known to the unknown, and by induction, analogy, and rational combination of particulars to attain to the general. "Not a pre-assumed idea of God determines God's being, but what is cognisable by us of God in the world and in ourselves determines our idea of Him."

*Fechner* (1801-1887) pursues this method in the various works which he has given to the world. He complains that Schelling and Hegel, by their process of deduction, have placed the cart before the horse, and have confounded the goal with the starting-point of philosophy. They have been building castles in the air. No firm structure of metaphysics can be reared except on the basis of the results of natural science. He regards the world as a closely articulated psychological unity. Just as the body and soul are indissolubly related in the individual, so in the world as a whole, men, animals, and plants, all earthly forms and heavenly bodies, are bound together in one organic system. The universe he conceives as forming an ascending series of circles, the larger including the lesser, the lesser still smaller. Human beings are the smaller circles, the earth is the larger, while God is the largest of all. The whole universe is tenanted by a soul, and is animated through all its parts by the world-spirit. Every single individual has his own soul and all share in the general life of the whole. God is the highest soul of all, and all things are contained in Him, and participate in His spirit. While in one sense the earth is placed higher in the ascending series than man, in another, man is the goal and crown of creation. The world is, indeed, like a great



house in which all things have their place. The highest constituent in the house is man, as the being for whom all the arrangements of it exist, and to whom all the particular objects are subservient. "But the house which supports this keystone must denote more than the keystone itself, for without the house it would fall into nothingness, though the house also would be void of meaning without its tenant."

The relation of the lower and higher forms of consciousness is determined by Fechner by a closer investigation of the life of the soul. In each individual there exists a variety of sensations, feelings, and ideas, which stimulate each other and strive for the mastery. This action and reaction among the particular physical elements is dependent upon the fact that they all take place within a larger common consciousness in which the various individuals share. In this way Fechner explains not only the influence of one part of our consciousness upon another, but also the living spiritual relation and intercourse of humanity. Without the supposition of a mightier, greater consciousness as a common centre of influence, it would be impossible, he holds, to understand the action of mind upon mind, the growth of ideas, and the commingling of souls which exist. The all-embracing consciousness, which includes all the lesser series of psycho-physical appearances, the supreme spirit—whose body is the world—is called God, whose soul takes up into itself all particular forms of consciousness, but, at the same time, remains in its unity superior to them all.

Fechner does not draw a sharp distinction between body and soul. He regards them as modes of phenomenal manifestation, completely separated and different in kind, but in constant correspondence with each other—of one and the same unknown reality. They are related like the convex and concave of the same circle. "The body is appearance for others," says Fechner, "the soul is self-manifestation."

Fechner's general significance in the history of philosophy rests, on the one hand, on his being the first to emphasize the necessity of basing metaphysics upon natural science and of proceeding in our investigations, not by *à priori* speculations, but by the methods of induction and analogy; and, on the other hand, in the development of a psycho-physical explanation of the world in which all things are connected in a living unity, and by an ascending series of stages lead up to and find their existence in the consciousness of God.

Connected with Fechner in his spiritual and teleological conception of the world, *Lotze* deserves to be mentioned (1817-1881) as one of the greatest thinkers of recent times. His best known work, *Microcosmus*, was published in three volumes in 1856-64. The attractive style and popular character of his writings have caused them to be widely read. The construction of his system is most comprehensive in its scope as well as artistic in its arrangement. Lotze follows Fechner in his repudiation of the speculative method. But while he acknowledges the need of recognising the work of the physical sciences, he does not regard their results as in themselves final. The philosophy of Hegel, Lotze considers, set up a splendid ideal, but it committed the great error of conceiving that ideal as realizable by our finite knowledge. The goal of an all-sufficing rational view of the world lies, according to Lotze, in the infinite. We can only provisionally reach it, and must ever regard reality as much richer than our conception of it. The province of metaphysics is to present the total reality that is known to us in a logical, reasonable form; its vocation is not to create or construe a world according to our own ideas.

The object of metaphysics is reality. Reality belongs to things which are, to events which happen, to relations which subsist. The question as to what a thing is in itself, or how an event happens, is unanswerable. To solve such problems we would require to place ourselves wholly out-

side of all reality, which is impossible. At the same time, for the right understanding of reality as given, it is required that we should not merely know the laws of its working and the elements of which it is composed. A knowledge of the mere mechanism of nature, such as science gives, is not sufficient to afford an insight into the meaning of the processes and manifestations of the actual world. We must also have some conception of the goal towards which the entire machinery is working, and have an idea of the worth or purpose which the world by its existence and development would realize. Therefore, beyond the mechanical view must exist for philosophy a teleological view.

In his metaphysics, Lotze starts with an analysis of the notion of being. What do we mean when we say that a thing is? It is not enough to say with Berkeley that a thing is when we perceive it, as if it depended on our perception. Nor can we affirm with Herbart that we know a thing when it is apprehended in its absoluteness as independent of all relations, which would be simply an unthinkable abstraction. If we would determine the being of a thing with reference to given reality, then all we can say is, that a thing is that which *stands in relations* with other things. The unity of a being does not consist of its properties. These change. The being itself remains amid every variety of quality. A thing, therefore, is *a unity in multiplicity*. When one quality alters, all the others are likewise altered, but the balance of qualities remains constant. What we perceive in objects, then, is a perpetual activity or exchange of constituents, a constant action and reaction in relations. The question of metaphysics, therefore, comes to be, how does this reciprocal activity take place? A causal connection, a direct influence of one object upon another is inconceivable—or, at all events, is beyond our cognition. When we say one thing acts upon another, all we can mean is that corresponding changes take place in the two things. The problem of

causality can only be solved by regarding the individual existences as modes, conditions, or parts of one single infinite, all-embracing substance. Thus, according to Lotze, we are compelled to assume an absolute, all-comprehending unity in which all things are rooted and have their being. But, by the analogy of experience, we must infer that only a spiritual being, a soul, has the property of remaining a unity throughout all change and variety of manifestation. Hence it follows that all things whose unity we recognise must be conceived by us as spirits or souls after the analogy of our own inner life. Thus all the souls of the universe are united, and form a community of monads, which are held together in mutual correspondence and relationship through their direct relation with the supreme substance or absolute spirit. Every single monad is a spiritual being, and it has its place and justification in the system in virtue of its service and fitness to the whole. The idea of the absolute which metaphysics establishes as the unity of the universe, receives from religion the value of a personal God. Thus, at the head of this world of spirits Lotze is constrained to place a divine personal Being whose will of goodness and purpose diffuses itself through and over them all, so as to create in them in varying degrees feelings and aims similar to His own. He is at once personal and immanent—the soul of souls—the vivifying breath of the universe. By thought, indeed, we cannot grasp Him, and can only enter into conscious communion with Him through feeling. It will thus be seen that Lotze combines the monadology of Leibnitz with the pantheism of Spinoza. Lotze maintains a constant polemic against the so-called scientific philosophy of the age. While conceding to mechanism its fullest rights in the explanation of events and outward facts, he insists that the function of mechanism is entirely subordinate, and “must be regarded philosophically as the instrument of a purpose.” It gives us but the outer scaffolding of existence, while the inner meaning of the



universe can only be read in the light of the highest good. Lotze's conception of the world is, therefore, essentially a teleological one. The universe is a microcosm whose Maker and indwelling Spirit is God, and whose purpose is the supreme good. The question as to how or why the world has come into existence is unanswerable. We understand, indeed, the sense of the drama that is being unfolded before us, but how the machinery behind the scenes is worked we cannot see.

With Lotze we may associate the name of *Eduard v. Hartmann*, in so far as he also would reject the deductive method and base his philosophy upon scientific observation. Like Lotze he is somewhat of an eclectic; but while Lotze is an optimist, and sees in the constitution of the world a divine order, Hartmann, though recognising an ultimate purpose, follows Schopenhauer in his pessimistic view of the evolution of mankind. While again a strain of agnosticism runs through the philosophy of Lotze, and he everywhere exhibits the temper of extreme diffidence and restraint in advocating his own views, Hartmann is full of assurance, of self-confidence. He delights in vigorous onslaughts upon the prevailing cowardice of the age. If the world is growing worse, as he believes with Schopenhauer, men have themselves to blame. He never tires, therefore, of condemning the "unmanly fashion of cowering before the March winds of misery and of despising that weariness ere eventide which has become so common in our generation." Hartmann was born in Berlin in 1842, and has given us an account of his own life in his collected studies, published in 1876. He is a voluminous writer, and his works are marked by clearness and grace of style. In his earlier years he was chiefly engaged in studying the natural sciences. From 1878 onwards he has been more concerned with questions of religion and ethics. His chief writings are his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 1869; *The Religious Consciousness of Humanity in its Stages of Development*, 1881; and his

*Doctrine of the Categories*, 1896. Hartmann has characterized his system as a synthesis of Hegel and Schopenhauer, which he has reduced by means of Schelling's conception of the unconscious, and a fusion of Leibnitz' individualism with modern scientific realism, to a concrete monism. He proposes to reject the deductive method and to base his system upon the inductive procedure of the natural sciences. "I have followed Schelling's precedent in uniting Hegel's one-sided identification of the world's substance with the logical idea with Schopenhauer's similarly one-sided identification of it with Will, so I have also endeavoured to effect a higher unity between Hegel's coldness and want of feeling whereby the individual is degraded to an insensitive instrument of the idea, and Schopenhauer's lack of interest in the process of the All, and his insistence on the redemption of the self from an individual existence of pain as the sole end of life." What is the nature of that reality, the existence of which we are justified in assuming from the facts presented in our experience? Hartmann designates it "the unconscious absolute," to which he attributes two inseparable functions, —Will and Idea. These in combination create the world as we see it. The one, the Will, gives us the outward substantial phenomena; the other, the Idea, gives the rational form or the order of the world. Without the will, the idea could never be realized; without the idea, the will in its irrational striving would never attain to an intelligent purpose. The original rest of the unconscious absolute is broken up by the effort of the irrational, active will to express itself, which it does by producing a world of suffering and meaningless phenomena. But as the unconscious also contains the attribute of the idea, the world assumes the character of reason and purpose. Hence the two, will and idea, are in constant conflict, and the aim of the idea is to overcome the illusions of the will, to undo the pain and suffering which it creates, and bring back the world to the peace and harmony which the

absolute originally enjoyed. The goal of the development of the world is deliverance from the misery of being, the peace of non-existence, and the return to the pre-existent identity of will and idea. In bringing about this end, individuals must co-operate, by ceasing to follow the dictates of their blind impulse and obeying the behests of intelligence. Not by withdrawing ourselves in cowardly isolation from the world, but by mutual assistance in overcoming the suffering of the world do we fulfil our moral purpose. The greater the number of individuals who are possessed of the intelligent principle, and who have yielded themselves as instruments of the rational purpose, the more surely will the consummation be realized. The world, Hartmann believes with Schopenhauer, is a huge blunder. The notion of happiness is an illusion both for the individual and the race, but it is an illusion which must be lived through, and can only be expelled by successive attainments of consciousness and the gradual victory of intelligence over the irrational will. When the last illusion of all is dissipated, then humanity will attain to the Nirvana of peace, the end of all striving and desire—the goal of existence.

The inductive method originated by Fechner and applied by Lotze and Hartmann with such different results, was finally followed up and developed by *Wilhelm Wundt* (b. 1832), who has founded a school of psychology which has at present a considerable number of adherents. While Wundt is known specially in connection with his psychological studies, he has interested himself in all departments of philosophy, and is regarded in Germany to-day as the most influential among the writers who have mediated between philosophy and natural science, and he has done not a little to regain for the queen of sciences the respect which, during the last decades, it has somewhat lost. His chief works are *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, three vols., 5th Ed., 1902; *Logic*, 1894; *Ethics*, 1903; and *Psychology of the Nations*, 1904.

Philosophy, according to Wundt, rests upon the particular sciences, and forms a general enlargement and completion of them. It is its province to bind their results into a unity, and show their inter-relations. Philosophy ought to confine itself chiefly to an exposition of the pre-suppositions which lie at the root of all science, and to a systematic comprehension of their results. In this way Wundt seeks to avoid all ungrounded speculation, and to abolish every conception of the world which does not follow from a strictly scientific induction. While we must never dissociate our reasoning from experience, there is one law we detect among the principles of the mind which at least carries with it the possibilities of knowledge beyond what is immediately given. This is the *law of ground and inference*, a law which binds together all our ideas. By this principle we are able to reach truth which, while partly given in experience, also transcends experience.

In particular metaphysical problems are divided into Cosmological, Psychological, and Ontological. In the case of Cosmological, by the law of inference or transcendence we are led to the idea of an absolutely indivisible unity and to the idea of an infinite totality of experience. A like double inference takes place in the psychological realm. There we infer at once an independent unity and a universal totality of humanity. From these two inferences there springs a third, an ontological. The realization of the unity of the objective world and the oneness of humanity demands an adequate ground in an all-embracing ontological conception of the universe. This idea of an absolute ground of the world we identify with the idea of God. It is true that metaphysics of itself is not in a position to give concrete content to this idea. But here religious faith, which is an actuality of experience, comes in and fills the metaphysical conception with a moral ideal. This God can only be conceived by us as the world-will; and the development of nature and of history may be regarded by us as the unfolding of the divine willing and



working. Thus Wundt believes that by beginning with the facts of experience and basing our conclusions on the results of science, by the logical process of inference, we may build up a rational system of metaphysics which will embrace a cosmogony and a theology.

4. With Fechner, Wundt and others, psychology tends more and more to become separate from metaphysics. No longer the science of the mind, it is now treated as the science of inner psychical facts and processes, whose value can be computed, and their physiological concomitants. To discover laws instead of causes, to examine the facts of animal existence and human consciousness, is the task of the new psychology.

Psychology therefore is regarded by Wundt and other modern exponents as an exact science like physiology. The old idea of a soul-substance or fixed substratum has been generally discarded. There is no psychical "substance," but only "psychical processes." At the same time, these processes are not fragmentary and isolated, but linked together, thereby disclosing a certain unity. The psychical processes therefore stand in a certain "relation" to each other—a fact which constitutes the first and most general psychical law, "the law of relativity." From this law of relativity there arises the conception first propounded by Leibnitz, that the world of the spirit forms a 'continuous stream.' These considerations naturally lead to the study of Weber's or Fechner's law, which aims at establishing, with mathematical accuracy, the relation existing between the various sensations and the strength of the corresponding physical impressions by which they are produced.

It cannot be denied that the discovery of this law, if it could be accurately applied, would place psychology upon an entirely new footing, and render it possible to investigate experimentally the behaviour of mental processes in their reciprocal relations. At the same time, it would be a mistake, as Wundt has pointed out, to infer

that there exists any absolute parallelism between two totally different orders of phenomena or that the mental processes are caused by, or are wholly dependent upon, physical or cerebral changes. While sensations, as the simplest of psychical processes and those more nearly allied to physical changes, may be susceptible of objective measurement, it must be remembered that there is a large series of more complicated mental phenomena—subtle emotions, high intellectual activities and acts of volition—to which it is impossible to apply any mechanical standard of measurement. Wundt, after a long and accurate study of the subject, has shown that psychology has its own laws, that indeed there is a ‘psychical causality,’ but that this form of it cannot be subjected to the accurate measurements applicable to physical causality. It is a further merit of Wundt that, following the suggestions of Spencer, he has contributed to the principles of a new science which has been called the “Psychology of Peoples.” History, sociology, political economy, are all connected with events and facts which are nothing but products of the human consciousness. Inasmuch as individual psychology, dealing only with the mental processes of the individual considered in his isolation, had no direct connection with the moral sciences, it was necessary to find a branch of investigation which should serve to connect psychology and the moral sciences. Hence Wundt has instituted a parallelism between the evolution of the consciousness of the individual and that of the community, discovering that the same laws and principles govern both. The individual, as he is at present, has been formed by social evolution, and social evolution is the work of individuals. Hence to investigate the life of primitive races and ancient civilizations, by mental physiology, pathology and linguistic research, to study, in short, the reciprocal action of the social surroundings on the individual and of the individual on his surroundings, have become the method and aims of modern psychological research.

Modern Psychology may be said to date from Herbart, who published his psychological works about 1820. He was followed by Beneke, Lotze, and Spencer, whose *Principles of Psychology* appeared in 1855, by Fechner, and by Bain, whose *Senses of the Intellect*, 1856, and his *Emotions and the Will*, 1859, contributed materially to the progress of the science. The works of Lazarus and Steinthal, dating from about 1860, mark the beginning of the psychology of peoples. The first period of modern psychology may therefore be said to extend from Herbart to Lazarus. The second period, which may be called that of 'Contemporary Psychology,' starts with the first publications of Sully, Wundt, and Bretano, and comes down to the present day, including among its most prominent representatives Ribot, Höfding, Ladd, James, Baldwin, Külpe, Ebbinghaus, Munsterberg, Ward, Bidet, Jodl and others. Apart from the works of these writers, it may be added that the best account of the progress and primal position of psychology may be obtained from Mercier's *Les origines de la psychologie contemporaine* (1897), and especially from the Italian writer Guido Villa, whose work has been admirably translated under the title *Contemporary Psychology*, 1903.

5. The Materialism which about the middle of the century appeared as the inevitable reaction from the one-sided idealism of the Romantic philosophy was not satisfactorily overcome by the weapons of the theological or spiritualistic writers, who merely assumed, without proving, a spiritualistic basis. It began to be felt by many that what was needed was a re-examination of the principles of knowledge. Hence from different sides the cry was raised, "Back to Kant." As early as 1850 Schopenhauer had already indicated that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was the true basis of all philosophy; but the real revival of interest began in 1860 with the appearance of Kuno Fischer's great work on Kant. Otto Liebmann gave to this movement an energetic impulse by the publication of his book, *Kant und die*

*Epigonen*, in 1865, with its constant refrain, "Thus we must go back to Kant." Paulsen also, who recognises in Kant's theory of cognition "the only basis of the philosophy of the future," helped to direct attention to this subject. The book, however, which dealt the most decisive blow to the materialistic tendencies of the age and gave a new name to the revival of Kantianism, was Albert Lange's *History of Materialism*, the last edition of which appeared in 1875. The result arrived at by Lange in this important work is that while materialism is indispensable as a method of investigation, it is untenable as a system. We have to thank materialism for the banishment of the notions of miracle and caprice from nature, and for its deliverance of men from fear of supernatural powers; but its central positive dogma of the absoluteness of corporeal substance cannot stand in face of the advance of modern thought alike in physics and metaphysics. The law of the persistence of force is altogether incompatible with the dogmatic claims of materialism. While Lange himself cannot be styled a Kantian, still the whole tendency of his teaching was in the line of critical idealism. It is enough to mention the names of Cohen and Natorp of Marburg, and Riehl of Halle as the present representatives of Neo-Kantianism.

The Kantian view—that our knowledge must be limited to the province of possible experience, that it can yield no information regarding things in themselves,—these transcendental matters which lie beyond the boundaries of consciousness—has exerted in its revived form an immense influence upon the various branches of present-day science and theology. First of all, it has given rise to a new form of *Scientific Positivism*, represented on the one hand by the Empirico-Criticism of Avenarius (1843-96) and the Materialism of Mach; and on the other hand to *The Philosophy of Reality* of Eugen Dühring, who defines philosophy as the development of the highest forms of the consciousness of the world and life, and affirms that our



understanding is capable of grasping the whole of reality. The law of identity is the ultimate law of all reality. The principles of the mind and the principles of the world of experience are the same. The only real, which is also the only rational, is the actuality which lies before us. Notwithstanding his recognition of Kant, it must be confessed that Dühring's standpoint is that of a somewhat crude materialism. He attaches a high importance to Comte and Feuerbach, as well as to Buckle and the English Empirical writers. Dühring would explain all phenomena upon mechanical principles. In sense-perception, nature, so to speak, repeats herself, and we are justified in assuming that the objects in space and time have a real existence corresponding to our perceptions of them. Connected also with the revival of Kantianism, yet opposed to the philosophy of reality of Dühring, is the so-called *Immanent Philosophy*, which has affinity not with Kant only, but even more with Hume and Berkeley. The aim of this movement, which is represented to-day by *Wilhelm Schuppe* (b. 1836), professor in Greifswold, *Richard v. Schubert Soldern* (b. 1852), *Bergmann* (1840-1904), and *Johann Rehmke* (b. 1848), also professor in Greifswold, is simply to analyse the contents of our inner consciousness and to abjure all metaphysical theorizing about what is beyond. Nothing exists outside of our thought. What is real is what is known. There is no object without its subject, and no subject without its object. The one and only true starting-point of all investigation is the existence of the conscious *ego*, the source and measure of all our knowledge. Within my consciousness lies the whole world I know.

Finally, the influence of Neo-Kantianism may be traced to the latest school of German theology—*Ritschlianism*—of which, besides Albert Ritschl himself, who died in 1889, *Hermann* of Marburg, *Kaftan* of Berlin, and *Schultz*, now in Strassburg, are the living representatives. The professed object of this school is to overcome the antagonism

between Supranaturalism and Rationalism in faith and science, and finally conquer an independent province in the religious consciousness by dissociating religion from metaphysics, natural science, and historical criticism. Ritschl insists with Kant upon the purely subjective character of the categories which the theoretic reason formulates and upon the pre-eminent function of the practical reason. He denies that we can attain to a knowledge of what lies beyond the domain of experience by the theoretic way of induction and intuition. This method can never discover the real principles of being, and still less can it establish any doctrine whatever regarding God and the realities of the invisible world. Every attempt to exalt the simple representations of faith to the rank of ideas is involved in metaphysical fiction. Thus Ritschl completely separates theology from philosophy, and finds the only authority for religion in the person and work of Christ as made known to us through the first religious community. Hermann holds that the absolute does not exist for science, and is only found in the moral law which man discovers, by the light of religion, within the depths of his own consciousness. In his *Essence of the Christian Religion* Kaftan presents a clear exposition of the tenets of the Neo-Kantian school. Religion belongs not to the domain of theoretical judgment, but to that of feeling or the estimation of worth. The essence of the Christian Religion is determined by the good which it offers to man. The kingdom of God, which is at once the Supreme Good, is the proper object of the activity of man.

6. In Germany to-day philosophy proper tends to become more and more specialized, and it would be impossible to name the various workers in the separate departments of thought. Among the most eminent exponents of philosophy may be mentioned *W. Windelband* of Heidelberg, *Eucken* of Jena, *Siebeck* of Giessen, *Troeltsh* of Heidelberg, *Dilthey* of Göttingen, and *Rickert* of Freiburg. These writers, though they have a certain sympathy with

one another, can scarcely be styled a school. Of these the most representative and best known is *Rudolph Eucken*, who has already produced a large number of important works, of which we may mention, *Die Einheit des Geisteslebens*, 1888; *Der Kampf um einen Geistigen Lebensinhalt*, 1896; *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, 1901; *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, 1904; and quite recently *Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, 1907.

In some respects Eucken may be said to have affinities with the philosophy of worth, which has come so much to the front both on the continent and in America. Generally speaking his attitude is that of objective Idealism. While recognising the causal relations in nature, he seeks to establish the independence of the soul-world over against the necessity of natural law. With this end in view, he analyses and estimates the meaning and worth of personal action, the development and trend of individual life, and above all, the historical significance of art, science, and religion, in which the spirit through individual effort finds expression. In these various departments of human endeavour the spirit appears as a universal infinite power, which is called forth and sustained by its own activity. Through all the manifold complex and often conflicting streams of spiritual life there moves and works a higher unity, which at once combines and controls the whole and determines its direction and progress.

The distinguishing feature of Eucken's philosophy is the idea of a "personal world" above and beyond the actual world which he conceives. Superior to all natural order and human existence there is an eternal spiritual world, which he sometimes calls a "spiritual substance" or "soul basis" (*Eine geistige Substanz, ein seelischer Bestand*), a world of spiritual ends which unfolds itself in the actual world, and constitutes the active source and uniting bond of all the variety and activity of human life. This eternal world contains the possibilities of new life-formations and the potentiality of continual development. In this higher

soul-world lies the essence and worth of life as well as the goal and purpose of all endeavour. Idealism with Eucken is not a mere theory : it is a life, an ideal to be wrought out not merely in the individual but, above all, in the general spiritual activity of the race.

The method of thought by which Eucken seeks to establish this life-essence he calls the "noological spirit" (from *Nous*), which he distinguishes at once from the psychological and metaphysical in so far as it does not merely analyse the conditions and contents of the individual mind, but investigates the activity of the spirit as it is realized in the totality of the spiritual life.

The noological process leads directly to the fact of *religion*—the presence of an absolute soul-life which is raised above the phenomena of experience but yet works in and through them all. Eucken distinguishes between two kinds of religion—the "Universal Religion" and the "Characteristic Religions." The foundation of religion in the universal sense is the recognition of a higher timeless order, ever and in constant conflict with the immediately given world. This universal religion changes the character of ordinary life. It acts as a constant challenge and ideal. It gives a purpose to all our striving, and calls forth new conditions and forms of life. But the universal religion can only exist as it finds expression in the characteristic religions—in the positive and particular faiths which have appeared in history,—each of which, in its own way, seeks to present a clear and complete image of the truth. Characteristic religion is so named because it realizes itself in great personalities, who in their character and work give expression to the inmost essence of the spiritual life. Thus universal religion is ever breaking forth into new life, and those realizations which the particular religions disclose are at once attainments and new starting-points in a mighty spiritual evolution.

Eucken's place in the philosophy of religion is determined before all else by his conviction that values in life



can only be known and estimated if we assume that behind and beyond the world of manifold experience, in which the spiritual life is dissipated and scattered, there exists a higher reality which endures amid all change as an eternal unity. With deep religious earnestness and in language often poetical and mystic, he insists upon the necessity of the opposition between the actual and the ideal world. It is, he declares, the province of philosophy to indicate the possibilities, to point to the ideals; while it is the mission of great souls, prophetic personalities, to embody these ideals in actual living forms. Eucken thus attaches great importance to the personal life as the expression of the spiritual. The sense and worth of life lies in this, that it is the channel of the divine. "Is human life," he asks, "but a mere addition to nature, or is it the beginning of a new world?" Upon this question depends the very constitution of our being, the entire worth and direction of our action. Religion seeks to raise human existence to a height above all transitory things, and thus to rescue life from nullity. If our endeavour be only a flight of Icarus, then all hope is fled, our noblest and best aspirations are but empty fancies, and the whole world ends in unreason."

## CHAPTER II

### RECENT FRENCH THOUGHT

THE progress of philosophy in France was greatly retarded by the Revolution. Thought was dethroned by passion, and in the popular mind superstition and occultism usurped the place of knowledge. Before the beginning of the century a powerful impulse had been given to psychological studies from the investigations of the physician Cabanis, who had pushed the doctrines of Condillac to their extreme. Cabanis, whose principal work was *Relations between the Physical System and Mental Faculties of Man*, endeavoured to prove that both volition and intelligence are evolved from physical movement. He exerted an influence upon Gall (1758-1828), the founder of phrenology, a system based on the assumption that the character of the mind can be determined by the mass of the brain. In the early part of the century this theory was widely propagated by Spurzheim in Germany and France, and also in England, where it was taken up by Combe and others. These ideas, somewhat crude and unscientific, paved the way for the more systematic investigations into the relations of psychology and physiology, of which, as we have just seen, Fechner, Weber, and Wundt in Germany are the chief exponents.

Immediately after the French Revolution, France was too busy putting its house in order to afford much time for speculation proper. The first Napoleon, as is well known,

was wont to express unmitigated scorn of idealists and philosophers generally. He was seeking to reconstruct society and to set up a military despotism. But, as often happens, the very discouragement of thought was more favourable to its growth than its patronage would have been. Men were forced to ask what was the meaning of this empire which had arisen out of the ruins of the Revolution. It was felt that there were factors of society which must be taken account of, ignored by the eighteenth century writers. History must be studied and humanity investigated. The fearful degradation and disorder of the French peasantry, which had once hoped to share universal freedom but had suffered a bitter disillusionment, awakened in the heart of Fourier and others, who set themselves to meditate on the conditions of human society, communistic ideals which experiment, however, only proved to be impracticable.

After the restoration of peace, reflection succeeded to action. The impulse to social inquiry was not less strong, but it began to exhibit itself more in philosophical theories and systematic study of the various ages and races of men.

In the department of mere philosophy a reaction set in against the materialistic doctrines of Condillac which, it was felt, lay at the foundation of the aberrations of the eighteenth century. The most thoughtful men were convinced that consciousness was not to be explained by sensation. The influence of Scottish and German philosophy had begun to act upon France. Reid and Dugald Stewart were translated. Madame de Staël and others had brought reports from Germany of the wonderful systems of Kant and Jacobi, of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Fresh interest was awakened; the idealism of the Germans seemed to be the element needed to balance and complete the realism of France.

1. A new spiritualistic departure was made by such men as Maine de Biran, Prevost, Ancillon, Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and, above all, Cousin. Founded by Royer-Collard,

established by Victor Cousin, this school owes its originality and distinctive character more to *Maine de Biran* than any other, whom Cousin calls the first metaphysician of his time. It was he who struck the distinctively spiritual note. The method of psychology, he held, cannot be the method of physical science. The leading idea of Maine de Biran is that a being who knows himself must consider himself from a point of view different from that from which he regards a thing known externally. The mistake made by the Sensationalists was that they confused spiritual forces with physical causes. By what right is a being who is conscious of his acts, and of the activity with which he performs them, to be treated as an external object? Between the absolute of the pure metaphysicians and the phenomenalism of the empiricists there is a third point of view, that of Self-reflection, which enables the subject to distinguish itself from its own modes and from the hidden causes, the existence of which we assume outside ourselves. The primary fact of consciousness, Maine de Biran held, is voluntary effort, by which we know the *ego* and the *non-ego* in their mutual opposition.

If Maine de Biran gave the original impulse to Spiritualism, *Royer-Collard* (1763-1845) may be regarded as the real founder of the school. As the first occupant, in 1809, of the Chair of Philosophy in the newly constituted University of Paris, he exerted a wide influence by his attempt to reconcile idealism and sensationalism. He favoured a kind of agnosticism similar to that of the Scottish school, which held that consciousness is not the product of feeling, but of certain unknowable mental categories. Royer-Collard's most distinguished follower was *Victor Cousin*, one of the ablest and most eloquent men France has produced (1792-1867). Cousin is known as the principal representative of the Eclectic school. Instead of originating a philosophy of his own, he subjected all forms of thought to a searching examination, combining into a system the various elements of different schools. The



intuitionism of Scottish thought, the critical philosophy of Kant, the mysticism of Neoplatonism, the transcendentalism of Schelling and Hegel were all reviewed and made tributary to his all-embracing scheme of knowledge. It was his aim to combine in one school the thought of the world. He translated Plato in thirteen volumes, edited the writings of Descartes, and wrote essays on Abelard, Pascal, and Locke. His principal works are a *History of Philosophy* and a valuable treatise on *The True, the Beautiful, and the Good*. He was eminent as a critic rather than as an original thinker. He was distinguished as a writer by his moral earnestness, his lucid and graceful expression, and his power of co-ordinating the facts of history and life so as to make them illustrative of evolution. Born within a stone-throw of the Bastille, with its tragic associations, Cousin became a politician as well as a philosopher. On account of his liberalism, in 1821 he was deposed from his office, and spent some time in Germany studying the various systems of German thought. Here he made the acquaintance of Hegel, whose *Philosophy of the Absolute* filled him with admiration. On his return to France he was reinstated in his Chair at the Sorbonne, where he sought to translate into clear and graceful periods the often dark and uncouth language of the German metaphysician. The enthusiasm which his lectures created can only be paralleled by the excitement roused by the teaching of Abelard in the middle ages.

The Eclectic school, however, at this point, was divided into two branches, a German and a Scottish. The first was represented by Cousin, and the second by his disciple, Jouffroy. Cousin adopted Hegel's conception of philosophy, as thought thinking itself, having itself for its object. The chief feature of his philosophy was his theory of reason, which he conceived not only as a conscious determination, but also as an instinct. It is desirable to enumerate the principles of the mind, but it is more important still to grasp them in a unity. He dwells on two

distinctive characteristics of reason—its spontaneity and its impersonality. By establishing the spontaneity of reason he thought to escape from Kant's subjectivity, which he held was due to Kant contemplating the laws of the mind at the reflective instead of at the spontaneous stage. Before reflection is possible, there is an anterior act of mind, a spontaneous act which Cousin calls the "pure apperception of truth." Before truth presents itself to us as necessary, which it does on reflection, it appears simply as true. Spontaneous reason is the first stage, when truth appears as an intuition, an inspiration. Reason is also impersonal. If reason were an individual faculty, it would be variable like our will, or relative like our senses. But it is the same for all men. I do not say *my* truths. Reason is the truth manifesting itself not in me, but in man. An appeal to reason, Cousin held, is not an appeal to the mere individual, but to that which is common to all individuals. In this impersonality or universality of reason Cousin recognises the best safeguard against anarchy and individualism. It is the supremacy of reason which binds men together. At a later period Cousin linked those two features of reason in a higher—the idea of the infinite or absolute, which is God, in whom the one and the many, the real and the phenomenal, are united, and who is the foundation of all reason and thought. "To think is to know that we think, to trust one's thought, to believe in the principle of thought. . . . So that all thought implies the spontaneous belief in God."

While Cousin thus maintained the most lofty idea of philosophy, Jouffroy adopted rather the spirit of the Scottish school and severed himself from his master. He divided all questions of philosophy into two classes—questions of fact and ulterior questions. But the latter he only admitted in so far as they were related to the former. All philosophical questions resolved themselves into questions as to the laws and categories of the mind, into problems, in short, of psychology.

Cousin became not only a popular teacher of philosophy, but also one of the most influential political leaders of France. His career is identified with the great struggles of his country for civil and intellectual liberty, and to him more than to any other is due a settlement of those educational and social questions which were exercising men's minds. When his friend and pupil, Guizot, became Prime Minister after the Revolution of 1830, Cousin was made Director of Public Instruction. The direction of the philosopher's thought to practical affairs indicates the line which the energies of Frenchmen are prone to follow. Almost unconsciously the French mind turns to social questions, and the needs and claims of political life have invariably cast abstract speculation into the shade.

A certain realism belongs to the French genius. Frenchmen think in the concrete. They are more interested in the affairs of life and questions of humanity than in ontological problems of Being and Essence. Theories of social contract, of political liberty, and general communism have always had a peculiar fascination for them. The country which produced a Rousseau also gave birth to a Fourier, a St. Simon, and a Comte. Visions of a universal Church and a universal Bank rose before the St. Simonians, and it seemed for a time as if another social revolution was to be attempted. The Divine and the Secular were to be combined. Principles of theology and of political economy were regarded as identical. But a reaction set in. An acute philosopher, an adherent of St. Simon, came forth to prove that theology belonged to the dim past, that philosophical questions belonged to a later period, and that the age of science, of positive knowledge, which deals only with the laws of nature and the outward phenomena of the world, had now arrived.

2. While Cousin and Jouffroy were lecturing at the Sorbonne, *Auguste Comte* was laying the foundations of his Sociology. He was born in 1798 at Montpellier. Distinguished by his aptitude for mathematics, he became a

teacher of that science in Paris, but at the instigation of St. Simon, he began the researches which ultimately led to the construction of his philosophical system. In his own country, during his lifetime, he had only a limited following, and while the lecture-hall of Cousin was crowded, Comte's public exposition of his philosophy had few hearers. Under the influence of John Stuart Mill in England and of Littré in France his views eventually acquired both here and abroad a considerable recognition. Comte died in comparative poverty in 1857. His character was by no means an estimable one. He was vain, dogmatic, and egotistical. He vilified the friend and patron of his youth, St. Simon, to whom he was indebted both pecuniarily and intellectually, and the only recompense Mill and others in England received for the assistance and support they gave him was ingratitude and reproach. His chief work is *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, in six volumes (1840-2), a translation and condensation of which has been published by Harriet Martineau.

The philosophy of Comte is known as Positivism. "Positivism," he says, "is essentially composed of a philosophy and a polity, which are necessarily inseparable, because they constitute the basis and aim of a system in which intellect and sociability are intimately connected." Dissatisfied with the manifold socialistic and communistic theories to which the Revolution had given rise, Comte conceived the idea of constructing a new social system on scientific principles. In order to construct his sociology he finds it necessary to organize the sciences, *i.e.* to unify knowledge and bring it within the sphere of scientific investigation. If the social life of man is to attain to the dignity of a science, it must be dealt with in the same positive and exact way as any other science. All sciences, indeed, social as well as physical, must be conceived as branches of one science, and be investigated by one and the same method. This has not hitherto been the case. In the interpretation of the world and of life, all kinds of



unscientific and supernatural explanations—providences, interventions, miracles—have been resorted to, and the various sciences have only attained to exactitude, to precision, by gradual steps and at different periods. Hence Comte was led to the enunciation of his famous law of historical progress—“the law of the three stages”—which he applies to all departments of life and thought. Every branch of knowledge passes successively through the threefold periods—the religious or supernatural, the metaphysical or abstract, the positive or scientific.

In the *theological* stage man seeks after causes, and regards all effects as the productions of supernatural agents. It is the stage of the human mind in which feeling predominates, and imagination resorts first to Fetichism, next to Polytheism, and later to Monotheism in explanation of the world.

In the *metaphysical* or transitional stage, reason comes to the front, and starting with monotheism, supernatural agents are set aside for abstract forces, infinite entities, and first causes, the constancy of whose appearance leads the mind to conclude that they are not produced by the intervention of an external being, but belong to the nature of things themselves.

In the third stage—the *positive*—the mind is convinced of the futility of all inquiry into causes and essences, and restricts itself to the observation and classification of phenomena according to the invariable relations of succession and similitude which things bear to each other.

It will thus be seen that Comte holds that all knowledge is relative. We know nothing save phenomena. To talk of first causes and ultimate ends of things has no meaning. The mind can only deal with facts as they are presented to us, and the discovery and systematizing of the laws of nature, by observation and induction, can be the only legitimate aim of man.

Comte proceeds to apply this law of the three stages to the history of mankind in order to construct a theory of

society. As a basis for his new science of sociology he finds it necessary to co-ordinate the sciences. This classification in the order of their dependence determined by the degrees of simplicity or generality of the phenomena they deal with, has been pronounced by Comte's admirers as one of the great achievements of modern thought. In the hierarchy of the sciences there is a regular progress visible from the simple to the more complex. Mathematics is followed by Astronomy, that by Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and, finally, by Sociology, which is made to rest on the preceding. All the sciences, according to Comte, have reached the positive stage, more or less, with the exception of the last, the science of man as a social being. To found and elaborate this science is the purpose of Comte's labours.

The two conditions of civilization he conceives to be *order* and *progress*, which must, therefore, form the basis of every scientific political system. Corresponding to these two ideas, he divides Sociology into two parts; the one of which he calls the *Static*, under which he considers the conditions; and the other, the *Dynamic*, which has to do with the laws of social movement. Under the first, the *Static*, he deals with man as a member of the family and the State; and under the second, the *Dynamic*, he treats of the evolution of human society as a whole in accordance with the law of the three stages already mentioned. To this universal law of mental life the whole movement of history is subject. He shows that the material development of society follows a course analogous to that of the intellectual development of mankind. The lowest or theological stage is coincident with the military state of society. The military spirit gradually gives way to the legal state or the rule of the jurists, which, in its turn, finally passes into the industrial stage, which must become the permanent object of European polity.

The theological and military spirit begins with the most primitive ages of history—the age of fetichism and magic,

when every man's hand is against his neighbour. Gradually fetichism passes into polytheism, the most perfect type of which is to be found in the East. In the classical civilization of Greece we have an intellectual polytheism. In the third, a Roman period, the prevailing feature is militarism. The priestly class is subordinated to the secular power, and intellectual activity has free scope. Gradually monotheism takes the place of the old polytheism, and a conflict arises also between the military and industrial orders.

With the advent of the middle ages a separation is effected between the spiritual and temporal powers, which is accompanied by a conversion of slavery into feudalism and the domination of morality over polity. With the decline of the mediaeval society there begins the metaphysical stage, which reaches its culmination in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the revolutionary theories of the eighteenth century. This period is destined to yield at length to the positive stage, the age of science, the industrial and peaceful epoch which the *Positive Polity* of Comte has inaugurated.

In his *Positive Polity*, which he rears on the basis of the principles just described, Comte elaborates a scheme of individual and social conduct. Comte believed the first requisite of systematic action to be a recognition of a central intellectual authority. He had no faith in the "equality" demanded by the Revolutionary spirits of his time. Society was for him an organism, the members of which had different parts to play and different functions to serve. There must be degrees of rank and variety and subordination of class. At the head of the regime he would accordingly place "a spiritual power," a college of philosophers or thinkers, to be supported by the State. The temporal power he would place in the hands of the captains of industry, the Capitalists and bankers, with whom a third class, the "workers," including labourers, agriculturists, tradesmen, manufacturers, and merchants—

were to co-operate in the use and exercise of wealth for the good of all. In this way all workers would find their place, labour would be organized, selfish interests would be abolished, and the general welfare advanced.

In the sphere of morals the main office of the spiritual power is to strengthen the social tendencies of man as against the purely personal, to settle disputes, and to regulate and concentrate the labours of the various members of society so that their combined efforts may meet the social needs of the whole.

Though the theological stage is one which must be renounced by man in his intellectual progress, it is significant that Comte does not dispense with religion. Indeed, strange as it may seem, it is the keynote of his whole system, the bond which binds the divergent tendencies of society together. Religion, as defined by Comte, is the harmony proper to human existence, individual and collective; it gathers together and presides over all the elements of our nature, active, affectionate, and intelligent. To fulfil its true function religion must first subordinate our existence to an external and irresistible power, which is also capable of drawing forth the two primary feelings of our nature, love and faith. The conception of humanity regarded as a collective unity is one which, according to Comte, alone fulfils these conditions. This *grand être*, consisting of all the men and women, past, present, and future, whose lives have been or shall be devoted to the well-being of the race, is the object of man's affection, service, and worship, to whom to devote himself is his highest virtue, and with whom finally to be incorporated his supreme reward. Comte regarded the religion of humanity as a fulfilment of all the highest aims of the religions of the past and as succeeding naturally to Christianity, which he held to be but a transitional phase of religious development.

The religion of Positivism, which has "love for its principle, order as its basis, and progress for its goal," is a



religion without a God and without any other immortality than a continuance in the grateful memory of posterity. The dogmas of the positive religion are scientific formulae; its public worship with its multiplicity of sacraments and festivals is offered to the "Grand being," Humanity, along with which, space and time, the earth and its powers, and the heroes of by-gone times are the objects of veneration. The ethics of the future has as its one motive for action the good of others.

For a time both in France and England Comtism created considerable interest, and churches were formed for the worship and cultivation of Positive principles. The head of English Positivism is Fred. Harrison, while Mill and Herbert Spencer and J. G. Lewes advocated its doctrines. In France Comte's school split eventually into two groups, one of which, headed by Littré, held to his earlier views, disclaiming his religious tenets; the other, presided over by Laffitte, claimed to be his faithful disciples, almost adoring his person as divine and cherishing his words as sacred.

There seems to be something like the irony of fate in the unconscious process by which Comte, the enemy of theology, should be led in the end to set up a worship as the last word of Positivism. The faiths of the past are dead and done with, but, after all, man needs some kind of religion, and the Goddess of Humanity is enthroned in the place of the old, and a priesthood and cult as elaborate as those of the Roman hierarchy are instituted. But Comte's reconstruction of religion is artificial and fictitious. It is evidently an after-thought. It is manufactured to fit such a definition of religion as modern science will permit. On Comte's principles, as his disciples saw, he was really precluded from formulating a religion altogether. All that relates to what we call God and the spiritual world belongs to the unknowable, and has, therefore, no meaning for Positivism. Religion even of the relative spurious kind which Comte advocates can only be a concession to

human weakness, a permissible form of self-deception, a fiction of the imagination which is to reconcile us to our fate by giving us the semblance of a providence.

With regard to the philosophical side of Positivism, and especially the development of his science of Sociology, on which the fame of Comte chiefly rests, it may be denied that it has the originality which is claimed for it. It has been compared to the doctrine of Hegel, but the comparison is superficial. While Hegel's idea of development was one from simpler to more complex forms of thought and life, each new stage taking up into itself the results of the former, and thus becoming richer and fuller as history advanced, Comte sees in history only a movement of abstraction and generalization, by which the first concreteness of religious conceptions was gradually attenuated till nothing remained but the bare idea of nature. As a matter of fact, Comte shows no real development at all. His three stages are not borne out by facts. History nowhere reveals a succession of theological, metaphysical, and scientific periods. The advance has rather been from the material to the spiritual, from the simple and abstract to the complex and social conception of the world and of mankind.

To believe that Comte's theory of historical progress is unsatisfactory as an explanation of civilization, that his social ideal is but a revival of the mediaeval system of feudalism, and that his religion of humanity is incompatible with the principles on which he bases his positive philosophy, ought not to prevent us from recognising the many valuable elements in his work as a whole. The merit of Comte lies in his insistence upon the social nature and destiny of man. It must be remembered that he lived in the throes of a social revolution. Positivism has at once the defects and merits which belong to the speculations of a transition period.

Comte gives us an insight into the diseases and wants of modern society, and with the practical earnestness of a

reformer he attempts to reconstruct a new fabric of society on the ruins of the old.

3. Since the time of Comte no outstanding name appears in the annals of French speculation. The philosophy of religion has received attention lately from several thinkers. As early as 1858, *Emile Saisset*, a disciple of Cousin, in his work, *Essai de Philosophie Religieuse*, sought to defend theism against the pantheism of Germany. He follows Descartes in proving the existence of the Deity from our conceptions of a perfect being. Saisset meets pantheism with an ingenious dilemma. If the world and God are one, then either God is absorbed in the world, and we have no longer pantheism, but atheism; or, on the other hand, the world is absorbed in God, and we have not pantheism, but simply a theory of annihilation, a state of Nirvana. In the first case God is nothing, simply nature; in the second, the world, nature, life, individual freedom, family, society, State, science—all vanish like shadows into the universal void. The link which binds God to the world is, Saisset holds, the link of love and freedom, which are, both in God and man, the expression of personality. He sums up his doctrine in the maxim of Maine de Biran: "There are two poles in human science, the person, I, whence all things radiate, and the person God, where all things meet and end."

*Jules Simon*, in his work, *Religion Naturelle*, 1860; *Caro*, *Idée de Dieu*, 1866; *Ravaisson*, *Rapport sur la Philosophie du 19 Siècle*, 1868; and *Janet*, in his *Final Causes*, which has been translated—have all supported the fundamental idea of a spiritual theism, and have advocated a perfect being who produces the world by an act of love and freedom. Opposed to this school it is sufficient to mention *MM. Vacherot* (1809-1897) and *Renan*, the former of whom in his work *Métaphysique et la Science*, and the latter in his various *Essais*, maintain that God is nothing but an ideal in the human mind, an ideal which is being gradually realized by the world in its onward progress.

Among the latest writers, *M. Secrétan* teaches that God is absolute freedom; and *M. Renouvier*, a disciple of Kant, denies that metaphysics can attain to a knowledge of God; but he vindicates the claims of religion on practical grounds.

French writers of recent times have taken a prominent place in the discussion of the question of immortality. In the school of Comte, as we have seen, the idea of a future life is reduced to the glorification and worship of great men. But a more positive attitude was taken by Jouffroy, who based immortality on the infinity of our capacities and aspirations, arguing from the inconceivable injustice that would result if death were to quench for ever that which is potential in our being. The same idea on a larger scale is developed by the Humanitarian school, of which *Pierre Leroux* (1797-1871) and *Jean Reynaud* (1806-1863) are the representatives. Leroux, in his work, *L'Humanité*, teaches a doctrine of metempsychosis which implies that human beings are repeatedly born into the world again—a theory, it may be observed, of individual continuance, but not of personal immortality in another world. Reynaud, unable to admit an immortality which does not imply consciousness and memory, in order to preserve the idea of personality, suggests in his work, *Terre et Ciel*, that there is a migration of souls from planet to planet, which takes place according to individual merit or demerit. At the same time, he believes, in harmony with the spirit of optimism, which is the prevailing tone of French theology at present, that there will be a final victory of good over evil.

These writers are also noted for their socialistic tendencies. Following St. Simon, they advocate a reorganization of the social order on the basis of material progress, substituting industrial and economic ideals for intellectual in the political and social life.

4. Among those who have exerted the greatest influence upon the present generation, the names of Taine, Renan and Fouillée, the leading representatives of the *French*



*Development philosophy*, ought to be mentioned. *Taine* (1828-1893) is better known as a litterateur and art critic than as a philosopher. In his purely philosophical studies he reflects the influence of the English Psychological school as represented by Mill, Bain and Spencer. His chief work, *De l'Intelligence*, works out the idea of a development of the mental faculty through conflict with the other psychical elements of our being. Taine's views of life were largely determined by his melancholy temperament. The political events of 1870 shattered his hopes and caused him to withdraw from political life. His recent biography shows that he was a keen observer of men and affairs. His visit to England enlarged his sympathies. In spite of his many disappointments he preserved the disposition of a Stoic. The best part of his life belongs to the world of thought.

*Ernest Renan* (1823-1892) forms a contrast to Taine. Vivacious, sanguine, somewhat dilettante, and lacking in system, he has the brilliancy and wit which are so characteristic of the French nature. At an early age he forsook the Catholic faith and became an enthusiast for religious freedom and scientific progress. As a writer his fame rests upon his works of ecclesiastical history and criticism, and especially upon his epoch-making book, the *Life of Jesus*. In his philosophical dialogues he asks what is the goal of the world's progress? The hope of man rests not in the ascendancy of the people, the mediocracy, but in the supremacy of thought, in the production of an intellectual aristocracy. In his last book, the *Examination of the Philosophic Conscience* (1888), he gives utterance to the two thoughts which sum up his philosophy. First, whether we are occupied with great things or small we touch the infinite. Whatever be the immediate results of our labours, the infinite, into which everything runs up, gives us a great hope. We know nothing, but because there is in us an infinite element which lifts us above the present, we may believe in immortality. And the second

thought is connected with the first. In the midst of all uncertainty and mystery, there exist for us four great imperatives or ideals—love, religion, poetry, virtue—forces which the materialist and egoist deny, but which redeem and carry forward the world. They are the voice of the universe, or, if you will, the voice of God.

*Alfred Fouillée* (b. 1838) is more strictly a systematic philosopher than Renan, and may be said to develop the note of continuity and spiritual evolution which Taine has struck. A strong idealist, in the most notable of his books—*La Psychologie des Idées-forces*, 1893—he lays the foundation of his thought in psychology, which he defines as a study of the will. Hence he works out an elaborate system of voluntarism. Psychology has hitherto suffered by being narrowed down to mere intellectualism. It has not been sufficiently remarked that our psychical phenomena are the expressions of an impulse or desire (*appétition*) which are accompanied by pleasure or pain according as they are favoured or suppressed. Every decision or discernment, even the most elementary, presupposes a choice (*préférence, chose pratique rudimentaire*). This preference, which is constantly offered, gives the character to our life. Every thought or idea betokens a more or less conscious direction of effort. Fouillée's ethics stand in close relationship with his psychology. Thus he emphasizes the fact that the *ego* cannot be conscious of itself without being aware of other like beings. This idea of the relativity of personality implies not only the solidarity of life, but also a universal altruistic sense. This inner force of our being, which exists as a primitive natural instinct, becomes an imperative of our nature, the fulfilment of which is the ideal and end of life to be realized at last in a kingdom of freedom, equality and justice. The word 'God,' the idea of which is borrowed from our human relationships, betokens the universal reason and the highest aspiration of universal social life.

While Renouvier and Boutroux (b. 1845) contend ener-

getically against the philosophy of continuity (the latter especially contributing a remarkable agreement with the positivism of Comte), and represent a critical philosophy which is tending towards a partial dogmatism, it may be noticed in conclusion that a school of pathological psychology has recently arisen in France, of which Ribot, Delbœuf, Paulhan, Binet, Luys, and Pierre Janet are the chief representatives.

## CHAPTER III

### RECENT BRITISH THOUGHT

THE prevailing type of English philosophy has been practical rather than speculative, and the trend of recent thought has been towards ethical and social questions. In general three principal factors may be distinguished as shaping the mental activity of the century—an ethical, a scientific, and a metaphysical. The first was the doctrine of utilitarianism; the second, the theory of evolution; and the third, the influence of German idealism.

1. For a time in England as in France the influence of Gall was shown in the devotion of such writers as Combe, Bailey, and Hartley to psychological and phrenological pursuits. It was James Mill and his more illustrious son, John Stuart Mill (1806-78), who first brought back their countrymen to Hume's starting-point. The philosophy of the Mills and the modern associational school generally have, however, added little to the principles advanced by their earlier masters—Locke and Hume. J. S. Mill was a critic rather than a constructive thinker, and his main interest, apart from his contributions to utilitarian ethics, lies in his controversy with Sir William Hamilton and his pupil Mansel regarding the limits of the infinite. Mill's position generally is set forth in his *Inductive Logic*, 1843; his examination of *Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 1865; and his *Utilitarianism*, 1863. Mill is a disciple of Hume, with whom he combines the influence of Comte's



positivism, according to which the whole history of the human mind goes to prove that we can only know facts and their relations. Mill makes experience the sole source of knowledge, rejecting all *à priori* and intuitive elements of every kind. Experience tells us what is, but not what must be. Mind and matter belong to two distinct realms, and are incapable of being compared. "Matter" he defines as a "permanent possibility of sensations." Our belief in an external world is not the result of an immediate primitive or ultimate intuition. Psychological analysis resolves it into an illusion which is explained and produced by the laws of association. Mind he resolves into a "series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling." Psychology, as the science of the laws of mental life, has to do with the facts of the mind alone. Intuitions are wholly the product of experience. They arise from impressions made upon us in infancy, and are so frequently conjoined as to seem native to the mind. Thus, as Hume had previously held, so-called primary truths are only habits of the mind which time and repetition have rendered irresistible. But while Hume seems to make an exception in the case of mathematics, whose axioms are self-evident, Mill, with more consistent boldness, declares that even mathematics is an experimental science. Its truths have no inherent validity. They are only true by association. There may be other planets in which 2 plus 2 do not equal 4. A conviction created by experience may be destroyed by experience. All inference is from particulars to particulars. The syllogism itself is but a concealed induction. Universal judgments are merely brief expressions for aggregates of particular truths. Causation is another name for the invariable association of phenomena which, in virtue of its frequent occurrence, leads us invariably to believe it to be necessary. The uniformity of nature, which is the basis of induction, is not absolutely certain, and can only be accepted as highly probable. On this assumption, indeed, we build the positive sciences. But

history shows us that theories universally accepted to-day were once regarded as absurd.

J. S. Mill has been recognised as one of the most powerful advocates in modern times of what is known as utilitarianism. In this department of thought he was largely influenced not only by his father and Bentham, but also by the positive philosophy of Comte, which he introduced to English readers.

Towards the middle of the century the interest of philosophy was largely concentrated upon ethical questions, and particularly as to the sources and sanctions or motives of moral action.

The real founder of modern utilitarianism was David Hume, who defined virtue as a quality approved by the spectator, and vice as a quality blamed by the spectator, and sought to show that the qualities approved are those which are serviceable or useful to others as well as ourselves.

*Paley* (1743-1805) may be said to be the first writer who gave a systematic treatment of morality on the basis of utilitarianism. In his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785), he bases his system upon what might be called other-worldly selfishness. Moral obligations proceed from the command of God, and the punishments and rewards of the hereafter are the motives to obedience. He defines virtue "as the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness." Thus while, according to Paley, virtue springs from self-love, there is involved in its realization the general good of man.

*Jeremy Bentham* (1748-1842), while in general agreeing with Paley that pleasure is the only self-evident good which every man naturally strives after in some form, differs as to the nature of the motives or "sanctions," as he calls them, for moral action. He does not lay much stress on the religious sanctions, but emphasizes rather the physical, political, and popular. Pleasure, according

to Bentham, differs in quantity rather than quality. In investigating the good and bad effects of an act, he adduces the different elements which must be taken account of in calculating the value of a pleasure. These are intensity, nearness, certainty, purity, and fruitfulness. By purity is meant not moral quality, but freedom from accompanying pain. Thus intellectual pleasure may take precedence of sensual. By the fruitfulness of a pleasure is meant the tendency to bring forth other pleasures—the benefits which accrue from it. When we sum up the values of all pleasures or pains thus scrutinized, the balance of the one side or other gives us the total good or bad tendency of an act. Ethics thus becomes with Bentham a matter of calculation. He defines the end of morality to be the “greatest happiness of the greatest number,” calculated upon the basis of the equality of the claims of all. Happiness is a social thing. His idea is that the sum of pleasure is to be raised to the utmost and to be equally divided over as many people as possible. “Everybody is to count for one, and nobody for more than one.” Our first care, however, must be for our own welfare, but it is found that to regard self involves consideration of others. Hence arise two classes of virtue—which are really interdependent—prudential and benevolent. As a political economist and practical reformer, Bentham was more concerned to impress upon his countrymen how much their individual happiness was promoted by whatever conduced to the general well-being, than to reconcile self-love with benevolence. However you may explain it, he seemed to say, the practical outcome is that in serving others you serve yourself.

In his essay on *Utilitarianism*, J. S. Mill, while advocating the greatest-happiness theory, defends it against the charges of selfishness and sensualism. It is not selfish, for it requires impartiality in deciding between our own interests and those of others; and it is not sensual, for man possesses faculties which sensual pleasures cannot

satisfy, and until a man provides for his highest nature, he cannot be said to attain to the true end or happiness of his life.

In dealing with the problem which Bentham left unsolved—the mode of reconciling self-love with the promotion of general happiness, Mill adduces his famous argument in the fourth chapter of *Utilitarianism*. “No reason,” he says, “can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person desires his own happiness. Each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.”

While Mill agrees with Bentham in maintaining that the principle of morality is the promotion of the happiness of all, he differs from him by the recognition of qualitative as well as quantitative differences in pleasure. In thus giving up a qualitative identity, the utilitarianism of Mill loses its distinctive element. It is easy to see that if pleasures are qualitatively the same, there must be a standard of estimate. But what is to be the standard? Two pleasures cannot be felt together. Memory of past happiness as against present gratification is not a sufficient guide, for even the estimate of a former pleasure depends on a present state of feeling. If, on the other hand, the quality of pleasures differs, the question arises, what makes the difference? Mill sets up no standard, but refers us to men of experience. But obviously if we select men for their character, we have already decided for the kind of pleasure that corresponds to their view of things.

A view of the origin of moral sentiments somewhat similar to that of J. S. Mill has been maintained by *Alexander Bain*, one of the best known writers of the psychological school. He lays particular stress on the operation of purely disinterested sympathy, which he regards as a particular case of “the tendency of every idea to act itself out, to become an actuality, not with a view to bring pleasure or to ward off pain, but from an inde-



pendent prompting of the mind." Without explaining the combination of selfish and altruistic tendencies, the school of which Mr. Bain is the representative regards it to be such as "would make the moral promptings of any normal individual harmonize on the whole with the general interests of the community of which he is a member" (Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 250).

Utilitarianism, though defective as a theory of ethics, has not been without its beneficial influence on political questions, and those writers of whom we have spoken, particularly Bentham and Mill, by their works on political economy and social science, have largely contributed to the reform and progress of our institutions.

2. The utilitarian theory has recently been adopted by some of the leading exponents of biological evolution, and has received from them a new form. The difference between the older and more modern form of the theory of pleasure does not lie in the nature of the end as the standard of value in moral judgments. "No school," says Mr. Spencer, "can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling, called by whatever name, gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure, somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element in the conception" (*Data of Ethics*, § 15). But it is pointed out that the older form of utilitarianism rests on a false idea of man's nature. It regarded society as stationary and as consisting of an aggregate of individuals mechanically united, as the atoms of matter. Pleasure was considered as a fixed thing for all time, having a certain definite value for all. Instead of this atomic theory of human nature and happiness, modern science has substituted the organic. It is held that just as the human organism is the product of heredity, the result of selection and development, so society as a whole is an evolution, and all mental faculties and moral sentiments advance from lower to higher stages. The individual only exists in society, and he acquires all he has of inner and outer

endowment in and through it. All man's powers of body and mind are inherited from the past. The moral faculty is nothing but the tendency to bring about results judged to be good by experience. A man's life takes its form at every point from the relation in which he stands in his social environment. "A full perception of this truth," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, "that society is not a mere aggregate, but an organic growth—that it forms a whole, the laws of whose growth can be studied apart from those of the individual atom—supplies the most characteristic postulate of modern times."

This theory of evolutionary ethics, of which Herbert Spencer is the chief exponent, is an attempt to deduce morality from biological and sociological laws, and is based upon the more general doctrine of evolution connected with the name of Darwin, which has revolutionized modern science and modified the whole conception of life.

*The Origin of Species*, which Darwin published in 1859, is justly regarded as one of the epoch-making books of the world. Its author not only shows that the development of species proceeds by a regular and natural evolution from the lowest forms of life to the highest, but that also by the law of the survival of the fittest through struggle for existence and natural selection, new types have been evolved endowed with organs, faculties, and habits tending to the preservation of the individual or of the species under the conditions of life in which it is placed. As far more individual animals of all kinds come into the world than can be supported in it, those that have some slight advantage have the best chance of surviving and of producing their kind, while injurious or weaker variations, those unadapted to their environment, are destroyed. This law of natural selection, or "survival of the fittest," naturally leads through the ages to the improvement of each type, and consequently to an advance in organization.

This theory of evolution which Darwin has worked out with great elaboration and wealth of illustration in the

natural world, has exerted a wide influence on all departments of thought, and is not without its bearings on questions of moral and spiritual life. For one thing, if Darwin's hypothesis be true, the old idea of a God as an external designer, acting without the world, and creating the universe by a series of interferences, is no longer tenable. The theory was left incomplete by its propounder, but it has been elaborated and applied with triumphant success in different directions by various writers—amongst others, by Wallace, Huxley, Marsh, Galton. Though now generally established in the realm of biological science, it is freely admitted that the hypothesis of selection by no means accounts for all the facts of man's moral life. There are points in the progress of the world at which transitions have occurred, and apparently new starts have been made which the evolution theory of variation and adaptation to environment does not successfully explain. It cannot satisfactorily account for the beginning of the world, for the first appearance of man upon the planet, nor does it offer a solution of the genesis of the soul or the production of human reason. On the other hand, it must be remarked that evolution does not profess to explain creation, and however far back we place the first cause, a beginning of the world and of life there must be. Nor does evolution in any way contradict the notion of design or deny the idea of the government and purpose of a divine ruler of the world. In one sense it may be said that so far from this theory diminishing, it rather enhances the wonder of the universe, and in so far as the Deity must be conceived as immanent in the world, it suggests a higher and richer idea of God and His relation to creation than the old mechanical view afforded.

Darwin was professedly a naturalist, and only incidentally did he touch on the domain of man's spiritual life. But what he did not essay has been attempted by others, notably by *Herbert Spencer*, who in recent times has elaborated a complete system of philosophy embracing the

whole field of human knowledge on the basis of evolution. Lavoisier discovered the indestructibility of matter; Meyer and Helmholtz the conservation and equivalence of the physical forces, making it possible for Spencer to extend Darwin's theory of the mutability of species to a philosophy of evolution. Spencer's philosophy attempts to prove that all phenomena, physical, psychical, and social, are manifestations of one ultimate principle—the persistence of force. The method adopted is to reduce life to its simplest conditions, to explain the highest in terms of the lowest, and to show that in the organic, mental, and social realms the principle of development prevails. In pursuance of this design, Spencer published in 1862 his *First Principles*; in 1864, *Principles of Biology*; in 1870-72, *Principles of Psychology*; in 1876, *Principles of Sociology*; and in 1879, *Data of Ethics*. These works comprise what he has called his system of Synthetic philosophy. They deal, as will be seen from their titles, with every department of knowledge, and seek to classify and synthesise the sciences in one comprehensive system. The best account of his philosophy as a whole is to be obtained from *An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy*, by T. Howard Collins.

The metaphysical basis of his philosophy is laid down by Spencer in his work, entitled *First Principles*. He starts from the principle of the relativity of knowledge—the distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. Along with a definite consciousness of things known in relation to one another, there is implied an indefinite consciousness of an absolute existence, in the recognition of which science and religion find their reconciliation. Science shows us the existence of an Absolute behind all phenomena, but religion points to the inscrutable nature of this existence. All knowledge is limited to relations, and consists in a series of generalizations. We begin with mere crude observations, and go on to more complete propositions. "Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified



knowledge; science is partially unified knowledge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge." The data of philosophy are those organized components of our knowledge without which thought could not proceed. Besides the unknowable power and its manifestations, space, time, matter, motion, force, are the ultimate postulates on which all other truths depend. But once more all these are traceable to experiences of that mode of consciousness whose reality is shown by its persistence—in other words—to force. The persistence of force—the persistence of some cause which transcends our knowledge and conception—is a truth which all other truths imply. "The phenomena of evolution," he says, "have to be deduced from the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and in this a rational synthesis must be built up." From the fact that force can neither arise out of, nor lapse into, nothing, follows the uniformity of law. Motion follows the line of least resistance, and is rhythmic. Force can never disappear; it can only be transformed. Hence from the persistence of force there follow the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, and the rhythm of motion.

But now these analytic truths, or "components of phenomena," as Spencer calls them, demand a law of universal synthesis. "Having seen that forces are everywhere undergoing transformation, and that motion, always following the line of least resistance, is invariably rhythmic, it remains to discover the similarly invariable formula expressing the combined consequences of the actions thus separately formulated." This may be defined as "the law of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion," which holds good for each single thing and every change. At every moment all objects are undergoing some change, either absorbing motion or losing motion. What then is the principle which expresses this constant change of relation?

The whole universe is involved in a double process of

evolution or integration, and dissolution or disintegration. The formula of evolution is thus stated: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion: during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." The law of evolution applies to every order of phenomena—astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic—since these are all component parts of one universe.

The causes which necessitate this evolution from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and from the indefinite and incoherent to the definite are: (1) The instability of the homogeneous which is consequent upon the different exposures of different parts to various forces; and (2) the multiplication of effects. Every mass on which a force falls, subdivides, and each part becomes the parent of further differences. At the same time, by a principle of segregation, which is a process tending ever to separate unlike units and bring together like units, the differences are sharpened and made definite.

But now what is the goal of this evolution? Equilibrium is the final result of these transformations. Changes go on until the various forces become balanced and so produce rest. There is a tendency in every organism, however disordered by some unusual influence, to return to a balanced state. To this principle may be traced the capacity of individuals, and still more of species, of becoming adapted to new circumstances. It also affords a basis for the inference that there is a gradual advance towards harmony between man's mental nature and the conditions of his existence. And, finally, from this same principle "we may draw a warrant for the belief that evolution can end only in the establishment of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness."

Dissolution is the counter-change which sooner or later every evolved aggregate undergoes. Once equilibrium is

reached all change takes place in the direction of disintegration. This, which is illustrated in the destruction and death of planetary systems, of societies and of individuals, is no less true of the world as a whole. Thus the rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing itself during short periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates in periods immeasurable by human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and eternal. All these phenomena, from their greatest features down to their minutest details, are necessarily results of the permanence of force under its forms, matter and motion.

The *First Principles* closes with a restatement of the doctrine of the Unknowable with which Spencer started. "That which persists unchanging in quantity, but ever changing in form, under those sensible appearances which the universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge—is an unknown and unknowable power, which we are obliged to recognise as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time."

In his *First Principles* Spencer's whole philosophy is contained, and it would be impossible here to show how he applies and works out his principles in the various departments of Biology, Psychology, Sociology, and Ethics.

In all these realms change from the simple to the complex is the order of organic growth. The application of the theory of evolution to physical and mental phenomena is focussed in the definition which Spencer has given of life as "*the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations*," which, reduced to its simplest form, is the interaction of organism and environment.

The theme of the first five books, one on First Principles, two on Biology, and two on Psychology, is the individual life, which prepares the way for the science of Society—super-organic evolution, as Spencer calls it, implying the co-ordinated actions of many individuals. Society is a vast living organism whose development, like that of the

individual, is to be accounted for by the interaction of organism and environment. The evolution of humanity is traced from primitive man, through the family, the community, the nation, to the confederation of nations. Through struggle for existence, by gradual adaptation to his surroundings, by means of co-operation and individualism, man has advanced from his simple, savage condition in pre-historic times to his present complex civilized state. In the chapter entitled "The Factors of Social Phenomena," Spencer presents a vivid picture of human progress. "First comes the material appliances, which, beginning with simply-chipped flints, end in the complex automatic tools of an engine-factory driven by steam . . . which from huts of branches and grass grow to cities with their palaces and cathedrals. Then we have language, able at first only to eke out gestures in communicating simple ideas . . . from which we pass through picture-writing up to steam-printing, multiplying indefinitely the number communicated with, and making accessible in voluminous literatures the ideas and feelings of innumerable men. . . . Concomitantly there goes on the development of knowledge, ending in science." Simple customs end in systems of laws. Rude superstitions grow up into elaborate mythologies, theologies, cosmogonies. Opinions become embodied in creeds, ceremonies, and social sentiments. The necklace of fish bones passes into elaborate ornaments and gorgeous forms of dress. From the discordant war-chant come symphonies and operas. Cairns develop into temples. Rude cave-markings, to galleries of paintings. The recital of deeds of blood gives rise to the epic, the drama, and the history. Everywhere social progress is an advance in the number and complexity of adjustments of organism to environment.

Spencer traces the origin of religion to ancestor-worship, and generally to the worship of the dead. The idea of another life—from which the belief in deities is generally evolved—originated mainly "in such phenomena as



shadows, reflections, echoes," which were regarded by primitive man as his double or other self. The belief in ghosts and phantoms gives rise to all belief in supernatural powers. It was fear of the dead that lay at the root of religious control, just as it is fear of the living that is at the root of all political control.

It may be pointed out here that the ghost theory of Mr. Spencer has been subjected by Max Müller and others to a searching criticism, and is found to be based on totally mistaken data. In his *Anthropological Religion*, Max Müller, after a historical examination of the theory, says: "I make no secret that I consider the results of Mr. H. Spencer's one-sided explanation of the origin of religion as worthy of the strongest condemnation which a love of truth can dictate." With this criticism Pfeleiderer and Renouf Réville generally agree, finding the beginning of religion rather in the worship of the greater objects of nature, such as the sun, mountains, rivers, etc.

The earlier communities, according to Spencer, were of the predatory and warlike type, and tended, therefore, to centralized control. The later, the industrial type, tends rather to restriction of governmental authority and to freedom of the individual. Spencer thinks that a still higher type than the industrial is possible in the future, when the present belief that life is for work will be changed for the principle that work is for life, and that instead of the individual existing for the State, the idea will prevail that the State exists for the individual.

The climax of Spencer's system—to which all his previous studies lead up—is his theory of ethics. Ethics, he holds, has its root in the physical, biological, and social conditions which he has considered. The moral sense is the result of a process of evolution. Development implies the acquisition of new instincts and desires. Hence happiness resulting from the satisfaction of desires, which satisfies at one stage of development, ceases to satisfy at a higher. The production of vitality, health of the com-

plete social organism, is the aim of morals, and the best conduct is that which most fully realizes the law of evolution, which is really making for the greatest totality of life.

Apart from the obvious circle in which Spencer moves, making happiness a means towards the completion of life, and then assuming that "increase of life" is desirable in order to greater happiness, it may be said that a theory which sets out "to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness," is not a theory of ethics at all. There is no room for freedom of the subject. If man is necessitated like any material object, as the theory asserts, then it is as absurd to enjoin on him anything at all as to command the sun to stand still. Moral conduct is transmitted. We are what the past has made us, and what we must do is determined by heredity and environment, so that the future action of the individual and of society can be predicted and even tabulated from the known laws of life. Mr. Spencer's language implies that there is something else transmitted than a nervous system—our very experiences and sensations are transmitted. Our moral sense is nothing but the highly developed product of a series of modifications which have been going on through the generations, and have resulted in our present necessary intuitions and aims. Spencer really applies causality to mind and will, and by reducing ethics to a form of mechanism, empties morality of all contents.

The strength of Spencer, as has been pointed out, lies in his brilliant power of generalization; and through his acquaintance with science he has thrown much light upon the problems of biology, especially in their relation to psychology. But his conclusions in the regions of sociology, religion, and ethics are by no means so satisfactory. He starts with a false duality between subject and object which vitiates his whole system. While he maintains that

these exist in relation, he never succeeds in showing the inner connection between the subjective modes of thought and the objective forms of force. His attempt to reconcile science and religion, materialism and idealism, on the basis of an abstract unknown substratum, while it saves him from the position of materialism, involves him in innumerable contradictions. He tells us we cannot know the absolute, and yet almost with the same breath he insists that we have an idea of the absolute, which our minds are compelled to form. Now he defines it as that which stands out of all relations, and is, therefore, unknowable; and, again, he affirms that it manifests itself in all that is, and is an element in every idea we form. The absolute, in other words, stands in relation to both mind and matter, and has, indeed, its very nature in that relation, and yet though it is continually manifesting itself in innumerable ways, it is absolutely unknown and unknowable!

An author, however, has a right to expect to be interpreted by his best, and there is a sense in which it may be said that Mr. Spencer does contend for an ultimate reality from which all things proceed,—a reality which binds together our whole consciousness and gives a spiritualistic rather than a materialistic aspect to the universe. His latest commentator, M. Emile Boutroux of Paris, in his little work recently published, *Religion according to Herbert Spencer*, says that the value of Spencer's religious teaching lies in its testimony to the living consciousness of the tie that binds the individual being to that common source of all, which wells up in the thinking mind; and, after quoting Spencer's famous question: "Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical action?" he finds its natural and necessary completion in the prayer, "Thy kingdom come."

3. English thought has been greatly enriched in recent years by an acquaintance with continental philosophy and theology, especially of the great German idealists. In the

early part of last century the writings of S. T. Coleridge (1772-1832), particularly his *Biographia Literaria*, in which he gives an account of modern German speculation—did much to promote a knowledge of German literature. The works of Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) also—*Past and Present*, *Sartor Resartus*, and his various essays—have helped to familiarize our countrymen with the continental mode of thinking. In philosophy this influence made itself felt principally through Kant, to whose theory of Cognition, Herschel, Whewell, and others are indebted.

More recently a Hegelian movement in British thought has been discernible, and the problem as to the constitution of reality or experience has been re-examined in the light of the contributions of the post-Kantian thinkers. Among the adherents of this new movement may be mentioned J. H. Stirling (*Secret of Hegel*, 1865); F. H. Bradley (*Ethical Studies*, 1876); Dr. John Caird, late Principal of Glasgow University (*Introd. to the Philosophy of Religion*, 1880); and Dr. Edward Caird, Master of Balliol, Oxford (*Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 1889, and *Evolution of Religion*, 1893, *Hegel*, etc.); Robert Adamson, R. B. Haldane, Pringle-Pattison, William Wallace, and the late T. H. Green.

The first impulse to the British study of Hegel was given by Dr. *Hutchison Stirling* in his memorable book, *The Secret of Hegel*, published in 1865. The most notable feature of Dr. Stirling's treatment of Hegel is his strongly conservative attitude. He is a thorough defender of the German's dialectic, and hails him as a champion of God, Freedom, and Immortality. He endorses Hegel's philosophical vindications of Christianity, and may be regarded as identified with the Hegelianism of the right.

Not long after the publication of Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, there appeared, in the person of *Edward Caird* (b. 1835), a powerful teacher of Idealism. First as professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow and after as Master of Balliol, Oxford, few men have more deeply influenced



British speculation. His works on Kant, with which he began his literary efforts, and those on Comte and Hegel, as well as his *Evolution of Religion*, are of first importance in the realm of philosophy. In his *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, published in 1889, he gives a most careful survey from the Hegelian standpoint of the whole field of Kant's writings. Here he shows that Kant is the true basis of Hegel, and that Hegel is the interpreter of Kant. In his later books, specially in his *Evolution of Religion* and in his *Lay Sermons*, published in 1907, he reveals more frankly than in his other books his personal attitude to religion. In two respects at least Caird may be said to have a strong affinity with Hegel. He is a thorough-going idealist. He believes in the spiritual interpretation of the world. The world is essentially a rational world, and can have a meaning for us only as we find in it the expression of a mind to which our own can appeal. Again, like Hegel, Caird emphasizes the principle of development, and finds in it the key to all the problems of thought, life, and history. Poetry, art, and religion are but parts of a connected whole, progressive manifestations of our spirit. Christianity is thus seen to be a religion, not revealed once and for all, but one which has been ever growing and expanding and showing greater powers to use the new elements which it is continually absorbing. In his latest book, *Lay Sermons*, which represents his practical teaching, the greatness of life as a trust and opportunity and the boundlessness of man's capacity are the ever-recurring themes. The whole tenor of his teaching has been a protest against the materialistic interpretation of the world, and a plea for that larger self-consciousness in which a man loses himself in others' good, and by losing himself really finds himself again.

Slightly younger than Edward Caird, but earlier in the field of letters, we may mention *Thomas Hill Green* (1836-1882), whose principal books, *Introduction to Hume*, and *Prolegomena to Ethics*, published after his death, may be

regarded as typical of the Neo-Hegelian movement. While in one sense Green and the other writers we have named are largely indebted to Hegel, and acknowledge their indebtedness with more or less frankness, they mark also a return to Kant, and seek in restarting from him "to do," as Green has said, "the work of Hegel over again."

The *Prolegomena to Ethics* begins with a metaphysics of knowledge. Green endeavours to develop the first part of Kant's doctrine, but refuses to accept the principle of the primacy of practical reason. He maintains with Kant that our ordinary experience presupposes the operation of the combining activity of thought. He claims therefore that as the world of experience exists only for a self-conscious being, we must interpret reality as a spiritual and not as a mechanical system.

With Hegel he places first the systematic unity of all things as grasped by thought. We must be able to comprehend the world in a synthesis by a principle of reason, within which we have a kind of expression of the rational order without. But at the same time, Green holds that it is only by a gradual process that the spiritual system which constitutes reality comes into existence for us. He postulates indeed an absolute reason at the heart of the universe which is in no way affected by the process of experience in us. But at the same time, he regards human knowledge of the good and pure as the progressive self-imparting of this absolute consciousness to us. Divine thought constitutes the world, and human experience is not so much knowledge of the world as the finite transcript gradually made, of divine thought.

This contrast between the world of experience as arising for us only in the process by which we gradually come to know it and the world as it is for the eternally complete consciousness leads Green to deny that we can know God in an absolute sense. We know indeed that the world in its truth or full reality is spiritual, because nothing else will explain the fact of our experience; but such a know-

ledge of the spiritual unity of the world as would be a knowledge of God is impossible for us. Indeed, as Green strongly puts it, "to know God we must be God."

In the region of ethics Green holds that the end or good of every man is the realization of his being, as one of the many self-conscious "spirits" or "persons" in whom the Divine Mind—the Supreme Spirit of the world—partially reproduces itself. Man is the instrument of a higher power, which realizes itself in humanity through the activity of self-conscious persons. Man is free so far as he is in sympathy with God, and at every step of his development is manifesting the thought of God. To Green, duty is a divine revelation, and in the service of duty each of us acts for and with God. While Green's analysis of knowledge would seem to preclude a pantheistic identification of God with the soul, he appears to find some difficulty in safeguarding the self-identity and freedom of the individual; and though in one sense his system is theistic and his whole philosophy a justification of the religious consciousness, it must be noticed that he resolutely refuses to admit any idea of a supernatural revelation.

The last name which we shall mention in this connection is that of *F. H. Bradley*, whose works, *Ethical Studies* (1876), *Principles of Logic* (1883), *Appearance and Reality* (1893), have established his position as one of the foremost British thinkers of our time. In his earliest book he contends against the atomism of the English psychologists in the spirit of Hegel and Lotze. Consciousness, he affirms, cannot be described as a mere collection of elements, for it would be impossible to conceive how such a collection could "become aware of itself." The *ego* must be regarded as a harmonious and consistent whole, in which there is an ultimate agreement between our practical and theoretic nature. Within ourselves we possess a standard and norm by which we can determine what is higher and lower in life. This measure is constituted by

our whole consciousness. We could never feel the pain of contradiction if we were not a whole and had not within us a sense of harmony, a prophecy of completeness. This idea of a standard is the ground-thought of Bradley's whole philosophy. In his *Appearance and Reality*, in which he passes beyond Hegel, he applies this thought to the various categories and grades of appearance. Everywhere he sees contradiction, leading us on from appearance to reality. The degrees of reality allotted to the various appearances are not so much connected links in a chain as rays converging on the real as their centre. But the final or absolute reality we can never know. The highest truth that we are able to discover is still conditioned for us by an unknown something. Our thought ever strains after something which is greater than thought; our personality after something more than personality; our morality after that which stands above all morals. -

Bradley's philosophy thus bears the character of a scepticism, or at least agnosticism. It reminds us of the relativity of Hamilton. The absolute, or real which in one sense gives meaning to all the various degrees of reality, is in another sense unknown. "We cannot construe the one absorbing experience to ourselves." Two principles underlie his view of things: one is the relational way of thought; the other, that the standard of reality must be our complete experience. Both lead to the same result—to the impossibility at any particular point to call a halt, although we may advance step by step to a more complete determination of reality.

Mr. Bradley can scarcely be regarded as any more successful than Green in defining the absolute as God. It is true he does maintain that we are able in general to determine its nature. Our very inability to accept the contradictions of ordinary experience proves the existence of a true self-consistent reality. Ultimate reality must be a harmonious whole, an absolute spiritual unity, in which all the complexity of our experience, including science,



morality, art and religion, must find its place and justification. But while Mr. Bradley grants that there are "degrees of reality" within our experience, he refuses to admit that even the highest form of reality known to us is an adequate characterization of the absolute.

There are those who tell us that the day of philosophy is past, and that henceforth the reign of science will be supreme. It is true that in our country, as on the Continent, no outstanding name can be mentioned to equal that of a Kant, a Comte, or a Spencer, and no new view of the world has been put forth which arrests our thought, but here as abroad there are no signs of diminished interest in speculative inquiry, especially in the departments of ethics and religion. Such men as Flint and Fairbairn on the religious side; Professors Wallace, Muirhead, Maccunn, Mackintosh, Bradley, Mackenzie, Ward, Bosanquet, Benjamin Kidd on the ethical; and Professors Jones and Latta of Glasgow, Pringle-Pattison and James Seth of Edinburgh, Sorley of Oxford, Ritchie and Burnet of St. Andrews, and others—not to mention those who have recently passed away—Ferrier, Principal Caird, Calderwood, Veitch, Adamson, Nettleship, Sidgwick, Jowett, Walter Pater—worthily represent the philosophical activity of our country.

Space forbids us giving an adequate account of philosophy in America, where there has been recently considerable speculative activity. Here also for a time Neo-Hegelianism has flourished, and is represented by W. T. Harris, John Watson and, in a degree, by Josiah Royce. The latest phase of philosophic thought is that which has received the name of *Pragmatism*, as represented by Wm. James of Harvard, Caldwell, Royce and Dewey. This tendency insists upon the practical character of all knowledge, to the extent of confining knowledge to its instrumental value and denying the idea of the absolute altogether. Pragmatism seeks to interpret the meaning of conceptions by asking what difference they

make in the affairs of practical experience. What is their value for life? Only such ideas and theories can be justified which have produced results that prove useful. The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is the conduct it dictates and the consequence it involves. It is a common method of scientific men to regard their theories as working hypotheses rather than as absolute truths. They summarize the facts at present known and put them into a portable handy shape, and these serve as a basis for new facts. Scientific men are under no illusion that they have reached the absolute truth. Their theories are true so far as they are convenient and practically helpful—that is their justification. Anything that works, that helps, may be called, in a sense, true. Now Pragmatism may be regarded as an extension of this attitude and spirit to the realm of philosophy generally. When we call an action right, the old notion is that it corresponds with some abstract ideal standard. But, says the pragmatist, we can only judge of actions by their consequences. Some, in the end, have good results, some bad. This, then, it is urged, is the real basis for moral preference, for the distinction between right and wrong. "Conduct," says Mr. Bernard Shaw, "must justify itself by its effect upon happiness, and not by its conformity to any rule or ideal." Professor James says that the true is the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the right is the expedient in the way of our behaving. "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me at definite instances of our lives if this world-formula or that world-formula is the one which is true." This view was first proposed as a maxim in a paper in a science magazine in 1878 by C. S. Peirce, to whom Professor James, in his recent book on *Pragmatism*, accords the honour of being the pioneer in this line of thought.

Originally set forth in his *Will to Believe*, Pragmatism was in Professor James' hands little more than a working

conception, a 'method' by which, in default of scientific evidence, one may contrive to live and to turn nature to one's own ends. After maintaining this guarded attitude for a number of years, Professor James has at last convinced himself that Pragmatism is not "a method only," but a "certain theory of truth." It is now maintained, without qualification, that "an idea is true only in so far as it leads to satisfying and successful experiences." "True ideas," says Professor James, "are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify."

It will be observed that Pragmatism thus denies that there is any distinction between the truth of an idea and the proof of its truth: the truth indeed consists in its verification. Furthermore, it obliterates the distinction between the truth of an idea and its practical usefulness; an idea is true if it is useful.

Professor James' book on *Pragmatism*, like his former volume on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, is most seductively written. It has already called forth a vast amount of literature both for and against its main tenets. It has not yet evoked any elaborate or comprehensive reply, although Professor Pringle-Pattison, Mr. Bradley and Professor Watson have made some strictures upon it. It is not yet a closed system, and it is too soon to pronounce upon its value. Like every new theory, it has probably assumed, on its earliest experience, an exaggerated and one-sided form, and many of its excrescences will by and by be dropped. It seems surely a dangerous proposition that an idea can be *made* true by its satisfactory consequences—that truth, after all, is just what answers best, which will readily be taken to mean, what pays best. Is all truth then merely instrumental, and relative to the individual? Is truth for me something entirely different from truth for you? It must be acknowledged that much that Pragmatism contends for is not specifically its own. Truth is undoubtedly a growth and is in the making in the sense that we are only gradually

attaining to fuller and clearer realizations of what reality is. The old cleft between two fixed worlds is no longer held. The former theory of a fixed reality over against the mind, which it is the function of thought to 'copy,' leads indeed to the breakdown of all knowledge; and the conviction of the unity of existence has permeated all the best thought of the time. But surely truth presupposes a rational universe, and we have a right to regard these judgments as true which express what is compatible with the total system of experience. Must we not give up the quest for a rational view of the world if all we can say is, "it is impossible to say that any stage as yet in sight is more true than another"—if indeed we can say no more than that, "commonsense is better for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophical criticism for a third"?



## CONCLUSION

WE have traced the progress of European speculation from its earliest beginnings in Greece to the present day. We have sought to show that the history of philosophy is not a mere arbitrary collection of theories about the world and things in general, but a strictly rational development, an evolutionary process which conforms to certain distinguishable principles of mental growth. It is true that during this long period philosophers always seem to be asking the same primary questions and to be dealing with the same fundamental problems, just as if no answer had been given and no solution offered; but if we look at the history of thought as a whole, we cannot fail to discern a distinct advance from the earlier naive questionings of a Thales and a Heraclitus to the more complex and elaborate reasonings of a Kant and a Spencer. We have seen that no single answer is valid for all time, for no sooner does the mind attain to a certain mental position than new elements and new factors emerge which modify and enlarge the problem and demand a restatement of the truth. Just as at each stage of the individual life—in childhood, youth, and manhood—a different view of the world is taken, so in the larger life of the race there can be traced successive stages of growth in experience and outlook. We cannot say that the child's view is false and that the man's is true. The man sees all that the child sees, but his vision is fuller, richer, and more matured. So it is that the human race marches onward, changing its notions, enlarging its con-

ceptions, modifying its ideals, and replacing its earlier partial opinions with clearer and more adequate convictions. It may be said that the significance of each system of philosophy which has appeared in history is that it emphasizes some truth which others have neglected; and if it again has to be complemented by another aspect which it, in its turn, has overlooked, we can see how philosophy advances through statement and opposition to a larger comprehension, from abstract and partial views to broader and richer conceptions. While the history of philosophy presents many systems, it exhibits but one philosophy. It has sometimes taken the form of materialism and sometimes of idealism. Thinkers have now started from the external world and now from the mind itself; some have begun with the individual, others with the universal. But whatever has been the starting-point and whatever the goal reached, every form of philosophy has been an effort to grasp the unity of things, to search for the first principles of reality, to discover the meaning and purpose of all that is.

What the history of philosophy, therefore, affords is a series of successive efforts of the spirit of man to attain to a consciousness of itself and the world to which it is related, or what is the same thing, to attain to a rational conception of existence. We have, therefore, sought to show that each system of philosophy, though inadequate in itself, is a necessary stage in the evolution of thought. The successive systems are closely connected. Each can only be explained as the product of its predecessors, and can only be justified as containing the promise and potency of a higher truth.

The objection has sometimes been raised to the study of philosophy that it leads to no practical results. It is but a collection of individual theories which afford no certainty of truth. One philosophy refutes another, and we are no nearer the truth after thousands of years than we were at the beginning. Let us withdraw ourselves, it is said, from

all such sophistries, and betake ourselves to the guidance of our own common sense. But what is this common sense of which the ordinary man vaunts himself? It is in reality a number of vague assumptions borrowed unconsciously from old exploded theories—assertions, opinions, beliefs, accumulated, no one knows how, and accepted as settled judgments. We do not escape philosophy by refusing to think. Some kind of theory of life is implied in the words, "soul," "duty," "freedom," "power," "God," which the unreflecting mind is daily using. In employing those terms we are implying, though we do not know it, a system of philosophy. It is useless to say we can dispense with philosophy, for that is just to content ourselves with bad philosophy. "To ignore the progress and development in the history of philosophy," says T. H. Green, "is not to return to the simplicity of a pre-philosophic age, but to condemn ourselves to grope in the maze of cultivated opinion, itself the confused result of those past systems of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out." He who would be satisfied with the first unreflective view of things can never hope to know reality as it truly is. As long as human thought exists, philosophy will exist. The yearning for knowledge, the desire to lift the veil of nature and penetrate her secrets, is an everlasting impulse in the human soul. There is a divine unrest, a witness to our infinitude, which compels us to search for the hidden truth, to pierce below the seeming to the real; and the aim of all philosophy is just, as Plato said, to correct the assumptions of the ordinary mind and to grasp in their unity and cohesion those ultimate principles which the mind feels must lie at the root of all reality.

It is impossible to forecast what direction philosophic thought will take in the future, or to foresee how the world-problem will present itself to the next generation. It is obvious we are on the eve of great changes in the political and social world, not less than in the sphere of religious

faith. Already science has revolutionized many of our accepted beliefs, and new problems as to the relation of mind and matter and of God and man are pressing for solution.

Philosophy has often been divided into different departments, according as we regard existence from the point of view of nature, mind or God, but it is only for the sake of convenience that they are thus isolated. Each involves the other. Nature is a necessary manifestation of spirit, and is really included in it. Indeed, all questions of metaphysics run up into questions of ethics and theology. To know God and ourselves in God is the goal of all thought. But no adequate or satisfactory view will be obtained by seeking to divorce, as the Ritschlian school is endeavouring to do, metaphysics from theology. The rationality of religion rests on the possibility of an ultimate synthesis in which man and nature are regarded as the manifestation of one spiritual principle.

The philosophy of the future must take the whole of experience for its contents. It must not isolate itself, as it has too much done in the past, from practical life, nor refuse the findings of scientific discovery. It must be ready to accept any facts which history has revealed or any theory which science has established. The philosopher cannot ignore any manifestation in the past, whether in nature or humanity. His theory of the universe must be wide enough to embrace the facts of Christianity as well as the results of evolution. He will not be discomfited by the conclusions of biological development, or dismayed by the verdicts of physiological research. A crass materialism is no longer possible, nor is a purely subjective idealism valid. A solution will not be obtained by suppressing one of the factors, but rather by reaching a higher unity in which nature and spirit, mind and matter, are reconciled. At the same time, it is of the very nature of philosophy that thought is ultimate, that, in short, existence can mean nothing else than existence for a conscious self—a thinking



being. The opposition between mind and matter, between the thinking subject and the external world, is only apparent, or is at least one which is to be transcended in the higher unity of consciousness. For man is not merely a natural being among others, but a being in whom nature is at once completed and transcended. If, in one sense, he is a part of the world, in another sense he is greater than it. He is a link in the chain of being, but he is also a link which is conscious of what he is. He is a being who only knows himself as he knows the objective world, and who only realizes himself as he makes himself the agent of a divine purpose to which all things are contributing.

In the sphere of metaphysics the old problems as to the nature of reality and the limits of knowledge; in the domain of psychology, the relation of the nervous system to mental acts, and the investigation of the subconscious processes and motor effects of the psychical life; in the department of ethics, the questions as to the connection of determinism and freedom, of intellect and will; in the realm of social and political science, the inquiries as to the relation of the individual to society, and the place of man in the State; and, finally, on the religious side, the problem as to the meaning of God and His revelation to man—these are the questions which still press for an answer in the light of our past experience and progress. It may be that some great mind will come forth who will lift thought to a higher level and give to mankind a conception of life more comprehensive than any which has yet been offered. But as in the past so in the future, no philosopher can undo the results which have already been obtained, or dispense with the labours of those great thinkers whose aims and ideals it has been the object of this history to unfold.

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








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